Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio
State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections
The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose
The case involves the Ohio Democratic Party and two voters, Norman Wernet and Eric Duffy, who filed a mandamus action against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. They sought to compel LaRose to rescind Directive 2024-21, which requires individuals delivering absentee ballots for family members or disabled voters to complete an attestation at the board of elections and prohibits returning such ballots to a drop box. The directive aims to prevent "ballot harvesting" and ensure the integrity and security of absentee ballot delivery.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose that certain Ohio laws limiting who can return absentee ballots for disabled voters were preempted by the federal Voting Rights Act. Following this, LaRose issued Directive 2024-21 and later Directive 2024-24 and Advisory 2024-03, which provided additional guidance but did not substantially alter the original directive.The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the relators' claims were barred by laches due to their unreasonable delay in filing the complaint. The court noted that the directive was issued on August 31, but the complaint was not filed until September 27, a 24-day delay. This delay was deemed unreasonable, especially given the time-sensitive nature of election-related matters. The court also found that the delay caused material prejudice to the Secretary of State and county boards of elections, as absentee voting had already begun, and changing the procedures at this stage would lead to voter confusion and administrative burdens.The Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus based on laches and did not address the merits of the relators' claims. The court also denied the motion to intervene filed by the Republican National Committee and the Ohio Republican Party but accepted their brief as an amici curiae brief. View "State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose" on Justia Law
Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner
The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga County Board of Elections
The relator, Justin Tjaden, sought a writ of mandamus to have his name placed on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of Ohio House District 99. Tjaden's petition was found to be 124 valid signatures short of the required number. He argued that the boards of elections exceeded their authority by invalidating signatures as "not genuine" and violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Tjaden also contended that the statutory requirement for independent candidates to submit a petition with signatures amounting to at least one percent of registered voters who cast ballots for governor in the 2022 general election was unconstitutional.The Geauga County Board of Elections determined that Tjaden's petition contained 371 valid signatures, which was insufficient to qualify for the ballot. Tjaden attempted to challenge this decision in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas but was unsuccessful due to procedural issues. He then filed a complaint in the same court and a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court dismissed his first mandamus action based on the jurisdictional-priority rule but allowed him to file a second mandamus action after his common-pleas-court case was removed to federal court.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied Tjaden's writ of mandamus. The court held that Tjaden did not have enough valid signatures to qualify for the ballot, even if all contested signatures were deemed valid. The court also found that Tjaden's procedural due process rights were not violated, as the mandamus action provided him with the necessary process. Additionally, the court declined to address Tjaden's equal protection claim, stating that even if the statute were declared unconstitutional, there would be no statutory requirement for an independent candidate to qualify for the ballot. Thus, the court denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga County Board of Elections" on Justia Law
Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision
In this case, Dean and Dave Cook filed a complaint with the Union County Board of Revision in February 2022, seeking an increase in the property valuation of an apartment complex owned by The Residence at Cooks Pointe, L.L.C. The Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of Education filed a counter-complaint in May 2022, supporting the Cooks' claim that the property was undervalued. The Board of Revision held a hearing in August 2022 and decided not to change the property valuation due to insufficient evidence.The Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of Education appealed the Board of Revision's decision to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in September 2022. However, the BTA dismissed the appeal in December 2022, citing a recent amendment to R.C. 5717.01, effective July 21, 2022, which restricted the ability of school boards to appeal property valuation decisions unless they owned or leased the property in question. The school board then appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which reversed the BTA's decision, ruling that the amendment did not apply to cases pending before the Board of Revision when the amendment took effect.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Third District Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the amended R.C. 5717.01, which limits a political subdivision's ability to appeal a county board of revision's property valuation decision, does not apply to cases that were pending before a board of revision when the amendment took effect. The court emphasized that the language of the amended statute is written in the present tense and ties the right of appeal to the moment a complaint is filed with a board of revision. Therefore, the school board's appeal to the BTA should be considered under the former version of R.C. 5717.01. The case was remanded to the BTA for further proceedings. View "Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Board of Education
Vanessa Wells, a parent in the Lakota Local Schools district, filed a public records request seeking legal documentation related to the district's superintendent, Matt Miller, from the law firm of Elizabeth Tuck. Wells was concerned about allegations against Miller. The district's attorney, Brodi Conover, responded by providing a cease-and-desist letter but withheld other documents. Wells clarified her request to include all communications between Tuck and the school board regarding Miller from September 2022 to January 2023. Conover responded that certain communications were privileged and not subject to disclosure.Wells also requested all legal invoices from January 2022 to January 2023. Conover provided redacted invoices, omitting attorney names, hours, rates, and service descriptions, citing attorney-client privilege. In September 2023, after Wells filed a mandamus action, the district provided less-redacted invoices, retaining only the narrative descriptions and bank-account-related information.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It granted a writ of mandamus ordering the district to produce a demand letter from Tuck, rejecting the district's argument that it was protected under a federal settlement privilege. The court found that the district's reliance on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc. was misplaced. The court awarded Wells $2,000 in statutory damages for the district's failure to timely produce the demand letter and the improperly redacted invoices. The court also awarded some attorney fees and court costs to Wells but denied additional attorney fees related to the invoices, finding no evidence of bad faith by the district. View "State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Goldschmidt v. Triggs
Ronald Goldschmidt appealed the dismissal of his prohibition claim against Judge Alan Triggs and Magistrate Thomas Beridon of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Goldschmidt argued that Magistrate Beridon exceeded his authority by issuing a magistrate’s order instead of a magistrate’s decision regarding a charging order. This charging order was related to a civil action where Goldschmidt was found liable for over $1.5 million, and Elm Investment sought to collect on this judgment through Goldschmidt’s membership interests in several limited-liability companies.The First District Court of Appeals dismissed Goldschmidt’s claim, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the charging order and that any error in how it was issued was a matter of the exercise of jurisdiction, not a lack of it. The court also found that Goldschmidt had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by filing a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the First District’s judgment. The court held that the issuance of the charging order as a magistrate’s order did not exceed the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It noted that procedural errors by a magistrate do not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction and render decisions voidable, not void. The court concluded that Goldschmidt had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law through a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order and an appeal from any subsequent ruling on such a motion. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of Goldschmidt’s complaint for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Goldschmidt v. Triggs" on Justia Law
Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc.
The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law
Weidman v. Hildebrandt
Christopher Hildebrant, a real-estate developer, facilitated a property sale in 2011 and expected consulting fees from both the seller and the buyer. During the transaction, Hildebrant alleged that Thomas Weidman, a trustee on the Sycamore Township Board, demanded a kickback. To avoid paying, Hildebrant created a fictitious email account and sent himself an email portraying Weidman as demanding payments. This email was forwarded to another party but remained private until 2020, when Hildebrant showed it to other township officials during a separate transaction. Weidman learned of the email in November 2020 during an investigation and received a copy in January 2021.The Warren County Court of Common Pleas granted Hildebrant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Weidman’s defamation claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the email was first sent in 2011. The court also ruled that Weidman’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and false-light invasion of privacy were similarly time-barred as they were derivative of the defamation claim.The Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the discovery rule applied to defamation claims when the publication was secretive or inherently unknowable. The court ruled that Weidman’s claims were not time-barred because he could not have known about the defamatory email until it was disclosed to him in 2020.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision, holding that the discovery rule applies to libel claims when the publication is secretive or inherently unknowable. The court also held that the discovery rule applies to derivative claims like IIED and false-light invasion of privacy when they are based on the same allegations as the libel claim. The case was remanded to the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings. View "Weidman v. Hildebrandt" on Justia Law
Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs.
A public children-services agency determined that an allegation of child abuse against Kelly D. Kyser was substantiated. Kyser challenged this finding through the agency’s administrative-review process, but her appeal was unsuccessful. She then appealed the agency’s decision to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The court dismissed her appeal as untimely, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court noted that under R.C. 2506.01, a person may appeal a final order or decision of an agency that determines their rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships. However, the court found that an agency’s disposition finding that an allegation of child abuse is substantiated does not determine any of these things. The court explained that while certain consequences may result from such a finding, the agency’s disposition itself does not determine those consequences.The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to hear Kyser’s appeal because the agency’s disposition was not a final order under R.C. 2506.01. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Kyser v. Summit Cty. Children Servs." on Justia Law