Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In August 2015, Plaintiff-appellant, TIB-The Independent Bankers Bank ("TIB"), filed a foreclosure action against Kyle Goerke, based on a mortgage executed and recorded in 2007. TIB also included claims against Kyle Goerke's brother, defendant-appellee, Joseph Goerke ("Goerke"), and several of their family members because they possessed a right of first refusal recorded in the chain of title. At the time, Goerke also possessed a second interest in the property, a mortgage recorded in 2015. Although the title report ordered by TIB reflected both of Goerke's interests, TIB only named him as a defendant in the 2015 foreclosure based on his right of first refusal--and not on his mortgage interest. Goerke, an attorney, filed an answer in the 2015 foreclosure on behalf of himself and the other family members, noting that their right of first refusal had expired. Accordingly, Goerke claimed they had been improperly named as defendants and demanded that the claims against them be dismissed with prejudice. Goerke did not assert or reference his mortgage interest in his answer. TIB complied with Goerke's demand and dismissed the claims against him and his family members with prejudice. Kyle Goerke later resolved the default, and TIB dismissed the 2015 foreclosure action. Kyle Goerke defaulted again shortly thereafter, and TIB initiated a second foreclosure action. In the 2016 foreclosure, TIB discovered Goerke's mortgage interest and named him as a defendant on that basis. Goerke filed an answer to the 2016 foreclosure, claiming TIB was barred from bringing further claims against him because TIB dismissed him with prejudice from the 2015 foreclosure. Both TIB and Goerke filed motions for summary judgment. The district court entered an order denying TIB's motion for summary judgment and a journal entry granting Goerke's motion. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Plaintiff's claim against Goerke was not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. View "TIB-The Independent Bankers Bank v. Goerke" on Justia Law

A group of Oklahoma landowners petitioned for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, claiming that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority violated the Open Meeting Act, 25 O.S.2021, §§ 301 to 314, regarding its notice to the public of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program. Both parties sought summary judgment. The district court rendered summary judgment in the landowners' favor, finding that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority willfully violated the Open Meeting Act. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority gave sufficient notice of the agenda items that the landowners challenged. Furthermore, the Court found that the lack of notice regarding the announcement of the ACCESS Oklahoma Program at the February 2022 meeting did not violate the Open Meeting Act because the announcement was for informational purposes only. View "Hirschfeld, et al. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority" on Justia Law

Andrew William Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint asking a circuit court to enter a judgment declaring that he had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons's property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons's property and denied Ammons's counterclaims. Ammons appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Ammons Properties, LLC v. Spraggins" on Justia Law

The property at issue in this appeal served as a rental home located in a residential neighborhood. The property owner, J.C. King III, stopped paying property taxes in 2015 after a fire extensively damaged the property and rendered it uninhabitable. The State of Alabama purchased the property at a 2016 tax sale, and in 2019 the property was ultimately sold in its uninhabitable state to Anderson Realty Group, LLC ("ARG"). ARG spent $88,812 to extensively renovate and restore the property to a habitable condition, and in 2020 it filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property. King filed a counterclaim to redeem the property and disputed whether the extensive renovations to the property could be considered "preservation improvements" due to be included in the redemption amount pursuant to § 40-10-122, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court agreed with King, holding that "preservation improvements" included only those amounts expended by ARG to keep the property from further deterioration, the value of which it concluded was $10,000, and it entered a judgment setting the redemption amount accordingly. ARG appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment, holding that the trial court had erred in limiting the "preservation improvements" to the cost of repairs undertaken to keep the property in the same condition it was in at the time of the tax sale. The Alabama Supreme Court granted King's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider, as a matter of first impression, the meaning of the phrase "preservation improvements" as defined in § 40-10-122(d). The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in limiting ARG to the recovery of the cost of repairs to keep the property in the same condition it was in at the time of the tax sale. Accordingly, its judgment was affirmed. View "Ex parte J.C. King III" on Justia Law

MUSA Properties, LLC ("MUSA"), and R.K. Allen Oil Co., Inc. ("Allen Oil"), entered into a real-estate sales contract in which MUSA agreed to purchase from Allen Oil a gasoline service station and convenience store ("the property"). The terms of the sales contract were not fulfilled, and the property was not transferred to MUSA. Allen Oil filed a lawsuit against MUSA, alleging various causes of action based on the sales contract; MUSA filed various counterclaims in response. MUSA also filed in probate court a notice of lis pendens describing the property. In an interlocutory order, the circuit court later determined that MUSA did not have a right to or interest in the property, and, upon the motion of Allen Oil, the circuit court entered an order expunging the lis pendens notice. MUSA then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief, to direct the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. Finding that Allen Oil's argument did not provide a convincing basis for the Supreme Court to suspend application of the doctrine of lis pendens and deny MUSA's mandamus petition, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens notice. View "Ex parte MUSA Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Debbie Berry appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PHH Mortgage Corporation ("PHH") on PHH's ejectment claim and Berry's breach-of-contract counterclaim. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Berry waived most of the arguments she raised on appeal by failing to address the effects of her prior settlement with PHH's predecessor and because her other appellate arguments failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred. View "Berry v. PHH Mortgage Corporation" on Justia Law

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. In December 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence in Huntsville. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip- resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne traversed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located. According to Byrne's testimony, he was holding the handrail and being careful. However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne commenced this action against Fisk and fictitiously named parties. Byrne alleged that there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. Consequently, the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment in favor of Fisk. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Gates appealed a trial court’s extension and modification of three stalking orders against him. he parties are longtime neighbors who lived on the same street in Mendon, Vermont. Defendant owned a home on the street; he also owns a vacant lot next to the home of plaintiffs Elizabeth Swett and Doug Earle. In January 2021, plaintiffs sought stalking orders against defendant, alleging defendant was engaging in aggressive and intimidating behavior, including yelling and swearing at them, firing his gun to intimidate them, and otherwise acting in ways that made them fear for their physical safety. Gates raised numerous arguments, many of which related to the requirements for the issuance of initial stalking orders rather than extensions of those orders. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion in extending and modifying the orders and therefore affirmed. View "Swett, et al. v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Niki-Alexander Shetty purchased a home that had been foreclosed upon by a homeowners association. The home, however, was still subject to a defaulted mortgage and deed of trust between the bank and the original borrower. Defendants, the bank and mortgage servicer, recorded a notice of default and scheduled a foreclosure sale. Shetty sought to cure the default and resume regular payments on the loan. Defendants, however, refused, insisting that, as a stranger to the loan, he was not entitled to reinstate it. Shetty sued for wrongful foreclosure, arguing he had the right to reinstate the loan pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924c. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Shetty did not have standing under the statute. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that interpretation of the statute and reversed the judgment as to all defendants except Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, Inc. (MERS), whom Shetty conceded had no liability. View "Shetty v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Taunton Properties, LLC owned 63 townhomes and 3.8 acres of adjacent land in Eagle, Idaho. In 2020, Commercial Northwest, Taunton’s property manager and agent, provided Geringer Capital with documents regarding the property. The documents identified the townhomes as “Woodside Villas,” and included financial statements and tenant information. Geringer sent a written offer (“Offer Letter”) to Taunton Properties, proposing to purchase the 63 townhomes; the Offer Letter identified the Seller only as “Title Holder.” The Offer Letter also stated that, “Buyer and Seller agree to execute a more formal Agreement of Purchase and Sale within thirty (30) days containing market specific terms and the items set forth in this Agreement.” The Offer Letter contained sections for “Title Insurance,” “Proration’s [sic] and Closing Costs,” and “Seller’s Deliveries,” but stated those terms were “to be specified in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.” Peter Taunton, the manager of Taunton Properties, electronically signed the Offer Letter through DocuSign, which presumably returned it to Geringer. One day after signing and returning the Offer Letter, Taunton Properties received a different purchase offer from LCA-CA I, LLC (“LCA”), with a proposed sale price that was $400,000 more than Geringer’s offer. That same day, Peter Taunton advised Geringer that Taunton Properties considered Geringer’s Offer Letter unenforceable and that Taunton Properties would be selling the properties to LCA. Geringer filed a complaint for specific performance, breach of contract, and breach of preliminary agreement against Taunton Properties. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss. The district court determined: (1) the Offer Letter lacked material terms and represented an agreement to agree; (2) the property description was insufficient under the statute of frauds; and (3) Geringer’s claims for breach of preliminary agreement, tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred with the district court: the Offer Letter failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and was so vague, uncertain, and indefinite that it was unenforceable. As a result, there was no enforceable contract with which to tortiously interfere. View "Geringer Capital v. Taunton Properties, LLC" on Justia Law