Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellee Highpointe Energy filed a quiet title action in Oklahoma against appellants the Viersens, and others. The disputed property concerned mineral interests from two different chains of title: one chain stemmed from a bankruptcy proceeding, while the other chain arose from a mortgage foreclosure proceeding and subsequent sheriff's sale. The trial court determined that the chain resulting from the foreclosure/sheriff's sale was superior to the bankruptcy chain. The Viersens appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because the bankruptcy purchasers could secure no greater rights in the disputed property than the bankruptcy trustee held, the purchasers from the mortgage foreclosure proceeding held the superior title. View "Highpointe Energy v. Viersen" on Justia Law

Shamblin Hamilton appealed a circuit court judgment concluding he had no interest in a Birmingham property, and ejected him from the property. In 1992, the property was conveyed to Shamblin and Carol Hamilton by general warranty deed. The Hamiltons owned the property in fee simple subject to a mortgage to Compass Bank recorded in 2003. In 2004, Shambin and Carol divorced, and pursuant to that divorce judgment, Shamblin was awarded sole ownership of the property. In 2009, the divorce judgment was modified by an agreement of the parties, and a court order adopting that agreement declared that Shamblin had assumed sole responsibility of a home-equity line of credit that Shamblin and Carol had jointly executed with Compass Bank. In his filings in the circuit court in this case, Shamblin asserted that he was still making payments on the home-equity line of credit as the litigation ensued. The Hamiltons failed to pay the ad valorem real-property taxes on the property, and in 2014, the State sold the property at auction to Mercury Funding, LLC ("Mercury"). Mercury conveyed its interested to Guardian Tax AL, LLC (“Guardian”) by quitclaim deed. In 2018, Guardian filed a complaint for ejectment and to quiet title to the property against the Hamiltons and Compass Bank. Shamblin denied not paying the ad valorem property taxes on the property, and he asserted that he had no notice of delinquency even though he had retained physical ownership of the property since 1992. Shamblin asserted a counterclaim for judicial redemption of the property, arguing he, not Carol as part title-holder, had a right to redeem. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in holding Carol had a right to redeem, and reversed. View "Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Scott and Janet Lopas filed suit against, among others, Performance Builders, LLC, Chris White, Shana Tyler Clark, and DSKAT Holdings, LLC, d/b/a A-Pro Home Inspection Services Birmingham (collectively, "the movants") asserting various causes of actions based on the inspection, appraisal, and sale of a piece of real property purchased by the Lopases. The movants moved to compel arbitration of the Lopases' claims, which the circuit court denied. The movants appealed the circuit court's order. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded the movants met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement containing an arbitration provision between the parties, and that that agreement involved a transaction affecting interstate commerce. Furthermore, the arbitration provision dictated that the issue of enforceability raised by the Lopases had to be submitted to the arbitrator for determination. Therefore, the circuit court's order denying the movants' motion to compel arbitration was reversed. View "Performance Builders, LLC, et al. v. Lopas" on Justia Law

Donald Zucker appealed a summary-judgment decision awarding attorney’s fees to Gregory Wark, because Zucker refused to mediate a dispute arising out of a real estate purchase and sale agreement. On appeal, Zucker argued he was not required to mediate because the purchase and sale agreement was not an enforceable contract. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, and vacated the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. View "Zucker v. Wark" on Justia Law

Loyd Eugene Ware filed suit against the City of Kendrick (the City) alleging that in December 2016, a water pipe maintained by the City failed and flooded his property, causing damage. The City answered, claiming that Ware had failed to file a timely notice of tort claim within 180 days of the City’s alleged negligence, a statutory prerequisite to filing suit against a governmental entity under Idaho Code section 6-906. The City averred the flooding occurred on December 17, 2016, and the notice of tort claim was not filed until two hundred twenty-two days later. The City thus moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. Ware timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Ware v. City of Kendrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Charles Best Jr. and Robbie Johnson Best alleged that defendants (collectively the Bank), attempted to collect a debt secured by the Bests’ home, despite having no legal right to do so. They alleged that, in the process, the Bank engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent debt collection practices. Based on these allegations, they raised six causes of action, including one under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court sustained the Bank’s demurrer to the entire complaint on the ground of res judicata; it ruled that the Bests were asserting the same cause(s) of action as in a prior federal action that they brought, unsuccessfully, against the Bank. In the nonpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, as to three of the Best’s causes of action (including their Rosenthal Act cause of action) the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer based on res judicata. As to the other three, the Court found the Bests did not articulate any reason why res judicata does not apply; thus, they have forfeited any such contention. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court held that the Rosenthal Act could apply to a nonjudicial foreclosure; the lower federal court opinions on which the Bank relied were superseded by controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the California Courts of Appeal. View "Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

ABS REO Trust II (ABS) appealed an order denying its motion to correct/vacate the portion of a prior quiet title judgment adjudicating the rights of a defaulting party, Clarion Mortgage Capital, Inc. (Clarion), despite that Clarion had not been served with the operative amended complaint and the court did not hold a hearing on the plaintiff’s claims against Clarion. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred in denying ABS’s motion. ABS had standing to bring this motion and it met its burden to show the prior judgment was void as to Clarion. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with directions for the court to grant ABS’s motion and strike the portions of the prior judgment relating to Clarion. View "Paterra v. Hansen" on Justia Law

A homeowner sought to rescind a foreclosure sale, arguing the notices he received before the sale were deficient because they lacked information required under state and federal law. The notices were sent by a law firm acting on behalf of a bank, which by assignment was the beneficiary of the deed of trust. The superior court granted summary judgment to the bank, determining that the law firm’s communications on the bank’s behalf did not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), or the state nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and that the homeowner was not entitled to relief. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concurred with the superior court and affirmed its judgment. View "Wendt v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A." on Justia Law

Alicia Gangi brought a declaratory judgment action against Mark and Jane Doe Debolt (“Debolts”), the owners of a parcel adjacent to Gangi’s property. While a water tank and deck lie on Gangi’s property, the system only served the Debolts’ property with water. Moreover, the Debolts enjoyed exclusive use and enjoyment of an above-ground deck atop the water tank, since their property included an easement to the land where the water tank and deck were located. After the district court denied Gangi’s motion for summary judgment, Gangi dismissed her own case with prejudice. Thereafter, the Debolts sought attorney fees on the basis of a recorded agreement Gangi’s and the Debolts’ predecessor in interest had with a third party regarding the water system. The agreement provided that attorney fees would be awarded to the prevailing party if a suit were brought to enforce or interpret the agreement. On the basis of that agreement, the district court granted Debolts’ request for attorney fees. Gangi appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Gangi’s action was not brought to interpret or enforce the Debolts’ predecessor in interest’s agreement. “The true gravamen of the lawsuit was the interpretation of the 2012 Elliott-Debolt easement agreement and whether that agreement provided the Debolts with an exclusive easement to use the water system and the deck. Therefore, inasmuch as the district court’s decision was neither consistent with existing legal standards nor reached through the exercise of reason, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to the Debolts under the prior Elliott-Debolt agreement.” View "Gangi v. Debolt" on Justia Law

Kevin Johnson, APLC, Kevin Johnson, and Jeanne MacKinnon (collectively, the attorney defendants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint on behalf of their clients Christian Clews (Christian), Barbara Clews (Barbara), and Clews Land & Livestock, LLC (CLL) (collectively, Clews Horse Ranch) challenging a decision of the City of San Diego (City) to approve the construction of a private secondary school adjacent to the Clews’ commercial horse ranch. The petition asserted the City’s approval of the project and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project violated the California Environmental Quality Act, the San Diego Municipal Code, and the City’s land use plan. The trial court denied relief and, in Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 19 Cal.App.5th 161 (2017), the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Jan Dunning, Cal Coast Academy RE Holdings, LLC, and North County Center for Educational Development, Inc. (collectively, Cal Coast), the developers of the project and real parties in interest in the CEQA Litigation, then filed this lawsuit against Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants for malicious prosecution. Cal Coast asserted the defendants lacked probable cause and acted with malice when they pursued the CEQA Litigation. The attorney defendants filed a special motion to strike Cal Coast’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, to which the Clews Horse Ranch joined. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim. Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants appealed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concluded Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim against Clews Horse Ranch, but not against the attorney defendants. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to Clews Horse Ranch, and reversed the order denying the anti- SLAPP motion as to the attorney defendants. View "Dunning v. Johnson" on Justia Law