Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

During the construction of Jeff Anderson Regional Medical Center’s (“ARMC”) expansion, scaffolding built by W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Company collapsed, injuring plaintiffs David McKean, Francesco Medina, Donald Arrington, and Wayne Robertson. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against all defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the trial court. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court, it nevertheless granted certiorari to clarify two issues: (1) whether the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the seven-factor test used in "Hanna v. Huer, Johns Neel, Rivers, & Webb," (662 P.2d 243 (Kan. 1983) superceded by statute, as recognized in "Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc.," (166 P.3d 1047 (Kan. 2007)), to determine whether an architect’s supervisory powers go beyond the provisions of the contract; and (2) to clarify the Court’s position on the effect of an “undocumented immigrant” status on recovery for workplace injuries. View "McKean v. Yates Engineering Corp." on Justia Law

S.C. Anderson Group International, Inc. (“AGI”) filed two motions–one for leave to amend its complaint and one to transfer to the Circuit Court of Madison County. The County Court of Madison County granted AGI’s motion to transfer based on AGI’s averments and argument that it was seeking more in damages than it originally pleaded, specifically an increase in attorney’s fees. If the amendment were allowed, the ad damnum clause would have exceeded the $200,000 jurisdictional limit of the county court. Based on the facts and record presented in today’s case, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the county court attached at the time the original complaint was filed. The Court reversed the transferred order. The case was remanded back to the circuit court with instructions to transfer AGI’s claims against Ram-Kabir of America, LLC, back to the county court. View "Ram-Kabir of America, LLC v. S.C. Anderson Group International" on Justia Law

Mark Roberts filed various claims against multiple defendants, all of which were dismissed on summary judgment. Roberts began working for Warrior Energy Services Corporation in February 2012. He was an at-will, full-time salesman for the company. But in late March 2013, Warrior let him go. According to Roberts, his termination was the result of a conspiracy by Warrior; Bill Jenkins, a Warrior officer; Jason Smith, Jenkins’s close friend; and Boots Smith Oilfield Services, LLC. Roberts believed these four conspired to retaliate against Roberts for doing two things: (1) reporting illegal activity; and (2) buying the assets of a pipeline company to compete with Boots Smith. When the defendants filed their motions for summary judgment, discovery was not yet complete. Roberts had been deposed. But the depositions of the defendants, as well as a key factual witness, were still pending. So Roberts responded to the summary judgment motions with a motion to defer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Because completing discovery is often preferable and sometimes necessary to rule on a summary-judgment motion, Rule 56(f) permits a trial court to continue its ruling until discovery is complete. Roberts asserted in his Rule 56(f) motion that, to oppose the motions for summary judgment, he needed specific information in the defendants’ possession, namely, the defendants’ sworn deposition testimony about their involvement in terminating Roberts’s employment. And because those depositions had already been scheduled to take place, the Supreme Court found the trial court’s denial of Roberts’ Rule 56(f) motions was an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgments in favor of the defendants as prematurely granted. View "Roberts v. Boots Smith Oilfield Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Walter Griffith, Jr., a licensed master electrician, was critically injured while attempting to attach a ten-foot piece of metal conduit to an electrical pole owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. (“Entergy”). Griffith later filed a complaint against Entergy, alleging grossly negligent and willful conduct and requesting compensatory and punitive damages. The trial judge ultimately granted Entergy’s motion for summary judgment, and Griffith appealed to the Supreme Court, raising three alleged errors by the trial court in its grant of summary judgment to Entergy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Griffith v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc." on Justia Law

Henry Kinney filed several record requests under the Public Records Act regarding Leonard Bentz II's selection as Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District’s (District) executive director; however, some of Kinney’s requests were never fulfilled. As a result, Kinney filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the District be declared a public agency subject to the Mississippi Public Records Act, Mississippi Public Procurement laws, Open Meetings laws, Mississippi law regarding salaries/compensation of public officials, Mississippi Ethics in Government laws, Mississippi auditing requirements, Mississippi laws regarding removal of officers from public office, and other general provisions applicable to public office. Kinney also sought the selection of Bentz to be deemed invalid because it did not comply with Mississippi’s laws governing public agencies. As a result of Kinney’s suit, the District, joined by the Mississippi Association of Planning and Development District, Inc. (MAPDD), who intervened in the suit, filed motions for summary judgment. The chancery court granted the motions for summary judgment. Kinney appealed the chancery court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the case. View "Kinney v. So. Mississippi Planning & Development District, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Jackson was unable to serve notice to Willie Jordan by certified mail that his property was subject to condemnation and demolition. The City tried notice by publication, and set a hearing for twelve days after the first publication date. The applicable statute required two weeks’ notice. Jordan did not appear at the condemnation hearing. The property was declared condemned, and the house on the property was ordered demolished. After the house was demolished, Jordan filed a notice of tort claim with the city. When he filed his complaint, he alternatively asserted a constitutional claim for deprivation of property without due process. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Jordan $12,513.53. The city appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Jackson v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Scott Buras and Carlos Rodriguez founded Lagniappe Logistics in 2004. Since then, Buras and Rodriguez’s business relationship deteriorated to the point that Buras left the company in June 2013. In early 2014, Buras filed suit claiming that Rodriguez had been unjustly enriched through Lagniappe’s operation. Buras’s complaint requested that the chancellor declare Buras a fifty-percent owner of Lagniappe, order an accounting, judicially dissolve the company, and appoint a receiver or custodian to wind up its affairs. Rodriguez and Lagniappe moved to dismiss Buras’s complaint based on Mississippi’s catch-all, three-year statute of limitations. According to the defendants, Buras’s claims (which depended on Buras’s status as an owner) were time-barred because Buras failed to file a legal action to rescind or cancel a 2006 agreement transferring his ownership interest to Rodriguez within three years of the agreement’s execution. "Occasionally, the question of whether the statute of limitations has run turns on the resolution of a fact question. In such cases, a statute-of-limitations defense cannot be resolved on a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." The chancellor found it inappropriate to dismiss the case at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage due to an existing fact question and denied the motion. Finding no reversible error with that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lagniappe Logistics, Inc. v. Buras" on Justia Law

Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc., received a favorable arbitration award in Missouri against the Claiborne County Hospital. Linde reduced the award to a Missouri judgment, then enrolled the foreign judgment in two Mississippi counties. The Hospital successfully moved to set aside the foreign judgment in both Mississippi counties, since it never contracted with Linde and, thus, was not bound by the contract’s arbitration agreement. On appeal, Linde argued the Hospital’s motions to set aside the foreign judgment were filed too late and were time-barred by the Federal Arbitration Act’s procedural rules. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the FAA could not bind an entity that neither agreed to arbitrate nor contracted with the arbitration claimant. Therefore the Court affirmed the two Mississippi judgments setting aside the enrollment of the foreign judgment. View "Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc. v. Claiborne County Hospital" on Justia Law

Gay St. Mary Williams and her husband, Larry Williams, filed a complaint against William Tucker and two insurance companies. The Williamses alleged that Mrs. Williams had been severely injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by Tucker. When Tucker failed to answer, the circuit clerk entered a default. The trial court denied Tucker’s motion to set aside the entry of default and his motion for reconsideration. After a hearing, the trial court awarded damages in the amount of $2,962,984.60, plus $300,000 to Larry Williams for loss of consortium, and entered a default judgment in favor of the Williamses. Tucker appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to set aside the entry of default was an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, he challenged portions of the damages award. The Supreme Court found that under a liberal standard applicable to setting aside default judgments, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the entry of default in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Williams" on Justia Law

The property of Riverboat Corporation, an ad valorem taxpayer, was subject to assessment by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (“the Board”) because Riverboat owned certain personal and real property in Harrison County. The Mississippi Supreme Court was asked "to abandon the common law of this state, pronouncements of this Court, and customs and practices of trial courts across this state, all dating back to the nineteenth century, under the guise that today’s issue has not yet been squarely before" it and to "overrule a learned trial judge who, [. . .] determined a jury trial should be had in an appeal of a county’s ad valorem tax assessment." When Riverboat appealed its tax assessment, the Board requested a jury trial. Riverboat then moved for a bench trial, averring that there was no right to a jury trial in tax appeals. The trial court denied Riverboat's motion. The Supreme Court declined to rule against Mississippi precedent, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Riverboat's motion. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law