Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

A fifteen-year-old was involved in a physical altercation with a thirteen-year-old after getting off a school bus, during which he struck the younger student and kicked him once. Tragically, the victim died from his injuries. The defendant was subsequently indicted and convicted in the Superior Court of Cherokee County for felony murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and his federal habeas petition was denied, with the denial affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.Years later, the defendant filed a motion to correct a void sentence, arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because a life sentence was grossly disproportionate to an unintentional killing committed by a juvenile during a fistfight. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the sentence was within the statutory range and thus not void, and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim. The court also suggested the case did not meet the rare threshold for an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge but ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that a proportionality challenge under the Eighth Amendment is a cognizable void sentence claim that may be raised at any time, not just within the statutory time frame for sentence modification. The Court determined that the trial court erred in dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, vacated the dismissal order, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. View "MILLER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

A property owner participated in Georgia’s Conservation Use Value Assessment (CUVA) program, which allows for reduced property tax assessments in exchange for maintaining the land for conservation purposes under a ten-year covenant. The property was subsequently sold in part to a new owner, who failed to apply to continue the CUVA covenant by the statutory deadline. As a result, the Hall County Board of Tax Assessors determined that this failure constituted a breach of the covenant, imposed penalties for the breach, and sent tax statements reflecting the penalty to both the original and new property owners.The original owner appealed the Board’s determination to the Hall County Board of Equalization, which denied the appeal. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Superior Court of Hall County, arguing that the Board had not completed required statutory steps before imposing the penalty, that the relevant statutory provision was unconstitutionally vague, and that the wrong penalty provision had been applied. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all issues.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the owner’s constitutional claim challenging the statute’s validity. The Supreme Court concluded that, due to a 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9-4-7(c), any constitutional challenge to a statute—even as part of a non-declaratory judgment action—requires service of the proceeding on the Attorney General so the State may defend the statute. Because the owner had not served the Attorney General prior to the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. The Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order addressing the constitutional question and remanded the case to allow proper service on the Attorney General. The Court did not address the owner’s non-constitutional arguments. View "CHESTNUT RIDGE, LLC v. HALL COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS" on Justia Law

Tussahaw Reserves, LLC and Keys Ferry Crossing, LLC owned two parcels of land in Butts County, Georgia, zoned for agricultural and residential use. In 2020, they applied to rezone the property for use as a rock quarry, but the Butts County Board of Commissioners denied the applications in early 2021. Tussahaw then filed an “Appeal and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Verified Complaint” in the Butts County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision. The complaint named the Board and its members as “respondents-in-certiorari” and the County as “defendant.” The claims included a writ of certiorari against the Board and its members, and alternative claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County.After the Board and its members filed an answer and moved to be discharged from the case, the superior court denied their motion. Following the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, Butts County moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit violated the Georgia Constitution’s requirement that actions against a county be brought exclusively against the county and in its name. Tussahaw moved to drop the respondents-in-certiorari, but the superior court did not rule on that motion and instead dismissed the lawsuit, finding it barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the substance of the complaint sought relief against the Board, not just the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with the constitutional naming requirement is not a jurisdictional bar and does not preclude the trial court from considering motions to drop parties. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the superior court to vacate its dismissal order and address the pending motions. View "TUSSAHAW RESERVES, LLC v. BUTTS COUNTY" on Justia Law

P&J Beverage Corporation filed a lawsuit against the City of Columbus, seeking to prevent the city from issuing an alcoholic beverage license to The Bottle Shop, LLC, and later sought to revoke the license after it was issued. P&J argued that The Bottle Shop’s location was too close to a daycare, which it claimed qualified as a “school” under city ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to P&J, invalidating The Bottle Shop’s license and enjoining its operation. The Bottle Shop’s attorney then emailed P&J’s attorney, referencing a potential claim for wrongful injunction if the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. P&J declined, and The Bottle Shop’s motion for a stay was denied by the trial court but later granted by the Court of Appeals, which ultimately reversed the trial court’s decision on the merits.Subsequently, The Bottle Shop sued P&J for both abusive litigation and wrongful injunction, seeking damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. At trial, The Bottle Shop presented evidence of lost revenue, overhead costs, and attorney fees incurred during the period it was closed. The jury awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. P&J moved for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, that The Bottle Shop failed to provide the statutory notice required for an abusive litigation claim. The trial court denied these motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the email satisfied the statutory notice requirement.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the email sent by The Bottle Shop did not satisfy the statutory notice requirement under OCGA § 51-7-84 (a) for an abusive litigation claim, as it failed to identify the civil proceeding as abusive litigation. The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what portion of the damages, if any, remain valid. View "P& J BEVERAGE CORPORATION v. THE BOTTLE SHOP, LLC" on Justia Law

Roodson Fleureme alleged that he was injured when struck by a City of Atlanta vehicle driven by a city employee. Before filing a lawsuit, Fleureme sent several timely ante litem notices via Federal Express, including one addressed to "City of Atlanta Office of the Mayor" at the correct address of Atlanta City Hall. The notice inside the envelope was addressed to "City of Atlanta, Office of the Mayor" with the salutation "To Whom it May Concern." Fleureme later sued the City for negligence.The City moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Fleureme's ante litem notice did not comply with OCGA § 36-33-5 (f), which requires service on the mayor personally or by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that the notice must be served on the mayor individually by name. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that strict compliance with the service requirement was necessary and that the notice addressed to the "Office of the Mayor" did not meet this standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the statutory requirement to serve an ante litem notice on "the mayor" could be satisfied by mailing it to the correct address of the mayor's office, addressed to the "Office of the Mayor." The court held that such a notice does satisfy the service requirement. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to ensure that the governing authority of the municipality is aware of the claim, and addressing the notice to the office of the mayor at the correct address fulfills this purpose. The court also clarified that "strict compliance" with the statute does not necessitate a hyper-technical interpretation that would require the notice to be addressed to the mayor by name. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "FLEUREME v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law

Bettie Leverette was shopping at a Walmart store in Conyers, Georgia, when two Walmart employees moving a 2,000-pound box on a pallet jack backed into her. Leverette initially reported no significant injury but later went to the hospital with head pain, blurred vision, and nausea. She was diagnosed with a mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Leverette sued Walmart, claiming her symptoms were caused by the employees' negligence. At trial, Leverette's family and expert witnesses testified about her injuries and the projected costs of her future care, estimated between $2 million and $3.5 million. Walmart argued that Leverette's symptoms were due to pre-existing conditions and presented expert testimony to support this.The trial court gave a jury instruction on nominal damages at Walmart's request. Walmart suggested in closing arguments that nominal damages could be as low as $10 or as high as $500 but should not be $3 million. Leverette's counsel argued for over $5 million in damages. The jury awarded Leverette $1 million in nominal damages, leaving other damage categories blank. Walmart moved for a new trial, arguing the award was excessive, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that nominal damages have no maximum limit.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the $1 million award exceeded the limits on nominal damages under Georgia law. The court concluded that nominal damages, as adopted from English common law, are intended to be a trivial sum, important for the fact of the award but not meaningful in amount. The court overruled the Court of Appeals' precedent allowing large nominal damages and vacated the judgment. The case was remanded for the lower courts to resolve case-specific issues, including whether the error was invited by Walmart and the appropriate remedy. View "WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE" on Justia Law

Kierra Dates filed a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta after her minor son was injured by a falling tree branch on City property. Dates sent an initial ante litem notice to the City within the required time frame, claiming a nonspecific amount of loss. Over a year later, she sent a supplemental notice claiming a loss of $1,000,000. The trial court dismissed her complaint for failing to comply with the municipal ante litem notice statute, and Dates appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Dates's first notice was not specific enough and that her second notice was untimely. The court also ruled that the tolling provision for actions brought by minors did not apply to municipal ante litem notices.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the minor tolling provision applies to the municipal ante litem notice statute. The Court concluded that the tolling provision does not apply. The Court reasoned that the municipal ante litem notice statute is a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit, not a statute of limitations, and therefore is not subject to tolling under the minor tolling provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that Dates's supplemental notice was untimely and not tolled by the minor tolling provision. View "DATES v. CITY OF ATLANTA" on Justia Law