Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ann Doe was treated at Rankin Medical Center after she was sexually assaulted. Doe claimed that when she returned to school, fellow students teased her about the sexual assault. According to Doe, unidentified classmates said they had heard about the incident from a classmate, who was the daughter of Gina McBeth, a nurse who worked in the emergency room at Rankin Medical. Doe sued McBeth and Rankin Medical, alleging breach of confidentiality and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment in McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s favor. Doe appealed, arguing that circumstantial evidence and McBeth’s credibility created a genuine issue of material fact. She also argued first on appeal that the trial-court judge should have recused himself, since he was the prosecutor in the underlying rape case. Because Doe did not present any admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact under any actionable theory of recovery and failed to file a motion for recusal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Doe v. Rankin Medical Center" on Justia Law

While attending Auburn University on a full football scholarship, Austin Ramsey permanently injured his back in the university’s weight room in Auburn, Alabama. Ramsey filed suit in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi, against Auburn University and Kevin Yoxall, Auburn’s head strength and conditioning coach. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that venue was improper in Mississippi. The circuit court found that there were no facts creating venue in Madison County and dismissed Ramsey’s complaint without prejudice. Finding no error in that judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ramsey v. Auburn University" on Justia Law

A collection company, acting on behalf of a hospital, sued John Brown. The lawsuit stemmed from Brown’s nonpayment for medical services. Though Brown initially answered, claiming entitlement to a set-off, he later tried to amend his answer to add a recoupment defense aimed at whittling down his amount owed. The county court judge denied the amendment, but certified the judgment as final and appealable under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). But instead of seeking the intended review by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Brown chose to file his appeal with the circuit court, which affirmed the county court judgment and also entered a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found several "jurisdictional snags" with Brown’s case: (1) the county court’s judgment did not decide a “claim” between two parties, thereby making its Rule 54(b) certification invalid; (2) recoupment was a defense under Mississippi law inappropriate for final-judgment entries under Rule 54(b); and (3) appeals from interlocutory judgments of a county court must be filed with the Supreme Court, not the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court lacked a final, appealable judgment and an improper interlocutory appeal, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Brown v. Collections, Inc." on Justia Law

Perreice Collins filed a wrongful death action on behalf of her minor daughter, Shoniqwa, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Shoniqwa’s stillborn daughter, Shataja. Finding that Collins had not shown good cause for her failure to effect service of process upon Dr. Toikus Westbrook, the Circuit Court granted Westbrook’s motion to dismiss. Collins appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Collins petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court held that Collins offered uncontradicted proof of “good cause” in explanation of her failure to serve process upon Dr. Toikus Westbrook within 120 days of having filed a civil complaint as required by Rule 4(h) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Collins established “excusable neglect,” as contemplated by Rule 6(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, entitling her to an extension of time in which to serve process upon Westbrook. The judgments of the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals were reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Collins v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

In 2004, Quality Diesel Service, Inc. obtained a judgment against Gulf South Drilling Company, LLC. Then, after learning that Tiger Drilling Company, LLC was indebted to Gulf South, Quality Diesel had multiple writs of garnishment issued and served on Tiger Drilling from 2004 to 2006. All of Tiger Drilling’s answers to the writs were almost identical, stating that Tiger Drilling was indebted to Gulf South but that the debt was not yet due. On November 29, 2006, Quality Diesel contested Tiger Drilling’s responses by filing a Petition to Controvert Answers to Garnishments, specifically contesting Tiger Drilling’s answer to a writ issued on January 18, 2006. On March 14, 2014, Tiger Drilling filed a motion to dismiss the garnishment proceeding. On October 3, 2014, the Circuit Court granted dismissal on the ground that the underlying judgment had expired while the case was pending. On appeal, Quality Diesel contended that, because the underlying judgment was valid when the writs of garnishment were issued and served (and when it filed its Petition to Controvert) it could maintain a garnishment proceeding against Tiger Drilling, despite the fact that the underlying judgment has since lapsed. This case presented an issue of first impression concerning Mississippi’s garnishment law: when a party gets a judgment, timely executes a writ of garnishment, and timely initiates a garnishment proceeding, is that party required to renew the underlying judgment to collect the “property in the hands of the garnishee belonging to the defendant” at the time the garnishment proceeding was filed, to defeat the running of the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court held that a party was not required to renew the underlying judgment to collect such property under these circumstances. In this case, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Quality Diesel Service, Inc. v. Tiger Drilling Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Devin Jones worked for T&L Specialty Company as a product technician from 2012 to 2013. On February 4, 2013, Jones timely reported to work at 7:00 p.m. and performed his assigned duties until his first break at 9:00 p.m. While on his break, Jones learned that his fiancé was having complications related to her pregnancy, so he left work early. He did not notify his supervisor, Mitch Monts, that he was leaving, but he did ask his coworker, Demetrius Tatum, to tell Monts that he was leaving and why. Tatum, however, failed to relay this message, and so Monts did not learn of the emergency. Pursuant to a policy in T&L’s employee handbook, Monts concluded that by leaving work early without informing him within eight hours, Jones had “voluntarily quit” his job. He immediately hired a replacement for Jones. Unaware that Monts deemed him to have quit voluntarily, Jones returned to work the following day. Jones pleaded with Monts, and then with Karen Hodum from T&L’s Human Resources department, insisting that he had not intended to quit his job and maintaining that he believed that, by leaving work early, he would only receive a half-point on his record. Jones’s pleas with T&L representatives proved unsuccessful and so he filed a claim for unemployment benefits. After determining that Jones voluntarily quit his job without good cause, the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) denied his application for unemployment benefits. Because the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied solely on an inapplicable provision from the employee handbook in concluding that Jones had voluntarily quit his job, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission" on Justia Law

After all defendants to the original complaint filed responsive pleadings in Mary Meeks’s medical malpractice suit, Meeks obtained leave of court and filed a first amended complaint, adding as a defendant the manufacturer of a medical device, Hologic, Inc. A doctor performed an outpatient diagnostic hysteroscopy and an endometrial ablation on Meeks at the Northwest Regional Medical Center in Clarksdale using a Novasure medical device manufactured and sold by Hologic to treat Meeks’s menorrhagia. Meeks did not serve the first amended complaint on Hologic but instead filed a second amended complaint without leave of court or permission from all defendants. Hologic filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Meeks’s claims against Hologic were federally preempted and that Meeks’s claims additionally were barred by the statute of limitations. Because Meeks failed to obtain leave of court or permission from the defendants to file the second complaint, and because the first was never served on Hologic, the Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had expired against Hologic and that the trial court properly granted Hologic’s motion to dismiss. View "Mary Meeks v. Hologic, Inc." on Justia Law

On March 24, 2006, the Circuit Court granted Dr. Charles Brock and Dr. Steven Clark summary judgment based on the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). In 2010, Bolivar Medical Center (“BMC”), the final remaining defendant, was dismissed with prejudice. Improperly relying on an order certifying the March 24, 2006, order as final, which was later corrected by two separate orders by the trial court, Ginger Pope, administrarix of the Estate of Nancy Springer, requested an additional fourteen days in which to file her appeal. The trial court granted Pope additional time, and she filed her notice of appeal on October 9, 2013. The doctors appealed, and after review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court erroneously granted Pope additional time to file her appeal. The Court dismissed Pope’s appeal as out of time. View "Pope v. Brock" on Justia Law

Alan and Linda Anderson filed a medical malpractice action against Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital but failed to designate an expert timely in accordance with the scheduling order imposed by the Circuit Court. The Andersons filed their expert designation out of time, along with a motion for continuance. The hospital moved to strike the expert designation and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted a continuance to the Andersons and denied both the hospital’s motion to strike and its motion for summary judgment. The hospital filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge the denial of its motion for summary judgment. But after review, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court. View "Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law