Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellee J.B. was injured when certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”) Paul Serdula sexually assaulted her in a surgical suite in the dental practice of defendant-appellant Goldstein, Garber and Salama, LLC (GGS). Serdula was hired by GGS as an independent contractor through anesthesia staffing agency Certified Anesthesia Providers; in accordance with its standard practice, that agency conducted an independent credentialing process on Serdula prior to placing him in any medical or dental facilities. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that a third party’s sexual molestation of J.B. was an act foreseeable by GGS, whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of GGS’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence per se, and whether GGS waived any objection to the jury verdict’s apportionment of fault. Finding that appellate court misinterpreted OCGA 43-11-21.1, GGS’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. View "Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B." on Justia Law

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

After Dale Lyman and his wife, Helen, left Cellchem International, Inc. to work for a competitor, Cellchem sued the Lymans and two companies with which they had affiliated (collectively the “Lymans”), asserting claims for computer theft and computer trespass under the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act(GCSPA, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with business relations. Cellchem claimed that the Lymans stole data from Cellchem and used it to their competitive advantage. At trial, the jury found the Lymans liable on all claims and awarded Cellchem compensatory damages and attorney fees, as well as punitive damages of $5.1 million. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against the Lymans on the tortious interference claim. The Court of Appeals also remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial as to punitive damages, reasoning that, despite the fact that the tortious interference claim no longer existed to support a potential award for punitive damages, the remaining claims for breach of fiduciary duty and violations of the GCSPA could still support such a claim. In this regard, because the verdict form at trial did not designate to which claims the punitive damages were assigned, or in what proportion, a new determination had to be made with regard to punitive damages that eliminated any consideration of damages associated with alleged tortious interference and focused only on the remaining tort claims upon which the Lymans had been found liable at trial. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the GCSPA did not authorize an award of punitive damages. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals with respect to the availability of punitive damages under the GCSPA, and remanded this case with directions that the appellate court clarify that any remand to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages could not involve any purported award for such damages based on alleged violations of the GCSPA. View "Lyman v. CellChem International, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the refusal of Richard Alexander, in his capacity as clerk of court in Gwinnett County, to file a motion to compel discovery under a particular case number requested by the filing party, Thomas Gibson. The requested case number had previously been assigned to a case to which the motion to compel was directly related, and Gibson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in an effort to force Alexander to file the motion to compel under this case number. The trial court granted the mandamus petition, and Alexander appealed that ruling. Because the Supreme Court found that Alexander had a clear duty as the Clerk of the court to file the motion to compel under the requested case number without making an independent determination about whether a new case number should be assigned, it affirmed. View "Alexander v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of a superior court’s orders setting aside, in part, a final judgment and decree of divorce, and amending the final judgment of divorce. After a proceeding in which Wife was held in contempt, she filed in late 2013, a motion to set aside the March 2009 judgment and decree claiming, inter alia, that in his 2008 financial affidavit, Husband failed to disclose his interest in certain real properties. Husband opposed the motion to set aside, contending that the three-year statute of limitations barred any such claim under OCGA 9-11-60 (f). The trial court held that the three-year “statute of limitations” of OCGA 9-11-60 (f) was tolled until Wife became aware that Husband possessed certain previously undisclosed funds. However, the Supreme Court found that motion to set aside the judgment under OCGA 9–11–60 (d) was filed more than three years after the 2009 judgment. Because the motion to set aside the judgment was filed outside he exclusive time limitation for such a motion, the trial court’s order setting aside the judgment, as well as its subsequent order, was reversed. View "Myles v. Myles" on Justia Law

In 2014, Brooks Keel, president of Georgia Southern University, terminated the employment contract of tenured professor Lorne Wolfe for violation of University policies, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia denied Wolfe’s application for review of his termination. Wolfe then filed a complaint for breach of contract and mandamus against the Board and Keel seeking reinstatement and other relief. The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and Wolfe again appealed. The Supreme Court found that this appeal fell within the scope of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an application to appeal was therefore required. Because Wolfe did not file a discretionary application, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wolfe v. Regents of the University Sys. of Georgia" on Justia Law

Defendant Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC (“VPD”) appealed a Superior Court order granting injunctive relief and requiring an accounting in this suit by RMW Development Fund, II, LLC (“RMW”) stemming from VPD’s management of Veterans Parkway Apartments, LLC (the “Company”). The order at issue granted RMW an interlocutory injunction: (1) enjoining VPD from using funds in its possession or control to construct a second entrance to an apartment complex in Columbus (the “Property”), constructed and managed by the Company; (2) prohibiting VPD from using funds for any purpose other than the normal day-to-day expenses of the Property; and (3) requiring VPD to submit a monthly report of its expenses to the superior court, with copies to counsel for the parties. RMW filed suit against VPD alleging VPD’s breach of contract by its entering into an unauthorized management agreement and thereby paying an unauthorized management fee, and a claim for “promissory estoppel,” stemming from VPD’s alleged failure to use some of the Company’s funds for partial repayment of a development loan; RMW asked for VPD’s removal as manager of the Company and for the costs of litigation. Prior to the filing on the complaint, the Company had purchased a 60-foot strip of land for the purpose of creating a second entrance to the Property. At a hearing on the injunction, RMW argued that it could not undo any construction of the second entrance to the Property. VPD countered that RMW was, in reality, concerned about money being spent on the construction of the second entrance instead of being used to repay the loans made by RMW, and that any appropriate redress was monetary damages. Ultimately the injunction was granted and VPD appealed. The Supreme Court found after review of this matter that the trial court's injunction was not supported by the record, and that court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II, LLC" on Justia Law

These cases involved the repeated efforts of Willie Wright (“Husband”), who was incarcerated and filing pro se, to vacate and set aside the divorce decree entered in 2010 in the divorce action filed by Kenya Young Wright (“Wife”). In an earlier appearance of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court order denying Husband’s motion to set aside the final decree and remanded for the trial court to make findings on the issue of whether notice of the decree was given to Husband. On remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing, and Husband filed a request for an order requiring the authorities to produce him to the court to attend the hearing, but this request was denied. The trial court denied Husband’s motion to set aside. Husband filed both a notice of appeal and an application for discretionary appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the application, stating it was concerned with whether the trial court erred in concluding it had satisfied its duty under OCGA 15-6-21 (c) to provide notice of the entry of the final judgment and decree. This appeal was docketed as Case No. S16A1250. Prior to the date the case was docketed, the trial court entered an order purporting to dismiss the "action" (apparently meaning the appeal of Husband's failing to file a notice to appeal within a ten-day deadline). Husband appealed the dismissal order and an application for discretionary appeal. The Supreme Court granted review of dismissal of the "action," which was docketed as Case No. 16A1248. Husband applied to appeal the trial court's order denying an order to produce him at the motion hearing. After review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in 16A1248 for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that in case No. 16A1250, the trial court made no findings with respect to whether the trial court provided notice as required by statute. The Order was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration of Husband's motion to set aside. View "Wright v. Wright" on Justia Law

Roque “Rocky” De La Fuente submitted a nomination petition to the Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp, seeking to have his name placed upon the ballot for the 2016 general election as an independent candidate for President of the United States. That same day, De La Fuente also filed notices of candidacy for his slate of presidential electors. The Secretary of State rejected the notices of candidacy because they were submitted eleven days after the deadline set forth in OCGA 21-2-132 (d) (1). The Secretary of State also rejected the nomination petition, finding that the counties had verified only 2,964 of the signatures submitted with the petition, a number far short of the 7,500 verified signatures needed to validate the petition pursuant to a recent federal court order. After a superior court dismissed De La Fuente's subsequent lawsuit, the matter was appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of De La Fuente's suit. View "De La Fuente v. Kemp" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for review, the issues presented for the Supreme Court involved the scope of the State’s authority to regulate so-called “payday loans” pursuant to OCGA 16-17-1, et seq., known as the Payday Lending Act. Pursuant to the statute, the State filed suit alleging that CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”), Delbert Services Corporation (“Delbert Services”), Western Sky Financial, LLC (“Western Sky”), and Martin A. Webb (collectively “Defendants”) violated OCGA 16-17-2 (a) by engaging in a small-dollar lending enterprise that collected illegal usurious interest from Georgia borrowers. Defendants operated outside the State of Georgia and their dealings with Georgia borrowers occurred telephonically or over the Internet, and when a loan is funded, the funds are transferred to the borrower via electronic transfer to the borrower’s bank account. The State sought civil penalties and injunctive and other equitable relief. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The trial court referred the case to a special master who recommended the case be dismissed, but the trial court rejected the special master’s recommendation and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s claim was not barred by the language of OCGA 16-17-1 (d). Because the trial court found a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail on the merits of the claim at trial, and found a substantial threat existed that the State would suffer irreparable injury in that there might not be sufficient funds available to satisfy a judgment should the State prevail at trial, the trial court ordered Defendants to deposit a $15 million sum into the court’s registry and to make quarterly deposits of any additional amounts that could be collected from Georgia borrowers in the future. The trial court, however, agreed to stay the granted relief during an appeal, upon the Defendants’ deposit of an additional $1 million into the escrow account created following entry of the consent order requiring the deposit of $200,000. In a separate order, the trial court denied the State’s motion to add as defendants J. Paul Reddam and WS Funding, LLC (“WS Funding”). Defendants filed a notice of appeal and the State filed a notice of cross-appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, affirmed the modification of the injunction order, and reversed the order denying the State’s motion to add defendants. View "Western Sky Financial, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law