Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The crux of this interlocutory appeal was whether Plaintiffs, complaining of personal injury and property damage as a result of the alleged improper use of an oil-disposal well, had to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MSOGB) prior to proceeding on their common-law claims in the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the MSOGB could provide no adequate remedy for the Baucums’ personal-injury and property-damage claims, the Baucums were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in the circuit court. View "Petro Harvester Oil & Gas Co., LLC, et al. v. Baucum" on Justia Law

Lucille Ray sued the City of Rock Hill, South Carolina (the City) for inverse condemnation, claiming her property was taken as a result of stormwater flowing through pipes under City streets and into a terra cotta pipe that ran underneath and behind her property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, and the court of appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City engaged in an affirmative, positive, aggressive act sufficient to support Ray's claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals (as modified), and remanded the case back to the circuit court for a determination on the merits as to whether the City's reconnection of its three stormwater pipes to the catch basin and the resumed flow of water through the Pipe constituted an affirmative, positive, aggressive act causing damage to the Property over and above any damage that had occurred before the three pipes were severed and reconnected. "Given the posture of this case and the above discussion, Ray cannot recover for any damage to the Property caused by the flow of water though the Pipe before the City reconnected its three pipes to the catch basin in November 2012." View "Ray v. City of Rock Hill" on Justia Law

In January 2015, plaintiff Angel Pareja was walking to work when he slipped on ice, fell, and broke his hip. The sidewalk area on which he fell was on property owned and managed by defendant Princeton International Properties, Inc. (Princeton International). The night before, a wintry mix of light rain, freezing rain, and sleet began to fall. Around the time of his fall, light rain and pockets of freezing rain were falling. Pareja’s expert opined that Princeton International could have successfully reduced the hazardous icy condition by pre-treating the sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment to Princeton International. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Princeton International had a duty of reasonable care to maintain the sidewalk even when precipitation was falling. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that Princeton International owed Pareja a duty only in unusual circumstances, none of which were present here. Princeton International took no action to increase Pareja’s risk, and the record showed that the ice on the sidewalk was not a pre-existing condition. View "Pareja v. Princeton International Properties" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs fell into arrears on the taxes on their home in the Borough of Rutherford, New Jersey. After the date of redemption but before entry of final judgment, plaintiff John Winberry called the Tax Collector to determine the total amount needed to redeem the certificate. According to Winberry’s deposition testimony, the Tax Collector told him that she “[didn’t] have the time” to give him either the total amount or the per diem interest rate. The day after plaintiffs attempted to redeem the certificate, the court entered the final foreclosure judgment. After costly legal proceedings, plaintiffs succeeded in having the foreclosure judgment overturned and reclaimed their property. When deposed, the Tax Collector acknowledged the right to redemption at any time before entry of a final foreclosure judgment, and that her computer software could calculate arrearages “within a matter of minutes.” She testified that her policy as Tax Collector required the property owner put the redemption request in writing. and that her policy was to contact the certificate holder to get the correct amount owed. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Borough's Tax Collector was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs' suit to recover costs, and if not, whether the Borough could be liable for her actions. Plaintiffs alleged: (1) the Tax Collector violated their clearly established constitutional and statutory right to redeem the tax sale certificate on their home before entry of a final foreclosure judgment; and (2) that the Borough was liable for the Tax Collector’s violation of their right because the Tax Collector was the Borough’s final policymaker in the area of tax sale certificate redemptions. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny the Tax Collector qualified immunity. Based on the summary judgment record, the Tax Collector’s refusal to provide the redemption amount to plaintiffs because the request was not in writing or timely made was not objectively reasonable. The Court disagreed, however, that plaintiffs did not establish the basis for municipal liability: if the Tax Collector was the final policymaker on matters related to the redemption of tax sale certificates in the Borough, the Borough was liable if the Tax Collector violated the constitutional or statutory rights of plaintiffs. View "Winberry Realty Partnership v. Borough of Rutherford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff H.C. Equities, L.P. asserted contract claims against its commercial tenant, the County of Union, after the County began to withhold rent payments in response to a dispute about the condition of the leased commercial buildings. During negotiations to settle the contract matter, the County directed its co-defendant, the Union County Improvement Authority (Authority), to assess the County’s real estate needs. H.C. Equities obtained a copy of a consultant’s report prepared as part of that assessment and objected to statements in the report about the condition of the buildings that it had leased to the County. H.C. Equities filed suit against the County and the Authority, asserting conspiracy claims against both defendants and trade libel and defamation claims against the Authority. Plaintiff did not apply for permission to file a late tort claims notice until more than eight months after the expiration of the one-year period allowed under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 for the filing of such motions. The trial court held that H.C. Equities had failed to file the notices of claim that the Tort Claims Act required and dismissed its tort claims. H.C. Equities appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the trial court. Relying on a combination of excerpts from three letters written by H.C. Equities’ counsel, the Appellate Division found that H.C. Equities substantially complied with the Act’s notice of claim provisions. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed that a finding of substantial compliance with the Tort Claims Act could be premised on comments made by plaintiff’s counsel in three different letters sent to lawyers representing the defendant public entities. The Supreme Court did not find that H.C. Equities’ letters, individually or collectively, communicated the core information that a claimant had to provide to a public entity in advance of filing a tort claim. The Appellate Division’s determination was reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court. View "H.C. Equities, LP v. County of Union" on Justia Law

Antonia Nyman was renting a backyard cottage to Dan Hanley when the COVID-19 pandemic began. She sought to evict Hanley and gave him 60 days’ notice of her intention to move into the unit herself. Due to this unprecedented pandemic, Washington Governor Jay Inslee temporarily halted most evictions, but not for landlords seeking to occupy the unit personally. A federal eviction moratorium imposed by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also temporarily halted some evictions, but not for tenants who have violated a contractual obligation (with certain specified exceptions). The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Hanley violated a contractual obligation by holding over in his unit after his lease expired by its terms. Based on undisputed facts before us, the Court held that he did. "While the CDC order may be more protective than Washington’s eviction proclamation in some instances, it does not apply here. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court and lift the stay of the writ of restitution." View "Nyman v. Hanley" on Justia Law

In August 2017, the City of West Fargo passed a resolution determining it was necessary to construct a sewer improvement project. The project consisted of the design and installation of two sewer pipes between West Fargo and Fargo. To complete the project, West Fargo had to acquire a right of way across certain private property, including Mark McAllister’s. McAllister appealed a judgment allowing the City of West Fargo to use its quick-take eminent domain power to acquire a right of way across his property. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately granted the N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) order certifying the judgment as final, it dismissed the appeal. View "City of West Fargo v. McAllister, et al." on Justia Law

Gary and Bella Martin appealed after the trial court granted in part and denied in part their petition for writ of administrative mandate to challenge the imposition of certain special conditions placed on the development of their property - a vacant, oceanfront lot in Encinitas - by the California Coastal Commission (Commission). The Commission also appealed the judgment. The Martins’ challenged a condition requiring them to eliminate a basement from their proposed home, while the Commission challenged the trial court’s reversal of its condition requiring the Martins to set back their home 79 feet from the bluff edge. Because the Court of Appeal agreed with its own recent decision in Lindstrom v. California Coastal Com., 40 Cal.App.5th 73 (2019) interpreting the same provisions of the Encinitas Local Coastal Program (LCP) and Municipal Code at issue here, the trial court’s invalidation of the Commission’s setback requirement was reversed. The trial court’s decision to uphold the basement prohibition was affirmed. View "Martin v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda and Dwayne Struiksma lost title to their home in a foreclosure sale. The purchaser at the sale then brought an unlawful detainer action against them under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a(b)(3). A default judgment was issued, and plaintiffs were evicted from their property. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendants HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (collectively, defendants), their lender and loan servicer, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer action. Generally, they alleged defendants carelessly failed to credit several payments to their loan balance. Thus, plaintiffs contended they were never in default and defendants wrongfully foreclosed on the property. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the complaint, finding all of plaintiffs’ claims were precluded by the unlawful detainer judgment except for a claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which was defective for other reasons. Plaintiffs were denied leave to amend on all claims and appealed the resulting judgment. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in ruling plaintiffs’ claims were precluded, and published this case to clarify the preclusive effect of an unlawful detainer action under section 1161a. Defendants also argued certain claims the trial court found precluded failed for reasons other than preclusion. Given its ruling, the court had no opportunity to consider these arguments. So, this case was remanded for the trial court to consider them in the first instance. As to the TILA claim, the Court held it suffered from several defects, and the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer to this claim without leave to amend. View "Struiksma v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

RLR owns land on the Little Pigeon River. Tract 1 had a private resort and parking spaces. Tract 2 had a duplex building. The city decided to build a pedestrian walkway along the River, going through both tracts, and filed a petition for condemnation of a permanent easement. The easement would make some of the parking spaces on Tract 1 unusable. The petition also sought temporary construction easements, including one on which the city would construct Tract 2 parking spaces to replace those lost on Tract 1. RLR argued that the compensation for the loss of the spaces was too low and that the plan of building parking spaces on Tract 2 was a private, rather than public, purpose. The court ruled in favor of the city, which took possession of the land and built the walkway, but never built the parking spots. Before valuation proceedings, RLR filed suit in federal court, alleging an unlawful taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the source of RLR’s injury was the state court’s order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court’s 2005 Exxon decision abrogated Sixth Circuit precedent applying Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders. The state-court order of possession counts as a judgment under Rooker-Feldman. View "RLR Investments, LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge" on Justia Law