Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Ms. Wilson owned a property in the District of Columbia, which she subdivided into three lots: 825, 826, and 827. She sold Lot 826 to Ntaky Management in 2009 and Lot 825 to Ms. Lumbih in 2010. The deed for Lot 826 described it as measuring twenty feet by forty feet, while the deed for Lot 825 described it as thirty-eight feet in length, based on an informal survey by Vyfhuis & Associates. This created a disputed area of eight feet between the properties. Ms. Lumbih installed an HVAC unit and deck in this disputed area. In 2018, Ntaky asked Ms. Lumbih to remove these installations, but she did not comply, leading Ntaky to sue her.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a non-jury trial and ruled that Ntaky owned the disputed area and could remove the encroachments at Ms. Lumbih’s expense. The court also denied Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson and her claim for implied indemnity, which sought to hold Ms. Wilson responsible for the costs associated with removing the encroachments.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court’s decision regarding Ntaky’s ownership of the disputed area and the removal of the encroachments. However, it vacated the denial of Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson, finding that the trial court did not address whether Ms. Wilson breached her duty to convey a property thirty-eight feet in length. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ms. Lumbih’s claim for implied indemnity, as she failed to identify a non-contractual duty of care owed by Ms. Wilson. View "Lumbih v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

The Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) proposed a project to reconstruct the interchange between Interstate 89 and U.S. Routes 2 and 7 in Colchester, Vermont, into a Diverging Diamond Interchange (DDI). Timberlake Associates, LLP, the landowner of a gas station at the southeast corner of the interchange, contested the necessity of the land takings required for the project. Timberlake argued that AOT did not fulfill its pre-suit obligation to negotiate and that the trial court erred in its determination of necessity.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a four-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Timberlake failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of discretion by AOT. The court found that AOT had satisfied its burden of demonstrating the necessity of taking Timberlake’s property to the extent proposed. Timberlake appealed the decision, arguing that AOT did not adequately consider the statutory factors of necessity and failed to negotiate in good faith.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court found that AOT presented sufficient evidence showing it considered the statutory factors, including the adequacy of other property and locations, the effect on the landowner’s convenience, and the environmental impacts. The Court also determined that AOT’s selection of the DDI design was justified based on its superior performance in increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving safety compared to other alternatives. Additionally, the Court concluded that AOT made reasonable efforts to negotiate with Timberlake before filing suit, as required by statute.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining the necessity of the takings and that AOT fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to negotiate. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Steven Fustolo purchased a rental investment unit in Boston, Massachusetts, in 2009, taking out a mortgage with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Union Capital Mortgage Business Trust. The mortgage was reassigned six times, and Fustolo defaulted on the loan. He sought a declaratory judgment that the current holders, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Trustee of SCRT 2019-2 (the Trust) and Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), had no right to foreclose because they did not validly hold the mortgage or the accompanying promissory note. Fustolo also claimed defamation, slander of title, unfair business practices, violation of Massachusetts's Debt Collection Act, and a violation of Regulation X of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by SPS.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Fustolo's claims, except for one count challenging the adequacy of a notice letter, which was later settled. The court found that the Trust validly held both the mortgage and the note, and that Fustolo's state law claims hinged on the incorrect assertion that the Trust did not have the right to foreclose. The court also dismissed the RESPA claim, stating that Fustolo failed to specify which provision of RESPA was violated and that SPS had responded to his notice of error.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the Trust validly held the mortgage and the note, as the note was indorsed in blank and in the Trust's possession. The court also found that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage despite Union Capital's dissolution. Additionally, the court ruled that Fustolo's RESPA claim failed because challenges to the merits of a servicer's evaluation of a loss mitigation application do not relate to the servicing of the loan and are not covered errors under RESPA. View "Fustolo v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

Chris Welsh, representing CAL SD, LLC, entered into a purchase agreement with Interwest Leasing, LLC to buy commercial real estate, with a $30,000 earnest money deposit. Welsh passed away before closing, and CAL SD refused to close. Interwest sold the property to another buyer for the same price but did not return the earnest money. CAL SD filed a declaratory judgment action to recover the deposit, claiming the agreement was void due to their inability to obtain financing.The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in Pennington County, South Dakota, treated the declaratory judgment as a breach of contract action and set it for a jury trial. The jury found in favor of CAL SD, and the court ordered the return of the earnest money deposit. Interwest appealed, arguing the action was equitable and should not have been decided by a jury, and also claimed the court gave erroneous jury instructions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the declaratory judgment action was legal, not equitable, because it sought to enforce contractual rights under the purchase agreement, which was void if financing was not obtained. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to submit the case to a jury for a binding verdict, as the issue was whether CAL SD breached the contract by failing to secure financing. The court concluded that the jury's determination that CAL SD was unable to obtain financing rendered the purchase agreement void, entitling CAL SD to the return of the earnest money deposit. View "Cal SD, LLC v. Interwest Leasing, LLC" on Justia Law

Sarah Staab purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure sale conducted by the condominium association to recover unpaid fees. She later challenged two Superior Court orders that ruled the sale of the unit to her was barred by the Federal Foreclosure Bar, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), and thus void, and granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. on its claims for judicial foreclosure, declaratory judgment, and quiet title. Staab did not contest that the property was encumbered by a deed of trust owned by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and serviced by Wells Fargo, nor did she dispute the application of the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Instead, she raised three procedural arguments.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Wells Fargo, determining that the bank's claims were timely, the foreclosure and sale of the property to Staab were void under the Federal Foreclosure Bar, and the condominium association was not an indispensable party. Staab argued that the court applied the incorrect statute of limitations, abused its discretion by allowing Wells Fargo to amend its complaint years after filing, and erred by not joining the condominium association as an indispensable party.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that Wells Fargo's initial action for judicial foreclosure was timely and that the additional facts and arguments raised in the amended complaint were in direct response to Staab's affirmative defense. The court also concluded that any error in granting Wells Fargo leave to amend its complaint was harmless, as the bank could have raised the same arguments at the summary judgment stage. Finally, the court determined that the condominium association was not an essential party under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 19(a)(1), as the court could grant complete relief without its involvement. View "Staab v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves a partition action concerning two properties in Charlestown, Rhode Island, owned by Peter Karasuk, Lee Karasuk Ingley, and Sandra Karasuk Puchalski as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. The properties were inherited from their mother’s estate in 2017. After failed negotiations to sell the properties to Puchalski, Karasuk and Ingley filed a partition action on May 3, 2021. Numerous continuances were granted due to Puchalski's complaints of hearing impairment. Despite accommodations, Puchalski expressed dissatisfaction and failed to appear at several hearings.The Superior Court dismissed Puchalski’s appeals, approved the commissioner’s petition for instructions, and quashed a statement she filed in the Town of Charlestown Land Evidence Records. Puchalski appealed these decisions. The Superior Court had granted plaintiffs' motion to sell the properties, appointed a commissioner, and issued a temporary restraining order against Puchalski. Puchalski failed to appear at critical hearings, leading to the dismissal of her appeals.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Puchalski received adequate notice of the motions and hearings. The court determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory and not subject to review under the exceptions to the final-judgment rule. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decisions, including the dismissal of Puchalski’s appeals and the orders related to the partition and sale of the properties. The court emphasized that Puchalski’s continued attempts to delay the proceedings were unavailing and that the matter should proceed to finality. View "Karasuk v. Puchalski" on Justia Law