Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ralph Smith sued the Attorney General of Mississippi, Jim Hood, raising various causes of action, each of which was premised on Smith’s purely legal argument that the Office of the Attorney General was in the judicial branch of the state government. The circuit court disagreed with Smith and found that, as a matter of law, the Office of Attorney General was in the executive branch, and so, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hood. Smith appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Office of Attorney General was a member of the executive branch of government, as delineated in the Mississippi Constitution, Article 6. View "Smith v. Hood" on Justia Law

In 1996, the City of Gulfport filed an eminent domain complaint against Dedeaux Utility Company. Gulfport did not take physical control of the utility until December 20, 2004, after a jury awarded Dedeaux $3,634,757. Dedeaux appealed that verdict and Gulfport cross-appealed. In the first in a series of cases between these parties, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the second jury awarded Dedeaux $5,131,676 for the taking. Dedeaux again appealed, and Gulfport again cross-appealed. The Supreme Court again reversed and remanded in “Dedeaux II,” and the case was tried a third time, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Dedeaux totaling $8,063,981. The jury found that the fair market value of Dedeaux as of December 3, 1996, when the complaint was filed, was $7,082,778. It found that the fair market value of tangible assets added to Dedeaux from December 3, 1996, to December 20, 2004, when Gulfport took physical control, was $981,203. Based on payments already made by Gulfport to Dedeaux, the trial court found that Gulfport owed Dedeaux $1,951,102 plus interest on the amount of $7,082,778, and that it owed Dedeaux $728,117 plus interest on the amount of $981,203. Gulfport appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on all issues except interest: the trial court had determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-1 applied and mandated that it award eight-percent interest. The Supreme Court determined that Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7 applied, which charged the trial court to set an interest rate. The Court then remanded “for the limited purpose of determining a reasonable rate of interest and issuing an order for payment of that interest.” In the fourth appeal, the only issue was whether the interest rate on the judgment was appropriate. Because the trial court failed to follow the Mississippi Supreme Court’s mandate to set an interest rate, it reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the evidence presented. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming a circuit court’s denial of Illinois Central Railroad’s request for a setoff of a jury verdict awarded to Bennie Oakes through his representative Clara Hagan. As described by Illinois Central, who as appellant framed the issues for appeal, “This case is about whether, once those damages are assessed by a jury, a railroad company under the [Federal Employers’ Liability Act] is entitled to a credit or reduction of that verdict for sums that have already been paid by others to the Plaintiff for the same injuries and damages.” In Illinois Central’s answer, it raised an affirmative defense that it was entitled to apportionment or set off liability and/or damages for any negligence of or damages caused by third parties. However, Illinois Central later clarified its position that it was not attempting to have negligence apportioned, and the circuit court echoed the clarification by stating that Illinois Central had not “tried to use a third, an empty chair for any other defendants.” The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the primary case it relied upon and ignored other federal precedent; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the circuit court’s denial of Illinois Central’s motion for a setoff. View "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Oakes" on Justia Law

Turtle Creek Crossing, LLC, a minority interest holder in Kimco Hattiesburg, L.P., filed an action in circuit court after it learned it would receive no distribution from the sale of the partnership’s only asset, a multimillion-dollar shopping center. In its complaint, Turtle Creek alleged its fellow partners breached their fiduciary duties and conspired with each other, the partnership, and a sister partnership to market and sell the asset in such a way as to keep Turtle Creek from profiting. According to the defendants, the predominant claim was for an accounting - an equitable claim that belonges in chancery court; had this case been filed in chancery court, there would be a strong argument for the chancery court’s original jurisdiction over the accounting claim, as well as pendant jurisdiction over the legal claims. Turtle Creek did not file this action in chancery court. It filed it in circuit court. And the circuit court also had original jurisdiction, not only over the accounting claim, but also Turtle Creek’s other legal claims. Because Turtle Creek chose a forum with proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that choice must be respected. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to transfer and remanded for further proceedings. View "KD Hattiesburg 1128, Inc. v. Turtle Creek Crossing, LLC" on Justia Law

Benardrick McKinney and Kasey Hamp’s son, K.M., was born out of wedlock while McKinney attended and played football for Mississippi State University. Hamp sought assistance to pay for K.M.’s support and expenses. The Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved in her child-support request; DHS filed a complaint in Tunica County against McKinney to determine paternity and child support. A paternity test showed a 99.99% probability that McKinney was K.M.’s father. Based on that test, DHS returned to chancery court, and the chancellor entered a temporary order awarding Hamp $150 per month in child support. McKinney voluntarily increased his support obligation to $750 per month. In his junior year, McKinney was selected in the National Football League (NFL) draft, and signed a contract to play professional football for the Houston Texans. Hamp, individually, filed a complaint for child support, pointing out that McKinney’s income had increased substantially since DHS had filed its complaint. McKinney had signed a four-year, several-million-dollar NFL contract, which included a substantial signing bonus. McKinney answered the complaint and raised a counterclaim seeking custody of K.M. In his answer, McKinney argued that because DHS had already obtained a child-support award in another suit, Hamp failed to both state a claim and join a necessary party—DHS. Hamp petitioned to amend her complaint to name DHS as a party, but the chancellor denied her request. In consolidated appeals, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancellor properly included McKinney’s signing bonus as part of his gross income when crafting a child-support award. The Court also held that a chancellor’s order for prospective monthly child-support payments could not be stayed by a clerk-approved supersedeas bond under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a). But until opinion, the Supreme Court had not addressed Rule 8(a)’s effect on prospective child support payments, so it was reasonable for the father to have relied on his attorney’s advice that the award was stayed. Thus, he should not have been held in contempt for nonpayment of the increased support award. View "McKinney v. Hamp" on Justia Law

Benardrick McKinney and Kasey Hamp’s son, K.M., was born out of wedlock while McKinney attended and played football for Mississippi State University. Hamp sought assistance to pay for K.M.’s support and expenses. The Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved in her child-support request; DHS filed a complaint in Tunica County against McKinney to determine paternity and child support. A paternity test showed a 99.99% probability that McKinney was K.M.’s father. Based on that test, DHS returned to chancery court, and the chancellor entered a temporary order awarding Hamp $150 per month in child support. McKinney voluntarily increased his support obligation to $750 per month. In his junior year, McKinney was selected in the National Football League (NFL) draft, and signed a contract to play professional football for the Houston Texans. Hamp, individually, filed a complaint for child support, pointing out that McKinney’s income had increased substantially since DHS had filed its complaint. McKinney had signed a four-year, several-million-dollar NFL contract, which included a substantial signing bonus. McKinney answered the complaint and raised a counterclaim seeking custody of K.M. In his answer, McKinney argued that because DHS had already obtained a child-support award in another suit, Hamp failed to both state a claim and join a necessary party—DHS. Hamp petitioned to amend her complaint to name DHS as a party, but the chancellor denied her request. In consolidated appeals, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancellor properly included McKinney’s signing bonus as part of his gross income when crafting a child-support award. The Court also held that a chancellor’s order for prospective monthly child-support payments could not be stayed by a clerk-approved supersedeas bond under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a). But until opinion, the Supreme Court had not addressed Rule 8(a)’s effect on prospective child support payments, so it was reasonable for the father to have relied on his attorney’s advice that the award was stayed. Thus, he should not have been held in contempt for nonpayment of the increased support award. View "McKinney v. Hamp" on Justia Law

The Jackson City Council passed an ordinance rezoning an approximately 0.3 acre parcel of property in the City limits. Ben Allen, individually and in his capacity as President of Downtown Jackson Partners, Inc., filed a bill of exceptions seeking reversal of the City Council’s decision to rezone the property. The circuit court reversed the Jackson City Council’s decision. The City appealed, challenging: (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to overrule the City Council’s decision because no signed bill of exceptions had been filed as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the case for Allen’s lack of standing; and (2) whether the owner and lessor of the property were necessary parties to the appeal on the basis of basic due process requirements. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the City refused to comply with its ministerial duty to sign the bill of exceptions under Section 11-51-75. Despite the lack of a signature, the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction. The circuit court took judicial notice of the City Council minutes and video of the City Council meeting. The record presented by the bill of exceptions and materials judicially noticed were sufficient for the circuit court’s review. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order reversing the City Council’s decision because of a lack of a majority vote of a quorum under Section 21-8-11. The circuit court’s order finding Allen had standing to file a bill of exceptions in his capacity as President of Downtown Jackson Partners was also affirmed. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that the property owner and lessor were not necessary and indispensable parties to the appeal. The City’s due process argument was not preserved in the circuit court, and even if it had been preserved, the City’s argument was without merit because it had no standing to assert the due process rights of the property owner and lessor. View "City of Jackson v. Allen" on Justia Law

Jackson HMA moved for summary judgment on Evelyn Harris’s medical negligence claims, arguing that Harris failed to present expert medical testimony in support thereof. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. Because Harris failed to present sworn expert medical testimony to support her claims, no genuine issue of material fact exists. This Court reverses the trial court’s judgment and renders judgment in favor of Jackson HMA. View "Jackson HMA, LLC v. Harris" on Justia Law

Thomas Harris sought a reduction in the alimony award he paid to Susan Harris, due to the Social Security benefits she was receiving that were based on his income. After review of the applicable law in Mississippi and in other states, the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled Spalding v. Spalding, 691 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1997), to the extent that it held an alimony reduction to be automatic for Social Security benefits derived from the alimony-paying spouse’s income. Further, the Court fully reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for the trial court to perform an analysis under Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993). View "Harris v. Harris" on Justia Law

The husband in this case divorced his wife and entered into a property-settlement agreement that strongly favored his wife and child. The chancellor approved and adopted the agreement and incorporated it as part of the final divorce judgment. After abiding by the judgment’s terms for two years, the husband moved the court to set it aside or modify it. As grounds, he alleged duress and his wife’s supposed coercive misconduct in their negotiating of what he deemed an unconscionable settlement. The chancellor denied the husband’s request, finding he simply had waited too long to challenge the judgment. Finding no error in the chancellor’s decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Doe" on Justia Law