Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Cynthia Kuljis appealed the chancery court’s dismissal of her Bill of Discovery for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Bill sought discovery related to a prospective premises liability and personal-injury claim. Finding the actions of the chancery court were correct as a matter of law, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the chancery court’s dismissal of this case. View "Kuljis v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC" on Justia Law

Herman Grant Company (“Herman Grant”) filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine if the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Jasper County abused its discretion by denying its motion to transfer venue to the Second Judicial District of Jones County. The Court found venue was proper in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. Because the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman Grant Co., Inc. v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review centered on the interplay between the wrongful-death statute and the minors savings clause. In 1999, the Court held “[t]here is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action” brought under Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code. Three years later, the Court found reason not to apply the minors savings clause to the wrongful-death action filed in “Curry v. Turner,” (832 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 2002)). Instead, the Court found the two statutes to be “at irreconcilable odds with one another where there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.” In the present wrongful-death lawsuit, the defendants relied on “Curry” to claim the action was time-barred. They argued the minor savings clause did not apply because the minor beneficiaries had a maternal aunt who “qualified under the statute to bring suit.” Notwithstanding that, the Supreme Court found a material distinction between “Curry” and this case: in “Curry,” not only was the minor beneficiaries’ mother qualified to bring suit, but she also in fact filed a wrongful-death action. Thus, under Section 11-7-13’s “one-suit” requirement, the Supreme Court found the minor beneficiaries could not rely on the application of the minor savings clause to file what essentially would be a second wrongful-death action. But here, by contrast, the minor beneficiaries’ aunt never filed a wrongful-death action, though Section 11-7-13 authorized her to do so as the deceased’s sister. Instead, the first and only suit filed was by the deceased’s children. In this case, the Court held that only when someone who is qualified to bring a wrongful-death suit actually files a wrongful-death suit on the minor beneficiaries’ behalf will the minor savings clause not apply, because, once the suit is filed, the running of the statute of limitations is immaterial. The minor savings statute clearly applied in this case; the deceased’s oldest child had two years from when she reached the age of majority to file a wrongful-death suit based on medical negligence. Because she timely filed within this two-year period, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Pioneer Community Hospital of Newton v. Roberts" on Justia Law

After Enrique Myles’s death, his mother, Vivian Myles. filed this wrongful-death suit. Later, the parties became aware Enrique was survived by a minor child, LJW. Rather than dismissing the case for lack of standing, as requested by the defendant, the circuit judge allowed LJW to be substituted as the plaintiff. This interlocutory appeal of that decision followed, raising two related questions: (1) when a decedent is survived by his child, does the decedent’s mother have standing to file a wrongful-death action; and (2) if not, must the circuit judge dismiss the complaint, or may the circuit judge remedy the lack of standing by substituting the child as plaintiff? The Supreme Court found that Mississippi’s wrongful-death statute specifically granted the decedent’s mother standing to file the wrongful-death suit, even where a surviving child exists. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "TRK, LLC v. Myles" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Secretary of State found that David Watkins and Watkins Development, LLC, committed four securities-fraud violations in connection with revenue bonds sold to finance a renovation project at the Metrocenter mall in Jackson. Watkins appealed and the chancery court vacated one count but affirmed the other three. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Secretary on all four counts. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals in part because the Secretary failed to cross-appeal the chancellor’s decision to vacate Count I. That said, the Court affirmed the Secretary’s findings on the other three counts. View "Watkins Development, LLC v. Hosemann" on Justia Law

In 1989, Marcus Moore slipped and fell in a grocery store owned by the defendant, Roberts Company, Inc. (“RCI”). Moore was three years old at the time, and he allegedly struck his head when he fell. After he reached the age of majority, Moore filed suit against RCI, claiming that RCI was negligent in allowing the floor to be slick. Moore also alleged that the fall had caused “marked and significant traumatic and permanent injuries to his brain,” leaving him with “permanent and profound deficits” in several areas. The jury returned a verdict in the defendant’s favor, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with that verdict. Moore filed a post-trial motion arguing, among other things, that one of the jurors was a convicted felon and therefore, statutorily disqualified. The trial judge agreed and granted Moore a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for an interlocutory appeal, and reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial. View "Roberts Company, Inc. v. Moore" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue stemming from an interlocutory appeal of the registration of an Ohio-issued divorce decree and the subsequent petition for modification by the obligee, a Mississippi resident. Asserting the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio court in matters involving the modification and alteration of the decree, the obligor-father appealed the chancery court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the obligee-mother’s complaint for modification of the decree. Reviewing the procedural history and the facts of the case, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that: (1) neither the Ohio court nor the parties consented in writing to the transfer of jurisdiction; and (2) because evidence indicated that the Ohio court never relinquished jurisdiction, that court was the proper forum for proceedings on modification. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s ruling and entered judgment in favor of the father, dismissing the mother’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hamilton v. Young" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal of the Lincoln County Circuit court’s Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the plaintiff’s overarching claim was framed in negligence, it factually sounded in intentional tort and was subsequently barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s Order Denying Summary Judgement and rendered a verdict in favor of the Defendant. View "Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC; Graceland Management Company, Inc.; Lafayette LTC, Inc.; and Yalobusha General Hospital and Nursing Home (collectively, Graceland) in a case brought by Shirley Adams for injuries her mother allegedly sustained while in the defendants’ care. As the basis for granting summary judgment, the circuit court determined that Adams was judicially estopped from bringing her suit because Adams had failed to disclose the suit in her prior bankruptcy proceedings. Adams appealed, and the Court of Appeals, in a plurality opinion, reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to proceed with a trial on the merits. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and held that the Court of Appeals misapplied the applicable standard of review and the law of judicial estoppel in the instant case. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Adams v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLC" on Justia Law

HansaWorld USA, Inc. (HansaWorld) registered a foreign judgment with a Mississippi circuit court against Kimberlee Davenport from an award ordered by a court in Florida on claims of conversion and extortion. Davenport, a former employee of HansaWorld, also maintained claims against HansaWorld in a separate action before a federal district court in Mississippi alleging several violations of state and federal law, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment and discrimination. HansaWorld sought to collect on its foreign judgment by petitioning the circuit court to sell Davenport’s Employment Action, so the circuit court entered a Writ of Execution. With the Employment Action set to be auctioned off by the Forrest County sheriff, Davenport filed an Emergency Motion to Quash Writ of Execution mere days before the scheduled sale. At a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted Davenport’s motion to quash on the condition that she post a $100,000 bond by that afternoon, the day of the scheduled sheriff’s sale. Davenport failed to post the conditional bond, and as a result, the sheriff sold her Employment Action to the highest bidder, HansaWorld, for $1,000. Following sale of her Employment Action, Davenport appealed to the Supreme Court. Having determined that the circuit court’s order was a final, appealable judgment and that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that Davenport waived her right to challenge the circuit court’s imposition of the bond on appeal because she failed to challenge the bond before the circuit court. View "Davenport v. Hansaworld, USA, Inc." on Justia Law