Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dolgencorp, LLC, appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Deborah Gilliam. In March 2016, Daisy Pearl White Freeman was operating her vehicle in the parking lot of the Northwood Shopping Center. Freeman lost control of the vehicle, ran over a six-inch curb, crossed a sidewalk, and crashed through the storefront of a Dollar General store, striking Gilliam -- a customer of the store. Gilliam sustained serious and permanent injuries. According to an Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash Report, Freeman reported that, immediately before the accident, she had been traveling across the shopping center parking lot when the vehicle's steering wheel began to shake, the vehicle jerked to the left, and the vehicle's brakes failed. The traffic report also indicated that witnesses had observed Freeman's vehicle traveling across the parking lot at a "high rate of speed." The traffic report listed the speed limit in the parking lot at 15 miles per hour; it was estimated that Freeman's vehicle had been traveling approximately 33-34 miles per hour when it collided with the storefront. Gilliam filed suit against, among others, Dolgencorp, which owned the Dollar General store, alleging that Dolgencorp had been negligent and wanton in failing to erect barriers such as bollards outside the store's entrance, which, she claimed, could have prevented Freeman's vehicle from crashing into the storefront and injuring her. Dolgencorp moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Gilliam's claims were precluded as a matter of law. The Alabama Supreme Court concurred with the company, finding Gilliam's negligence claim failed as a matter of law. It therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Dolgencorp. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second time before the Idaho Supreme Court. It involved the existence of a prescriptive easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook owned a parcel of land which was originally owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr. The property stayed in the Harker family ever since. The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.” Tower Road connected the Cooks’ property to a county road and had been used by the Cooks and their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, finding it was necessary for the district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for establishing a prescriptive easement. On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. The Van Ordens appealed to the Supreme Court, contending the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed into an adverse use, and the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement. View "Cook v. Van Orden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Lakota Lakes and denying Emily Bialota's cross-motion for summary judgment in this quiet title action, holding that Bialota accomplished valid service on the Minnesota Secretary of State.Bialota brought an action to quiet title in Pennington County, alleging that she had fee simple ownership in real property previously owned by Lakota Lakes but later sold at a tax sale. In its summary judgment motion, Lakota Lakes claimed that it had not been validly served with the notice of intent to take tax deed, rendering the tax deed void. In her cross-motion for summary judgment, Bialota argued that service upon Lakota Lakes was proper and that Pennington County had correctly issued a tax deed based upon her affidavit of completed service. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) South Dakota law controlled this Court's determination whether Bialota personally served the Secretary as Lakota Lakes' registered agent; (2) Bialota accomplished valid service on the Secretary; and (3) Bialota was entitled to the tax deed to the property. View "Bialota v. Lakota Lakes, LLC" on Justia Law

After consuming excessive amounts of alcohol, Christina Demirelli left a restaurant in the Fashion Island shopping center (Fashion Island) and walked through a nearby parking structure while engaging in “displays of nonsensical horseplay.” She found herself on an upper story of the parking structure where she seated herself on a 43-inch tall perimeter wall, lost her balance, and fell backward out of the structure to the ground several stories below. Demirelli sued The Irvine Company, which owned the parking structure, for premises liability, alleging the parking structure had a physical defect or dangerous condition. The Irvine Company filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied. The Irvine Company filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause. The Court thereafter granted The Irvine Company’s petition. In her opposition, Demirelli conceded the parking structure did not have a physical defect or dangerous condition. In the stead of her original theory, Demirelli asserted a new theory of liability: The Irvine Company assumed a duty to her by hiring a security company charged with detecting and stopping horseplay according to the Fashion Island Code of Conduct. She argued The Irvine Company was liable for the security company’s negligence in enforcing that code. The Court of Appeal found The Irvine Company’s retention of security services did not increase any risk to Demirelli and she did not rely on that undertaking to her detriment. Therefore, The Irvine Company did not owe a duty to Demirelli and summary judgment should have been granted. View "The Irvine Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Breanne Martin alleged she was injured when a large metal gate fell on her while she was on a residential rental property located in Alpine, California. Martin initially filed claims for negligence and premises liability against the owners of the property. But upon learning that the owners had previously filed a bankruptcy petition, Martin amended her complaint to add the court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, Leslie Gladstone, as a defendant. Gladstone demurred to Martin’s complaint, asserting that application of federal statutory and common law demonstrated that Martin could not state a cause of action against her. The trial court rejected Gladstone’s argument regarding application of the "Barton" doctrine, but accepted her argument regarding the abandonment of the property at issue; the court sustained Gladstone’s demurrer on this ground and entered judgment in favor of Gladstone. On appeal, Martin contended the trial court erred in concluding that Gladstone’s abandonment of the relevant property after the accident prevented Gladstone from being held liable for Martin’s injuries. Martin further argued the trial court correctly determined it could not conclude as a matter of law that the Barton doctrine applied to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over Martin’s claims. The Court of Appeal agreed with Martin’s appellate contentions and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Martin v. Gladstone" on Justia Law

In 1994, Duncan moved into a rent-controlled unit in San Francisco. He was living there with his family when, in 2014, the landlords purchased the building and took away property-related benefits, ignored or delayed maintenance, were uncommunicative and uncooperative, and became increasingly hostile. While living in their unit, the tenants sued the landlords, alleging nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, harassment under San Francisco’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Unlawful detainer actions were then filed against the tenants, who asserted affirmative defenses of retaliation and violation of the Rent Ordinance but later vacated the premises The landlords then unsuccessfully argued that because the tenants did not file a cross-complaint in the unlawful detainer actions, they were barred from pursuing their already-pending separate action. In 2016, the tenants added an allegation of unlawful owner move-in eviction. The jurors found the landlords liable under the Rent Ordinance and awarded $2.7 million. The court of appeal affirmed in 2021.The landlords nonetheless filed motions to vacate, claiming that the trial court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tenants’ claims after they surrendered possession of their unit. The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of that claim. The only legal claim the tenants abandoned by moving out was current possession. The tenants’ other claims were not waived and were not required to be litigated in the unlawful detainer actions. View "Duncan v. Kihagi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William Doherty appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant Alphonse Sorrentino. On the morning of November 8, 2019, plaintiff walked a short distance from the Village Inn to the Woodstock Inn in Woodstock, Vermont. It was not precipitating at that time. He remained at the Woodstock Inn for about fifteen minutes. It began to snow as he left the Woodstock Inn to return to the Village Inn. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a sidewalk abutting 81 Central Street. Snow had lightly accumulated on the sidewalk. Defendant arrived after plaintiff fell but before an ambulance transported plaintiff to a local hospital. Defendant was also the sole owner of ACS Design Build and Construction Services, LLC, both of which had main offices at 81 Central Street. The sidewalk was owned by the Town of Woodstock. The Town had an ordinance that required owners of property abutting a [Woodstock] Village sidewalk clear accumulated snow or ice for pedestrian traffic to a minimum width of three feet, and within twenty-four hours of such accumulation. No accumulated snow had been cleared at the time plaintiff fell. Plaintiff sued, alleging that defendant, in his personal capacity, breached a duty to plaintiff to clear the sidewalk of snow, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that he owed no duty to plaintiff because: neither defendant nor the owner of the building, Tanglewood, owned or controlled the sidewalk on which plaintiff fell; landowners abutting public sidewalks owed no duty to the public to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition; and the municipal ordinance did not otherwise create a duty to plaintiff. The civil division awarded summary judgment to defendant concluding plaintiff did not bear his burden to show that defendant knew or should have known of a dangerous condition on the sidewalk. The court determined that plaintiff failed to offer any basis to reach defendant’s personal assets as sole shareholder of Tanglewood, and that plaintiff did not allege defendant owned or controlled the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The court found that the municipal ordinance did not create a duty of care to plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Doherty v. Sorrentino, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the director of the Department of Natural Resources that each purported objector to an application seeking an interbasin transfer to divert surface water from an over-appropriated Platte River reach to the Republican River Basin, holding that the purported objectors lacked standing.Several objector entities filed objectives to the operative application, but the director dismissed all of those entities for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to have standing in this surface water appropriation case Appellants were required to meet the common-law standard; and (2) because Appellants' allegations did not demonstrate that they had or will suffer an injury in fact each failed to establish standing. View "In re Application A-19594" on Justia Law

Laura Folkes sued PriorityOne Bank (PriorityOne) in Mississippi chancery court, seeking to set aside a foreclosure on the ground that it had been conducted in bad faith. PriorityOne appealed the chancellor’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. In 2019, PriorityOne made a loan via a line of credit to Folkes, secured by a deed of trust on a commercial tract of real property. Folkes filed for bankruptcy in February 2020. PriorityOne foreclosed on the property after Folkes defaulted on her payment obligations under the bankruptcy agreement. Prior to the foreclosure, Folkes’s bankruptcy trustee made one payment in the amount of $9,394 to PriorityOne, which was credited to the loan. Following the foreclosure, PriorityOne sold the property to Steven Adams. In 2021, Folkes filed a complaint at chancery court alleging that the foreclosure was made in bad faith because the bank had accepted a “substantial payment” toward the debt prior to foreclosure. The chancellor never ruled on this motion. Later, Folkes amended her complaint against PriorityOne, PriorityOne employee Harvey Lott, Steven Adams, and 5-A Properties, LLP. In May 2022, the circuit court ordered that case to arbitration. In the chancery court proceeding, and with PriorityOne’s motion for summary judgment pending, Folkes was granted permission to amend her complaint to add clarifying facts to certain issues raised in the original complaint. The chancellor denied PriorityOne’s motion to compel arbitration, noting that chancery court was a court of equity and finding that Folkes “has established a prima faci[e] case showing that some impropriety may have occurred at or around the time of the foreclosure on her property that demands that she be given the opportunity to prove her case.” On the specific circumstances before us, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Folkes that PriorityOne waived any right it may have had to compel arbitration by substantially participating in litigation and that Folkes was bound by her representation to the Court that the amended chancery complaint did not and was not intended to add discrete claims to her chancery action. View "PriorityOne Bank v. Folkes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kiki Leslie Tidwell (“Tidwell”) and the Madison Jean Tidwell Trust opposed an affordable housing project on land dedicated to Blaine County, Idaho for public use. Plaintiffs contended the Final Plat contemplated the land be held for open space and recreational use, but Blaine County contracted with ARCH Community Housing Trust (“ARCH”) and Blaine County Housing Authority (“BCHA”) to donate a parcel ("Parcel C") to BCHA to construct community housing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the County, ARCH, and BCHA (collectively “the County”) seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages to Tidwell under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ultimately dismissed Tidwell’s section 1983 claim, but the district court allowed Plaintiffs to pursue the remaining claims, despite the County’s contention that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the complaint. Following a series of unsuccessful dispositive motions seeking summary and partial summary judgment on both sides, the case proceeded to court trial, where Plaintiffs prevailed on both claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court denied Tidwell’s request for attorney fees. The County appealed, and Tidwell cross-appealed the dismissal of her section 1983 claim and both Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees. On appeal, the County again raised its standing argument, contending Plaintiffs had no particularized interest in the parcel and suffered no particularized injury. If Plaintiffs had standing, the County claimed the district court erred by concluding the Final Plat was ambiguous and by permitting extrinsic evidence, including testimony of what the parties intended to construct on the parcel when the land was transferred. The Plaintiffs cross-appealed, with Tidwell alleging the district court erred in dismissing her procedural and substantive due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Both Plaintiffs also contended the district court abused its discretion in denying their claim for attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment because Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims. Costs, but not attorney fees, were awarded on appeal to the County. View "Tidwell, et al. v. Blaine County, et al." on Justia Law