Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff resided at an apartment complex with his son, who was arrested for aggravated armed robbery by the local police department. After the arrest, the police informed the apartment management, which then evicted both the plaintiff and his son based on a lease provision prohibiting criminal conduct. The plaintiff sought information about his son’s arrest from the city and police department under the Texas Public Information Act, but his request was denied after the city consulted the Texas Attorney General and invoked a law-enforcement exception.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the plaintiff filed suit against the city, the police department, the apartment complex, a debt collection agency, and the Texas Attorney General, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and Texas law. All defendants either appeared, filed answers, or moved to dismiss. The plaintiff moved for default judgment against each defendant, but the district court denied those motions and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, the plaintiff only challenged the denial of default judgment, as he did not brief arguments regarding the dismissals and thus forfeited them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed only the denial of default judgment for abuse of discretion. The court held that default judgment was not warranted because the city, police department, and debt collector had all appeared or answered, and the Attorney General had not been properly served. The court also found that arguments regarding attorney conflict and judicial bias were either forfeited or unsupported. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of default judgment. View "Clark v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

After a series of chemical explosions at an industrial plant in Crosby, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey, property owners and lessees in the affected area experienced contamination and property damage. These individuals, including the appellants, initially participated in a federal class action seeking both injunctive and monetary relief for the harm caused by the explosions. The federal district court certified a class for injunctive relief but declined to certify a class for monetary damages. Subsequently, a class settlement addressed only injunctive relief, leaving monetary claims unresolved.Following the settlement, nearly 800 class members, including the appellants, filed individual lawsuits in Texas state court seeking monetary damages for their property-related claims. The appellants acknowledged that their claims accrued in September 2017 and were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, but argued that the pendency of the federal class action tolled the limitations period under Texas law. Arkema, the defendant, removed the cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and moved to dismiss, asserting that Texas does not recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling—meaning a federal class action does not toll the state statute of limitations. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed the claims as untimely, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that, under its binding precedent, Texas law does not permit cross-jurisdictional tolling of statutes of limitations based on the pendency of a federal class action. The court rejected the appellants’ arguments for exceptions to this rule and found no intervening Texas authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claims as time-barred. View "Ackerman v. Arkema" on Justia Law

Talisker Finance, LLC and its affiliates defaulted on a $150 million loan secured by real property in Utah. The lenders, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Midtown Acquisitions L.P., foreclosed on the collateral and purchased it at two sheriff’s sales, but the sale proceeds did not satisfy the debt. Talisker later discovered that the lenders had entered into a Common Interest Agreement with the court-appointed receiver, allegedly colluded to depress the sale price, and deterred potential bidders. Talisker claimed that the lenders bundled properties in a way that made them less attractive and that the receiver stalled a third party’s interest in purchasing some of the collateral.The Third District Court, Summit County, reviewed Talisker’s complaint seeking equitable relief from the deficiency judgments, arguing that the lenders’ conduct violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69B(d) and common law principles. The district court accepted Talisker’s factual allegations as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss but found that Talisker had broadly waived its rights related to the foreclosure process in the loan documents. The court concluded that the lenders’ actions, while possibly unfair, were not unlawful under the terms of the agreements and dismissed the complaint.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Talisker’s waivers in the loan documents were broad and explicit enough to encompass all rights under Rule 69B(d), including the requirement that property be sold in parcels likely to bring the highest price. The court further held that Talisker had also waived any equitable or common law claims related to the foreclosure sales. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding no error in its conclusion that Talisker’s waivers precluded relief. View "TALISKER PARTNERSHIP v. MIDTOWN ACQUISITIONS" on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both real estate professionals, were married for 31 years and jointly owned several properties, including two farms, residential homes, and business assets acquired during the marriage. The couple had no children together but each had adult children from prior marriages. During the marriage, they operated a real estate business and were equal shareholders in a grain company that was dissolved before the divorce proceedings. The husband claimed certain assets as nonmarital property, including proceeds from a premarital business and an inheritance, and also sought to have debts incurred during the marriage, such as a COVID-related loan and loans taken to pay temporary spousal support, treated as marital debts. Additionally, a third party, J.E.M. Farms, LLC, intervened, claiming a one-half interest in one of the farms based on a prior agreement and financial contributions.The District Court for Antelope County conducted a bifurcated trial, first addressing the intervenor’s claim and then the dissolution action. The court entered a consent decree quieting title to half of one farm in favor of J.E.M. Farms, with all parties agreeing to pay their own attorney fees and costs. In the dissolution proceedings, the court found that the husband failed to adequately trace most of his claimed nonmarital assets, except for $260,000 from his inheritance that was used to purchase one farm. The court also found insufficient evidence to treat the COVID loan as an outstanding marital debt or to find dissipation by the wife. The court ordered both farms to be sold, with the proceeds divided equally after accounting for the nonmarital inheritance, and denied the husband’s request for attorney fees related to the intervention.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo for abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the husband did not meet his burden to trace additional nonmarital property, that the consent decree barred his claim for attorney fees related to the intervention, and that the order to sell the farms was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also found no error in the treatment of debts or in the division of property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

The case centers on a long-standing dispute involving three churches over ownership and sale of real property in Los Angeles. Attorney Steven C. Kim represented one of the churches, Central Korean Evangelical Church, which granted him a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of attorney fees. Central Korean had contracted to sell the property to New Life Oasis Church but later reneged, leading to litigation. The trial court ordered Central Korean to honor the sale and expunged Kim’s deed of trust, which was obstructing the transaction. Kim’s client appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, and Kim did not pursue his own appeal. The judgment became final in 2018.Following the final judgment, Kim filed a new lawsuit against New Life Oasis Church and Bank of Hope, seeking a declaration that his deed of trust was still valid and challenging the prior expungement order. New Life and Bank of Hope moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that issue preclusion barred Kim from relitigating the validity of his lien. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed and entered judgment against Kim. Additionally, New Life filed a cross-complaint alleging that Kim’s recording of a lis pendens constituted slander of title and abuse of process. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of New Life, awarding damages and not addressing Kim’s defense based on the litigation privilege.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s application of issue preclusion, holding that Kim could not relitigate the validity of his deed of trust. However, it reversed the judgment on the cross-complaint, holding that the litigation privilege protected Kim’s recording of the lis pendens from claims of slander of title and abuse of process. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Edward T. Saadi, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, obtained a $90,000 judgment against Pierre Maroun and Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) following a jury verdict in a federal defamation suit. Despite the judgment, Saadi was unable to collect payment for nine years. In 2018, Saadi discovered information suggesting Maroun had transferred $250,000 from his personal account to MILLC, allegedly to evade the judgment. Saadi claimed these funds were used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC but used as Maroun’s residence, and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses. Saadi initiated proceedings supplementary under Florida law, seeking to void the transfer and recover assets.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed Saadi to file an impleader complaint against Maroun and MILLC, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer and actual and constructive fraud under Florida statutes. Saadi also sought sanctions when MILLC failed to produce a representative for deposition, but the district court denied the motion, finding the individual was not a managing agent of MILLC. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC, ruling that Saadi’s claims were time-barred under Florida’s statutes of repose and limitations, and that tolling provisions did not apply. The court also found that the remedies Saadi sought were unavailable under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. Finding that several dispositive questions of Florida law lacked controlling precedent and were subject to conflicting interpretations by Florida’s intermediate appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The court deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response to the certified questions. View "Saadi v. Maroun" on Justia Law

A company acquired a tax title to certain immovable property in St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, after the original owners failed to pay property taxes. Following the expiration of the redemptive period, the company mailed post-tax sale notice to the executrix of the former owner’s succession at the address listed in the succession proceedings. The company then filed a petition to quiet title, and the executrix was personally served. In response, she filed a reconventional demand seeking to annul the tax sale, alleging she had not received adequate pre-tax and post-tax sale notice. The City, which had previously held a small interest in the property, was also named as a third-party defendant.The 16th Judicial District Court sustained exceptions of prescription raised by the company and the City, dismissing the executrix’s claims as untimely. On appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, finding the reconventional demand was timely because it was filed within six months of service of the petition to quiet title, as required by La. R.S. 47:2266. The appellate court also held that the failure to provide pre-tax sale notice could render the tax sale absolutely null, and that the company and the City bore the burden of proving the reconventional demand was prescribed.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and held that, following the 2008 revision to Louisiana’s tax sale statutes, failure to provide pre-tax sale notice for tax sales occurring after January 1, 2009, no longer results in an absolute nullity. Instead, such defects are relative nullities, subject to specific prescriptive periods under La. R.S. 47:2287. The Court further held that a nullity action brought as a reconventional demand in a quiet title action must also comply with the six-month limitation in La. R.S. 47:2266. The Court affirmed the appellate ruling regarding prescription but reversed on the issue of absolute nullity, remanding for further proceedings. View "BELAIRE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, LLC VS. SUCCESSION OF SHELTON" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner obtained a building permit from a city and was required, under the city’s standard procedures, to submit a form containing financial information about subcontractors before the city would conduct necessary inspections and issue a certificate of occupancy. The property owner refused to provide the requested information, leading the city to withhold inspections. As a result, the property owner filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the city lacked authority to require such information and requesting an order compelling the city to perform the inspections. The owner also sought damages for delays allegedly caused by the city’s refusal to inspect.After the property owner settled with the city’s building inspector, the case proceeded in the Baldwin Circuit Court. The jury was asked to decide both the declaratory judgment and damages claims, ultimately finding in favor of the property owner and awarding over $3.5 million in damages. The city appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a prior decision, held that the damages claim was barred by substantive immunity and reversed the damages award, but did not address the declaratory judgment claim, remanding the case for further proceedings.On remand, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered judgment for the property owner on the declaratory judgment claim but did not award damages. The city appealed again. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that, because the inspections had already been completed and all requested relief had been granted or resolved, no justiciable controversy remained. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for dismissal. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles" on Justia Law

A Georgia limited-liability company owned and operated a hotel in Birmingham, Alabama, which was subject to a $10,710,000 loan secured by a mortgage, an assignment of leases and rents, and other collateral. The loan was eventually assigned to a bank acting as trustee for a mortgage trust. After the hotel owner allegedly defaulted on its loan obligations and mismanaged the property, the bank filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking the appointment of a receiver to manage the hotel and ensure payment of operating expenses. The court appointed a receiver and issued orders outlining the receiver’s duties, including managing the hotel and paying its expenses.Following the appointment, disputes arose between the hotel owner, the receiver, and the bank regarding whether the receiver was required to pay expenses incurred before the receivership began (“pre-receivership claims”). The hotel owner sought to compel the receiver to pay these claims, while the receiver and the bank objected, arguing that such payments could harm the receivership estate and improperly prioritize unsecured creditors over the secured lender. The circuit court ultimately issued an order in July 2024 clarifying that the receiver was required to pay pre-receivership expenses, prompting the receiver to appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether the July 2024 order was an appealable interlocutory injunction and whether the circuit court erred in requiring the receiver to pay pre-receivership claims without regard to creditor priority. The court held that the order was injunctive in nature and appealable. It further held that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by requiring the receiver to pay all pre-receivership claims unconditionally, as this could harm the receivership estate and the interests of priority creditors. The Supreme Court reversed the July 2024 order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kolessar v. SJP Investment Partners, LLC" on Justia Law