Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The underlying dispute before the North Dakota Supreme Court in this case concerned two competing oil and gas leases. In 2006, Ritter, Laber and Associates, Inc. was part of a joint venture that was locating mineral owners and leasing their interests. Eugene and Carol Hanson entered into a lease agreement with Ritter ("EOG lease") and a "Side Letter Agreement" was executed at the same time, allowing Ritter to “exercise its option” to lease the minerals. If Ritter chose not to exercise the option, Ritter was required to “immediately release [the Hansons] from any further obligation.” The EOG Lease was not immediately recorded. In April 2007, Eugene and Carol Hanson executed a warranty deed to their son and daughter-in-law, Kelly and Denise Hanson, which included the minerals in question and was recorded. The deed reserved a 50% life estate in the minerals. In May 2007, Ritter recorded a “Memorandum of Oil and Gas Lease Option” that referenced the EOG Lease. In July 2007, Ritter recorded the EOG Lease and sent Eugene and Carol Hanson a letter stating it “has elected to exercise its option to lease.” In August 2007, Ritter’s partner sent the couple a check for roughly $37,000 “as total consideration for your Paid up Oil and Gas Lease dated December 20, 2006.” In September 2007, Ritter assigned the EOG Lease, along with a batch of other leases, to EOG. The assignment was recorded. In December 2007, Ritter obtained an oil and gas lease from Kelly and Denise Hanson listing the tracts in question ("Northern Lease"). It was recorded in January 2008 and assigned to Northern in June 2008. Northern filed suit seeking a declaration of what it owned. The court determined the transaction between Eugene and Carol Hanson and Ritter created an option to lease, Denise and Kelly Hanson had no notice of the option, and they took title to the minerals free of it. The court entered a partial judgment determining “the EOG Lease is not valid and subsisting insofar as it conflicts with the Northern Lease.” EOG Resources, Inc. appealed and Northern cross appealed, arguing the court erred when it declined to grant additional relief after its title determination. The Supreme Court held the district court erred when it quieted title in Northern. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern Oil & Gas v. EOG Resources, et al." on Justia Law

On June 23, 2021, Kathy Schmidt filed a quiet title action covering property located in Benson County, North Dakota, offering a document titled “warranty deed” as evidence of title. The district court granted the defendants’ N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice based on lack of standing and res judicata. Schmidt filed two motions for reconsideration arguing the court failed to consider new evidence. She appealed when the trial court denied her motions. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court did not err in dismissing Schmidt’s complaint based on standing. Because the warranty deed did not convey Schmidt a valid interest in the property, she failed to meet the requirements in N.D.C.C. § 47-10-05. Therefore, she did not have standing to bring a quiet title claim. Additionally, since the invalidity of the warranty deed was litigated and a final judgment was rendered, the district court did not err in dismissing Schmidt’s complaint based on res judicata. View "Schmidt v. Hageness, et al." on Justia Law

Karen and Keith Hood owned real property in Washington County, near Cambridge, Idaho. The Hoods’ property was near property owned by Gayle and Paul Poorman and Rusty Anderson. The Hoods’ property had three decreed appurtenant water rights; the water from two of these water rights was diverted from Rush Creek and conveyed to the Hoods’ property through an irrigation ditch (“the Hood ditch”). The crux of this case involved that portion of the Hood ditch which ran through the Poormans’ and Anderson’s properties. The Hoods filed a complaint in November 2019, seeking to have the district court: (1) enjoin the Poormans and Anderson from interfering with their maintenance of the Hood ditch right-of-way; (2) declare the Hoods’ rights with respect to the right-of-way; and (3) award damages against the Poormans and Anderson for damage done to the Hood ditch right-of way. Anderson sought to have the Hoods reinstall a bridge over the ditch on Anderson’s property. The Poormans asked the district court to require the Hoods to replace removed culverts on the Poormans’ property, and refrain from removing trees and other vegetation outside the scope of the Hood ditch right-of-way. The Poormans also requested monetary compensation for damage to their property as a result of the Hoods’ ditch maintenance, including the removal of trees and vegetation. The district court issued a written decision granting the Hoods’ motion for partial summary judgment that incorporated the limitations proposed by the Poormans and Anderson. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment. The Supreme Court found that while the district court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to enjoin the Hoods from excessively accessing the right-of-way, some of the district court’s specific limitations on when the Hoods could access the right-of-way were an abuse of discretion because they were either unsupported by evidence in the record or contradicted by the evidence presented at trial. On remand, the Supreme Court gave the district court a mandate to issue two judgments: one defining the purpose, length, width, and location of the primary easement to run with the land and bind the parties’ successors-in-interest; the second second to identify the injunctive relief limiting the Hoods’ exercise of their secondary easement rights and include the declaratory and monetary relief awarded, not to run with the land or bind the Hoods’ successors-in-interest. View "Hood v. Poorman" on Justia Law

In an issue of first impression for the Louisiana Supreme Court, was what prescriptive period, if any, was applicable to a citizen suit for injunctive relief pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16 suit. Justin Tureau instituted a citizen suit pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:16, alleging that defendants drilled and operated numerous oil and gas wells on his property, or on adjacent property, as well as constructed and used unlined earthen pits. Specifically, Tureau alleged that said unlined pits were either never closed, or were not closed in conformance with environmental rules and regulations, including Statewide Order 29-B, L.A.C. 43:XIX.101, et seq, which, among other things, requires the registration and closure of existing unlined oilfield pits, as well as the remediation of various enumerated contaminants in the soil to certain minimum standards. The Supreme Court held that a LSA-R.S. 30:16 citizen suit was not subject to liberative prescription. The Court further found that, insofar as the petition alleges that defendants violated conservation laws, rules, regulations, or orders, the allegations were sufficient to defeat an exception of no cause of action. The Court therefore affirmed the appeals court ruling, which overruled defendants’ exceptions of prescription, overruled the exceptions of no cause of action, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Pilcher" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC (“Whitetail”) appealed two district court judgments granting summary judgment and dismissing claims asserted by Whitetail against XTO Energy, Inc. (“XTO”) and the Board of University of School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and Director (collectively “State”). Whitetail argued the court erred by: (1) dismissing its claim asserting the State had committed an unconstitutional taking of its property interest; (2) by dismissing Whitetail’s trespass, slander of title, unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims asserted against the State; (3) by determining XTO had not breached its lease agreement by failing to pay royalties owed to Whitetail; (4) by determining XTO did not violate N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1; and (5) by dismissing Whitetail’s constructive fraud claim asserted against XTO. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there were quiet title claims asserted by Whitetail remaining unresolved, it dismissed the appeal. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc., and Lee Riggins appealed a circuit court judgment dismissing their complaint against Donald Moulton, Sr., and Broken Vessel United Church ("the Broken Vessel defendants") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the basis that the claims asserted in the complaint against the Broken Vessel defendants are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the allegations of the complaint, when construed in plaintiffs' favor, were sufficient to sate a claim for a declaratory judgment. Further, the Court found the trial court erred in dismissing count one of the complaint against the Broken Vessel defendants on the basis that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Matrix, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

An Alaska superior court ordered a landowner to temporarily remove a tourist railway it had built across an easement on his land to allow the easement holder to build a paved road capable of dedication as a public right-of-way. The court required the railway, once reinstalled, to be operated in ways designed to lessen interference with use of the road. Further, the court ruled that the landowner would be liable for any increased construction and dedication costs the easement holder incurred as a result of the railway crossing. On appeal the easement holder argued the court erred by permitting the landowner to make reasonable use of land covered by the easement; allowing the landowner to build permanent improvements in the easement; limiting the road width to 60 feet when the width of the granted easement was 100 feet; permitting improvements that would allegedly interfere with the ability to dedicate the easement; and failing to account for time needed to obtain administrative approvals when setting a road construction schedule. The landowner cross-appealed, claiming it was the prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees. Seeing no error in the superior court’s rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Reeves, et al. v. Godspeed Properties, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from a construction defect suit brought by a number of homeowners (Petitioners) against their homebuilder and general contractor, Lennar Carolinas, LLC (Lennar). Lennar moved to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provisions in a series of contracts signed by Petitioners at the time they purchased their homes. Petitioners pointed to purportedly unconscionable provisions in the contracts generally and in the arbitration provision specifically. Citing a number of terms in the contracts, and without delineating between the contracts generally and the arbitration provision specifically, the circuit court denied Lennar's motion to compel, finding the contracts were grossly one-sided and unconscionable and, thus, the arbitration provisions contained within those contracts were unenforceable. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. forbade consideration of unconscionable terms outside of an arbitration provision (the Prima Paint doctrine). The court of appeals found the circuit court's analysis ran afoul of the Prima Paint doctrine as it relied on the oppressive nature of terms outside of the arbitration provisions. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the circuit court violated the Prima Paint doctrine, it nonetheless agreed with Petitioners and found the arbitration provisions, standing alone, contained a number of oppressive and one-sided terms, thereby rendering the provisions unconscionable and unenforceable under South Carolina law. The Court further declined to sever the unconscionable terms from the remainder of the arbitration provisions, as "it would encourage sophisticated parties to intentionally insert unconscionable terms—that often go unchallenged—throughout their contracts, believing the courts would step in and rescue the party from its gross overreach. ... Rather, we merely recognize that where a contract would remain one-sided and be fragmented after severance, the better policy is to decline the invitation for judicial severance." View "Damico v. Lennar Carolinas, LLC et al." on Justia Law

In October 1998, Andrea and Brad Hall, together with Linda and Frank Exler, purchased real property in Roberts, Idaho. The Halls owned a two-thirds interest in the property and the Exlers owned one-third. In September 2005, Linda deeded all of her interest in the property to Frank. Frank died intestate in March 2006. Travis Exler, Frank’s son and sole heir, was appointed as the personal representative of Frank’s estate (“the Estate”). The parties dispute their relationship in the years between Frank's death and the filing of the underlying lawsuit. Brad testified he received notice from the County rearding unpaid taxes on the property. Travis said he was unable to pay the Estate's portion of the overdue taxes. Brad testified the parties reached an agreement by which Travis would deed the property to the Halls if they paid the outstanding tax balance. Within weeks of their conversation, Brad contacted a law firm to prepare a quitclaim deed. In contrast, Travis stated he would transfer the Estate’s interest in the property if the Halls reimbursed his costs associated with cleaning up the property. Travis testified that in 2009 the parties also agreed the Halls would take care of cleanup costs and taxes. Travis stated that he did not transfer ownership of the property to the Halls and was never presented with a quitclaim or personal representative’s deed. It was undisputed that the Halls had sole control, use, and operation of the property since 2009. The Halls oversaw the administration of the lease and maintenance of the property. Travis did not list any profit or loss from the property on his personal taxes. In addition, the Halls paid the overdue taxes on the property, and made all tax payments on the property since 2009. The Halls and Travis did not communicate between 2009 and 2019. In June 2010, Travis voluntarily filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Travis did not list the property on his bankruptcy petition. The Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee moved to dismiss based on Travis’s failure to list an interest in the property, rental income, and the transfer of an apartment building and 150 cattle. The bankruptcy court dismissed Travis’s petition. After Travis refused the Halls’ request to reopen probate of the Estate, the Halls filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court issued a memorandum decision and order, quieting title to the disputed property in the Halls based on the lost deed doctrine. Travis appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hall v. Exler" on Justia Law

Martha and Kevin Smith purchased and lived in a house that had a plumbing system composed of polyethylene ("PEX") tubing manufactured by NIBCO, Inc. The PEX tubing failed, which allowed water to leak into the house, allegedly causing damage. The Smiths subsequently commenced a lawsuit in against NIBCO, among others, asserting various theories of liability. Ultimately, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of NIBCO and certified the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. App. P. The Smiths appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the Smiths' claims against NIBCO, the judgment on which was certified as final under Rule 54(b), and the Smiths' claims against D.R. Horton and Dupree Plumbing that remained pending in the circuit court were so closely intertwined that separate adjudication of those claims would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the September 20, 2021, order granting NIBCO's summary-judgment motion as final. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal. View "Smith v. NIBCO, Inc." on Justia Law