Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Northwest Landowners Association filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of North Dakota Senate Bill 2344, which related to subsurface pore space. The district court granted the Association’s cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding S.B. 2344 was unconstitutional under the state and federal takings clauses. The State and Continental Resources appealed the district court’s summary judgment order and amended judgment. On appeal, the State argued S.B. 2344 did not violate the takings clauses and did not constitute an unconstitutional gift, and that the district court misapplied N.D.R. Civ.P. 56 by failing to consider evidence submitted by the State. Continental Resources argued the court erred in analyzing the Association’s facial challenge, in determining pore space had value as a matter of law, and in denying Rule 56(f) discovery. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in invalidating the entirety of S.B. 2344. The trial court’s judgment was affirmed to the extent that it declared certain portions unconstitutional, but reversed to the extent it declared the remainder of the bill inseparable and invalid. View "Northwest Landowners Association v. State, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance, argued that lower courts erred when they found that the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) denied it standing to appeal the decisions of the Saugatuck Township Planning Commission (Commission). Prior Court of Appeals decisions relied on by the Saugatuck Township Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and lower courts repeatedly and erroneously read the term “party aggrieved” too narrowly. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the MZEA did not require an appealing party to own real property and to demonstrate special damages only by comparison to other real-property owners similarly situated. The Supreme Court overruled several Court of Appeals decisions to the limited extent that they required: (1) real-property ownership as a prerequisite to being “aggrieved” by a zoning decision under the MZEA; and (2) special damages to be shown only by comparison to other real-property owners similarly situated. The Supreme Court explained, to be a “party aggrieved” under MCL 125.3605 and MCL 125.3606, the appellant must meet three criteria: (1) the appellant must have participated in the challenged proceedings by taking a position on the contested proposal or decision; (2) the appellant must claim some protected interest or protected personal, pecuniary, or property right that will be or is likely to be affected by the challenged decision; and (3) the appellant must provide some evidence of special damages arising from the challenged decision in the form of an actual or likely injury to or burden on their asserted interest or right that is different in kind or more significant in degree than the effects on others in the local community. A portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded back to the circuit court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's holding here. View "Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v. Saugatuck Twp." on Justia Law

Defendants Brenda and Dale Merritt (neighbors) challenged a superior court’s decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff Steven Daiello (landowner) and defendant Town of Vernon in a dispute over a road in Vernon, Vermont. They argued the court erred by concluding: (1) that Stebbins Road was properly established as a public road; and (2) that landowner had a common-law right of access to his property over Stebbins Road that prevented him from proving that the Town interfered with his right to access his property. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daiello v. Town of Vernon, et al." on Justia Law

Elton Lovro appealed a judgment dismissing his complaint with prejudice after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Finley (“City”). Lovro owned a house and property in Finley, Steele County, North Dakota. In March 2020, the City’s water line connected to the curb stop leading to Lovro’s home broke. Water flowed onto the property, damaging Lovro’s driveway and basement. Lovro sued the City for negligence and gross negligence, alleging the damages were caused by the City’s failure to properly operate, maintain, repair, and inspect their water system. Lovro also sued the City for breach of contract based on the City’s failure to properly and safely deliver water to his home. The City responded by denying the allegations that it was negligent, grossly negligent or that its acts or omissions caused the damages. The City denied the existence of any contractual relationship between Lovro and the City. The City affirmatively alleged that it was immune from suit under chapter 32-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. Lovro argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing his claims because the ruling was premature and discovery was still ongoing. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Lovro v. City of Finley" on Justia Law

Ghuman befriended the Shokers, becoming familiar with their rental properties and promising higher returns on an investment in a technology company.. Relying on his representations, the Shokers provided Ghuman with $1.5 million and then sold 10 of their rental properties to a purported cash buyer identified by Ghuman—Phangureh. Ghuman handled the negotiations and transactions. The Shokers paid Ghuman the proceeds for investment in the technology company. Years later, after learning of the fraudulent scheme, the Shokers sued and sought “an order declaring that [Ghuman and Phangureh] hold the [Shokers’ rental properties] in trust for [the Shokers],” and an order compelling Ghuman and Phangureh to convey the properties back to the Shokers. They recorded a notice of lis pendens for each of the rental properties.The trial court expunged the lis pendens, finding that the Shokers did not assert a “real property claim” under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.4. The court of appeal reversed. Section 405.4 defines a “real property claim" as a cause action that could "affect . . . title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property.” In their constructive trust claim, the Shokers claim a present right to title in the same real properties they claim were wrongfully obtained by Phangureh. View "Shoker v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee James Nelson was seriously injured while riding his bicycle on a trail on Air Force Academy property in Colorado. He and his wife, Elizabeth Varney, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Nelson sought damages for his personal injuries; Varney sought damages for loss of consortium. After several years of litigation, the district court ruled the government was liable for Nelson’s accident and injuries. The court based its decision on the Colorado Recreational Use Statute (“CRUS”). The court awarded Nelson more than $6.9 million, and awarded Varney more than $400,000. In addition to the damages awards, the district court also ordered the government to pay plaintiffs' attorney’s fees. CRUS contained an attorney’s-fees-shifting provision, allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover their fees against defendant landowners. Providing an exception to the United States’s sovereign immunity, the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) provided that “[t]he United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” The district court concluded that the government had to pay for plaintiffs' fees. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court erred in ordering the government to pay the attorney's fees after holding the CRUS qualified under the EAJA as “any statute which specifically provides for” an attorney’s fees award. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Nelson, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case was the second appeal arising out of a dispute over the operation of a commercial self-storage facility (Treelake Storage) within a planned unit development in Granite Bay (Treelake Village). Silversword Properties, LLC (Silversword) owned the property upon which K.H. Moss Company and Moss Equity (collectively, Moss) operated Treelake Storage. In a separate but related lawsuit filed in 2017, Parkford Owners for a Better Community (Parkford) challenged Placer County’s (County) issuance of a building permit for the construction of an expansion of Treelake Storage, arguing that the County failed to comply with both the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Planning and Zoning Law. The trial court concluded: (1) the County’s issuance of the building permit was ministerial rather than discretionary, and therefore CEQA did not apply; and (2) Parkford’s challenge under the Planning and Zoning Law was barred by the statute of limitations. Parkford appealed. In August 2020, a different panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that completion of the challenged expansion of Treelake Storage prior to entry of judgment rendered moot Parkford’s challenge to the County’s issuance of a building permit authorizing construction of the expansion. In June 2021, the trial court concluded that the lawsuit here, filed by Parkford in 2018 and challenged the County’s issuance of a business license for the operation of Treelake Storage, was barred by both aspects of the doctrine of res judicata--claim and issue preclusion. The Court of Appeal concluded “Parkford I” was not a final judgment “on the merits,” therefore res judicata did not operate to bar this suit. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Parkford Owners for a Better Community v. Windeshausen" on Justia Law

This was the second time plaintiff-appellant Petrolink, Inc. returned to the Court of Appeal in its suit against Lantel Enterprises. Petrolink filed an action against defendant Lantel Enterprises (Lantel), seeking specific performance of a lease agreement that gave Petrolink the option to purchase a commercial property owned by Lantel at fair market value; Lantel cross-complained against Petrolink, contending that Petrolink was refusing to purchase the property for its fair market value. The parties disagreed as to the valuation of the property and were effectively seeking a judicial determination as to the fair market value of the property so that they could complete the transaction. After years of litigation in the trial court, an appeal, a partial reversal of the judgment, remand, and further litigation, the trial court ultimately concluded that the fair market value of the property was $889,854. The court then calculated a net purchase price of $948,404 by subtracting from the fair market value a credit to Petrolink for the rents that it had paid from the date the purchase should have been completed, and adding a credit to Lantel for the loss of use of the sale proceeds. In its amended judgment, the court ordered the parties to complete the transaction; Petrolink was to deposit $948,404 in escrow and Lantel was to deliver title to the property “by grant deed free and clear of all encumbrances.” Petrolink appealed the amended judgment, arguing that it was entitled to certain additional financial reductions and offsets to the purchase price. The Court of Appeal rejected Petrolink’s contentions and affirmed the amended judgment in Petrolink II. Eleven days after Petrolink II was issued, and four days after Petrolink deposited the purchase funds in escrow, the State of California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) filed an eminent domain action pertaining to the property. The filing of the Caltrans action prevented Lantel from being able to convey unencumbered title, as required by the amended judgment. Petrolink then refused to close escrow. Lantel moved to compel performance under the trial court's order, despite the encumbrance on title resulting from the Caltrans eminent domain action. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Petrolink to accept title encumbered by the Caltrans eminent domain action. "[T]he trial court weighed the equities and concluded that it would be more equitable for Petrolink to bear any burden of the encumbrance created by the filing of the Caltrans action." View "Petrolink, Inc. v. Lantel Enterprises" on Justia Law

Black Diamond Compost, LLC (“Black Diamond”), filed a “Claim of Ownership” with the Ada County, Idaho Recorder’s Office to notify the public of its ownership of compost and humus located on real property in Ada County. Black Diamond disputed the ownership of the land and deemed it necessary to notify the public that the compost and humus located on the real property belonged to it. Ford Elsaesser, personal representative of the Estate of Victoria Smith, attempted to sell the real property but could not secure “clear title” in a preliminary title report and claimed this was due to Black Diamond’s Claim of Ownership. Elsaesser filed an action against Black Diamond, alleging the Claim of Ownership was a nonconsensual common law lien prohibited under Idaho Code section 45-811. The court agreed and ordered the release and discharge of the recorded Claim of Ownership. It also awarded Elsaesser a $5,000 civil penalty and granted his request for costs and attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding it did not err in: (1) determining the Claim of Ownership to be a prohibited nonconsensual common law lien; (2) ordering the lien to be released and discharged; (3) imposing a $5,000 civil penalty against Black Diamond; and (4) awarding attorney fees to the Personal Representative pursuant to Idaho Code section 45-811(4). View "Elsaesser v. Black Diamond Compost, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Amber Machowski was an individual with a disability who used a wheelchair for mobility. Defendant 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC, was the owner of a property in Fullerton, California, on which a business establishment known as City Market Liquor II was located. When Machowski attempted to patronize the store, she encountered architectural barriers that prevented her from making full use and enjoyment of the premises. Machowski sued Defendant, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The complaint sought injunctive relief, statutory damages under the Unruh Act, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. After Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, Machowski applied for the entry of default judgment, seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages. Machowski’s application for default judgment did not seek an award of attorney’s fees. Instead, it advised the district court that “plaintiff will separately file a motion for her attorney fees and costs once this application is granted and judgment has been entered.” The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Machowski’s Unruh Act claim, granted default judgment on her ADA claim, ordered injunctive relief, and sua sponte awarded Machowski $1000 in attorney’s fees under Central District of California Local Rule 55-3. Machowski timely appealed the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that where, as here, a prevailing party advises the district court that it is opting out of the fee schedule and will seek by motion, an award of reasonable attorney's fees, the district court abuses its discretion by disregarding the plaintiff's choice and sua sponte awarding fees under the fee schedule. Accordingly, the fee award was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Machowski v. 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC" on Justia Law