Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A developer purchased a historical property in Newton, Massachusetts, and began restoration work. The Newton Historical Commission issued a stop-work order, claiming the developer violated the permit by demolishing large portions of the building. The developer, 29 Greenwood, LLC, disagreed but complied with the order and submitted revised proposals, all of which were denied. The developer then filed a lawsuit, alleging a violation of the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and state law.The case was initially filed in state court but was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dispute was a typical zoning issue not rising to the level of a constitutional taking. The developer appealed the dismissal, arguing that the Commission acted in bad faith and would never permit the reconstruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that two related actions were pending in state court, which could potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional issues. The court decided to abstain from ruling on the federal issues until the state court proceedings concluded, invoking the Pullman abstention doctrine. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to stay the federal proceedings pending the outcome of the state court cases. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "29 Greenwood, LLC v. City of Newton" on Justia Law

In April 2009, Doneyn Bourke and William Hayward, Sr. defaulted on their $950,000 mortgage for a property in Nantucket, Massachusetts. The mortgage holder, Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc., foreclosed on the property, but Bourke and Hayward refused to vacate. Emigrant Mortgage Company and Retained Realty, Inc., the foreclosure sale purchaser, filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to seek remedies. The federal district court rejected Bourke and Hayward's arguments against federal jurisdiction and their counterclaims, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. The court declared that Retained Realty, Inc. was entitled to possession of the property and that Bourke and Hayward owed $6,500 per month in use and occupancy payments from March 21, 2011, until they vacated the property.Previously, the Massachusetts Land Court had issued a certificate of title to Bourke and Hayward in 2006. After defaulting on their loan, Emigrant foreclosed by conducting a foreclosure sale and making an entry onto the property. The Land Court registered the foreclosure deed to Retained Realty, Inc. in 2012. Retained Realty, Inc. then filed a summary process action in the Nantucket District Court, which initially ruled in their favor. However, the Massachusetts Appellate Division found the foreclosure notice inadequate but upheld the foreclosure by entry. The Nantucket District Court later entered judgment for Bourke and Hayward for possession due to the premature summary process action.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling, rejecting Bourke and Hayward's arguments that the Massachusetts Land Court statute deprived the federal court of jurisdiction. The court held that the federal district court had proper diversity jurisdiction and that there was no ongoing state in rem proceeding to invoke the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. The court also upheld the district court's findings on the merits, including the foreclosure by entry and possession and the application of estoppel by deed. View "Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Bourke" on Justia Law

Caruso Builder Belle Oak, LLC entered into a contract with Ronalda Sullivan on July 17, 2015, for the sale of a property in Prince George’s County, Maryland. The property was subject to deferred private water and sewer assessments, and Caruso provided a disclosure that was allegedly noncompliant with Maryland’s Real Property Article § 14-117(a)(3)(i). The parties settled on the contract on February 24, 2016. On February 22, 2019, Sullivan filed a complaint against Caruso seeking monetary penalties under § 14-117(b)(2)(i) for the noncompliant disclosure.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County dismissed Sullivan’s complaint, ruling that her claim was barred by Maryland’s three-year statute of limitations, which began to run on the date of the contract, July 17, 2015. Sullivan appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of settlement, February 24, 2016, making Sullivan’s claim timely.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that a seller’s violation of § 14-117(a)(3)(i) gives rise to a cause of action because the purchaser suffers an informational harm. The court determined that the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the contract, July 17, 2015, because Sullivan knew or should have known of the noncompliant disclosure at that time. Therefore, her claim filed on February 22, 2019, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to affirm the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Sullivan’s complaint. View "Caruso Builder Belle Oak v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Sherran Wasserman agreed to sell land in Franklin County to Anthony Pham, contingent on the approval of a conditional use permit by the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. Pham applied for the permit to build and operate chicken houses, but the Board denied the application. Wasserman then sued the Board and the County, initially bringing multiple claims under state and federal law. She dismissed some claims, conceded others, and the trial court dismissed her remaining state-law claims due to sovereign immunity. This left two federal claims: one alleging the County violated Pham’s equal protection rights based on race, and another alleging a violation of Wasserman’s equal protection rights as a “class of one.”The trial court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, applying the federal doctrine of third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of third parties. The court found genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on standing and the merits of Wasserman’s equal protection claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Wasserman lacked third-party standing and that her “class of one” claim failed as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether a plaintiff may rely on the federal doctrine of third-party standing to establish constitutional standing in Georgia courts. The court held that Georgia’s constitutional standing requirements, rooted in the common law and consistent precedent, do not allow a plaintiff to maintain an action by asserting only the rights of a nonparty. The court overruled its previous adoption of the federal doctrine of third-party standing, concluding that a plaintiff must assert her own legal rights to invoke the judicial power of Georgia courts. The judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WASSERMAN v. FRANKLIN COUNTY" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC sought to condemn a 9.89-acre easement on Elizabeth Reynolds' 109-acre farmland in Roanoke County, Virginia, under the Natural Gas Act. The district court granted partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession to Mountain Valley Pipeline, leaving the issue of just compensation unresolved. Reynolds submitted two expert reports to determine compensation, which the district court excluded, leading to a summary judgment in favor of Mountain Valley Pipeline.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia excluded Reynolds' expert reports, citing Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The court found the first report speculative and the second unreliable due to insufficient data. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment to Mountain Valley Pipeline, awarding just compensation based on the higher estimate of the pipeline company's experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of Rule 71.1(h) and Rule 702. The appellate court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply identically in eminent domain cases as in other cases, and the district court should not have conflated Rule 71.1(h) with Rule 702. The appellate court also determined that the district court should have made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when resolving contested factual issues under Rule 71.1(h). The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 9.89 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (MVP) condemned a 0.32-acre access easement on Grace Terry's land in southwestern Virginia to deliver heavy equipment to a section of its pipeline. The key issue in this case is the amount of just compensation MVP must pay Terry for the easement. Terry argued that the easement significantly devalued her land, blocking the best hiking trail and citing recent below-market sales of neighboring properties affected by MVP's actions. The district court excluded Terry's testimony on damages and an expert report she submitted, leading to her appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted MVP partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the easement. The court excluded Terry's testimony on damages, finding it speculative and without a rational basis. It also excluded the expert report by Dennis Gruelle, applying a heightened admissibility standard and determining contested facts at the evidentiary stage. The court then granted MVP summary judgment, awarding Terry $10,409 in just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding most of Terry's testimony and the Gruelle Report. The Fourth Circuit found that Terry's personal knowledge of her land and comparable sales were valid bases for her testimony. It also determined that the district court applied erroneous legal principles by using a heightened evidentiary standard for the expert report. The Fourth Circuit vacated the exclusion of the Gruelle Report and reversed the exclusion of most of Terry's testimony, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

CEZ Prior, LLC ("CEZ") entered into a purchase agreement with 755 N Prior Ave., LLC ("Prior") to buy a property for $26 million. The agreement required Prior to cooperate in obtaining tenant estoppel certificates. Errors in square footage measurements led to rent discrepancies, prompting an amendment to reduce the purchase price to $15.1 million and the cash required at closing to $3.8 million. CEZ later requested to delay closing due to financial issues, but Prior did not agree. Prior sent estoppel certificates that did not address rate increases, and CEZ proposed edits that Prior rejected. CEZ demanded satisfactory certificates on the closing date, but Prior terminated the agreement, alleging CEZ failed to tender cash.CEZ sued Prior for breach of contract in Minnesota state court and sought to enjoin the termination. Prior removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court stayed the matter and later denied CEZ's motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court found that CEZ was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim, as Prior had reasonably cooperated in obtaining the estoppel certificates. The balance of harms favored Prior, given CEZ's insufficient evidence of its ability to pay. The public interest did not favor CEZ due to its low probability of success on the merits.The court also addressed CEZ's argument under Minnesota law, finding that the district court's stay order was not an injunction and did not extend statutory deadlines. Consequently, CEZ was not entitled to additional time to close under Minnesota statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "CEZ Prior, LLC v. 755 N Prior Ave. LLC" on Justia Law

In 2001, Frances Mack-Marion refinanced her property, taking out a new mortgage. In 2020, U.S. Bank National Association, the successor-in-interest to the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings against her. Mack-Marion counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. Bank was barred from foreclosure because the mortgage closed without attorney supervision, referencing the Matrix Financial Services Corporation v. Frazer decision. The Master-in-Equity dismissed her claim, ruling it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix.The Master-in-Equity interpreted Hambrick v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation to mean only the South Carolina Supreme Court could determine unauthorized practice of law claims. Additionally, the Master found Mack-Marion's claim insufficient as the mortgage predated Matrix. Mack-Marion appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted her motion to certify the appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hambrick to the extent it held that circuit courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over unauthorized practice of law claims. The Court clarified that circuit courts do have jurisdiction over such claims and reaffirmed that Matrix applies prospectively. The Court held that the Master had subject matter jurisdiction but correctly dismissed Mack-Marion's claim under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, because her mortgage was recorded before the effective date of Matrix. The Court affirmed the Master's dismissal as modified, maintaining that U.S. Bank could pursue foreclosure. View "U.S. Bank National Association v. Mack" on Justia Law

Christine Berger and Brian Repnow were in a decade-long relationship but never married. During their relationship, they accumulated various properties and businesses. In August 2021, Berger filed a lawsuit seeking partition, conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, requesting an equitable division of their accumulated real and personal property or monetary damages. Repnow claimed sole ownership of the properties and requested denial of Berger's claims.The District Court of Mercer, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial in October 2023. The court granted Berger's partition claim for the Expansion Drive property, awarding her sole ownership, and determined that the other properties and vehicles were solely owned by Repnow. The court also granted Berger's unjust enrichment claim, awarding her $64,000 for her contributions to Repnow's properties, and denied the claims of conversion and promissory estoppel. The court awarded the Dream Girls Boutique business to Repnow and Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the parties intended to share ownership of the Expansion Drive property and the award of Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger. However, it reversed the decision to award 100% of the Expansion Drive property to Berger, stating that the district court should have considered the parties' respective ownership interests and made an equitable division. The court also found that the district court failed to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and adequately explain the $64,000 award.The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine the parties' respective ownership interests in the Expansion Drive property and make an award consistent with those interests. The court also instructed the district court to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and provide a clear explanation for the $64,000 award if necessary. View "Berger v. Repnow" on Justia Law

Interfaith Sanctuary Housing Services, Inc. (IFS) applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a large-scale low-barrier shelter home in Northwest Boise. The Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC) initially denied the application, citing concerns about compatibility with the neighborhood, undue burden on public facilities, adverse effects on nearby properties, and insufficient information on mitigating adverse impacts. IFS appealed to the Boise City Council, which reversed the PZC’s decision and granted the CUP, imposing 30 conditions of approval. The Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. (VPNA) sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned the district court for judicial review.The district court upheld the City Council’s decision, finding no error in the Council’s actions. VPNA appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, arguing that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, based on unlawful procedure, and that the Council’s reasoned statement was inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA).The Idaho Supreme Court found that the City Council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and based on unlawful procedure because the PZC’s determination that the CUP could not be conditioned into compliance with the CUP criteria was not an error. The Court also found that the City Council’s reasoned statement was conclusory and failed to adequately resolve pertinent factual disputes, thus violating LLUPA and depriving VPNA of due process. The Court concluded that VPNA demonstrated a prejudice to its substantial rights.The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to invalidate the City Council’s approval of the CUP. VPNA was awarded costs but not attorney fees on appeal. View "Veterans Park Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. City of Boise" on Justia Law