Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Alabama
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Nicholas Hoffman, a former firefighter for the City of Birmingham, was released from duty in 2022 due to a medical condition. He applied for both extraordinary and ordinary disability benefits from the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, but the Board of Managers denied his claims. Hoffman received notice of the denial on December 28, 2022. On March 10, 2023, he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Jefferson Circuit Court to review the Board's decision.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Hoffman's petition, citing improper service of process. Hoffman initially attempted service by certified mail, but the return receipts were signed by an employee of the City's finance department, not an authorized agent of the respondents. Hoffman then attempted service through the sheriff's office, but the summons was accepted by a city clerk, not the mayor or an authorized agent. The trial court granted the respondents' motion to quash service and ordered Hoffman to perfect service within 30 days. When Hoffman failed to do so to the court's satisfaction, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that Hoffman had made diligent efforts to serve the respondents and had not exhibited a clear record of delay, willful default, or contumacious conduct. The court held that the trial court exceeded its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hoffman v. City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System" on Justia Law

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Keith Edward Myers posted a negative online review about the legal services provided by Jerry M. Blevins. Blevins, representing himself, sued Myers in the Elmore Circuit Court for defamation per se, invasion of privacy, wantonness, and negligence, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court sealed the case record and, after unsuccessful attempts to serve Myers, allowed service by publication. Myers did not respond, leading to a default judgment awarding Blevins $500,000 in compensatory damages, $1.5 million in punitive damages, and a permanent injunction against Myers.Myers later appeared in court, filing motions to unseal the record and set aside the default judgment, arguing improper service and venue, among other issues. The trial court unsealed the record but did not rule on the motion to set aside the default judgment. Myers filed for bankruptcy, temporarily staying proceedings, but the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Myers then filed a notice of appeal and a renewed motion to stop execution on his property, which the trial court granted, staying execution pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court dismissed Myers's direct appeal as untimely regarding the default judgment and premature concerning the Rule 60(b) motion, which remained pending in the trial court. The court also dismissed Myers's challenge to the sealing of the record, noting that the trial court had already unsealed it, rendering the issue moot.Blevins's petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court's order quashing writs of execution was also dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court's resolution of the direct appeal allowed trial court proceedings, including Blevins's execution efforts, to resume, thus granting Blevins the relief he sought. View "Myers v. Blevins" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over a property deed. Earnest Coprich and Bessie Elizabeth Jones, who have known each other for about 50 years, disagreed over the terms of a property sale. Coprich claimed that he sold his residence to Jones for $15,000, while Jones contended that the sale price was $10,000. After Jones moved into the property and made several improvements, Coprich filed a complaint seeking to set aside the deed. He alleged that he was mentally incompetent at the time of signing the deed and that he was coerced and defrauded by Jones. Jones denied these allegations and asserted that she had purchased the property and occupied it since the transaction.The Montgomery Circuit Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Jones. The court found that Coprich failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his incompetence or that Jones had committed fraud or misrepresentation. Coprich's postjudgment motion to vacate the order was summarily denied by the court. Coprich then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, determined that the Court of Civil Appeals should have jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that the case is a "civil case" as defined by ยง 12-3-10 and that the "amount involved" does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000. Therefore, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Coprich v. Jones" on Justia Law

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David McGilvray, a former investigator for the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners (the Medical Board), was terminated for sending a sexually explicit email to his coworkers. Following his termination, the Medical Board requested the Local Government Health Insurance Board (the Insurance Board) to cancel McGilvray's health-insurance benefits. McGilvray, claiming he had retired before the Medical Board ratified his termination, sought retiree-health-insurance benefits. His request was denied by the Insurance Board on the grounds that he had been fired for cause and had not retired.McGilvray filed two lawsuits in an attempt to obtain retiree-health-insurance benefits. The first lawsuit was against the executive director of the Medical Board and the CEO of the Insurance Board. The Montgomery Circuit Court entered summary judgment against him, ruling that his claims were time-barred. In the second lawsuit, which is the subject of this appeal, McGilvray sued the executive director of the Medical Board and the members of the Medical Board in both their official and individual capacities. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed this suit based on the doctrines of State immunity and res judicata.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that McGilvray's breach-of-contract claim, seeking damages from the Medical Board defendants in their official capacities, was barred by State immunity. Furthermore, the court ruled that all of his other claims were barred by res judicata, as they arose from the same set of facts as his claims in the prior action: the termination of his employment and the Insurance Board's denial of his request for retiree-health-insurance benefits. View "McGilvray v. Perkins" on Justia Law

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The case involves Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats (the plaintiffs) who filed a private right-of-way condemnation case against Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers (the defendants). The plaintiffs sought a right-of-way across the defendants' property to access their own landlocked properties. The properties in question include several parcels of land, some of which are low-lying wetlands often flooded and used for hunting and fishing. A private dirt road, referred to as the "farm road," crosses the defendants' property and has been historically used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors to access their properties.The Tuscaloosa Probate Court initially granted the plaintiffs a right-of-way across the defendants' property, concluding that the plaintiffs' property was landlocked. The defendants appealed this decision to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked due to inheritance of additional land that touched a public road. The Circuit Court agreed with the defendants, granting a summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked and they had reasonable access to their property from a public road.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the decision of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs have an existing, reasonable means to access their landlocked property. The court noted that the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence indicating that they could not travel from the public road across their property to access their landlocked property. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had permission to cross an intervening property, and thus there was no requirement for them to seek a right-of-way over it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Coats v. Ayers" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose between the Alabama-West Florida Conference ("the Conference") of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the UMC"), and 44 Methodist churches in the Conference ("the churches"). Amid disagreements within the UMC over issues of human sexuality, the churches sought to leave the UMC with their properties under a provision of the Book of Discipline, the governing law of the UMC. After the Conference denied the churches the ability to vote to disaffiliate under that provision, the churches asked the Montgomery Circuit Court to order the Conference to grant them that vote. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.The Montgomery Circuit Court held an emergency hearing and heard evidence. The next day, the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, according to the court, the relief that the churches requested was "ecclesiastical in nature and would require Court interference in matters of church autonomy," which would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The churches appealed that judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The churches argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, they said, the case presents only "civil and property issues." However, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the churches' central claims turn entirely on the interpretation of the provision of the Book of Discipline and whether their efforts to leave the UMC were consistent with that church law. Under existing First Amendment law and the court's precedent, that interpretive issue constitutes an ecclesiastical question that courts do not have jurisdiction to decide. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Aldersgate United Methodist Church of Montgomery v. Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc." on Justia Law

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Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law

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The case involves National Trust Insurance Company ("National Trust") and Whaley Construction Company, Inc. ("Whaley"). Whaley was a general contractor on a project at a Lockheed Martin facility. Smith's Inc. of Dothan ("Smith's of Dothan") was a subcontractor hired to install an HVAC system on the project, and Phoenix II Contracting, LLC ("Phoenix II"), was a subcontractor hired to install the roofing. Smith's of Dothan's subcontract with Whaley provided that Smith's of Dothan would name Whaley and Lockheed Martin as additional insureds on its liability policies. National Trust issued Smith's of Dothan a commercial-package policy and a commercial-liability umbrella policy ("the subject policies") through Harmon-DennisBradshaw, Inc. ("HDB"). Whaley and Lockheed Martin were additional insureds under the subject policies. Timothy L. Bozeman was working as a roof laborer on the Lockheed Martin project when he fell through an opening in the roof and was seriously injured. Bozeman sued Phoenix II and various fictitiously named defendants in the circuit court ("the state-court action").National Trust commenced a declaratory-judgment action in the Northern Division of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ("the federal-court action"). The complaint in the federal-court action named Smith's of Dothan, Whaley, Lockheed Martin, and the estate as respondents and included the following factual allegations: "25. A dispute has arisen as to whether Respondents Smith's [of Dothan], Whaley, and Lockheed [Martin] are entitled to a defense and indemnification as to the claims asserted in the Underlying Lawsuit. National Trust asserts that, based on the terms, conditions, and exclusions contained in the [subject] policies, Respondents Smith's [of Dothan], Whaley, and Lockheed [Martin] are not entitled to a defense in the underlying lawsuit or indemnification against settlement, award, or judgment therefrom.On April 14, 2023, Whaley filed a third-party complaint against National Trust and Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") in the state-court action. The third-party complaint alleged claims of breach of contract and bad-faith refusal to pay against National Trust and Continental. On May 4, 2023, National Trust filed a motion to dismiss in the state-court action. In the motion, National Trust asked the circuit court "to reconsider its previous Order โ€ฆ dated April 21, 2023, granting Whaley's motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against [National Trust] and further move[d] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss both of Whaley's claims asserted against [National Trust] in the Third-Party Complaint." In its motion, National Trust asserted that Whaley's claims against it were due to be dismissed "because they were compulsory counterclaims that Whaley was required to file in the federal[-court] action pursuant to ยง 65-440, Ala. Code 1975." On June 7, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying National Trust's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. National Trust subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to direct the circuit court to enter an order dismissing National Trust from the state-court action.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted National Trust's mandamus petition in part and issued a writ directing the circuit court to enter an order dismissing Whaley's breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims in the state-court action that were based on National Trust's refusal to indemnify Whaley for the amount it had paid to settle Lockheed Martin's indemnity claim against it. However, the court denied the petition as to Whaley's contingent claims for a defense and indemnification. View "Ex parte National Trust Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed a case involving a dispute over an undeveloped island ("the island") located within a canal system on Ono Island, a residential subdivision. The island was created during the development of the canal system and was later sold in a tax sale. F Family South, LLC ("FFS") acquired the island and sought to construct a boat shelter on it. The Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc. ("the POA") objected, arguing that the island was subject to certain covenants restricting its use.The Baldwin Circuit Court ruled in favor of the POA, finding that the island was subject to both express and implied covenants restricting its use. The court also invalidated the 1995 tax sale through which FFS had obtained ownership of the island, and declared the POA as the island's owner.FFS appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in voiding the 1995 tax sale and in concluding that the island was subject to the covenants. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision to void the tax sale, but affirmed the finding that the island was subject to implied restrictive covenants governing its use. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "F Family South, LLC v. Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc." on Justia Law