Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jonathon Frantz appealed a district court’s award of attorney fees entered against him and his clients, jointly and severally, as a sanction for frivolous conduct. This appeal arose from an easement dispute among family members. The land at issue was split into multiple parcels: the Tracy Parcel, the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and the Osborn Parcel. Plaintiffs Brook Tracy and Travis Mathis owned the Tracy Parcel; Plaintiffs Gailord “Cowboy” Mathis, Brook Tracy, Laura Roll, and Rebecca Stafford owned the Mathis/Roll Parcel; and David and Naomi Osborn owned the Osborn Parcel. In 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Osborns. Frantz was Plaintiffs’ attorney. Plaintiffs claimed that more than thirty years ago they “constructed/placed a home” on the Tracy Parcel, “constructed/placed a cabin” on the Mathis/Roll Parcel, and “created a driveway” through the Osborn Parcel to access their respective properties. Plaintiffs also claimed that for more than thirty years they had openly and continuously used the driveway over the Osborn Parcel for access to the nearest public right-of-way, Highland Drive, which was the only reasonable way to reach their respective properties. Based on this use, Plaintiffs claimed that they had an easement by necessity, an easement by implication, or a prescriptive easement across the Osborn Parcel along the existing driveway. Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought a judgment from the district court declaring their rights in the driveway. The trial court denied a preliminary injunction for two reasons: (1) “the allegations in the complaint and the motion contain[ed] gross exaggerations, if not falsehoods” and “the credibility of all of the plaintiffs” was questionable; and (2) Plaintiffs could not establish entitlement to the relief demanded because they came to the hearing unprepared to support the easement theories they advanced with any competent evidence. The Osborns moved for attorney fees, leaving it to the trial court's discretion to award Rule 11 sanctions "if the [c]ourt determines that this motion was pursued frivolously." On appeal, Frantz contended the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees against him personally because it: (1) failed to follow the procedural requirements set out in Idaho Code section 12-123; and (2) erroneously found that he engaged in frivolous conduct. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded this matter did not present a justiciable controversy because the judgment was satisfied and Frantz did not preserve his right to appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1115. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Frantz’s appeal because the issues before the Court were moot. View "Frantz v. Osborn" on Justia Law

In 2005, U.S. Home Corporation entered into a contract to purchase two contiguous tracts of land, one of which was owned by West Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. Under the contract, West Pleasant and the other landowner were to gain certain approvals permitting development of the properties. Pursuant to the contract, U.S. Home paid advances to the landowners totaling over $1.5 million. As security for the advances, West Pleasant executed a mortgage and note on its property; the other landowner did not. When a contract dispute arose in 2006, U.S. Home sought to terminate the contract and get a return of its total advance. U.S. Home prevailed in arbitration and was awarded a judgment in the full amount of the advance, plus interest. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in 2009. When the judgment was not satisfied, U.S. Home commenced foreclosure actions against the properties. The foreclosure proceedings were stayed when West Pleasant and the other property owner filed for bankruptcy. In West Pleasant’s bankruptcy action, U.S. Home moved to dismiss and for relief from the automatic stay. West Pleasant and U.S. Home executed a Consent Order, in which West Pleasant dismissed its bankruptcy proceeding, waived a fair market valuation and its right to object to a sheriff’s sale of its property, and released U.S. Home from any claims in law or equity. U.S. Home never proceeded with any deficiency action against either landowner. Nonetheless, the landowners commenced the affirmative litigation that gave rise to this appeal, seeking a declaration that the arbitration award was fully satisfied, as well as compensation “in the amount of the excess fair market value of the properties obtained by defendant[] U.S. Home over the amount of its outstanding judgment.” The second property owner then assigned its rights to West Pleasant. After trial, the court valued the second property as worth almost $2.4 million and West Pleasant’s property as worth almost $2 million. The court ordered U.S. Home to pay the fair market value of the West Pleasant property, plus interest, and extinguished the arbitration award on the second property. On appeal, the Appellate Division determined that West Pleasant had waived its right to a fair market valuation on its property but that it was owed a fair market value credit for the second property. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for recalculation of damages. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding use of fair market value credit by this debtor to obtain a money judgment against a creditor, in the absence of a deficiency claim threatened or pursued or any objection being raised at the time of the sheriff’s sales, was "inconsistent with sound foreclosure processes and, moreover, inequitable in the circumstances presented." The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "West Pleasant-CPGT, Inc. v. U.S. Home Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant Javier Torres signed a promissory note (Note) secured by a residential mortgage (Mortgage). Torres defaulted on the Note. CitiMortgage, Inc., discovered that it had lost the original Note but had retained a digital copy setting forth its terms. CitiMortgage assigned the Mortgage and its interest in the Note to plaintiff Investors Bank (Investors). In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether Investors could enforce the Note. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: Investors Bank could enforce the note. Relying on two statutes addressing assignments, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1 and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, as well as common-law assignment principles, the Court held Investors had the right as an assignee of the Mortgage and transferee of the Note to enforce the Note. The Court construed N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309 to address the rights of CitiMortgage as the possessor of a note or other instrument at the time that the instrument was lost, but not to supplant New Jersey assignment statutes and common law in the setting of this appeal or to preclude an assignee in Investors’ position from asserting its rights according to the Note’s terms. Read together, "N.J.S.A. 12A:3-309, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1, and N.J.S.A. 46:9-9 clearly authorized the assignment and entitled Investors to enforce its assigned Mortgage and transferred Note." View "Investors Bank v. Torres" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising from a dispute between lien holders regarding the distribution of the money a foreclosure sale of Zermatt Resort had generated the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals concluding that it had jurisdiction to resolve a procedural matter and affirming the district court, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter.After the district court entered its final judgment in this matter but before the time to appeal expired Trapnell & Associates, LLC purchase the plaintiff's interest in the litigation. Trapnell filed a notice under Utah R. Civ. P. 17 that it was a real party in interest and, on that same day, lodged a notice of appeal. The court of appeals noted that it would have been better had Trapnell filed a motion invoking Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) instead of a notice invoking rule 17 but ruled on the merits of Trapnell's arguments, concluding that because Trapnell had intended to become a party and the district court had treated Trapnell as a party, Trapnell had become a party. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Trapnell had properly substituted into this matter. View "Trapnell & Associates, LLC v. Legacy Resorts, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Mocabee and Respondent Lindsey Wilson lived together, but were not married. In 2013, after receiving a large inheritance, Wilson fully funded the purchase of a home in Kootenai County, Idaho. Per Wilson’s instruction to the title company, Mocabee’s name was included on the deed. In 2017, Wilson and Mocabee split. Shortly thereafter, Wilson filed a complaint against Mocabee for quiet title, unlawful detainer and partition of the home. Mocabee answered and counterclaimed, seeking partition and for the district court to declare Mocabee owned a fifty percent interest in the home. Mocabee also moved for summary judgment arguing the statute of limitations barred Wilson’s quiet title action. The district court granted Mocabee’s motion for summary judgment as to the quiet title action. Then case then proceeded to trial on the partition action. Mocabee filed a motion in limine asking the district court to exclude evidence demonstrating Wilson did not intend to give Mocabee a fifty percent ownership interest in the home. The district court denied the motion. After a bench trial, the district court concluded Wilson had a one hundred percent ownership interest in the home because she had contributed one hundred percent of the purchase price and the evidence did not establish Wilson intended to give Mocabee any ownership interest. As a result, the district court held that a partitioning of the home was unnecessary. Mocabee timely appealed, arguing the district court erred in: (1) using partition statutes to deprive him of any interest in the home; (2) denying Mocabee’s motion in limine; and (3) concluding Mocabee did not own a fifty percent ownership interest in the home by way of a gift from Wilson. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Wilson v. Mocabee" on Justia Law

The Lorenzen Revocable Trust (“Lorenzen”) and David and Cynthia Pearson owned neighboring properties near Hayden Lake in Kootenai County, Idaho. The properties shared a common driveway. The properties were originally part of a 1,400 acre estate. Over the years, parcels were carved off the estate and frequently replatted. Two of those parcels included a cabin owned by Lorenzen and the “Red Barn” property owned by the Pearsons. The Pearsons purchased the Red Barn property in 2013 via quitclaim deed. Although the easement language was not in the Pearsons’ deed, the easements originally granted and reserved in a 1976 deed were recorded with the county and listed as exceptions from coverage in Pearsons’ title insurance policy. From 2013 onward, disputes over the shared driveway began. The disputes culminated in 2016 when Pearsons installed an electronic gate to control access to the shared driveway. In October 2016, Phyllis Lorenzen filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to define the rights concerning the parties’ easement and access rights, as well as listing other causes of action. Four days later, Lorenzen filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against Pearsons, seeking to enjoin them “from blocking or otherwise interfering with access” via the shared driveway. The district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering Pearsons to provide an access code or remote control to the gate and restraining both parties “from blocking or otherwise interfering with access” to their respective properties via the shared driveway. The next month, Phyllis Lorenzen passed away. Pearsons later filed an answer and counterclaim, arguing that Phyllis Lorenzen’s death “ended the express easement” from the 1976 quitclaim deed. They also filed a motion to dissolve the court’s prior preliminary injunction. The district court denied Pearsons’ motions, and the case proceeded to trial with the injunction remaining in effect. In 2018 following a jury trial, the district court issued a decision finding that the easement language in the quitclaim deeds was ambiguous; both parties had express easements granted to them as well as their heirs, successors and assigns. The district court then denied Pearsons’ motion to reconsider from the bench. Pearsons argued on appeal that the district court erred in establishing a legal description of the easement from the Plaintiff’s land survey. They argued this matter required another hearing to present evidence to establish an accurate metes-and-bounds description. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, finding Pearsons failed to provide an alternative metes-and-bounds survey for the district court to consider despite having had months to do so. "Only after their counsel was repeatedly unavailable to the court when it tried to request information or schedule such a hearing, did the district court accept and utilize the only legal description admitted as evidence. Pearsons cannot complain over the results of their inaction now, especially when they failed to object to the admittance of the land survey as evidence at trial." View "Lorenzen v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sukru and Gulay Bayramoglu, like many others, sought to modify their home loan in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis. They eventually succeeded in doing so in late 2011, obtaining a lower interest rate and a lower monthly payment from their loan servicer, Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar). According to plaintiffs, Nationstar, among other things, unlawfully inserted an inflated loan balance, rather than their actual loan balance, in the loan modification agreement. And for that and other reasons, plaintiffs filed suit against Nationstar. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ claims and granted Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment. According to the court, because plaintiffs had served “factually devoid” responses to Nationstar’s discovery, these responses tended to show that plaintiffs did not possess and could not reasonably obtain needed evidence to support most of their claims. And because, the court further found, plaintiffs never presented evidence to overcome this finding, it granted Nationstar’s motion. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court wrongly found their discovery responses were factually devoid and, even if they were factually devoid, the court nonetheless should have found triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the first part of plaintiffs' argument. The trial court found plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses were factually devoid because plaintiffs, rather than directly state responsive facts, told Nationstar that the answers to its interrogatories could be found in certain identified documents. "Although these responses may have been improper and warranted a motion to compel further responses, they were not the equivalent of factually devoid discovery responses." The trial court's decision was reversed to the extent it was grounded on that reasoning. View "Bayramoglu v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC" on Justia Law

Leah Brown, Robert Allen Brown ("Allen"), and Cheryl Woddail ("Cheryl") were heirs of Pauline Brown ("Brown"), who died without a will. Leah, Allen, and Cheryl appealed a circuit court judgment authorizing Ellen Berry-Pratt, the administrator of Brown's estate, to sell certain real property owned by Brown at the time of her death. Because Leah, Allen, and Cheryl did not establish the circuit court erred by entering its judgment in favor of Berry-Pratt, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Berry-Pratt, as successor administrator of the Estate of Pauline Brown" on Justia Law

Hill, Olive, and Mesa, appealed the trial court's denial of petitions for writ of mandate and related declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the City of Los Angeles's June 2017 establishment of the Downtown Center Business Improvement District (DCBID) and the San Pedro Historic Waterfront Business Improvement District (SPBID) (collectively, the BIDs).Because the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and the BIDs that Hill, Olive, and Mesa were required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention and that they failed to do so, the court affirmed the trial court's judgments on that ground and declined to reach Hill, Olive, and Mesa's arguments on the merits. View "Hill RHF Housing Partners, LP v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Mark Stiff's property was sold at a tax sale that took place inside the Bessemer courthouse instead of "in front of the door of the courthouse" as required by section 40-10-15, Ala. Code 1975. He argued that the sale was void because of that irregularity. To that, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed and therefore reversed the circuit court's judgment refusing to set aside the tax sale. "The tax-sale statutes include a clear list of procedures designed to protect the rights of property owners and the public. The requirement that a tax sale be held in a uniform public location encourages fairness and transparency, and it supports the legitimacy of the tax-sale system as a whole. If the 'in front of the door of the courthouse' requirement is no longer important to Alabamians, it is up to the legislature (not the courts) to remove it." View "Stiff v. Equivest Financial, LLC" on Justia Law