Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

From November 2004 to January 2011, The Door Shop, Inc., used $36,081.86 of electricity from Alcorn County Electric Power Association (ACE). But because of a billing error, it was charged only $10,396.28. Upon discovering the error, ACE sought to recover the $25,658.58 difference via supplemental billing. The Door Shop refused to pay, which prompted ACE to file suit. ACE maintained that The Door Shop was liable for the underbilled amount and moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "The Door Shop, Inc. v. Alcorn County Electric Power Association" on Justia Law

John Morgan submitted a public records request to the Mississippi State Hospital (“MSH”) after it had awarded a contract for insurance plan administration to XLK International, LLC (XLK). Morgan, whose bid for the insurance plan administration contract had been unsuccessful, demanded access to all documents XLK had submitted in response to the state hospital’s request for proposal (RFP). XLK sought and obtained a protective order from the chancery court. The chancery court allowed Morgan to intervene and held a hearing on his Motion to Set Aside Protective Order. The chancery court ruled that the documents XLK had submitted in response to MSH’s RFP were not subject to disclosure under the Mississippi Public Records Act, with the exception of the contract between MSH and XLK. Because the chancery court correctly applied the Mississippi Public Records Act, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Morgan v. XLK International, LLC" on Justia Law

Singing River Health System a/k/a Singing River Hospital System (“Singing River”) sued KPMG, LLP, alleging separate counts of breach of contract and negligence and/or professional malpractice based on the audits KPMG performed for Singing River in fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Singing River alleged that KPMG failed to comply with the professional auditing and accounting standards expressed in GAAS (Generally Accepted Auditing Standards), GAGAS (Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards), and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), which KPMG had agreed to follow. Singing River specifically alleged that KPMG’s audits were replete with computational errors and incorrect assumptions, and that KPMG had not performed basic tests to substantiate its opinions. Singing River separately alleged that KPMG was negligent and committed professional malpractice by failing to use the skill, prudence, and diligence other reasonable and prudent auditors would use in similar circumstances, as expressed in the GAAS, GAGAS and GAAP. Singing River alleged, inter alia, that, as a direct and proximate result of KPMG’s audits, Singing River was unaware that its employee-pension plan was underfunded by approximately one-hundred-fifty million dollars ($150,000,000.00). Further, Singing River alleged that it was unaware that it was not in compliance with certain bond covenants due to KPMG’s negligence. KPMG sought to compel arbitration of Singing River’s claims. The circuit court declined to order Singing River to arbitration. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined KPMG’s 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 letters were not spread across the Board’s minutes. The Court could not enforce these contracts or the dispute-resolution clauses attached to them. KPMG’s additional arguments concerning the delegation clause, collateral estoppel, and direct-benefit estoppel were without merit. The trial court’s order denying KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KPMG, LLP v. Singing River Health System" on Justia Law

James Owens had been experiencing drug-withdrawal symptoms when he wandered off his work shift onto a dark Louisiana highway. At that time, Will Gates was driving his employer’s truck when he struck Owens. Gates did not see Owens, and the truck never left its lane of travel. Owens filed a negligence suit against Gates and his employer. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Gates and his employer. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Gates had not been negligent. Furthermore, the Court found no merit to Owens’s claim that the judge wrongly denied his request for a mistrial based on Gates’s cousin Abraham Gates, a justice court judge, acting as a jury consultant in his case. View "Fairley v. Total Transportation of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2015, Mississippi filed a complaint against fifteen pharmaceutical manufacturers and their affiliates (“Defendants”). In this interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the location of a foreign corporation’s registered agent was relevant when determining the appropriate venue for an action. The Supreme Court found that the adoption of the Registered Agents Act (“RAA”) made the location of a corporation’s registered agent irrelevant for purposes of venue. View "Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

BTH Quitman Hickory, LLC, challenged the amount of the ad valorem taxes assessed by the Clarke County Board of Supervisors by appealing the assessments to circuit court. However, BTH Quitman did not submit a bond with its appeals; therefore, the Board of Supervisors moved to dismiss the appeals. The circuit court found in favor of BTH Quitman, and the Board filed this interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in its opinion in Natchez Hospital Co., LLC v. Adams County Board of Supervisors, 238 So. 3d 1162 (Miss. 2018), it reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for the circuit court to dismiss BTH Quitman’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Board of Supervisors of Clarke County, Mississippi v. BTH Quitman Hickory, LLC" on Justia Law

Dr. Jeff Almand performed a left-knee arthroscopy on plaintiff Janice Phelps at Mississippi Baptist Medical Center (“MBMC”). Shortly after surgery, Phelps experienced shortness of breath, and Dr. Jeffrey LeDuff ordered a chest x-ray and placed her on oxygen. Dr. LeDuff subsequently discharged her on May 4, 2013. Two days later, Phelps’s shortening of breath worsened, and she went to the emergency room at Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center (“SMRMC”). There, she was diagnosed with pneumonia. After being placed on a ventilator, she exhibited signs of a stroke. On May 24, 2013, SMRMC discharged Phelps with a diagnosis of Cebrovascular Accident and Ventilator Dependence and transferred her to Baton Rouge Rehabilitation Hospital. On April 30, 2015, Phelps filed suit against MBMC, Drs. Almand and LeDuff and others (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging medical malpractice arising out of her care and treatment at MBMC. The circuit court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. Finding that plaintiff failed to support her medical- malpractice claims with sworn expert testimony on whether Defendants breached any applicable standard of care owed to Phelps, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, Inc. v. Phelps" on Justia Law

Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., and Fresenius USA, Inc., operated dialysis treatment clinics throughout the United States, including Mississippi. Fresenius also manufactured and sold dialysis products, including GranuFlo, a product administered to patients being treated for end-stage renal disease. GranuFlo was an acid concentrate mixed with bicarbonate and water to create a dialysis fluid. In 2014, the State of Mississippi brought a civil action against Fresenius, alleging that it had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in connection with GranuFlo in violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act. At issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court in this appeal were a batch of discovery disputes arising between the State and Fresenius brought on interlocutory appeal. The State filed a motion to compel discovery against Fresenius and requested a privilege log. Fresenius provided the State with a privilege log similar to the logs produced in other GranuFlo litigation pending elsewhere. Although the State had objected, Fresenius did not log each individual email and email attachment; rather, Fresenius logged “families” or aggregates of documents. The chancery court granted the State’s motion to compel and ordered Fresenius to produce a “full and complete privilege log” to the State. Fresenius produced a second amended privilege log to the State, continuing to use the family logging method. The State filed a second motion to compel, seeking: (1) all emails and email attachments not separately identified on Fresenius’s July 1, 2016, privilege log; (2) withheld documents referred to as attorney notifications (nurses’ memoranda sent to doctors and in-house counsel); and (3) withheld documents referred to as public comment advice (public relations documents). The chancery court ordered Fresenius to produce all emails and email attachments that were responsive to the State’s discovery requests, that had not been produced, and that had not been separately identified on Fresenius’s July 1, 2016, privilege log. The chancery court also ordered Fresenius to submit attorney notifications and public relations documents for in camera review, later ordering production of the notifications. Fresenius appealed these orders. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's order with respect to the public relations documents; the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Hood" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether Appellant Marilyn Newsome's claims could survive summary judgment against Appellees, People’s Bank and Chris Dunn. The claims addressed the issuance of cashier’s checks by People’s Bank and Chris Dunn without Newsome's signature or approval, the conservatorship account holder. Victoria Newsome had settled a medical malpractice case, but she was unable to manage her affairs. The trial court appointed Newsome, Victoria's mother, as conservator. A trial court denied a request to purchase a home for Victoria, and instead, ordered that a house be built for her. In the interim, the trial court ordered a mobile home to be purchased. With the help of Dunn, a Bank employee, Newsome opened a checking account for the conservatorship with the Bank. When Newsome opened the conservatorship account, she signed a Deposit Agreement as the sole authorized signor on the account. Newsome testified that she did not have any discussions with the Bank about who would be authorized to sign on the account. The Deposit Agreement also provided that Newsome had thirty days to review her statements for errors or unauthorized activity. The estate attorneys prepared court orders for release of funds to pay for construction of the house; the trial court would in turn approve the orders, and the attorney would deliver the orders to the Bank for release of funds. The Orders did not provide any guidance, particularly whether cashier's checks could be issued to disburse the money. Despite frequent visits to the bank herself, Newsome allegedly never sought monthly accounting of the conservator account. Newsome filed suit, alleging the Bank and Dunn were liable for failing to require Newsome's signature on any checks negotiated on the conservatorship account. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Newsome's case could indeed survive summary judgment, reversed the trial court in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newsome v. Peoples Bancshares" on Justia Law

Belmont Holding, LLC, filed a complaint in replevin against Davis Monuments, LLC, and Jason Davis, individually. The case proceeded to trial. The county court denied the replevin and entered a final judgment. Aggrieved, Belmont filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the final judgment. However, Belmont did not pay the cost bond within thirty days of the final judgment as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-51-79 (Rev. 2012). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction because the bond was not paid. View "Belmont Holding, LLC v. Davis Monuments, LLC" on Justia Law