Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide a question left open in its recent decision in "Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.," (783 SE2d 614 (2016)), with reference to the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case: whether a plaintiff property owner who alleges that he is no longer a debtor because the security deed on his property has been cancelled has standing to challenge an alleged assignment of the security deed. Appellee Bobby Johnson made concessions to the Court, however, that made it unnecessary for the Court to decide that question. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on other grounds. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Out-of-state attorney Frederick Fein appealed a final order of the Superior Court of Fulton County granting the motion of state court judge Diane Bessen, to dismiss Fein’s “Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus” for failure to state a claim. The mandamus petition, as amended, sought to compel Judge Bessen to rule on default motions and to enter a final judgment in a civil action pending before her so that Fein might pursue his alleged “clear legal right to appeal Judge Bessen's revocation of his pro hac vice admission in that action.” In granting the motion, the superior court ruled that Fein failed to state such a claim because Judge Bessen was precluded from entering the requested orders inasmuch as a bankruptcy petition filed in the matter acted as an automatic stay, which had not been lifted, thus barring Judge Bessen from entering any other orders in the Chenault case. Finding no error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Fein v. Bessen" on Justia Law

Appellant Frederick Whitney owned a piece of property located in Habersham County. Whitney became delinquent on his property taxes. As a result, Habersham County sold the property at a tax sale to Appellee Lanier 5, LLC. Over a year later, on August 15, 2014, Lanier sent a notice of foreclosure of the right to redeem the property by certified and first class mail to Whitney at his residence in Forsyth County, giving Whitney until September 21, 2014, to exercise his right of redemption. While the certified mailing sent to Whitney went unclaimed, the first class mail notice was never returned as undeliverable. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2014, a security deed was created between Whitney and Appellant Reliance Equities, LLC. Two days after the September 21 foreclosure date, Whitney’s agent attempted to redeem the property. After confirming its certified and first class mailings were sent to the proper address, Lanier rejected the tender as untimely. Receiving no other tenders for redemption, Lanier filed a “Petition to Remove a Cloud on Title – Conventional Quia Timet” in the Superior Court of Habersham County, requesting the court remove the cloud of title in Lanier’s favor. Whitney filed a counterclaim requesting the trial court quiet title in his favor and also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that he did not receive sufficient notice of Lanier’s foreclosure of his right of redemption. The trial court denied Whitney’s motion. On November 19, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Lanier’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Reliance’s motion to intervene, Whitney’s motion for reconsideration and Whitney’s motion for summary judgment, finding all motions to be moot. On appeal, Reliance argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene; Whitney argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and quieting title in favor of Lanier. The Supreme Court agreed with Whitney (based on the plain language of the applicable statute, Lanier could not foreclose Whitney's right to redeem until all conditions enumerated in the statute were met), and reversed the trial court in case S16A1014. Because the decision effectively ended the underlying litigation between Whitney and Lanier, Reliance’s appeal in case S16A1013 was rendered moot and dismissed. View "Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the passage of two weapons related bills passed by the Georgia General Assembly during the 2013-2014 legislative session. Appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., (“GCO”) filed a complaint against the Code Revision Commission and its members, David Ralston, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives of Georgia, Lowell Cagle, in his official capacity as President of the Senate of Georgia, and Governor Nathan Deal, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Code Revision Commission (CRC) to amend the text of OCGA 16-11-127.1 and a judgment declaring that it was not a crime for a person with a weapons carry license to carry a firearm within a school safety zone. After motions to dismiss filed by both the Governor and CRC were granted in separate orders, GCO appealed the order granting CRC’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that GCO was not entitled to relief under "any state of provable facts" alleged in its amended complaint, there was no actual controversy which would have authorized a declaratory judgment, and the trial did not err in granting CRC's motion to dismiss. View "Georgiacarry.org v. Code Revision Comm'n" on Justia Law

Iselda Moreno, wife of Rudy Robles, received liposuction, buttock augmentation, and abdominoplasty surgery performed by Dr. Patricia Yugueros of Artisan Plastic Surgery, LLC on June 24, 2009. Moreno went to the ER experiencing abdominal pains. Five days after the surgery, she died. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appellate court was correct in holding that deposition testimony of an organizational representative taken under OCGA 9-11-30(b)(6) could be admitted into evidence at trial under OCGA 9-11-32(a)(2), without regard to the rules of evidence governing admissibility of expert testimony. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Yugueros v. Robles" on Justia Law

Appellant Pandora Franchising, LLC was a foreign limited liability company. In its application for certificate of authority to transact business in Georgia, Pandora identified its principal place of business in Maryland. Appellee Kingdom Retail Group (“Kingdom”) filed suit against Pandora in Thomas County Superior Court, alleging Pandora wrongfully withheld its consent to Kingdom’s bid to acquire a number of Pandora franchises. Kingdom alleged venue was proper in Thomas County pursuant to OCGA 14-2-510 (b) (4) because the cause of action originated in Thomas County. Over Kingdom’s objection, the trial court granted Pandora’s request to remove the complaint to Gwinnett County where, Pandora claimed in its notice of removal, “it maintains its registered office as its principal place of business in Georgia.” The Court of Appeals granted Kingdom’s application for interlocutory review and reversed the grant of removal. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed OCGA 14-2-510 (b) (4) to mean that, in a claim in which the basis for venue was the allegation that the cause of action originated in the county where the claim was filed, only a corporation with its worldwide principal place of business, or “nerve center” in Georgia had the right to remove the claim to the county in Georgia where that principal place of business was located. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and adopted the reasoning set forth in that court’s opinion. View "Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a deficiency action brought by appellant SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”) as the assignee under a motor vehicle conditional sales contract following its repossession and sale of a motor vehicle purchased by appellee Mattie Venable. Specifically, the issue was which statute of limitations applied here: the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA 11-2-725 (1) applicable to actions on contracts for the sale of goods, or the six-year statute of limitation found in OCGA 9-3-24, generally applicable to actions on simple written contracts. After review, the Court concluded that this action was subject to the four-year statute of limitation found in 11-2-725 (1). View "SunTrust Bank v. Venable" on Justia Law

Appellee Daniel Massey, who was serving his third consecutive term as Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, and later amended the petition to add a claim for declaratory judgment. The petition sought, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claims it paid to him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. The County asserted in its counterclaim that Massey had, in fact, been overpaid. The parties agreed that the sole issue in dispute was a matter of statutory interpretation regarding Massey’s entitlement to County COLAs. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chatham County v. Massey" on Justia Law

In March 2012, 91-year-old Bucilla Stephenson died at the end of a two-week stay at Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC (“Hospital”). In May 2013, Jacqueline Alicea, Bucilla's granddaughter, acting as the administratix of her grandmother’s estate, sued defendants the Hospital and Dr. Phillip Catalano. Alicea alleged among other things that they intubated her grandmother and put her on a mechanical ventilator, which prolonged her life when she was in a terminal condition and caused her unnecessary pain and suffering, contrary to her advance directive for health care and the specific directions of Alicea, her designated health care agent. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing among other things that OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), a part of the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act, gave them immunity from liability. The trial court rejected the immunity argument and denied summary judgment. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the order denying immunity. The Supreme Court then granted Defendants’ petition for certiorari to review that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. After review, the Court concluded the appellate court skipped over one important point: "[t]he correct analysis makes it even clearer, however, that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on their claim of immunity under OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to that issue." View "Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea" on Justia Law

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. was a textile manufacturer, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it produced dryer felts at a manufacturing facility in Waycross. Some of the pipes and boilers in that facility were insulated with material containing asbestos, and Scapa used yarn containing asbestos in some of its manufacturing processes. Between 1967 and 1973, Roy Knight worked on multiple occasions at the Waycross facility as an independent contractor. Almost forty years later, Knight was diagnosed with mesothelioma. After his mesothelioma was diagnosed, Knight and his wife sued Scapa, claiming that Scapa negligently exposed him to asbestos at the Waycross facility and caused his mesothelioma. The case was tried in front of a jury, which returned a verdict against Scapa and awarded more than $4 million in damages to the Knights. The trial court entered a judgment upon that verdict, and Scapa appealed. At trial, the Knights bore the burden to establish not only that one of their experts, Dr. Abraham, was qualified and that his testimony was reliable, but also that his testimony would be helpful to the jury. His ultimate opinion as to causation, however, was not limited to any meaningful estimate of exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility (whether qualitative or quantitative), and it instead invited the jury to find that causation was established by any exposure at all. In that respect, the Supreme Court concluded the testimony did not “fit” the pertinent causation inquiry under Georgia law, and it should have been excluded by the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, because it could only serve to confuse the jury on the issue of causation. "And given that Dr. Abraham’s opinion 'went to the heart' of the dispute about the extent of exposure and causation, 'the erroneous admission of the opinion requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.'" View "Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight" on Justia Law