Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2001, appellant SunTrust Bank entered into a loan agreement with L-T Adventures, Inc. (“LTA”); this agreement did not include an arbitration provision. In 2005, SunTrust entered into a subsequent agreement with Jedon Lilliston (a co-owner of LTA) and her former husband in a transaction guaranteed by LTA. In connection with this second loan, the parties entered into a “Swap Agreement.” The Swap Agreement included an arbitration clause, providing, inter alia, that “any party may demand arbitration.” Following a dispute concerning interest charges associated with both transactions, Lilliston and LTA filed suit against SunTrust in April 2013. In January 2015, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action; at no point before the action was dismissed did SunTrust demand arbitration. Lilliston and LTA filed a renewal action, pursuant to OCGA 9-2-61 (a). SunTrust answered the complaint and moved to compel arbitration based on the provision in the Swap Agreement. The question presented in this case was whether a party’s demand for arbitration in a renewal action could be deemed waived based on that party’s conduct in the earlier, original litigation; the Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirmative. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded, however, that a renewal suit filed pursuant to OCGA 9-2-61 (a) was a de novo action, thus, a party’s conduct in the original action had no bearing on the question of waiver in the recommenced action. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sun Trust Bank v. Lilliston" on Justia Law

In 2001, appellant SunTrust Bank entered into a loan agreement with L-T Adventures, Inc. (“LTA”); this agreement did not include an arbitration provision. In 2005, SunTrust entered into a subsequent agreement with Jedon Lilliston (a co-owner of LTA) and her former husband in a transaction guaranteed by LTA. In connection with this second loan, the parties entered into a “Swap Agreement.” The Swap Agreement included an arbitration clause, providing, inter alia, that “any party may demand arbitration.” Following a dispute concerning interest charges associated with both transactions, Lilliston and LTA filed suit against SunTrust in April 2013. In January 2015, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action; at no point before the action was dismissed did SunTrust demand arbitration. Lilliston and LTA filed a renewal action, pursuant to OCGA 9-2-61 (a). SunTrust answered the complaint and moved to compel arbitration based on the provision in the Swap Agreement. The question presented in this case was whether a party’s demand for arbitration in a renewal action could be deemed waived based on that party’s conduct in the earlier, original litigation; the Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirmative. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded, however, that a renewal suit filed pursuant to OCGA 9-2-61 (a) was a de novo action, thus, a party’s conduct in the original action had no bearing on the question of waiver in the recommenced action. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Sun Trust Bank v. Lilliston" on Justia Law

High school student Antoine Williams tragically died after engaging in horseplay with another student while his teacher was out of their classroom. Antoine’s parents, appellants Jena Barnett and Marc Williams filed a complaint against Appellee Phyllis Caldwell, the teacher. They alleged that Caldwell was liable in her individual capacity for Antoine’s wrongful death because she had been negligent in supervising his classroom. The trial court granted Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that she was entitled to official immunity because her acts were the product of discretionary decisions concerning the supervision of students. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that student supervision was not unalterably discretionary in all respects, but here, because the school’s policy was not so definite as to render Caldwell’s actions ministerial, therefore, she was entitled to official immunity. View "Barnett v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

High school student Antoine Williams tragically died after engaging in horseplay with another student while his teacher was out of their classroom. Antoine’s parents, appellants Jena Barnett and Marc Williams filed a complaint against Appellee Phyllis Caldwell, the teacher. They alleged that Caldwell was liable in her individual capacity for Antoine’s wrongful death because she had been negligent in supervising his classroom. The trial court granted Caldwell’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that she was entitled to official immunity because her acts were the product of discretionary decisions concerning the supervision of students. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that student supervision was not unalterably discretionary in all respects, but here, because the school’s policy was not so definite as to render Caldwell’s actions ministerial, therefore, she was entitled to official immunity. View "Barnett v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

In 2010, Patrick Edokpolor and Linda Iyahea filed a lawsuit against Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation for the wrongful death of their decedent, Rose Edokpolor. Grady failed to waive formal service of process, and in 2013, the trial court granted a motion under OCGA 9-11-4 for an award of the expenses that plaintiffs incurred in perfecting service. The trial court, however, reserved the amount of the award for determination at a later date. In October 2014, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Grady, but it continued to reserve the amount of the expenses of service award. Three months later, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider and modify the summary judgment, asserting that the case was still pending (and the summary judgment was only interlocutory and, therefore, subject to reconsideration and modification) because the award of expenses remained outstanding. In September 2015, the trial court entered an order establishing the amount of the expenses to which plaintiffs were entitled, but concluding that summary judgment was final and no longer subject to reconsideration or modification. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred when it awarded summary judgment to Grady, and arguing that summary judgment still was appealable because the expenses award remained outstanding until September 2015. The Court of Appeals disagreed and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the reserved issue about expenses under OCGA 9-11-4 (d) (4) was “ancillary” to the case and, therefore, the summary judgment was a final judgment that had to be appealed within 30 days. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed: because this reserved issue remained pending at the time the trial court awarded summary judgment to Grady, the summary judgment was not a “final judgment[ ]” under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (1), and plaintiffs were not required to bring their appeal within 30 days of that judgment. View "Edokpolor v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced in 1995; the final decree of divorce incorporated a settlement agreement that provided for child support and at least half of his Armed Services retirement pay monthly. The child support obligation terminated in 2006, and his first payment of retirement benefits was due to Wife the following month. Husband, however, never paid. Although Wife employed attorneys to demand payment from Husband, Wife took no court action until February 25, 2016, when she filed a motion for contempt. The trial court held that the first payment of retirement benefits became due on July 1, 2006, and the judgment went dormant on July 1, 2013. Although filing a scire facias within three years of dormancy would have revived the judgment if it were dormant, Wife made no such filing. Therefore, the trial court held: that although Husband “clearly and knowingly failed to uphold his obligations under the decree,” it could not hold him in contempt. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in its analysis: Wife’s first viable opportunity to enforce the judgment occurred in July of 2006, when the initial payment became due. The dormancy period did not begin to run until each installment is due. Here, installments that became due within seven years preceding the issuance and recording of the execution are collectible and enforceable. Installments that were dormant remain subject to revival pursuant to OCGA 9-12-61. View "Holmes-Bracy v. Bracy" on Justia Law

Appellant Diversified Holdings, LLP (“Diversified”) and the City of Suwanee (“the City”) were involved in a zoning dispute regarding the status of 30 acres of undeveloped land located in the City (“Property”). On the merits of the issues presented, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that there was no error in denying Diversified’s application to rezone the Property. But the Court clarified that the “substantially advances” standard that derives from constitutional due process guarantees had no place in an eminent domain or inverse condemnation proceeding. “Consequently, where a landowner claims harm from a particular zoning classification, inverse condemnation is not an available remedy unless the landowner can meet the separate and distinct requirements for such a claim.” The Court did not reach the City’s contention on cross appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that Diversified showed a substantial detriment based on the value of the Property as currently zoned versus its value if rezoned. View "Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee" on Justia Law

E. Kendrick Smith, an Atlanta lawyer, brought this action to compel a corporation, Northside Hospital, Inc. and its parent company, Northside Health Services, Inc., (collectively, “Northside”), to provide him with access to certain documents in response to his request under the Georgia Open Records Act (“the Act”). A government agency owns and operates a large and complex hospital as part of its mission to provide healthcare throughout Fulton County. The agency leased its assets (including the hospital) to the Northside for a 40-year term at a relatively minimal rent. All governmental powers were delegated to Northside with respect to running the hospital and other assets. Northside’s organizing documents reflected that its purpose aligned with the agency’s: to provide healthcare for the benefit of the public. Thirty years into the arrangement, the corporation became “massive,” and owned other assets in surrounding counties. In resisting Smith’s request for records, Northside argued it no didn’t really do anything on behalf of the agency (in part because the now nearly-nonexistent agency has no idea what the corporation is doing), and thus the corporation’s records of a series of healthcare-related acquisitions weren’t subject to public inspection. The Georgia Supreme Court surmised that if the corporation’s aggressive position were wholly correct, it would cast serious doubt on the legality of the whole arrangement between Northside and the agency. Smith argued everything Northside did was for the agency’s benefit and thus all of its records were public. The Supreme Court concluded both were wrong: Northside’s operation of the hospital and other leased facilities was a service it performed on behalf of the agency, so records related to that operation were public records. But whether the acquisition-related records sought here were also public records depended on how closely related the acquisition was to the operation of the leased facilities, a factual question for the trial court to determine on remand. View "Smith v. Northside Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an order modifying an existing interlocutory injunction. In December 2016, appellee Peach Trader Inc., d/b/a A City Discount and A City Discount, Inc. (“Peach Trader”), filed a complaint against appellants Jeffery and Sharon Jones, a married couple, alleging that Mr. Jones used his position as an employee to embezzle or misappropriate over $1 million from Peach Trader and take advantage of business opportunities for personal gain to the detriment of his employer. Along with its complaint, Peach Trader sought a temporary restraining order against the Joneses, and the order was granted. The Joneses then filed a motion to dissolve the order. The trial court later entered an order granting an interlocutory injunction against the Joneses that prohibited them from selling, transferring, altering, encumbering, or otherwise disposing of any assets within their custody, control, or possession. The Joneses did not attempt to appeal the order. Six months later, in July, the Joneses filed a second motion to dissolve the interlocutory injunction. During a hearing on several outstanding issues, Peach Trader’s counsel consented to certain accounts being removed from the purview of the interlocutory injunction. In line with an agreement between the parties, the trial court entered an order denying the Joneses’ motion to dissolve the interlocutory injunction but granting the motion to modify the injunction by removing the restrictions on at least one of the Joneses’ accounts. The Joneses timely filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Georgia Supreme Court seeking review of the trial court’s orders dismissing their notices of appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s initial notice of appeal because Georgia law vests appellate courts with the sole authority to determine if a decision or judgment is appealable. “But that is not the end of the matter. Because an order modifying an interlocutory injunction is not subject to direct appeal under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (4), we dismiss the appeal.” View "Jones v. Peach Trader, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerns a small grocery store on Allgood Road in Marietta and, specifically the parcel of land on which that store sat. Ray Summerour owned the land for nearly three decades; the City of Marietta wanted to acquire the land to build a public park. When the City was unable to negotiate a voluntary sale of the parcel, it resolved to take the land by eminent domain, and it filed a petition to condemn the property. Following an evidentiary hearing before a special master, the superior court adopted the return and entered an order of condemnation. Summerour appealed, and the Court of Appeals set aside the condemnation order, reasoning that when the City attempted to negotiate a voluntary sale of the land, it failed to fulfill its obligations under OCGA 22-1-9. The Court of Appeals directed that the case be remanded for the superior court to consider whether the failure to comply with Section 22-1-9 amounted to bad faith. The Georgia Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and held that compliance with Section 22-1-9 was an essential prerequisite to the filing of a petition to condemn, that the City failed in this case to fulfill that prerequisite, and that its petition to condemn, therefore, must be dismissed, irrespective of bad faith. View "City of Marietta v. Summerour" on Justia Law