Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law

In 2021, the appellee purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure auction and later filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to quiet title against Jose Strickland. The complaint was amended to include Plus Properties, LLC, and later Plus Properties Trust as defendants. The docket indicated service was directed to Plus Properties Trust, but no affidavit of service was filed. Plus Properties Trust, represented by Kellee Baker, moved to dismiss some claims but did not allege insufficient service of process. The trial court granted partial dismissal, requiring a responsive pleading by October 4, 2022, which Plus Properties Trust failed to file.The trial court entered default against Plus Properties Trust and scheduled an ex parte proof hearing. Despite being served with notice of the hearing and subsequent motions, Plus Properties Trust did not respond. The court granted default judgment, quieting title in the appellee's name and issuing a preliminary injunction against Plus Properties Trust. Plus Properties Trust, with new counsel, filed two Rule 60(b) motions to vacate the default judgment, arguing lack of notice and ineffective service of process. Both motions were denied by the trial court.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Plus Properties Trust failed to preserve its claim of ineffective service of process by not raising it in the trial court. The court also found that Plus Properties Trust had sufficient notice of the default proceedings and the ex parte proof hearing, as evidenced by the certificates of service. The court concluded that the default judgment did not violate due process and affirmed the trial court's orders denying the Rule 60(b) motions. View "Plus Properties Trust v. Molinuevo Then" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

Dwight D. Sikes appealed a judgment from the Choctaw Circuit Court, where Michelle M. Kirkland, representing Kenneth McIlwain's estate, had obtained a judgment against him. The case involved land originally owned by Dwight's father, James Sikes, which was deeded to Dwight's brother, Archie, and subsequently to Kenneth and Patricia McIlwain. The McIlwains sued Dwight, alleging his livestock trespassed and caused damage. Dwight counterclaimed, alleging the McIlwains improperly removed James's personal property, and cross-claimed, arguing James was not competent when deeding the land to Archie.The Choctaw Circuit Court ordered Dwight to remove his livestock but did not rule on his counterclaim. After the McIlwains passed away, Kirkland was substituted as the plaintiff. The court later ruled against Dwight on his cross-claim, finding James competent when deeding the land, but did not address the counterclaim. Dwight appealed this judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and noted that the lower court had not disposed of all claims, specifically Dwight's counterclaim regarding the removal of personal property. The court emphasized that a final judgment must conclusively determine all issues and rights of the parties. Since the trial court's judgment did not address the counterclaim or fully resolve the initial trespass and nuisance claims, it was not a final judgment.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Dwight's appeal due to the lack of a final judgment, as the unresolved claims deprived the court of jurisdiction. View "Sikes v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex, alleged that the defendants, the complex's owner and management company, failed to maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition. They claimed the defendants delayed inspections, concealed hazards, and violated housing laws. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all residents from 2004 to 2019, citing issues like a 2019 sewage backup and systemic neglect.The Superior Court in Hartford, transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket, denied the motion for class certification. The court found that the proposed class did not meet the predominance and superiority requirements under Practice Book § 9-8 (3). It reasoned that determining whether each unit was uninhabitable required individualized proof, making a class action unsuitable. The court noted that while some claims might support class certification for specific events, the broad class definition over many years was too extensive.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the proposed class was too broad and lacked generalized evidence for the entire period. It emphasized that the trial court had no obligation to redefine the class sua sponte. The plaintiffs did not request a narrower class definition, and the trial court was not required to do so on its own. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification. View "Collier v. Adar Hartford Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC (Phoenix Capital) sought to recover mineral royalties as a life tenant and alternatively to reform the deed that established its life estate. The dispute arose from a series of property transfers beginning in 1977, when Mr. and Mrs. Peterson transferred a parcel of real property to Alva and Velma Woods, retaining a life estate in the mineral estate. In 2003, Alva and Velma deeded the property to their son Paul and his wife Cheryl, intending to retain a life estate in the mineral estate. However, the 2003 deed did not reserve this life estate, leading to a 2006 deed that conveyed a life estate in one-half of the mineral estate to Alva and Velma. Subsequent leases were executed, and in 2021, Velma sold her life estate to Phoenix Capital.The District Court of Laramie County dismissed Phoenix Capital’s claims. It concluded that under the doctrine of waste, a life tenant does not have the right to receive royalties unless expressly stated in the deed or agreed upon with the remainderman. The court also found that the claim to reform the deed was barred by the statute of limitations, which began when the deed was recorded in 2006.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the doctrine of waste precludes a life tenant from receiving royalties without an agreement with the remainderman or express language in the deed. The court also held that the statute of limitations for reformation claims begins when the deed is recorded, making Phoenix Capital’s 2022 reformation claim untimely. The court found no error in the district court’s application of settled law and affirmed the dismissal of Phoenix Capital’s claims. View "Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC v. Woods" on Justia Law