Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Gary D. Foster and Stephen Foster were brothers who had a disagreement over the management of the "Foster Family 1989 Trust" ("the Trust"). Gary filed a "complaint" seeking an accounting and an inventory of the Trust and, subsequently, seeking to remove Stephen as the trustee of the Trust. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Gary and assessed damages. Stephen appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decision, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Foster v. Foster" on Justia Law

LED Corporations, Inc. ("LED"), and Anthony Florence petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction an action filed against them by SDM Electric, LLC ("SDM"), and to enter an order dismissing the case against them. SDM is an Alabama corporation that served as an electrical subcontractor for a construction project at a high school in Calhoun County, Alabama. LED is a Florida corporation owned by Florence, its sole shareholder. In 2017, SDM contacted LED to solicit a bid for lighting fixtures for use in the construction project. SDM executed and delivered to LED a purchase order for lighting fixtures; SDM paid LED the balance of the purchase order. The fixtures were never shipped, and, in late 2018, SDM sued LED and Florence (among others), for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding SDM satisfied its burden in opposition to LED's and Florence's motions to dismiss by showing that LED and Florence has sufficient contacts with Alabama to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over them "complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Ex parte LED Corporations, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Rosenthal ("Mark"), as personal representative of the estate of Richard Rosenthal, deceased ("Richard"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of JRHBW Realty, Inc., d/b/a RealtySouth ("RealtySouth"), and Charles Valekis on Richard's claims alleging breach of contract and negligence/wantonness. In early June 2013, Richard retained RealtySouth through its agent Valekis to assist him in locating a new house to purchase. Valekis told Richard about an unlisted property that Valekis believed would meet Richard's needs. Richard testified that he told Valekis that he would not buy the home without having a structural engineer examine it. Richard testified that, based on Valekis's representation that he had had a structural engineer inspect the home and on Valekis's representation that Garland Caudle, a home inspector (but not a structural engineer) had not found any structural issues, he placed an offer on the home. Richard closed on the home on July 19, 2013, and he moved into the home soon thereafter. After he had lived in the home for several months, Richard concluded that the home was too small and that he needed a larger home. He again engaged the services of Valekis and RealtySouth to sell the home. After the home was placed on the real-estate market, Richard began to notice problems with it. Valekis subsequently informed Richard that numerous potential buyers were concerned with the condition of the home. Ultimately, Richard had the home inspected by a foundation-repair contractor, and that contractor recommended that Richard hire a structural engineer. The structural engineer determined the home was experiencing significant structural distress and estimated that fixing the issues would cost over $100,000. In 2015, Richard sued RealtySouth, Valekis, Caudle, Foundations Unlimited of Alabama, and the Coopers (the previous owners of the house). The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Mark's allegation of a breach of contract by Valekis apart from the agency agreement was without merit. As the circuit court concluded, the agency agreement "contains language that RealtySouth and Valekis did not assume any responsibility to inspect the property or retain building experts to inspect the property," so the Court concluded the agency agreement did not provide a basis for Richard's breach-of-contract claim. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of RealtySouth and Valekis with respect to any alleged breach of contract. View "Estate of Richard Rosenthal v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., d/b/a RealtySouth" on Justia Law

Drury Hotels Company, LLC ("Drury"), petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss Maritza Diaz's tort claims against Drury. Diaz worked as a housekeeper at Drury's hotel in Montgomery. In her complaint, Diaz alleged that she was working at the hotel when she was attacked by an unknown assailant. Diaz alleged that the assailant "sexually assaulted and robbed [her] by placing a knife to her throat, threatening to harm [her], attempting to force [her to] have sexual intercourse and taking approximately $200 in property from [her]." Diaz further claimed that the assault caused her serious bodily injuries, emotional distress, and mental anguish. In December 2018, Diaz sued Drury, alleging claims of negligence and wantonness based on allegations that Drury had failed to provide a secure workplace. Diaz also alleged a claim of negligence based on the theory of premises liability, and she alleged claims against fictitiously named parties. As an alternative to her tort claims, Diaz also alleged a claim for workers' compensation benefits under the Act if her injuries are in fact covered under the Act. Given the procedural posture of this case and the arguments presented, the Supreme Court concluded Drury did not establish a clear legal right to mandamus relief. Thus, Drury's petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. The Court made no conclusion regarding whether Drury could ultimately be entitled to immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. View "Ex parte Drury Hotels Company, LLC." on Justia Law

The Talladega County Commission ("the Commission") appealed a trial court's dismissal of its mandamus petition filed against the Commission by the City of Lincoln ("the City"), that left in place a prior order interpreting provisions of a local act. At issue was a dispute between the Commission and the City regarding the interpretation of Act No. 91-533, Ala. Acts 1991 ("the Act"), as amended by Act No. 2000-758, Ala. Acts 2000 ("the amended Act"). The Act, which local to and operative only in Talladega County, levied special county "privilege license and excise taxes" in parts of Talladega County located outside the corporate limits of cities within the county. Initially, the Act required the revenues from the taxes to be used for the retirement of the County's indebtedness. The amended Act, enacted after the retirement of the County's indebtedness, created the "Talladega County Special Tax Fund" ("the fund") into which all revenues from the taxes, less the costs of collection, were to be deposited. The City claimed in its petition that the Commission did not have any discretion to withhold the disbursement of moneys contained in the fund once the delegation had authorized the disbursement. The City asked the trial court to order the Commission to disburse $494,639 collected to the City as had been recommended by the TCEDA and approved by the delegation. In order to resolve the Commission's declaratory-judgment counterclaim, the trial court was required to determine whether the Commission had authority under the amended Act to "veto, overrule, or otherwise deny" the delegation's approval of the TCEDA's recommendation. At the time the trial court entered the October 30 order on the Commission's declaratory- judgment counterclaim, the Alabama Supreme Court determined there existed a clear justiciable controversy between the City and the Commission concerning the Commission's duties and authority under the amended Act. Once State representatives withdrew their approval, a necessary precursor to the disbursement of moneys from the fund under the amended Act, the City was no longer entitled to the funds and there ceased to be a controversy between the City and the Commission. The Supreme Court therefore determined the action was moot and dismissed the appeal. View "Talladega County Commission v. State of Alabama ex rel. City of Lincoln" on Justia Law

Petitioners George Cowgill and Elise Yarbrough, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant their motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's substitution of them for fictitiously named defendants was made after the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Petitioners owned Black Mark 2, LLC, a Birmingham bar. On New Year's Eve 2012, plaintiff Paul Thomas was with his friend Brian Pallante. Pallante and another patron, Dalton Teal, got into an altercation. Staff from Black Market removed Teal. An unidentified female patron returned a handgun Teal had dropped inside Black Market. Teal waited outside for Thomas, Pallante and another to leave. Within five minutes, a second altercation ensued, ending with shots fired, and leaving Thomas injured. The Supreme Court that although Thomas disputed knowledge of petitioners' precise duties, it was undisputed he possessed sufficient information from which he should have known or was at least placed on notice of a factual basis for his eventual claims against them. "Because [he] knew of [petitioners'] involvement in [training and supervision of Black Market employees], it was incumbent upon [Thomas], before the statute of limitations on [his] claim expired, to investigate and evaluate the claim to determine who was responsible for [his injuries]." Therefore, the Court concluded the undisputed evidence demonstrated Thomas failed to exercise due diligence in identifying petitioners as proper party defendants; the trial court thus erred in denying petitioners' motion for partial summary judgment. The Court issued the writ and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Cowgill" on Justia Law

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"), a defendant below, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge Clarke Circuit Court's failure to dismiss the underlying action or to enter a judgment in its favor on the claims of the plaintiffs, Samuel Boykin, Lucretia Boykin, Reginald Berry, and Ida Berry (collectively referred to as "the respondents"). Specifically, State Farm contended respondents' claims were barred by section 27-23-2, Ala. Code 1975 ("the direct-action statute). In denying the writ, the Supreme Court found it “never recognized an exception to the general rule that would permit interlocutory review of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss or for a judgment on the pleadings for cases that turn on whether the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under the applicable law. We will not make an exception here. Accordingly, the petition is denied.” View "Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Company." on Justia Law

Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Allstate") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to grant Allstate’s request for a jury trial in a pending action there. In August 2013, a vehicle occupied by Danielle Carter was involved in an accident with a vehicle being driven by Alvin Lee Walker. Carter sued Walker, alleging negligence and wantonness in the operation of his vehicle. In the same action, Carter also sued her underinsured-motorist carrier, Allstate, seeking underinsured-motorist benefits. In her complaint, Carter demanded a jury trial. Likewise, Allstate demanded a jury in its answer to the complaint. Pursuant to Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988), Allstate opted out of active participation in the litigation. Opting out under Lowe keeps the jury in a vehicle-accident action from learning that insurance coverage might be available to pay damages. As the trial date approached, Carter and Walker decided that they would rather try the case without a jury. Allstate, however, demanded a jury trial. The trial court denied Allstate's demand and set the case for a nonjury trial. The Supreme Court determined that Lowe demonstrated there was a strong policy in Alabama against tainting a jury with knowledge of the possible availability of insurance to cover a party's damages. “There is also a strong policy of preserving the right to have a jury determine the extent of a party's liability.” Accordingly, the Court held Allstate could insist that a jury determine liability and damages and, at the same time, keep its involvement from the jury pursuant to the opt-out procedure adopted in Lowe. View "Ex parte Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Rose McClurg sued Birmingham Realty Company ("BRC") based on injuries she sustained when she fell in the parking lot of a shopping center owned by BRC. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of BRC, and McClurg appealed. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hole in which McClurg stepped was an open and obvious danger, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgement. View "McClurg v. Birmingham Realty Company" on Justia Law

Dow AgroSciences LLC ("DAS"), a counterclaim defendant, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus challenging a circuit court’s refusal to dismiss a fraud claim filed against it by defendant Robert Ward in an action filed by Andalusia Farmers Cooperative ("AFC") against Ward. Specifically, DAS contended that Ward's fraud claim was plainly barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed and granted the petition. View "Ex parte Dow AgroSciences LLC." on Justia Law