Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The federal district court for the District of North Dakota certified five questions regarding N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) and North Dakota Industrial Commission pooling orders. The litigation before the federal court involved allocation of mineral royalties in the case of overlapping oil and gas spacing units. Allen and Arlen Dominek owned oil and gas interests in Williams County, North Dakota. In 2011, the North Dakota Industrial Commission pooled the interests in Section 13 on the Dominek property with the interests in Section 24 in a 1280-acre spacing unit (the “Underlying Spacing Unit”). In 2016, the Commission pooled the interests in Sections 11, 12, 13, and 14 in a 2560-acre spacing unit (the “Overlapping Spacing Unit). The "Weisz" well terminated in the southeast corner of Section 14. The Defendants (together “Equinor”) operated the Weisz well. The Domineks sued Equinor in federal district court to recover revenue proceeds from the Weisz well. The parties agreed production from the Weisz well should have been allocated equally to the four sections comprising the Overlapping Spacing Unit. Their disagreement was whether the 25% attributable to Section 13 should have been shared with the interest owners in Section 24 given those sections were pooled in the Underlying Spacing Unit. In response to the motions, the federal district court certified five questions to the North Dakota Court. Responding "no" to the first: whether language from N.D.C.C. § 38-08-08(1) required production from Section 13 to be allocated to Section 24, the Supreme Court declined to answer the remaining questions because it found they were based on an assumption that the Commission had jurisdiction to direct how production was allocated among mineral interest owners. "Questions concerning correlative rights and the Commission’s jurisdiction entail factual considerations. ... An undeveloped record exposes this Court 'to the danger of improvidently deciding issues and of not sufficiently contemplating ramifications of the opinion.'” View "Dominek, et al. v. Equinor Energy, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a third-party entity in a post-judgment collection action has party standing to appeal from an order of the district court resolving its petition to return property levied pursuant to a writ of execution.Jennifer Goldstein obtained a judgment against NuVeda, LLC for over $2.5 million. In post-judgment collection proceedings, Goldstein had a writ of execution serviced on Clark NMSD, LLC, and cash was seized. Clark NMSD filed a third-party claimant petition, which NuVeda joined, seeking return of the seized cash and requesting that Goldstein be prohibited from further collection activity. The district court denied the petition. Goldstein then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Clark NMSD was not a party to the proceedings below it had not standing to appeal. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Clark NMSD had party standing to challenge the district court's order, and the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal. View "Clark NMSD, LLC v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

In this action concerning a disputed agreement between between Kenneth and Rebecca Goens and Lynn VanSloten for the sale of an empty lot, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-3, holding that the underlying interlocutory judgment was not a final judgment under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-54(b) and was therefore not appealable.Kenneth delivered the purchase agreement at issue and VanSloten's earnest money check to FDT, LLC with the intention that FDT act as the closing agent for the property sale. When a dispute arose regarding the earnest money check and purchase agreement the Goenses filed a complaint against FDT and VanSloten. VanSloten asserted a counterclaim against the Goenses. The circuit court granted FDT's motion for summary judgment against the Goenses, but the order did not resolve the remaining claims or contain any certification under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-54(b). The Goenses appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because active claims remained in this action at the time of appeal and no Rule 54(b) certification was made, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-3. View "Goens v. FDT, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Merlyn Clay appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Charles Chavis, Clay's grandfather. The dispute concerned Clay's purchase of real property from Chavis and Clay's alleged failure to fulfill certain requirements of a sale contract for the real property executed by the parties. The Alabama Supreme Court found there were several discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the terms the parties agreed were part of the transaction, as well as discrepancies between the stated terms of the sale contract and the performance of the parties. "Those discrepancies are crucial to the outcome of this dispute because Chavis's claims are premised on the contention that Clay breached the sale contract by failing to provide a promissory note and a mortgage and by ceasing to make monthly loan payments to Chavis. Yet, under the terms of the sale contract, Chavis likewise did not provide the deed to the river property in a timely manner, and the sale contract does not expressly state that Clay had to make monthly loan payments. Those discrepancies are also crucial to the relief granted to Chavis by the circuit court." Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further findings and proceedings. View "Clay v. Chavis." on Justia Law

A mother, son, and daughter conveyed real property among themselves by competing deeds. The daughter used the property as security for two bank loans and defaulted on the second one; when the bank attempted foreclosure, the son, claiming to be the property’s owner, brought suit against the bank on a constructive notice theory, also alleging that the daughter’s deed to the property was void because of fraud. The superior court found that the bank lacked notice of the son’s alleged adverse interest and granted it summary judgment as a bona fide lender. The court also dismissed the fraud claim. The son appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the bank’s bona fide lender status, but remanded for a determination of whether the daughter acquired her deed as a result of fraud in the factum, which, if proven, would render her title and the bank’s mortgage interest void. View "Eriksson v. Eriksson Sibley et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants filed suit in this water rights case claiming that defendants-appellees interfered with their rights by damming a stream that flowed down to plaintiffs' property. After a jury verdict in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appealed. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding error in the jury instructions and remanded the case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari found no such errors, vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. View "Farris v. Masquelier" on Justia Law

Phillip and Anna Kennedy contracted with DIMA Homes, Inc., to build a house on property they owned in Marion County, Mississippi. The Kennedys failed to pay DIMA, and DIMA obtained a judgment, which it properly enrolled, creating a judgment lien on the property. The Kennedys then failed to pay property taxes, and in 2016, the land was sold at a tax sale to ACC Tax Sales Property, LLC. HL&C Marion, LLC, obtained the property from ACC. DIMA did not receive notice of the tax sale. In 2019, more than two years after the tax sale, HL&C filed suit to quiet title. The chancery court ruled that the failure to give written notice of the sale to DIMA resulted in an extension of the two-year redemption period and set aside the tax sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Granting certiorari review, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the chancellor, holding that no legal authority required notice of the tax sale to have been given to DIMA. Accordingly, judgment was rendered in favor of HL&C Marion. View "HL&C Marion, LLC v. DIMA Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals stemmed from an action filed by The Citizens Bank ("Citizens Bank") against Steve Matherly ("Steve"); Sue E. Matherly a/k/a Sue Ellen Stratten, Steve's former spouse ("Sue"); and Penn Waters, LLC ("Penn Waters"). The initial complaint sought: (1) to quiet title to certain real property in Steve; (2) an accounting from Penn Waters as to the balance allegedly owed on a mortgage securing a home-equity line of credit on the same real property; (3) damages from Steve for breach of contract and fraud based on his failure to pay on his personal guaranty of a corporate debt; and (4) a judicial foreclosure of the mortgage securing the indebtedness owed Citizens Bank by Steve. In the course of the proceedings, Steve's current spouse, Jenny Matherly ("Jenny"), intervened as a defendant, claiming a homestead interest in the real property at issue. Eventually, the circuit court entered two orders granting summary judgment in favor of Citizens Bank. The first order awarded the real property in question to Citizens Bank and granted it immediate possession thereof, requiring Steve and Jenny to vacate the property, awarded Jenny $5,000 based on a homestead claim, and required Steve to pay the deficiency balance owed by him to Citizens Bank following foreclosure on the subject real property. The second order concluded that the mortgage held by Penn Waters was void because it had been previously satisfied. Both Jenny and Penn Waters appealed the circuit court's judgments, and Citizens Bank cross-appealed the circuit court's judgment awarding $5,000 to Jenny. Steve did not appeal the judgment against him, and Sue was not a party to the appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgments. View "Penn Waters, LLC v. The Citizens Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a district court judgment granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss her complaint. n relevant part, the district court found wanting her claims for fraud in the enforcement of a mortgage; fraud upon the court; collusion and deceit upon the court in violation of New York State Judiciary Law Section 487; and negligence. It explained that it was precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from adjudicating all of Plaintiff’s claims, and that, in any event, principles of res judicata and estoppel barred her from pursuing these claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s fraud and negligence claims against the Attorney Defendants and vacated in part the dismissal of her claims under New York Judiciary Law Section 487. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not require the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims; that res judicata does not bar her claims, and that collateral estoppel bars her fraud and negligence claims, but not her section 487 claim for deceit upon the court View "Hansen v. Miller" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute before the North Dakota Supreme Court in this case concerned two competing oil and gas leases. In 2006, Ritter, Laber and Associates, Inc. was part of a joint venture that was locating mineral owners and leasing their interests. Eugene and Carol Hanson entered into a lease agreement with Ritter ("EOG lease") and a "Side Letter Agreement" was executed at the same time, allowing Ritter to “exercise its option” to lease the minerals. If Ritter chose not to exercise the option, Ritter was required to “immediately release [the Hansons] from any further obligation.” The EOG Lease was not immediately recorded. In April 2007, Eugene and Carol Hanson executed a warranty deed to their son and daughter-in-law, Kelly and Denise Hanson, which included the minerals in question and was recorded. The deed reserved a 50% life estate in the minerals. In May 2007, Ritter recorded a “Memorandum of Oil and Gas Lease Option” that referenced the EOG Lease. In July 2007, Ritter recorded the EOG Lease and sent Eugene and Carol Hanson a letter stating it “has elected to exercise its option to lease.” In August 2007, Ritter’s partner sent the couple a check for roughly $37,000 “as total consideration for your Paid up Oil and Gas Lease dated December 20, 2006.” In September 2007, Ritter assigned the EOG Lease, along with a batch of other leases, to EOG. The assignment was recorded. In December 2007, Ritter obtained an oil and gas lease from Kelly and Denise Hanson listing the tracts in question ("Northern Lease"). It was recorded in January 2008 and assigned to Northern in June 2008. Northern filed suit seeking a declaration of what it owned. The court determined the transaction between Eugene and Carol Hanson and Ritter created an option to lease, Denise and Kelly Hanson had no notice of the option, and they took title to the minerals free of it. The court entered a partial judgment determining “the EOG Lease is not valid and subsisting insofar as it conflicts with the Northern Lease.” EOG Resources, Inc. appealed and Northern cross appealed, arguing the court erred when it declined to grant additional relief after its title determination. The Supreme Court held the district court erred when it quieted title in Northern. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern Oil & Gas v. EOG Resources, et al." on Justia Law