Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are Constance Swanston (“Swanston”), Shannon Jones (“Jones”), and Women’s Elevated Sober Living, LLC (“WESL”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Swanston is an individual in recovery from substance use disorders (“SUDs”) and the owner and operator of WESL. In November 2018, WESL opened a sober living home (the “Home”) on Stoney Point Drive in Plano, Texas. Jones is a caretaker and resident of the Home. Defendant-Appellant, the City of Plano (the “City”) appealed the district court’s judgment holding that it violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) due to its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs as to the capacity limits in the applicable zoning ordinance. The district court enjoined the City from (1) restricting the Home’s occupancy to fewer than fifteen residents; (2) enforcing any other property restriction violative of the FHA or ADA; and (3) retaliating against Plaintiffs for pursuing housing discrimination complaints under the FHA and ADA. Following a hearing, awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded it. The court held that the district court erred in determining that the evidence satisfied the applicable legal standard. The court explained that the Third Circuit concluded that, based on its strict reading of Section 3604(f)(3)(B) and the prior jurisprudence in its court and its sister circuits, the resident failed to prove that her requested accommodation was necessary considering the definition of the term, the purpose of the FHA, and the proffered alternatives. The court wrote that for the same reasons, it holds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that their requested accommodation was therapeutically necessary. View "Women's Elevated v. City of Plano" on Justia Law

McMurray Contracting, LLC ("McMurray"), appealed a circuit court's denial of its second motion to compel arbitration of this case commenced by Kenneth Hardy and his wife Helen Hardy. The Hardys filed suit in December 2022 alleging they "retained" McMurray to perform restoration work to their house damaged in Hurricane Sally. The Hardys specifically alleged that McMurray "did not complete all restoration work in a good and workmanlike manner, and has refused to correct numerous deficiencies through [the Hardys'] property," and that McMurray "performed work and charged for materials that were never approved." The Alabama Supreme Court found McMurray's notice of appeal was not timely filed so as to invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, it dismissed McMurray's appeal. View "McMurray Contracting, LLC v. Hardy" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review centered on the redemption of residential real property sold at a tax sale, specifically, the definition of the term "preservation improvements" as used in the applicable redemption statute, § 40-10-122, Ala. Code 1975. The property at issue had served as a rental home in a residential neighborhood. The property owner, J.C. King III, stopped paying property taxes in 2015 after a fire extensively damaged the property and rendered it uninhabitable. The State of Alabama purchased the property at a 2016 tax sale, and in 2019 the property was ultimately sold in its uninhabitable state to Anderson Realty Group, LLC ("ARG"). ARG spent $88,812 to extensively renovate and restore the property to a habitable condition, and in 2020 it filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property. King counterclaimed to redeem the property and disputed whether the extensive renovations to the property could be considered "preservation improvements" due to be included in the redemption amount pursuant to § 40-10-122(c). The trial court agreed with King, holding that "preservation improvements" included only those amounts expended by ARG to keep the property from further deterioration, the value of which it concluded was $10,000, and it entered a judgment setting the redemption amount accordingly. ARG appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed that judgment, holding that the trial court had erred in limiting the "preservation improvements" to the cost of repairs undertaken to keep the property in the same condition it was in at the time of the tax sale. To this, the Alabama Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Ex parte J.C. King III" on Justia Law

Andrew Spraggins's driveway crossed a neighboring tract of land owned by Ammons Properties, LLC ("Ammons"). After a dispute arose between Spraggins and Ammons, Spraggins filed a complaint asking a circuit court to declare he had an easement for the portion of his driveway that crossed Ammons' property. Ammons filed a counterclaim alleging that Spraggins was liable for several tortious acts. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that Spraggins had an easement across Ammons' property and denied Ammons' counterclaims. Ammons appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Ammons Properties, LLC v. Spraggins" on Justia Law

Debbie Berry appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PHH Mortgage Corporation ("PHH") on PHH's ejectment claim and Berry's breach-of-contract counterclaim. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Berry waived most of the arguments she raises on appeal by failing to address the effects of her prior settlement with PHH's predecessor and because her other appellate arguments failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred. View "Berry v. PHH Mortgage Corporation" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the City of Orange Beach ("the City") appealed a judgment entered in favor of Ian Boles in regard to a dispute over the City's inspection of Boles' property. Between 2013 and 2015 Boles constructed two eight-bedroom duplexes on property he owned located within the City limits ("the beachfront property"). In September 2015, Boles filed a building-permit application seeking a permit to construct two additional multiple-level duplexes on the beachfront property. Additionally, in October 2015, Boles filed a separate building-permit application for the construction of a single-family dwelling on another parcel of property that Boles owned within the City limits ("the Burkhart Drive property"). At the time of each permit request, Boles completed a "Home Builders Affidavit" attesting that he was the owner of the property; that he would be acting as his own contractor on the proposed project, which would not be offered for sale; and that he was, thus, exempt from the requirement that he be licensed under Alabama's Home Builders Licensure Law. The building-permit packages provided to Boles explained that a certificate of occupancy for the proposed structure would not be issued until, among other things, "a subcontractor list has been submitted to the [City's] Finance Department." Boles also received with each package a blank subcontractor form for identifying all subcontractors for the proposed project, which specified that it was due within 10 days of the issuance of the building permits. Boles proceeded with construction on the two properties without completing or returning the subcontractor form for either property. Boles's electrical subcontractor apparently contacted the City to request an electrical meter-release inspection upon completion of the electrical portion of that project; the City refused. Boles contended the City either lacked the authority to and/or were exceeding their authority in refusing to inspect the beachfront property until the City received information to which, according to Boles, it was not entitled. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred both in submitting Boles's damages claims to a jury and in denying the City's motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court's judgment was reversed, and these matters were remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Orange Beach v. Boles." on Justia Law

John and Amy Penrose bought a house in Montgomery. After moving in, they discovered multiple problems with the house and sued several parties that had been involved in the transaction, alleging that those parties' negligent or intentional acts had prevented the Penroses from discovering the house's problems before the purchase closed. During discovery, the Penroses failed to provide timely and complete responses to the defendants' discovery requests or to appear at two hearings on the resulting motions to compel. Following the second missed hearing, the circuit court dismissed the Penroses' lawsuit with prejudice. Invoking Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the Penroses moved the trial court to reinstate their lawsuit, arguing among other things that the dismissal violated their due-process rights because no defendant had moved for dismissal and because the trial court had given them no indication that it was considering that sanction. The trial court denied their motion. The Penroses appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Penrose v. Garcia, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Alex and Jane Galea fell behind on the mortgage payments for their house in Tuscaloosa; as a result, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The property was eventually conveyed to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs ("SVA"), which sent formal notice to the Galeas demanding they vacate the property. After the Galeas refused to do so, SVA initiated an ejectment action. The Galeas stated in their answer that they had evidence to prove that the foreclosure sale here was illegal, but they apparently never submitted that evidence to the trial court. Indeed, as the trial court noted in its judgment, the Galeas "did not offer any valid testimony or evidence" that would refute the evidence submitted by SVA. The trial court ultimately entered a summary judgment in favor of SVA. The Galeas appealed. But finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Galea v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Dorothy Richey appealed a trial court judgment that set aside a deed conveying an interest in certain property to her on grounds that the grantor, Rodney Morris ("Rodney"), was incompetent at the time he purportedly executed the deed. Paul Morris, as guardian and conservator of the estate of his brother Rodney, an incapacitated person, initiated this action against Richey, seeking to set aside a deed in which Rodney had purported to convey his interest in the property to Richey. Morris alleged that Rodney had lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed in question and sought a judgment declaring the deed void and setting it aside. Morris also sought an accounting of any proceeds Richey had obtained from harvesting timber located on the property. The Alabama Supreme Court determined Richey's appeal was not from a final judgment, and therefore dismissed it. View "Richey v. Morris" on Justia Law

Cody Durham filed suit against Jacob Cooper, alleging breach of a purchase agreement between them involving the sale of Cooper's residence. In August 2020, Durham saw a listing on the Facebook Marketplace social-media website advertising for sale Cooper's house and the two acres of real property on which the house was situated. Over text messages between Durham and Cooper, they agreed to a purchase price and closing date, with Cooper paying the closing costs. Durham testified that he did not engage any realtor or lawyer to help him with drafting the purchase agreement. Instead, he just Google-searched for "residential purchase agreement" and used the first fillable form generated by that search. One of the conditions of Durham's FHA loan was that the loan would not be approved unless the subject property's appraised value was confirmed by a certified appraiser. A certified appraiser appraised the property's value, but that value was subject to the condition that a storage shed in Cooper's backyard needed to be fixed or torn down. Cooper told Durham he "don't have the money" to fix or tear down the storage shed, so it would be up to Durham to take care of it. Cooper then sent Durham a text stating he was backing out of the deal because the closing date had passed, and the issue of the shed had not been resolved. Durham sought specific performance of the purchase agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Durham $79,000 in damages. Cooper appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court misapplied the law to the facts by measuring Durham's damages based on the difference between the contract price and the subject property's assessed market value in a new appraisal because the proper legal standard for measuring damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of real property was the difference between the contract price and the subject property's market value at the time of the breach. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a recalculation of damages. View "Cooper v. Durham" on Justia Law