Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellants Darren Herrera and Paula Garcia purchased a home in the City of Espanola, New Mexico (the “City”). At the time Appellants purchased the home, the existing owner, Charlotte Miera, was not current on her water and sewer bill. Although the City initially provided water service to Appellants, it discontinued service in February 2017, and declined to recommence it until someone paid the water and sewer bill. In June 2020, Appellants filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (“NMTCA”) based on the City’s refusal to provide them water service unless someone paid Miera’s bill. The City filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, arguing the statute of limitations had elapsed before Appellants filed their action. Although Appellants conceded a three-year statute of limitations governed their section 1983 claims, and a two-year statute of limitations governed their NMTCA claim, they argued the limitations period had not expired on their claims because the City repeatedly denied their requests for water service between February 2017 and February 2020. They expressly relied on the continuing violation doctrine to extend the limitations period, and also argued facts consistent with the related repeated violations doctrine. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the district court that Appellants’ action first accrued no later than March 2017. Further, although it held the continuing violation doctrine was available within the section 1983 context, the Court concurred with the district court that it did not save Appellants’ claims against the City or their NMTCA claim. The Court found Appellants’ claims premised on the City’s alleged policy of conditioning water service to new property owners on the payment of bills owed by prior property owners was not time-barred under the repeated violation doctrine and Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2019). View "Herrera, et al. v. City of Espanola, et al." on Justia Law

A church entity became the legal or beneficial owner of certain real and personal property after The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina (Disassociated Diocese) and thirty-six individual Episcopal Parishes (Parishes) disassociated from The Episcopal Church in the United States of America (National Church). The dispute presented two broad questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court: (1) who owned the real estate long-owned and occupied by the individual Parishes; and (2) who was the beneficiary of a statutorily-created trust controlled by the Trustees of The Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Trustees). The National Church and the Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Associated Diocese) contended the South Carolina Supreme Court made a final decision as to who owned all the disputed property when the Court heard the case in 2015 and each Justice sitting on the Court in 2015 issued a separate opinion in 2017. The Parishes disagreed the Court made a final decision as to the real property occupied by twenty-nine Parishes, and contended the Court left much to be decided by the circuit court as to these Parishes. The Disassociated Diocese and the Trustees agreed the Supreme Court made a final decision as to real and personal property the Trustees formerly held in trust for the Lower Diocese—the second question—but they disagree what that decision was. To the second question presented, the Supreme Court agreed with the National Church and the Associated Diocese that the 2017 Court decided the real and personal property held in trust by the Trustees was held for the benefit of the Associated Diocese. As to the first question, the Supreme Court determined the 2017 Court did not make a final decision as to the real property owned by the twenty-nine Parishes. As to some Parishes, the Court held the circuit court correctly ruled the individual Parish retained ownership of its property. As to other Parishes, those Parishes created an irrevocable trust in favor of the National Church and its diocese, now the Associated Diocese. As to the Parishes that created a trust, the Court directed that appropriate documentation be filed in the public record indicating the National Church and the Associated Diocese now owned that real estate. From its decision here, there will be no remand. "The case is over." View "The Protestant Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Church" on Justia Law

A boiler exploded in a home owned by a nonprofit regional housing authority, severely injuring a man who lived there. He sued the housing authority in both contract and tort, claiming that his lease-purchase contract included a promise that the authority would inspect the boiler, which it failed to do with reasonable care. After the man dismissed his contract claim, the housing authority asked the court to decide as a matter of law that a breach of a contractual promise could not give rise to a tort claim. But the superior court allowed the man to proceed to trial on his tort claim, and the jury awarded over $3 million in damages, including over $1.5 million in noneconomic damages and separate awards to several of his family members for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court reduced the man’s noneconomic damages award to $1 million because of a statutory damages cap, but it excluded the family members’ awards from the amount subject to the cap. The housing authority appealed, maintaining it should have been granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the contract did not create a continuing legal duty to inspect the boiler with reasonable care. It also argued it should have been granted a new trial because it had established that the boiler explosion was caused by a product defect rather than negligent inspection. Finally, the authority argued the family members’ damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been included in the amount subject to the statutory damages cap. The man cross-appealed, arguing that the damages cap violated due process because it failed to account for inflation or the severe nature of his physical injuries. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the superior court's judgment on all issues. View "Association of Village Council Presidents Regional Housing Authority v. Mael, et al." on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

In dividing the divorcing parties’ assets, a Massachusetts court ordered a special master to sell the Vermont property. After the sale, plaintiff filed an action in a Vermont superior court to rescind the sale and quiet title to the property. Applying the doctrine of comity, the civil division dismissed his action, deferring to the ongoing proceeding in Massachusetts. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Vermont court should not have dismissed his suit on comity grounds because the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order the special master to sell the property. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont court acted within its discretion and affirmed. View "Nijensohn v. Ring" on Justia Law

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property, hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute of limitations applied. Finding that the appellate court erred in concluding the statute of limitations applied, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

Defendants GMPM Company and 479 Maple Street, LLC, appealed a circuit court order granting the petition for wrongful eviction filed by plaintiff Melissa Natal. On appeal, defendants argued the circuit court erred by determining that its property was not a “shared facility” as defined by RSA 540-B:1 (2021). Specifically, defendants argued RSA 540-B:1 did not require that an owner occupy the premises, but, rather, only that an owner have access to the common areas for the purposes of cleaning, maintaining, and monitoring the premises. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, for property to qualify as a shared facility under RSA 540-B:1, the owner had to reside at the premises with the occupants. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Natal v. GMPM Company & al." on Justia Law

RCW 49.60.227 permitted a court to strike a racially restrictive, legally unenforceable covenant from the public records and eliminate the covenant from the title. This case concerned what under the statute, striking from the public records and eliminating from the title meant, and whether a court order declaring the covenant struck and void was all that was required or allowed. Alex May sought a declaratory action under former RCW 49.60.227 (2006) to have a racially restrictive covenant voided and physically removed from the title to his property and from the public records. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute at issue did not allow the physical removal of the covenant from the title but, instead, allowed only for an order voiding the covenant to be filed with the title. In the interim, the legislature amended RCW 49.60.227, clarifying the procedure under which these covenants were struck and eliminated. The Washington Supreme Court held that the interim amendments in Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4 applied, and therefore the Supreme Court did not address the statute under which May initially sought to have the covenants removed. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for relief under Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4. View "In re That Portion of Lots 1 & 2" on Justia Law

Appellants sought a petition for writ of mandate and/or injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell them the homes they are renting at the original price paid by Caltrans when it purchased the properties to make way for the 710 Freeway. Under the version of Government Code section 54237.9 effective at the time of the decision in the trial court, the trial court held that Caltrans was permitted to sell the homes at the original price paid by Caltrans adjusted for inflation. In July 2021, while this appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended section 54237.9 by adding a sentence precluding adjustment for inflation.Because this suit seeks a writ of mandamus and injunctive relief compelling Caltrans to sell the homes at a certain price, and thus prospective relief, the Court of Appeal concluded that California Supreme Court precedent establishes that it must apply the law current at the time of the decision in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court to apply the current version of section 54237.9. Finally, appellants' challenge to the trial court's evidentiary challenge as to Exhibit 7 is moot. View "Flores v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 1996, Schmier converted Berkley apartment units into condominiums. Berkeley ordinances then required that he record Affordable Housing Fee liens based on a formula. Schmier's lien agreements that provided, “Execution of this document shall not prejudice the right of the undersigned to challenge the validity of the Affordable Housing Fee. In the event that the Affordable Housing Fee is ... rescinded … this lien shall be void.” Schmier alleged that in 2008, Berkeley rescinded that ordinance. The new section includes a different formula. In 2019, Schmier advised Berkeley of the sale of the property. Berkeley requested an affordable housing fee of $147,202.66, calculated under the rescinded ordinance. Under the current ordinance, the fee would have been less than half of what was requested.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit, as barred by a 90-day statute of limitations (Subdivision Map Act, Gov. Code, 66499.37). Schmier did not challenge the requirement that he execute a lien agreement, nor did he challenge the adoption of the former ordinance, its alleged recission, or adoption of a new section; Schmier’s complaint is not subject to the Map Act’s limitations period. Even assuming the 90-day period applied, it could not have begun to run until Berkeley rejected Schmier’s assertion that the lien agreement was no longer operative when the city rescinded the former ordinance. The language of the lien agreements is ambiguous, rendering both asserted constructions arguably reasonable. View "Schmier v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law