Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Consolidated election contests arose out of the December 9, 2019 city council elections in Wards 1 and 6 of Greenville, Mississippi. Contestant Oliver Johnson lost in Ward 1 to William Albert Brock, and Chauncy Wright lost in Ward 6 to James Wilson. Both Johnson and Wright subsequently filed petitions to contest the elections both claiming multiple voting irregularities. Brock and Wilson then filed motions for summary judgment. After taking into consideration all of the testimony, petitions, responses, and affidavits, the circuit court granted Brock’s and Wilson’s motions for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error in those judgments, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson, et al. v. Brock, et al." on Justia Law

Frankie Ware died in 2011, survived by his wife, Carolyn Ware, and their three children, Dana Ware, Angela Ware Mohr, and Richard Ware. Richard was married to Melisa Ware. Carolyn was appointed executor of Frankie’s estate. At the time of his death, Frankie owned 25 percent of four different family corporations. Carolyn owned another 25 percent of each, and Richard owned 50 percent of each. Frankie’s will placed the majority of Frankie’s assets, including his shares in the four family corporations, into two testamentary trusts for which Carolyn, Richard, Angela, and Dana were appointed trustees. The primary beneficiary of both trusts was Carolyn, but one trust allowed potential, limited distributions to Richard, Angela, and Dana. Prolonged litigation between Carolyn and Richard ensued over disagreements regarding how to dispose of Frankie’s shares in the four corporations and how to manage the four corporations. Richard eventually filed for dissolution of the four corporations. The trial court ultimately consolidated the estate case with the corporate dissolution case, and denied Angela and Dana’s motions to join/intervene in both cases. It also appointed a corporate receiver (Derek Henderson) in the dissolution case by agreed order that also authorized dissolution. The chancery court ultimately ordered that the shares be offered for sale to the corporations, and it approved the dissolution and sale of the corporations. Angela and Dana appealed the trial court’s denial of their attempts to join or intervene in the two cases. Carolyn appeals a multitude of issues surrounding the trial court’s decisions regarding the corporations and shares. Richard cross-appealed the trial court’s net asset value determination date and methodology. The Receiver argued the trial court’s judgment should have been affirmed on all issues. In the estate case, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s determination that the estate had to offer the shares to the corporation prior to transferring them to the trusts; the corporations filed their breach of contract claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of Angela and Dana’s motions to intervene, and it affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the dissolution case. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent that it allowed the corporations to purchase shares from the estate. The cases were remanded to the chancery court for a determination of how to distribute the money from the corporate sales, in which the estate held 25 percent of the corporate shares. View "In The Matter of The Estate of Frankie Don Ware" on Justia Law

In 2012, United Healthcare of Mississippi (United) entered into provider agreements with Mississippi’s fourteen Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) to provide Medicaid services under the Division of Medicaid’s (DOM’s) managed care program. From 2012 until 2019, United paid the CMHCs an agreed upon amount for Medicaid services - 100 percent of the medicaid fee schedule rates. In July 2019, United unilaterally imposed a 5 percent rate cut, retroactive to January 1, 2019, and later demanded that the CMHCs refund 5 percent of all payments made from July 1, 2018, through December 31, 2018, all of which totaled more than $1 million. The CMCHs demanded that United immediately cease and desist from the 5 percent rate cut and recoupments. When United refused, the CMHCs filed a Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, specifically requesting, inter alia, a preliminary injunction. United responded with a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied United’s motion to compel arbitration, granted the CMHCs’ request for injunctive relief, and issued a preliminary injunction. The limited issues presented to the Mississippi Supreme Court were whether the trial court properly enjoined United from imposing a 5 percent rate cut and whether the trial court erred by denying arbitration. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction and to deny the motion to compel arbitration. View "United Healthcare of Mississippi Inc. et al. v. Mississippi's Community Mental Health Commissions, et al." on Justia Law

The Hinds County Circuit Court denied the motion of Weeks, Inc., to transfer venue to Madison County, even though neither Mississippi defendant (both corporations) had its principal place of business in Hinds County. Nor did any substantial alleged act or event causing the alleged injuries occur in Hinds County. The circuit court based its ruling on Weeks’s corporate filings with the Mississippi Secretary of State, which listed a Hinds County address as Weeks’s principal address. Affidavits and other documents submitted with Weeks’s motion to transfer venue showed this was not Weeks’s address; the address belonged to an outside certified public accountant who handled Weeks’s correspondence and filings with the Secretary of State. Weeks conducts no business from this location. Instead, it solely operates out of its Madison County location. Still, plaintiff Gregory Lewis, asked the Mississippi Supreme Court to hold that Weeks’s corporate filings were conclusive evidence of the corporation’s principal place of business. Lewis conceded, in his own words, that the “actual physical location” where Weeks conducted its business was in Madison County. The Supreme Court therefore concluded the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Weeks’s motion to transfer venue. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to transfer this case to the Madison County Circuit Court. View "Weeks, Inc. et al.. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Holcomb, Dunbar, Watts, Best, Masters & Golmon, P.A. (“Holcomb Dunbar”), was the tenant and 400 South Lamar Mad Hatter Partners, LLC (“Mad Hatter”), was the successor landlord to the property at issue in this case. Mad Hatter sued Holcomb Dunbar for breach of the lease due to its failure to pay rent for the remaining eighteen months of a three-year lease. After discovery, Mad Hatter moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Mad Hatter was awarded $133,900 in unpaid rent. The trial court also denied Holcomb Dunbar’s motion for partial summary judgment and motion to amend its counterclaim, while granting Mad Hatter’s motion to quash certain subpoenas. Holcomb Dunbar’s remaining counterclaims went to trial, and the jury found against it. Holcomb Dunbar appealed the trial court’s rulings on these four motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Holcomb, Dunbar, Watts, Best, Masters & Golmon, P.A. v. 400 South Lamar Oxford Mad Hatter Partners, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Victoria Leasy sued after she allegedly slipped and fell in her hotel room’s bathroom at Harlow’s Casino. The circuit court granted SW Gaming LLC d/b/a Harlow’s Casino's motion to dismiss, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case. Finding that the Court of Appeals reweighed the evidence and substituted its own findings for those of the circuit court, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and reaffirmed the controlling abuse-of-discretion standard of review in such cases. View "Leasy v. SW Gaming, LLC d/b/a Harlow's Casino" on Justia Law

Claiborne County Hospital (CCH) sought summary judgment against Julius Truitt on his medical-negligence claim. CCH claimed Truitt failed to designate a medical expert. Truitt responded to CCH’s motion that a genuine issue of material fact existed, and that he was exempt from producing sworn expert testimony under the layman’s exception allowing lay testimony despite the general rule requiring medical expert testimony in medical-negligence cases. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that as a matter of law, the trial court erred by denying CCH’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found CCH met its summary-judgment burden by showing that Truitt failed to produce sworn expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of medical negligence. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Claiborne County Hospital v. Truitt" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from damages that Pine Belt Oil Co. (Pine Belt) incurred for the remediation of a September 2008 gasoline leak that originated on property Walter and Tammy Cooley (the Cooleys) had sold to Pine Belt four months prior to discovery of the leak. In 2009, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) issued an administrative order demanding that Pine Belt, the owners of Pine Belt, Robert and Melissa Morgan, and the Cooleys pay remediation costs, including future costs, for the properties afflicted by the gasoline leak. Since October 2008, Pine Belt maintained that the Cooleys were responsible for the gasoline leak, not Pine Belt. After initially refusing to pay the remediation costs, Pine Belt did begin paying them in July 2009. In April 2016, six years and nine months after its first remediation payment, Pine Belt filed a complaint seeking indemnification from the Cooleys for Pine Belt’s past and future expenses incurred due to its remediation damage caused by the gasoline leak. The Cooleys moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial judge denied the summary judgment motion. The Cooleys then filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, arguing that the statute of limitations barred Pine Belt’s implied indemnity claim. The Cooleys argued alternatively that Pine Belt could not prove that it did not actively participate in the underlying wrong, i.e., the gasoline leak. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the applicable three-year statute of limitations ran on Pine Belt’s claim on March 5, 2012. Pine Belt’s claim was thus time barred, and all other arguments were moot. View "Cooley v. Pine Belt Oil Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appealed a county court judgment granting Genevieve Jensen’s motion for extension of time to serve process on the attorney general and its decision denying UMMC’s motion for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. Since Jensen failed to articulate good cause for an extension of time to serve process, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the county court abused its discretion by granting her motion for extension, it reversed the county court’s decision and dismissed Jensen’s case with prejudice. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The City of Gautier granted David Vindich a permit to build a 1,410 square foot garage/workshop on his .76 acre lot. When the building was almost completed, Vindich’s neighbor, Martin Wheelan, filed a lawsuit arguing the City’s decision was unlawful because Vindich actually sought a variance, which required a public hearing rather than a building permit. Thus, Wheelan said he was denied due process. Wheelan also claimed the City’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the workshop “completely overwhelm[ed]” the neighborhood and created a nuisance. After a trial, the chancellor dismissed Wheelan’s claims, finding that the City’s interpretation of the applicable ordinance was not manifestly unreasonable. The chancellor also found that the building was not a nuisance. Wheelan appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's dissenting opinion, finding the City erred in its interpretation of the ordinance at issue here. The Court therefore reversed the Court of appeals and the chancery court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wheelan v. City of Gautier, et al." on Justia Law