Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over an easement across a property, Lot 4, in Sausalito, California. The property was part of a larger estate that once belonged to Alan Patterson. Patterson had sold a neighboring property, Lot 3, to Steven McArthur, who took title in the name of a limited liability company, Green Tree Headlands LLC.The purchase agreement between Patterson and McArthur included an addendum (the "Rider") stating that a 15-foot driveway easement across Lot 4 for access to Lot 3 would "remain in existence." However, a subsequent document, the "Declaration of Restrictions," stated that the easement would expire after Patterson moved out of his residence on Lot 3.After Patterson's death, Tara Crawford, the trustee of a trust holding his assets, took over the management of Lot 4. Crawford relied on the Declaration of Restrictions to assert that the driveway easement had expired. McArthur disagreed, citing the Rider.Crawford filed a lawsuit against McArthur, but later voluntarily dismissed her action. McArthur then filed a malicious prosecution action against Crawford and her lawyer, Benjamin Graves. In response, Crawford and Graves filed a motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four held that Crawford and Graves' motion should have been granted. The court reasoned that while the underlying purchase agreement and subsequent documents were in conflict, Crawford had a reasonable basis to seek judicial resolution of that conflict. As such, McArthur could not show that Crawford's lawsuit was completely without merit, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and directed the lower court to enter a new order granting the motion. View "Green Tree Headlands LLC v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In this case, Eliezer and Valeria Taveras (the appellants) appealed the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida when it abstained from exercising federal jurisdiction over their case, pending the conclusion of a related state case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. The Taveras' case centered around a dispute concerning the validity of a mortgage and an allegedly fraudulent promissory note secured by a parcel of real property they had purchased in 2006. The appellants contended that the district court improperly abstained from exercising jurisdiction and erroneously denied their motion to amend the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine as the federal and state proceedings involved substantially similar issues and parties. It also found that the district court properly denied the Taveras' motion to amend the complaint because the proposed amendments would not have changed the outcome of the abstention analysis. View "Taveras v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware upheld a lower court's decision regarding a dispute between the Salt Meadows Homeowners Association (Salt Meadows) and Zonko Builders, Inc. (Zonko). Salt Meadows accused Zonko of faulty construction leading to water damage in the condominium complex built by Zonko. The Superior Court found Zonko liable but left the question of damages to a jury, which awarded Salt Meadows $11.3 million in general damages and $1.6 million for specific repair costs. However, the Superior Court later reduced the general damage award to $8.3 million, citing unsupported, speculative, and excessive damage claims. The court also granted Zonko's motion for judgment as a matter of law related to the specific repair costs, finding that Salt Meadows expanded its claims without sufficient evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, agreeing that Salt Meadows' damage claims were speculative and unsupported. The court also agreed with the lower court's calculation of pre-judgment interest from the date the damages were discovered, not from the date of Zonko's negligent construction. The court further affirmed the calculation of post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict, as agreed upon by both parties. View "Salt Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Zonko Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, the plaintiffs, Dallen and Rachel Worthington, filed an expedited unlawful detainer action against the defendant, Carlene Crazy Thunder, for failure to pay rent. Crazy Thunder requested a jury trial, which was denied by the magistrate court. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court ruled that Crazy Thunder had unlawfully detained the Worthingtons’ property and ordered her to vacate the residence. Crazy Thunder appealed to the district court, arguing she had a right to a jury trial under Idaho’s constitution and Idaho Code section 6313. The district court agreed, concluding that section 6-311A conflicted with section 6-313, and that section 6-311A violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. The Worthingtons then appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Idaho Code section 6-311A does not violate the Idaho Constitution. The court reasoned that an action for unlawful detainer is an equitable claim, and under Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, the right to trial by jury only exists for legal claims, not equitable ones. However, the court also ruled that Crazy Thunder was entitled to a jury trial on her legal claims. The court held that in wrongful detainer cases like this one, when issues of fact are presented by the pleadings, those issues must be tried by a jury, unless such a jury is waived. As such, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision, though on different grounds. The court further ruled that Crazy Thunder, as the prevailing party on appeal, was entitled to costs, but neither party was entitled to attorney fees. View "Worthington v. Crazy Thunder" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Jere Hinman hired BrightView Landscape Development, Inc., to design and construct a pool at her residence. BrightView subcontracted with Georgia Gunite and Pool Company, Inc., to install plumbing and spray shotcrete for the pool shell. In November 2015, Hinman contacted BrightView after receiving an unusually high water bill and discovered that the pool was leaking water due to a missing part that was not included in Georgia Gunite’s scope of work. BrightView and Georgia Gunite worked together to address the issue in April 2016. In 2018, Hinman sued BrightView for defective construction of the pool, and BrightView filed a third-party complaint against Georgia Gunite, seeking indemnification based on the subcontractor agreement. Georgia Gunite moved for summary judgment, arguing that BrightView's claim was barred by Tennessee's four-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective improvements to real estate.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Gunite. The court held that, although BrightView's indemnification claim against Georgia Gunite was contractual in nature, it fell within the scope of Tennessee's statute of repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property because, at its core, it sought to recover damages arising from such deficient construction. The court rejected BrightView's argument that the statute of repose only applies to tort actions. The court also rejected BrightView's argument that the application of the statute of repose in this case would extinguish its claim before it even accrued, noting that this argument is directed at the nature of a statute of repose. The court further held that the repose statute is not mutually exclusive with statutes of limitation. Thus, BrightView's claim against Georgia Gunite was barred because it was not brought within four years after substantial completion of the pool construction. View "Hinman v. ValleyCrest Landscaping Dev." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the City and County of Honolulu, acting through the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART), and Victoria Ward, Limited, over the amount of just compensation to be paid for two acres of easements on property previously owned by Victoria Ward. The easements were obtained by HART for the construction of a fixed rail system and a proposed Kaka‘ako Station. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i ruled that the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment on many of the issues in the case. The supreme court ruled that the circuit court had incorrectly used summary judgment to resolve disputed factual issues including whether Victoria Ward was estopped from seeking severance damages, whether Victoria Ward's claims relating to a "lost tower" were too speculative, and whether Victoria Ward was precluded from seeking severance damages for impacts to non-taken properties. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on some issues, but vacated others and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court's pause of the accrual of "blight of summons" interest during the pendency of the appeal. View "HART v. Ward " on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores and One Shot, LLC, filed a petition against the City of Wall, South Dakota, City Council, and Planning and Zoning Commission for the City. Love’s, a corporation that operates 24-hour truck stops, entered into an agreement to purchase a 13-acre parcel of land from One Shot, contingent on obtaining the necessary zoning and permitting approvals from the city. After the City Council denied Love's rezoning and building permit applications, Love’s filed a petition for writ of mandamus, writ of certiorari, and request for declaratory relief with the circuit court. The circuit court granted Love's petition in part, declaring that the City’s Zoning Ordinance did not apply to the property and required the City to reconsider Love's application for a building permit. The City Council reconsidered and again denied Love's building permit application. Love’s then filed a motion for order to show cause requesting the circuit court to find the City in contempt of the court’s order and sought issuance of a building permit. The circuit court found the City in contempt and ordered the City to issue Love's a building permit. The City appealed.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court order was clearly erroneous in finding that the City willfully and contumaciously violated the court’s order to reconsider and vote on Love's requested building permit. The Supreme Court also noted that the circuit court’s remedy for its finding of contempt was inconsistent with the purpose of civil contempt and exceeded its authority by imposing a punitive, rather than coercive civil contempt remedy. The court's order to issue a building permit was punitive and denied the City the opportunity to purge itself of contempt and come into compliance with the original court order. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s finding of contempt and the order issuing a building permit to Love's. View "Love’s Travel Stops V. City Of Wall" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by William Russell and Mountain View Investments, LLC, (MVI) against a judgment from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, in favor of 360 Reclaim, LLC. The dispute revolves around a twenty-acre parcel of land in Montana which was purchased by Russell in 2010 and later foreclosed due to defaulted loan payments. 360 Reclaim purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale and then started charging Russell for storage and cleanup of items left on the property. Russell attempted to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, but his payment was rejected as insufficient by 360 Reclaim, which calculated a higher redemption amount that included cleanup costs. The District Court determined that 360 Reclaim was entitled to include cleanup costs as maintenance expenses, rendering Russell's redemption invalid.However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana held that "maintenance expenses," as used in the redemption statute, do not include cleanup costs for the removal of a redemptioner’s personal property. The court found that 360 Reclaim took a calculated risk in purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, knowing its condition and the presence of Russell's personal property. The court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further findings and conclusions consistent with this decision. The lower court was directed to determine what credits, if any, Russell and MVI are entitled to against the redemption price and whether Russell’s offer of redemption was in substantial compliance with the redemption statutes. View "360 Reclaim v. Russell" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered an appeal by David C. Milton, Kelly O. Milton, and two associated entities, Southeastern Land Group, Inc., and Pinhoti Ridge Retreat, LLC, collectively referred to as "the defendants". The defendants appealed a preliminary injunction entered by the Talladega Circuit Court which required them to remove two gates they had erected across a road they claimed as private. The injunction was requested by plaintiffs Anthony D. Haywood and Sammy K. Gallman, who claimed that the public, including themselves, had used the road for many years to access County Road 600-2 and trails in Talladega National Forest. The trial court granted the injunction without requiring the plaintiffs to give security for costs, damages, or attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the trial court erred in not requiring the plaintiffs to give security upon the issuance of the preliminary injunction. The court noted that under Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., the giving of security by the applicant is mandatory unless a valid exception applies. The court found that the trial court's determination that this case was of "great public concern" was not supported by the evidence and therefore did not constitute a valid exception to the security requirement. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Milton v. Haywood" on Justia Law

In Washington, a couple, the Lewises, moved into a rental property owned by another couple, the Ridgways. After the Lewises moved out, a dispute arose over the return of their security deposit. The Ridgways claimed the Lewises caused damage to the property and deducted repair costs from the deposit. The Lewises disputed these charges, and the case was sent to arbitration. During arbitration, the Lewises were awarded the full amount of their security deposit, but the Ridgways were given attorney fees under the small claims statute. The Lewises attempted to appeal the arbitration award and a pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. However, the Lewises did not personally sign their request for a trial de novo, a requirement under court rules and the arbitration statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that the Lewises' request for a trial de novo was ineffective because they did not personally sign the request, as required by the court rule and the arbitration statute. The court also held that, absent a valid request for a trial de novo, the Lewises could not appeal the pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. The court further stated that the question of who should be considered the prevailing party for the purpose of any attorney fee award needed further consideration, and remanded the case back to the lower court for determination of attorney fees. View "Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway" on Justia Law