Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Three community stakeholders moved to intervene in several lawsuits challenging the authority of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to ban all off-highway vehicle (OHV) use at Oceano Dunes State Vehicular Recreation Area (Oceano Dunes). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the stakeholders’ interests are adequately represented in the litigation. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it: (1) denied them leave to intervene as of right, (2) denied their request for permissive intervention, and (3) sustained Respondents’ evidentiary objections.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that where a nonparty has interests in the outcome of a civil action that are identical to those of a party to the action, the nonparty must make a compelling showing of inadequate representation to be permitted to intervene as of right. The court explained that the trial court’s decision to deny Appellants’ request for permissive intervention did not exceed the bounds of reason because “ ‘the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit on their own terms’ ” outweighed the reasons for intervention. The court wrote that additionally, permitting Appellants to intervene would add to an already-expansive action, one with four consolidated writ petitions; multiple plaintiffs, defendants, and real parties in interest; and significant burdens on the trial court. View "Friends of Oceano Dunes v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Petitioners' petition for a writ of review seeking interlocutory review of the orders of the district court denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss and motion to set aside default, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the default judgment.At issue was subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on service by publication. Petitioners argued that the failure to serve Defendants with a summons stripped the district court of both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit held (1) absent a statute or rule to the contrary, no summons is required when service is accomplished by publication; (2) the district court correctly determined that a summons is not required as to those defendants who are properly subject to service by publication; but (3) the court erred in finding the service by publication conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendants with a known address. View "Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC" on Justia Law

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. The Corps settled on a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet. The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps and various federal officials. Their complaint alleged that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and certain easements. The district court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its height on the date of the Act’s enactment. Corps argued that this reading ignores the clause “for water supply and recreational activities” and that a lowered pool that still fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim and the resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. The court left it to the district court to decide whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and recreational purposes. The court explained that it agreed with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to “absurd results.” Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” But neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.” View "State of South Carolina v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC, JHM HIX Keene, LLC, VIDHI Hospitality, LLC, NAKSH Hospitality, LLC, 298 Queen City Hotel, LLC, ANSHI Hospitality, LLC, 700 Elm, LLC, Bedford-Carnevale, LLC, and Carnevale Holdings, LLC, owned commercial real estate on which they operated hotels, some of which offered restaurant services along with banquet or function facilities. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic was a “natural disaster” and that their buildings were “damaged” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. Plaintiffs sought relief from the New Hampshire municipalities involved: the Cities of Laconia, Keene, and Manchester, and the Town of Bedford. After denial of their applications, they appealed to the superior court in the applicable county. Observing that there were thirteen separate lawsuits pending in six counties, they then filed an assented-to motion for interlocutory transfer without ruling and motion to consolidate to allow the coordinated transfer of the common questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In this interlocutory transfer without ruling, the Supreme Court was asked to determine: (1) whether, for purposes of RSA 76:21, the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “natural disaster”; and (2) if so, whether the buildings owned by the plaintiffs were “damaged” by COVID-19 such that they were “not able to be used for [their] intended use” within the meaning of RSA 76:21, I. The Court answered the second question in the negative. View "Clearview Realty Ventures, LLC v. City of Laconia; et al." on Justia Law

SR Construction held a lien on real property owned by RE Palm Springs II. The property owner is a corporate affiliate of Hall Palm Springs LLC, who had financed the original undertaking for a separate real estate developer. The latter requested leave of the bankruptcy court to submit a credit bid to purchase the property from its affiliate, which the bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court later approved the sale and discharged all liens. The construction company appealed the bankruptcy court’s credit-bid and sale orders. Finding that the lender was a good faith purchaser, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and dismissed the appeal as moot under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the pandemic dramatically changed not only the lender’s plans for the Property but it also severely impacted the affiliate’s ability to market and sell a hotel, particularly an unfinished one. In sum, these two factors must also be weighed in considering whether any of the actions or procedures, particularly with regard to pricing or timing issues, were performed in bad faith or as a result of sub-optimal external forces beyond the lender’s control. The court explained that the record facts, framed by the external context and circumstances, make plain that there is no error in the judgments of the able bankruptcy and district courts. Accordingly, the court held that the lender did not engage in fraud and was a “good faith purchaser.” View "SR Construction v. Hall Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Wilburn Lord, Jr. agreed to sell SEL Business Services, LLP and Skip Lloyd (collectively, SEL) a building in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, for $60,000. SEL moved into the building and alleged to have begun making improvements and paying the taxes. But Lord never followed through with the sale. Instead, Lord sold the building to Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital, a community hospital operated by Sharkey and Issaquena Counties (collectively, Hospital Defendants). SEL initially sought to enjoin the sale. In an amended complaint, in addition to seeking the injunction, SEL alleged Lord breached his contract with SEL to sell the building. SEL requested specific performance. Alternatively, SEL alleged detrimental reliance and promissory estoppel. SEL finally requested, “should the Court find that specific performance, promissory estoppel and/or equitable estoppel are somehow inapplicable and/or the Contract should not otherwise be enforced based on the principles of equity and/or other grounds/for other reasons, . . . [that] the Court disgorge all funds paid to Defendants and/or otherwise award all monetary damages available under Mississippi law.” Both Lord and the Hospital Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the statute of frauds barred not only SEL’s contract-based claim for specific performance but also any “derivative” equitable claims. Both the chancery and Court of Appeals relied on Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson, 153 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2014) to conclude that the statute of frauds barred not just claims for equitable liens but all potential equitable remedies. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted SEL’s petition for writ of certiorari to overrule the erroneous Barriffe decision and to reinstate the Supreme Court’s long-standing equitable principles. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court reversed the chancellor’s dismissal of SEL and Lloyd’s equitable claims against Lord. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment of dismissal as to the remaining defendants. The case was remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "SEL Business Services, LLC v. Lord, et al." on Justia Law

In 2017, Charles Green was stabbed and killed. His body was found in a parking lot in front of an abandoned building. Deepak Jasco, LLC, owned and operated a convenience store in the adjacent lot. Luretha Green Palmer, Green’s sister and the executrix of his estate, filed a wrongful-death lawsuit and asserted a claim for premises liability based on negligent security. The circuit judge denied the motion for summary judgment, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal. Palmer did not allege that defendants had actual knowledge of the violent nature of Green’s attacker and offered no affidavit or evidence to establish this element. Instead, Palmer argued that Defendants were aware of an atmosphere of violence on their premises. Further, Palmer insisted that summary judgment was properly denied because there was a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute about whether Green was killed on Defendant’s premises at 1034 West Woodrow Wilson Drive and whether Deepak Jasco, LLC, exercised possession and control over the portion of the common parking lot where Green died from his injuries. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not agree with Palmer's contentions, finding she failed to establish an atmosphere of violence through police records of other instances of crime at or near the property in question, and that defendants owned or operated the property. With no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the Court found defendants were entitled to summary judgment. View "Deepak Jasco, LLC, et al. v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Michael Upchurch, his brother David Upchurch, and his nephew Jason Upchurch owned several pieces of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They signed a contract to sell the properties to third parties. However, before closing, Michael died. In this declaratory-judgment action, Michael's widow Carol Upchurch, individually and as the executor of Michael's estate, asserted, among other things, a claim to one-third of the proceeds from that sale. David and Jason filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. The Alabama Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, Michael, David, and Jason's decision to enter into a contract to sell the properties severed their joint tenancy and that, as a result, Michael's estate was entitled to one-third of the proceeds from the sale of properties. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the estate. View "Upchurch v. Upchurch" on Justia Law

Desiree Million owned property in Mentone, Alabama that bordered property owned by Steve Carpenter and Colleen Duffley. A boundary-line dispute arose; Million, acting pro se, ultimately filed suit against Carpenter, Duffley, and several other defendants who were involved in the dispute. Among others, Million named Albert Shumaker as a defendant; Shumaker, an attorney, had been retained by Carpenter and Duffley in relation to the boundary-line dispute and had sent, on behalf of Carpenter and Duffley, a cease-and-desist letter to Million. Upon Shumaker's motion, the circuit court entered an interlocutory order dismissing Shumaker from the action. Million, again acting pro se, appealed the circuit court's interlocutory order. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed Million's appeal as having been taken from a nonfinal judgment. View "Million v. Shumaker" on Justia Law