Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Yshekia Fletcher appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville d/b/a Huntsville Hospital ("the Authority") on Fletcher's claims asserted in her medical-malpractice action. In 2016, Fletcher was admitted to Huntsville Hospital to undergo a laparoscopic tubal-ligation surgery. Before the surgery, Fletcher's doctor, Dr. Leon Lewis, explained to Fletcher that he might have issues performing the surgery because of her obesity. During the procedure, Fletcher was placed in a Trendelenburg position - a position that lowers the head of the patient by manipulating the angle of the operating table. While in Trendelenburg, Fletcher began to slip downward off the operating table. Nursing staff caught Fletcher’s body and gently placed her on the operating room floor, where the surgeon removed the trocars and closed the incisions. After the procedure, Fletcher underwent a CT scan of her head, neck, and hip, which were normal. She was admitted overnight and discharged the following day. Fletcher later complained of hip pain after the incident. She was evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon, who noted that she had a contusion and that she had had right-hip surgery as a child. Fletcher was admitted to the hospital overnight and discharged the following day with a walker. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Authority based on Fletcher's failure to present expert medical testimony. View "Fletcher v. Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville d/b/a Huntsville Hospital" on Justia Law

Patrick Jackson appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Voncille Allen, as the personal representative of the estate of Valerie Allen ("the estate"), and Penn Tank Lines, Inc. ("PTL"). In 2016, Jackson was injured in an automobile accident while receiving training and riding as a passenger in a tractor-tanker trailer commercial motor vehicle ("the CMV") driven by Valerie Allen ("Allen"). Allen died as a result of the accident. Jackson was an employee of PTL and was being trained by Allen at the time of the accident. Allen owned the CMV, and PTL was leasing the vehicle from Allen, who worked for PTL, delivering fuel, under an independent-contractor agreement. Jackson received medical treatment for his injuries after the accident, and PTL's workers' compensation insurance covered the costs of the treatment. In 2018, Jackson sued the estate and PTL, alleging claims of negligence and "gross negligence and/or wantonness" against the estate and a claim of negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision against PTL; in addition, Jackson sought to hold PTL vicariously liable for Allen's actions through the doctrine of respondeat superior. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirm the judgment insofar as the trial court determined that PTL was entitled to complete immunity from Jackson's claims against it pursuant to the exclusive-remedy provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. The Court reversed insofar as the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Allen was PTL's agent under the purview of the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Allen" on Justia Law

Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation ("CFS") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief from a circuit court order purporting to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of CFS in its action against Horton Logging, LLC ("HL"), and Gary Horton ("Horton"). Because the Supreme Court found the trial court's order purported to grant a successive postjudgment motion, over which the trial court had no jurisdiction, it granted CFS's petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation." on Justia Law

Pentagon Federal Credit Union ("PenFed") purchased Susan McMahan's house at a foreclosure sale and sold it less than a year later. They disagreed about how to divide the sales proceeds. In "PenFed I," the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a circuit court judgment in favor of McMahan, holding that the trial court had erred by not considering PenFed's unjust-enrichment argument. On remand, the trial court concluded that the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not apply and again entered judgment in favor of McMahan. PenFed appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found McMahan sued PenFed, arguing she was entitled to $94,741.20 of the $157,525 that PenFed received when it sold the house she had lost in foreclosure. PenFed conceded that McMahan should have received $3,484.66 of the sales proceeds but argued that it was entitled to retain $91,256.54 of the amount she sought -- because that was how much it cost PenFed to pay off her debt to Wells Fargo so that the property could be sold unencumbered by Wells Fargo's lien. The trial court awarded the disputed $91,256.54 to McMahan, but the doctrine of unjust enrichment will not allow her to receive those funds. The trial court's judgment was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pentagon Federal Credit Union v. McMahan" on Justia Law

Steve Lands appealed summary judgment entered in favor of Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking ("Lucky B") in a suit he filed seeking damages for injuries sustained on the job. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Lucky B on both of Lands's claims against it -- negligence and wantonness -- because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a duty. Tennessee Valley Land and Timber, LLC ("TVL&T"), contracted with Lands to haul timber for processing at various locations in the Southeast. Kenneth Ward, the owner of TVL&T, provided Lands with a 1994 Peterbilt 379 Truck ("the truck") to make the deliveries. According to Lands, when Kenneth first provided the truck, he told Lands that it was sometimes difficult to start. If the truck would not start, Kenneth instructed Lands to use a "hot-wire" method, which required Lands to use a 12-inch piece of partially exposed wire to "jump" the truck while its ignition was left in the on position. Although TVL&T allowed Lands to use the truck for work, the truck was owned by Lucky B. After a delivery, Lands had to hot-wire the truck to start it. Lands put the truck in neutral, engaged the parking brake, and got out of the truck to use the hot-wire method. With both feet on the front-wheel axle and a cigarette lighter in hand, he lifted the hood and connected the 12-inch piece of wire to the firewall solenoid. The truck jumped back to life and sent Lands to the ground. The truck then rolled over Lands, severing the muscles in the lower half of his leg. Lands sued Lucky B, TVL&T, and other entities for negligence and wantonness. The essence of Lands's claims was that Lucky B, as the owner of the truck, had a duty under statute, regulation, and common law to inspect the truck and maintain it in safe condition. By failing to inspect and maintain it, he argued, the truck fell into disrepair and triggered the sequence of events that caused his injuries. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Lands made out a prima facie case of negligence. While questions about causation and his own possible negligence remained, the Court found Lands was entitled to have those questions answered by a jury. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment on that claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. With respect to Lands' wantonness claims, the Court found no evidence of heightened culpability required to prove wantonness. Judgment as to that claim was affirmed. View "Lands v. Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking" on Justia Law

Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. ("Jackson Hospital") appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict against Jackson Hospital and in favor of plaintiff, Cameron Murphy. In February 2011, Murphy, after experiencing back pain, was referred for treatment to Dr. Margaret Vereb, a board-certified urologist employed by Jackson Hospital. Dr. Vereb determined that Murphy had kidney stones and recommended a ureteroscopy procedure to remove the stones. During that procedure, Dr. Vereb used a glidewire to establish the correct surgical path to Murphy's kidneys through his urinary tract. Dr. Vereb then used a laser to break the kidney stones into smaller fragments for removal. Following an uneventful period of recovery, the surgery was deemed successful, and Murphy was released. During a postoperative evaluation two days later, it was reported that Murphy had been experiencing pain, but he was assured that such symptoms were normal. Murphy was prescribed pain medication and discharged. In June 2011, however, Murphy experienced painful urination and blood in his urine. An X-ray performed at that time revealed that a piece of the glidewire used during the ureteroscopy procedure remained lodged in Murphy's bladder. Upon seeking treatment from another urologist, a 5.6 centimeter glidewire fragment was removed from Murphy's bladder. Murphy subsequently sued both Dr. Vereb and Jackson Hospital alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the AMLA"). The Alabama Supreme Court found Murphy presented no evidence -- in the form of expert testimony or otherwise -- that Jackson Hospital breached the applicable standard of care in any manner, Murphy failed to present evidence substantiating an essential element of his defective-equipment claim against Jackson Hospital, and therefore the jury's verdict on that claim was unsupported. Therefore, Jackson Hospital was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in its favor. The judgment entered on the jury's verdict against Jackson Hospital was reversed. View "Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc., and Lee Riggins appealed the dismissal of their complaint asserting various claims against, among others, Donald Moulton, Sr., Broken Vessel United Church ("Broken Vessel"), Lucien Blankenship, Blankenship & Associates, Antoinette M. Plump, Felicia Harris-Daniels, Tara Walker, and Tavares Roberts ("defendants"). Cathedral Church conducted worship at its property until membership dwindled and discontinued meeting. A mortgage existed on the property with Regions Bank which was outstanding and failed to be paid by Riggins. Riggins and Willie Bell Hall were the sole survivors and interest holders of Cathedral Church; their interest conveyed legally to Riggins. Moulton, on behalf of Broken Vessel Church, sought to rent the Cathedral Church property from Riggins. Riggins agreed to rent the property; Moulton and Broken Vessel Church were to seek financing. Moulton and Broken Vessel Church were to pay the commercial liability insurance Cathedral Church maintained with Planter's Insurance. However Moulton and Broken Vessel unilaterally changed the insurance carrier in July 2015 to Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company without Cathedral Church and Riggins's knowledge or consent. Moulton and Broken Vessel never obtained financing to purchase the property and never paid any money to Riggins or Cathedral Church. Riggins paid for all Cathedral Church repairs and renovations required. Then in late 2016, Cathedral Church burned and was a total loss. Moulton made a claim to Nationwide for the lost premises and contents. No money was paid to Riggins. Riggins discovered the property settlement with Nationwide in or around August 2017. Riggins also discovered two recordings of a general warranty deed at the local Tax Assessor's office purporting to be the sale of the property by Riggins to Broken Vessel. Riggins filed suit, raising a number of causes of action sounding in fraud and conspiracy, and denying he conveyed the church property to Moulton or Broken Vessel, and denied the validity of the deeds on file at the Assessor's office. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court judgment on appeal here did not adjudicate all claims before the court. It was therefore a nonfinal judgement that could not support this appeal. The appeal was thus dismissed. View "Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc. et al. v. Moulton, et al." on Justia Law

Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. ("Nucor"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") and Onin Staffing, LLC ("Onin"), on claims asserted by Nucor arising from an alleged breach of an indemnification agreement. Nucor operated a steel-manufacturing facility in Tuscaloosa. Nucor had an internship program that offered part-time work to technical-school students, who, as part of the internship program, earned both academic credit and work experience relevant to their vocational training. In 2010, Nucor entered into a "Temporary Services Agency Agreement" ("the TSA Agreement") with Onin, a personnel-staffing agency, whereby Onin was to manage the employment of the technical-school students selected by Nucor for its internship program. Korey Ryan was a student at Shelton State Community College who applied for Nucor's internship program through Shelton State. In October 2014, Ryan was killed while working in the course of his duties at the Nucor facility. Ricky Edwards, a Nucor employee, directed Ryan to stand in a certain area in front of a water filter so that he would be clear of a moving crane. Edwards stated that he then turned his attention back to the load and began moving the crane. Ryan's right boot was struck by and became caught underneath the gearbox as the crane was moving. Ryan was dragged by the crane along the concrete floor through the narrow passageway between the crane and the warehouse wall, where he was crushed to death against a building support beam. Ryan's estate brought a wrongful-death action against Nucor; OSHA cited Nucor for a "serious" safety violation and fined it. Zurich issued a letter to Nucor and Onin in which it questioned whether the general-liability policy afforded coverage for the claims asserted in the wrongful-death action. Zurich noted that neither the indemnification provision in the TSA Agreement nor the additional-insured endorsement contained in the policy applied to in instances when the alleged "bodily injury" and/or "property damage" was caused by Nucor’s sole wrongful conduct. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the particular facts and circumstances underlying the wrongful- death action did not trigger the indemnification provision and the payment of an insurance benefit; rather, the facts and circumstances voided the indemnification provision altogether. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. View "Nucor Steel Tuscaloosa, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company et al." on Justia Law

Martin Burdette appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of Auburn-Opelika Investments, LLC ("AOI"), regarding a dispute involving a promissory note entered into by the parties. AOI cross-appealed the trial court's judgment denying its request for relief under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act. In 2004, Martin Burdette and Susan Burdette, a married couple, formed AOI, with each owning 50% of the company. After its formation, AOI obtained a bank loan to purchase certain commercial property. In 2012, Martin and Susan sold property that they owned in Florida for $432,855. Martin and Susan agreed to use the proceeds from that sale, along with other funds, to make a loan to AOI so that it could pay off the bank loan. In May 2012, AOI executed a promissory note ("the 2012 note"). In 2014, Martin and Susan divorced. Neither the 2012 note nor ownership of AOI was addressed in the divorce proceedings. In 2016, Martin and Susan had a disagreement regarding the management and operation of AOI, and Martin sued Susan. In June 2017, as part of those proceedings, Martin and Susan entered into a mediated settlement agreement wherein Susan agreed to pay Martin in exchange for sole ownership of AOI ("the 2017 agreement"). That note was secured by a mortgage on the property owned by AOI. Susan later sold the property, and she paid the balance due on the note to Martin in full. In August 2019, Martin sued AOI, asserting claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, alleging AOI had failed to pay Martin the amount owed under the 2012 note. AOI argued Martin commenced the action against it without substantial justification because Martin was "fully aware that he has been paid in full for his interest in the 2012 Promissory Note and despite that fact, [he] initiated the groundless underlying lawsuit." The Alabama Supreme Court found that although the trial court found in favor of AOI on the substantive claims Martin asserted in his complaint, the trial court could have determined the issues of fact surrounding Martin's claim were reasonably in conflict. Accordingly, the trial court's factual determination that Martin's action was not frivolous or groundless in fact was supported by the evidence. Moreover, the Supreme Court's review of the record, lead it to conclude that Martin's claims against AOI were not groundless in law. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to not award attorney fees and costs to AOI under the ALAA was affirmed. View "Auburn-Opelika Investments, LLC v. Burdette" on Justia Law

Nicholas Jay appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") on his claim against USAA seeking uninsured-motorist ("UM") benefits. Nicholas was injured in an automobile accident when riding as a passenger in Ryen Gorman's automobile. Gorman did not have automobile insurance. Nicholas received $50,000 in UM benefits through a policy he had with Nationwide Insurance Company. Thereafter, Nicholas commenced an action against USAA, seeking UM benefits pursuant to a USAA policy owned by his father-in-law, George Brewer, and under which Nicholas's wife, Michelle Jay, had automobile-insurance coverage. Because Nicholas was not a "covered person" under the USAA policy, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Jay v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law