Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-respondent City of Norco (City) filed a receivership action to abate what it described as “nearly 20 life-safety hazards” on a property belonging to defendant-appellant Ronald Mugar. During the litigation, Mugar abated the substandard conditions on the property, and the matter was dismissed. Mugar appealed the trial court's order declaring the City as the prevailing party, and awarding it attorney fees pursuant to Health & Safety Code section 17980.7(c)(11). Mugar contended: (1) his due process rights were violated because the City was represented by a private law firm with an inappropriate financial interest in the litigation, and without adequate supervision by neutral government attorneys; (2) the award of attorney fees unconstitutionally burdened his First Amendment right to petition by penalizing him for asserting defenses in the action; and (3) the City should not be considered the prevailing party. The City argued Mugar forfeited his constitutional arguments, and it contested the merits of Mugar’s claims. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the City that Mugar forfeited his constitutional arguments. On the merits, however, the Court rejected each of Mugar’s contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "City of Norco v. Mugar" on Justia Law

CHKRS leased Friedman’s property and paid $8,500 for an option to purchase by giving 30 days’ notice. With respect to eminent-domain, the lease stated that any money from the City of Dublin was payable to Friedman “until [CHKRS] has procured on the purchase option.” Dublin was constructing a roundabout near the property. Weeks later, Dublin notified the residents that workers would be entering to construct a bike path through the leased property. Dublin initiated a “quick-take” action, adding CHKRS to the suit, and deposited $25,080. with the court. CHKRS emailed Friedman, indicating that CHKRS intended to buy the property. Ohio courts ruled that the email did not “procure” the purchase option and that Friedman was entitled to Dublin’s funds. Dublin began construction. CHKRS sued, citing the driveway's removal. In 2016, the city constructed a new driveway, which CHKRS asserts suffers from design flaws, violates building and traffic codes, creates a hazard, and limits access. CHKRS completed its purchase of the property.CHKRS filed federal litigation, asserting takings and due-process claims, seeking payment for the defective replacement driveway. CHKRS disavowed any attempt to again seek payment for the appropriation of the bike-path easements. The court held that CHKRS lacked Article III standing, reasoning that the state courts had already held that CHKRS lacked a protectable interest in the property.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Article III standing was not the correct doctrine. CHKRS established its standing by alleging a colorable interest in the property for its takings claim. The district court misread Ohio issue-preclusion law in reaching the contrary result. The court affirmed the dismissal of CHKRS’s due-process claims as forfeited. View "CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, Ohio" on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"), the successor by merger to Vision Bank, and FNB Bank ("FNB") separately appealed a circuit court's judgments on their breach-of-contract claims against Bama Bayou, LLC, formerly known as Riverwalk, LLC ("Bama Bayou"), and Marine Park, LLC ("Marine Park"), and the individuals and entities guaranteeing Bama Bayou's and Marine Park's contract obligations, challenging the trial court's damages awards. Bama Bayou and Marine Park were the developers of a planned mixed-use development in Orange Beach consisting of a marine park, residential condominiums, retail shops, hotels, and commercial entertainment venues. Marine Park specifically intended to develop a special-use facility for the exhibition of marine animals. Vision Bank made four loans to Bama Bayou and Marine Park related to the development project. The Marine Park loan was fully funded by FNB pursuant to a participation agreement with Vision Bank. The participation agreement provided that the Marine Park parcel would be owned by FNB in the event it was acquired by foreclosure. Bama Bayou and Marine Park were having financial problems with regard to the project by August 2007. Vision Bank demanded payment at that time, and Bama Bayou, Marine Park, and the guarantors failed and/or refused to pay the indebtedness owed on the loans. In 2009, Vision Bank conducted a public auction to separately foreclose the mortgages. No bids were submitted; Vision Bank purchased the properties. Neither Bama Bayou, nor Marine Park, nor the guarantors exercised their rights to redeem the properties. Vision Bank sued Bama Bayou and its guarantors, and Marine Park and its guarantors for amounts owed under those loans, including all principal, accrued interest, late charges, attorney's fees and collection costs. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgments in these consolidated cases and remanded for a determination of the appropriate awards on the breach-of-contract claims. "Such awards should account for all accrued interest, late charges, attorney's fees, collection costs, and property- preservation expenses owed." View "FNB Bank v. Marine Park, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Heirs contested rights to a family cabin and a federal use permit authorizing the cabin on federal land. Plaintiffs alleged the defendant was wrongfully claiming sole ownership of the cabin and permit, and was threatening to sell the property. Three actions taken by the trial court were the subject of this appeal: (1) the court sustained defendant’s demurrer without prejudice and dismissed the action solely based on lack of jurisdiction; (2) it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify defendant’s attorney; and (3) it denied plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief filed while this appeal was pending. Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in each instance. In his cross-appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred by not dismissing the action with prejudice. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to try this matter; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel; and (3) plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief pending this appeal was now moot. An application for injunctive relief and defendant’s arguments for dismissing with prejudice could be considered by the trial court on remand. View "Capra v. Capra" on Justia Law

Maryam Soheili and Morteza Sohyly (appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a house owned by respondents Joseph and Dinah Trenk. After Sohyly filed suit against Joseph Trenk for malpractice, the parties settled and Joseph agreed to pay $100,000 and executed a promissory note and a trust deed on the property to secure the obligation. Sohyly’s sister, Maryam Soheili, was designated as the beneficiary of the trust deed. After Joseph stopped regular payments on the note after 2003, Sohyly began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2018.The Trenks then filed this action to clear title to their house, alleging that the trust deed was no longer enforceable. The trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the Trenks, ruling that both the statute of limitations and the Marketable Record Title Act barred enforcement of the trust deed.The Court of Appeal held that a power of sale in a trust deed is enforceable even if the statute of limitations has run on the underlying obligation. In this case, because the trust deed did not state the last date for payment under the promissory note, under Civil Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2), appellants would have 60 years to exercise the power of sale in the trust deed. However, the court held that the power of sale is not enforceable for another reason. The court explained that the property presumptively is community property, appellants did not rebut that presumption at trial, and because Dinah did not execute the trust deed, she has the power to void it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Trenk v. Soheili" on Justia Law

Eleanor Williams appealed a probate court order denying her request for redemption of certain real property. In 2003, the State purchased property located in Birmingham ("the property") at a tax sale after the then owners, Benjamin and Marzella Rosser, failed to pay ad valorem taxes. The State sold the property in 2016 for $1,000 to Waynew Global Holdings, LLC ("WGH"). In February 2017, WGH sold the property to Mari Properties, LLC ("Mari"), for $5,000, and Mari recorded the deed to the property. Williams claimed that she inherited the property from the Rossers in or around March 2003. In September 2017, Williams petitioned for redemption of the property under section 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975, with which she tendered $1,100. The probate court granted Williams petition, thereby ordering Mari to compute and submit the amount of those items and stated that, upon receipt of those figures, the probate court would enter an amendment to the order and direct payment by Williams. The probate court did not vest title of the property in Williams. Mari, however, moved to vacate the probate's order, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the redemption petition because, it argued, Williams was required under 40-10-120 to redeem the property through statutory redemption within three years of the May 13, 2003, tax sale. Mari contended in the motion that the only redemption process available to Williams was judicial redemption under section 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975, and that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over that process. Despite Mari's filing of the notice of appeal to the circuit court, the parties continued filing documents in the probate court. By March 6, 2020, the probate court reversed course, vacating its earlier judgment in favor of Williams for redemption under 40-10-120, and holding that Williams should have filed her redemption petition with the circuit court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that once Mari appealed to the circuit court, the probate court's jurisdiction was divested, making all orders filed after Mari's circuit court suit void. View "Williams v. Mari Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Riley Kuntz appealed the district court’s default judgment entered in his favor. Kuntz sued Ashlynn Leiss and Joseph Westbrook for trespass and theft of his cat trap. Neither Leiss nor Westbrook answered the complaint or otherwise appeared. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted default judgment in favor of Kuntz. The court found a trespass and conversion of the cat trap had occurred. The court awarded Kuntz a money judgment for conversion of the cat trap, but found he did not suffer any actual damages as a result of the trespass. Kuntz argues the district court erred by denying his damages for trespass. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kuntz v. Leiss, et al." on Justia Law

Tokiko Johnson's real property was damaged in a storm and she filed a claim with her insurance company. Johnson also executed an assignment of her insurance claim for the purpose of repairing the property with the execution in favor of Triple Diamond Construction LLC (the construction company). An appraiser retained by the construction company determined storm damage to the property in the amount of $36,346.06. The insurer determined the amount of damage due to the storm was $21,725.36. When sued, the insurer argued the insured property owner was required to obtain written consent from the insurer prior to making the assignment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined an insured's post-loss assignment of a property insurance claim was an assignment of a chose in action and not an assignment of the insured's policy. Therefore, the insured's assignment was not prohibited by either the insurance policy or 36 O.S. section 3624. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The insurer's motion to dismiss the appeal was thus denied. View "Johnson v. CSAA General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston ("the Board") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Calhoun Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order entering a partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs Betty Milner and Teresa Holiday. In 2018, plaintiffs sued the Board seeking compensatory and punitive damages based on claims of breach of contract, nuisance, continuing trespass, negligence, and wantonness. Plaintiffs alleged that in February 2016 they instructed the Board to cut off water supply to a house they owned; that plaintiffs "returned to reopen" the house in February 2018 and discovered that the water supply to the house had not been completely cut off; and, that the Board's failure to properly cut off the water supply caused severe damage to the house. The Board filed an answer that included general denials of plaintiffs' allegations and asserted a number of "affirmative defenses," including that plaintiffs' injuries were the result of the "intervening and superseding" actions of an individual or entity other than the Board or anyone under its control. Viewing the evidence before it in a light most favorable to the Board, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court could have assigned some culpability to the Board. However, the Court determined the Board could not have known plaintiffs would initiate litigation against the Board once it was discovered that, at least from the Board's perspective, water was running to plaintiffs' house only because a third party had tampered with the cap and lock device, not because the Board had failed to properly cut off the water in 2016. Moreover, the Court concluded plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that fundamental fairness required the most severe sanction available to the trial court to impose upon the Board. Therefore, the Court determined the Board established a clear legal right to mandamus relief. The petition was granted and the writ issued. View "Ex parte The Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Anniston." on Justia Law

In case 1190468, Lewis and Ellen Richardson, and in case 1190469, Sherry Phelps (collectively, "the landowners") appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mobile County, Alabama in their respective actions against the County. The landowners asserted the County was responsible for flooding that damaged the landowners' personal property, allegedly decreased the value of their residential property, and made travel over the roads in their neighborhood unsafe and inconvenient. The trial court concluded the County owed no duty to remediate the flooding. To this, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed: the landowners did not demonstrate the County owed them a duty to prevent the flooding of their property. However, the Court concluded the County did owe a duty to keep its roads safe and convenient for travel, and the landowners could seek to enforce that duty. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Richardson et al. v. County of Mobile" on Justia Law