Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Oscar Blalock sought access to records held by the City of Lovejoy under the Georgia Open Records Act. After failing to receive those records, or any response from the City, Blalock filed a mandamus action seeking to compel compliance with the Act. The trial court dismissed Blalock’s petition, finding that mandamus was unavailable because the Act’s civil penalties provision affords Blalock a remedy “as complete and convenient as mandamus.” Although the Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court’s conclusion regarding the remedial adequacy of civil penalties, that did not save Blalock’s claim: because the Act provided its own cause of action for enforcement in OCGA 50-18-73 (a), that provision was plainly a “complete and convenient” alternative to mandamus. View "Blalock v. Cartwright" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. Arthur and Barbara Sheridan owned several pre-1972 master sound recordings of certain popular songs, as well as the associated intellectual property and contract rights. iHeartMedia operated AM/FM radio stations, as well as internet radio services. These latter services allow listeners to access and listen to a song through an internet-connected device such as a tablet, computer, or smartphone. iHeartMedia streamed the Sheridans’ recordings to listeners over its internet radio platform, iHeartRadio. It was undisputed that iHeartMedia had no license, authority, or consent from the Sheridans to stream the recordings, and iHeartMedia did not compensate the Sheridans for the use of their recordings. The Sheridans claimed that iHeartMedia needed their consent to transfer their master sound recordings to iHeartRadio listeners, and that iHeartMedia engaged in racketeering activity by making unauthorized transfers. iHeartMedia moved to dismiss the Sheridans’ complaint under the radio broadcast exemption in OCGA 16-8-60 (c) (1), which stated that the statute did not apply to “any person who transfers or causes to be transferred any such sounds or visual images intended for or in connection with radio or television broadcast transmission or related uses." After review, the Supreme Court found that the type of internet radio services being offered by iHeartMedia, Inc. in this case fell under the exemption set forth in OCGA 16-8-60 (c) (l). View "iHeartMedia, Inc. v. Sheridan" on Justia Law

This case centered on the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a variance request could be appealed to the superior court. Kerley Family Homes, LLC was granted a variance by the City of Cumming’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Neighboring homeowners aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA’s decision by filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction with the superior court. The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners because the zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that could be challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1. The Supreme Court concluded they were right, and therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. View "City of Cumming v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Donald Markle appealed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in this child custody case. While residing in Georgia in 2010, Katrina Dass gave birth to the minor child at the center of this controversy; Dass and Markle, the child’s father, were never married, and prior to 2016, Markle did not attempt to legitimate the child. Sometime after the child’s birth, Markle relocated to New Mexico. The child lived in Georgia with Dass from birth until January 2011; he then lived with both Markle and Dass in New Mexico until August 2012. Dass returned to Georgia, and the child lived in Georgia with her from August 2012 until July 2015, spending the summers of 2013 and 2014 in New Mexico with Markle. In July 2015, the child returned to New Mexico, and it is undisputed that between late July 2015 and Dass’s February 16, 2016 filing of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the child lived continuously in New Mexico with Markle, and that Dass did not live with them in New Mexico. In 2016, Markle filed a petition seeking to determine paternity, custody, and child support for the minor child in New Mexico, naming Dass as respondent. The New Mexico court entered a temporary order providing, inter alia, that the child not be removed from New Mexico without the written consent of the other party. Dass requested that Markle return the child to Georgia but Markle declined. Dass filed ia “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and EmergencyMotion for Return of Child” in Georgia. After a hearing, the superior court entered a writ of habeas corpus, finding that Georgia was the “home state” of the child within the meaning of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), and ordering that the child be returned to Dass. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed that Georgia was the child's home state, and vacated the grant of habeas relief to Dass. "Nothing precludes Dass from seeking such a ruling from the New Mexico court, and nothing indicates that, were a custody determination to be made by the New Mexico court, it would be unfair to her." View "Markle v. Dass" on Justia Law

Amanda Rae Coon lived in Alabama but received treatment from a hospital owned by The Medical Center, Inc. in Georgia. After the hospital mishandled the remains of her stillborn baby, Coon filed this lawsuit. Among other claims, she sought to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court ultimately entered an order granting summary judgment to the hospital. The court applied Georgia’s common-law “physical impact rule” to reject Coon’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, rather than applying case law from the Alabama courts that allows such claims based on the mishandling of human remains. Coon appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, although the seven judges disagreed about the choice-of-law analysis. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that where a claim in a Georgia lawsuit is governed by the common law, and the common law is also in force in the other state, as it was in Alabama, the common law as determined by Georgia’s courts controlled. Because the Court of Appeals reached the right result, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Coon v. The Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants Ken and Rochel Parker and Appellees Andrew and Penny Leeuwenburg were neighbors with a contentious relationship. Appellees first sought to have Appellants secure a good behavior bond in 2011, but the parties reached an agreement without the issuance of the bond. Appellees again sought a good behavior bond in 2013; the parties agreed to a six-month bond, which was later extended for an additional six months, and that bond expired in December 2014. Appellees sought a second bond in January 2015, alleging that Appellants had: installed security cameras aimed at Appellees’ property; conversed with and “objected to the activities of a tree service hired by [Appellees]”; and used flashlights in a manner that disrupted the sleep of Appellees. Following a hearing a magistrate court issued a bond enjoining both parties from: having direct or indirect contact with the other. Appellants sought review of the bond by way of a petition for certiorari with the superior court. Later, however, Appellees agreed to dismiss the bond, and Appellants agreed to dismiss their appeal; a consent order memorializing the parties’ agreement was filed in June 2016. In that same month, Appellants filed a complaint in the superior court seeking, among other things, a declaration that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional and granted summary judgment to Appellees. On appeal, Appellants continued to assert that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. In response, Appellees argued that Appellants lacked standing to bring their challenge. With that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Parker v. Leeuwenberg" on Justia Law

Gary and Lori Steagald sued David, Cheryl, and Joshua Eason, alleging that the Easons failed to keep Joshua’s dog properly restrained, and asserting that the Easons, therefore, were liable for injuries that Lori sustained when the dog attacked her as she was visiting the Eason home.The Easons filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the Steagalds had no evidence that the Easons had reason to know the dog to be vicious or dangerous and, therefore, in need of restraint. The trial court granted that motion, the Steagalds appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that whether the Easons had knowledge that the dog had a propensity to bite another without provocation was a question for the jury, and summary judgment was the inappropriate resolution of this case. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Steagald v. Eason" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Janice Eversole filed a divorce action against Jay Eversole seeking, among other things, an award of alimony, child custody, and child support. Wife alleged Husband had left the marital home in Georgia less than six months prior to the filing of the complaint and was living at a stated address in South Carolina. With respect to personal jurisdiction over Husband for the award of alimony and child support, Wife alleged Husband was subject to the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute (OCGA 9-10-91 (5)). When Wife was unable to perfect personal service on Husband, the trial court granted her motion for service by publication. Husband failed to file a timely answer, and a hearing in the matter was conducted at which Husband failed to appear. After the hearing but before the trial court entered an order granting the divorce and other relief sought by Wife, Husband filed a late answer in which he admitted jurisdiction as pleaded in the complaint and admitted the marriage was irretrievably broken. He raised no objection to sufficiency of service. Husband denied other allegations of the complaint and sought custody of the parties’ minor child, along with an award of child support, and sought alimony from Wife. Nevertheless, the trial court entered the final judgment and decree of divorce which it dated nunc pro tunc to July 13, 2015, the date the hearing was conducted. In the order, the trial court awarded child custody to Wife, and also awarded, among other things, child support, alimony, and attorney fees and costs. Husband then filed a motion to set aside the judgment on two grounds: (1) that although he was served by publication he never received personal service or service by mail, and (2) that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because he was a resident of South Carolina. The trial court granted Husband’s motion in part and set aside its award of alimony, child support, and attorney fees and costs because it found it lacked personal jurisdiction over Husband to make these awards. The trial court did not set aside the grant of divorce, the division of personal property located in Georgia, the award of real property located in Georgia, or the child custody award, since it concluded personal jurisdiction was not required for those decisions. Wife filed an application for discretionary appeal which the Georgia Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court found final judgment in this case had not been executed or entered at the time Husband filed his responsive pleading, even though the judgment was later executed and back-dated. The trial court erred in granting, part, Husband’s motion to set aside because he was bound by his admission of jurisdiction and waiver of the defense of insufficiency of service. Because the Supreme Court reversed in part the order granting Husband’s motion to set aside the divorce judgment, Wife’s remaining enumerations of error were moot and need not be addressed. View "Eversole v. Eversole" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a trial court order determining that Father-appellant George Denney was the legal and biological father of minor child M. S. G., and ordering the state registrar to issue a new birth certificate for the child listing Father’s name. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Father’s discretionary application to address whether the court erred in ruling that it was without authority to correct the child’s surname. The Court agreed with Father that the trial court erred in its conclusion, albeit for a reason other than that urged by Father, and therefore vacated the judgment in part and remanded this case with direction and further proceedings. View "Denney v. Denney" on Justia Law

Husband Imran Rasheed appealed the trial court’s grant of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by wife Maryam Sarwat and its incorporation into a final decree of divorce. Husband contended that no settlement had ever been reached and that, in any event, the trial court’s order setting forth what it found as a complete settlement and the subsequent decree of divorce incorporating that settlement were too incomplete to be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the terms of the settlement agreement as found by the trial court were incomplete, and those terms did not address all required aspects of the divorce: “Though visitation is cursorily addressed, the word custody never even appears in the order. Furthermore, the order setting forth the settlement does not contain a permanent parenting plan that complies with OCGA 19-9-1. The order regarding settlement terms also appears to be incomplete with regard to property holdings, or, at the very least, requires a great deal of inferences from unspecified sources to determine who actually owns what, what must be sold, and how any proceeds should be split between the parties. A trial court errs when it seeks to enforce what amounts to a settlement containing incomplete terms of a divorce. By incorporating such an incomplete settlement into the parties’ divorce decree and using that settlement as the decree’s operative terms, the infirmities of the incomplete settlement agreement became the infirmities of the divorce decree, which omits fundamental considerations such as the custody of the minor children.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rasheed v. Sarwat" on Justia Law