Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Charles Green was stabbed and killed. His body was found in a parking lot in front of an abandoned building. Deepak Jasco, LLC, owned and operated a convenience store in the adjacent lot. Luretha Green Palmer, Green’s sister and the executrix of his estate, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit and asserted a claim for premises liability based on negligent security. The circuit judge denied the motion for summary judgment, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. Palmer did not allege that defendants had actual knowledge of the violent nature of Green’s attacker and offered no affidavit or evidence to establish this element. Instead, Palmer argued that Defendants were aware of an atmosphere of violence on their premises. Further, Palmer insisted that summary judgment was properly denied because there was a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute about whether Green was killed on Defendant’s premises at 1034 West Woodrow Wilson Drive and whether Deepak Jasco, LLC, exercised possession and control over the portion of the common parking lot where Green died from his injuries. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not agree with Palmer's contentions, finding she failed to establish an atmosphere of violence through police records of other instances of crime at or near the property in question, and that defendants owned or operated the property. With no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the Court found defendants were entitled to summary judgment. View "Deepak Jasco, LLC, et al. v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Former City of Clarksdale Commissioner Charles Moton alleged that his December 2013 and May 2015 arrests at Clarksdale city commissioners meetings were in violation of "a litany" of his state constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Moton’s claims because he failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Moton v. City of Clarksdale" on Justia Law

In 2019, after Roosevelt Jones paid his annual rent more than thirty days late, the North Bolivar Consolidated School District, pursuant to a late penalty provision contained in the lease between the parties, assessed Jones a late fee for $11,028.60. Jones filed suit arguing, amongst other things, that the district should be estopped from enforcing the late payment penalty provision because it had a custom of accepting late rent payments without penalty. Jones argued he relied on the custom to his detriment when making his rent payment late. In August 2021, the school district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its officials. The chancellor found that the district had failed to show the acts of its officials in accepting the late payments were not authorized. The school district sought interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment, and was granted. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the school district was a trustee of sixteenth section school lands and, consequently, bore a statutory duty to collect all funds due from the sixteenth section properties that it leased. Any past failure by it to collect such funds was unauthorized as a matter of law and could not form the basis for estoppel. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the school district. View "North Bolivar Consolidated School District v. Jones" on Justia Law

Following a vehicular accident, Martin Peteet entered into a release and settlement agreement with the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer. Peteet did not seek a waiver of subrogation or consent from his own automobile insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), prior to executing the release and settlement agreement. After the release and settlement agreement was executed, Peteet filed a complaint against Farm Bureau, seeking damages under the uninsured motorist (UM) provision in his auto policy with Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint, and the county court denied the motion. Farm Bureau sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. View "Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Peteet" on Justia Law

John and Sandra Davis, then-married, had two children in the 1980s. In 2018, John discovered the possibility that the children were not biologically his, but that they may have been the biological result of Sandra’s extramarital relations with Porter Horgan. Almost immediately after discovering this possibility, John sued Sandra and Horgan for fraud, alienation of affection, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury ultimately awarded John $700,000 in damages. Because some of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and because John completely failed to request proper jury instructions on damages, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment in favor of Sandra and Horgan on John’s claims against them. View "Davis, et al. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Andy White, an independent contractor, worked for Ergon Trucking, Inc. (Ergon), loading and hauling chemicals. Another Ergon, Inc., subsidiary, Lampton-Love, Inc., contracted with Targa Downstream, LLC to store Lampton-Love’s propane at Targa’s facility in Petal, Mississippi. Targa owned and operated the facility in Petal, which consisted of propane storage as well as equipment to load and unload the propane. Prior to operating the propane loading equipment at the Targa facility and hauling the propane, White was required to load and unload the trailer with propane during several supervised training sessions. White testified he operated the Targa loading equipment exactly as he had done on all previous occasions but that when he was returning the Targa hose to its resting tray, the valve on the Targa hose opened, and liquified propane began spilling out of the hose. White testified that he tackled the hose, grabbed the detachable handle, placed it back on the Targa hose valve and, eventually, closed the valve, stopping the flow of propane. Following the incident, White stated he left the Targa facility with no feeling or indication that he had been injured by coming in contact with the liquified propane. White went to the Ergon yard, removed his “propane soaked clothes,” took a shower and put on fresh clothes. White then proceeded to his trailer to complete the propane delivery. White did not seek medical attention until the following day, January 15, 2017. By the time White did seek medical treatment, he stated that blisters had formed on his legs and that he was in excruciating pain. This case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review an issue of the scope of the intimately connected doctrine, which immunizes a premises owner against claims of an independent contractor for injuries that arise out of or are intimately connected with the work that the independent contractor was hired to perform. The circuit court granted Targa's second summary judgment motion based on this doctrine. The circuit court initially denied Targa’s first motion, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Targa modified its equipment in a manner that constituted a dangerous condition and whether White knew or should have known of the alleged dangerous condition. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Targa and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "White v. Targa Downstream, LLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Vincent Kelly was injured in a forklift accident at his workplace on August 14, 2019. His left foot was crushed. Kelly was taken to Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and then was transferred to UMMC. Kelly was then evaluated and treated by an orthopedic surgeon. Upon return to UMMC, he complained of uncontrolled pain and discoloration of his third and fourth toes, which he said had turned black the previous day. UMMC orthopedic surgeon Patrick Bergin, M.D., took over Kelly’s care. The next day, Dr. Bergin performed a surgical evaluation of Kelly’s left foot and toes. Dr. Bergin determined that Kelly’s third and fourth toes were dysvascular and in need of amputation. Dr. Bergin then proceeded to amputate the two toes and obtained wound cultures, which confirmed infection. After the procedure, Dr. Bergin continued to provide care to Kelly for his wounds and infection. Kelly filed this lawsuit and a claim for medical malpractice, alleging UMMC’s physicians failed to properly treat the injury during his first visit and surgery. UMMC argued upon denial of summary judgment that Kelly’s expert witness lacked qualifications, rendering him unable to prove the required elements of medical malpractice. To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and reversed the denial of summary judgment. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Attorney Ali Muhammad Shamsiddeen appealed a trial court’s Order of Contempt and Order Denying Motion for Recusal. Michael Sorrell was convicted of one count of first degree murder and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed Sorrell’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. After numerous continuances, Sorrell’s new trial was scheduled for April 5, 2021. On the morning of trial, Sorrell’s then-counsel, Kevin Camp, failed to appear. Camp was terminated as defense counsel. On April 13, Shamsiddeen entered an appearance as counsel for Sorrell. By agreement of all parties, the trial was rescheduled for September 27. The trial court advised that no further continuances would be granted and that the case would proceed to trial on the 27th. On August 18, Shamsiddeen moved ore tenus for a continuance, which was denied. On August 31, Shamsiddeen filed a motion to continue trial. At the pretrial motion hearing on September 1, Shamsiddeen reasserted his motion to continue. The trial court denied the motion. On September 21, Shamsiddeen contacted the court administrator and advised that he had the coronavirus and would not be able to appear at the pretrial conference scheduled for September 22. Shamsiddeen was instructed to provide to the trial court documentation “from a healthcare provider that counsel [wa]s infected with the coronavirus and that he [wa]s symptomatic not asymptomatic.” On the morning of September 22, Shamsiddeen did not appear in person or virtually at the pretrial conference. Later that morning, Shamsiddeen emailed the court administrator a statement from a medical provider dated September 21. The statement not include a diagnosis or confirm any medical condition, only that the nature of the illness or injury was “medical” and that Shamsiddeen would “be able to return to work/school on 10-11-21.” On the day before trial, Shamsiddeen sent an email to the trial court noting that he was quarantining; he did not appear in court for trial. Before the jury panels were released, Shamsiddeen had someone from the City of Jackson’s legal department hand deliver a medical statement, dated September 27, identical to the September 21 medical statement with the exception of the word “quarantine” added to the nature of the illness or injury. The trial court thereafter entered the orders of contempt at issue here. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error in the orders and affirmed them. View "In Re: Ali M. Shamsiddeen" on Justia Law

Almost two decades prior to this decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court handed down Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So. 2d 714 (Miss. 2004). In that opinion, the Court held that Farmland Mutual Insurance Co., the liability insurer for Mitchell Scruggs, Eddie Scruggs, Scruggs Farms & Supplies LLC, and Scruggs Farm Joint Venture (collectively, Scruggs), had no duty to defend Scruggs in a federal lawsuit by Monsanto Company. The reason no coverage applied was because Monsanto had alleged that Scruggs committed the intentional act of conversion by saving and using unlicensed seeds. Eight years later, a district court judge overturned a jury’s verdict that Scruggs had willfully violated Monsanto’s patents. Consequently, Scruggs was not liable for treble damages and attorney’s fees. Scruggs returned to state court in 2013. Citing Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Scruggs asked the Lee County Circuit Court to reopen and vacate the final judgment entered in 2004 in favor of Farmland on the coverage issue. Scruggs asserted the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion had been erroneously decided based on facts that came to light in the federal case. The state court rejected the motion as untimely under Rule 60(b). Scruggs appealed. While Scruggs asserted the motion was timely, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the motion’s timing is irrelevant: Rule 60(b) was not a procedural vehicle for a trial court to overturn a mandate issued from the Mississippi Supreme Court. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant Scruggs’s request, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion. View "Scruggs, et al. v. Farmland Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law