Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case pertains to an appeal by the City of Los Angeles and real parties in interest, TTLC Los Angeles – El Sereno, LLC and The True Life Companies, LLC against a petition filed by Delia Guerrero and Coyotl + Macehualli Citizens (Objectors). The Objectors alleged that the city's approval of a real estate development project violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The city and the developers had argued that the petition was untimely, but the trial court granted the Objectors’ petition, directing the city to vacate project approvals and prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) evaluating the project's environmental impacts. On appeal by the city and developers, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the Objectors’ petition was untimely, as it was filed more than a year after the city's notice of determination, which triggered the statute of limitations for challenges under the CEQA. The court concluded that the city's initial approval of the project represented its earliest firm commitment to approving the project, and hence constituted project approval under CEQA. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the city and the developers and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Objectors' petition. View "Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled on a case involving a commercial real estate transaction in Puerto Rico that failed to close. The sellers of the property, located in Valle Arriba Heights, had entered into agreements to sell their respective parcels to KRB Universal Investments, LLC, which later assigned its rights under the agreements to CPC Carolina PR, LLC ("CPC"). The conditions of the sale included the cancellation of restrictive covenants that limited the use of the property to residential purposes. CPC intended to lease the properties to Puerto Rico CVS Pharmacy, LLC ("CVS") for commercial use. However, CVS refused to proceed with the lease due to restrictive covenants and issues with the title insurance policy. The sellers sued CPC and CVS for negligence, alleging that they had been induced into an impossible contract and that CVS's actions had contributed to vandalism on the properties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CPC and CVS. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the sellers' claims were time-barred and that they failed to establish the necessary elements of their negligence claims. View "Hamdallah v. CPC Carolina PR, LLC" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a property dispute in Ketchum, Idaho, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the lower court's judgment, in part, and vacated and remanded the case, in part, for further proceedings. The dispute arose when Trustees Glen Miller and Cynthia Anderson attempted to build a home on a lot they purchased in the Rocking Ranch No. 3 subdivision. The Rocking Ranch No. 3 Property Owners’ Association denied their application to construct the home and asserted several counterclaims to recover unpaid homeowners association (HOA) assessments. The district court granted summary judgment to the Association on Miller and Anderson’s claims and dismissed the Association’s counterclaims. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Association’s counterclaims, concluding that the Association failed to establish its breach of contract counterclaim because it had not established two elements of the prima facie case: breach of the contract and damages resulting from the breach. The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho also vacated and remanded the district court's award of attorney fees to the Association for further proceedings, finding that the Association was not entitled to recover attorney fees for the counterclaims on which it did not prevail. View "Miller v. Rocking Ranch No. 3" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In this case, Richard Mullen and Cheryl Mullen petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer their case to the Walker Circuit Court. The case at hand arises from a dispute between the Mullens and Karl Leo and Fay Leo, who purchased a parcel of property from the Mullens in Walker County. The Leos alleged that the Mullens, unlicensed homebuilders, sold them a residence with multiple latent defects and refused to remedy these defects. The Leos filed a suit against the Mullens in the Jefferson Circuit Court, where the Mullens resided, claiming breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, and fraudulent suppression.The Mullens sought dismissal or transfer of the case to Walker County, arguing that as the property in question was located there, it was the appropriate venue. The Jefferson Circuit Court, however, denied their motion. The Mullens then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing that Walker County was the proper venue due to the location of the property and the Leos' request for equitable relief in their complaint.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the Mullens' petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court found that the property sold by the Mullens to the Leos in Walker County was the "subject matter" of the action within the meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B). Therefore, the Court directed the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the Mullens' motion to transfer the action and to transfer the case to the Walker Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Mullen" on Justia Law

This case involved an appeal by John William Riley against a judgment by the Autauga Circuit Court, Alabama. The judgment declared that Kenneth R. Boles had an easement by prescription across a road on Riley's property. Riley's property is a 25-acre parcel located in Autauga County, and the road in dispute leads back to the property owned by Boles. Boles sought to establish that he and his predecessors in title had used the road adversely to Riley for more than 20 years, a requirement for establishing a prescriptive easement under Alabama law.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's order denying Riley's motion to dismiss the case, on the grounds that the dispute between the parties constituted a justiciable controversy. However, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's declaration in favor of Boles. The court found that Boles had not established a prescriptive easement across Riley's property.Boles had relied on the use of the road by a friend and hunting partner, Edmondson, to establish a continuous 20-year period of adverse use. However, Edmondson was not a predecessor in title to Boles and had no title to any relevant real-property interest that he could have transferred to Boles. Thus, the court ruled that the relationship between Edmondson and Boles did not satisfy the legal requirement for "tacking" the periods of use to establish a prescriptive easement. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's declaration that Boles had established a prescriptive easement across Riley's property. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Riley v. Boles" on Justia Law

In Alabama, RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC contracted Construction Services LLC, d/b/a MCA Construction, Inc. ("MCA") to build infrastructure for a proposed housing subdivision. The relationship between the two parties deteriorated, leading to a lawsuit by RAM-Robertsdale against MCA for various claims including breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation, among others. MCA counterclaimed and also filed third-party claims against Retail Specialists, LLC, a member of RAM-Robertsdale, and Rodney Barstein, a corporate officer for Retail Specialists and RAM-Robertsdale, for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and defamation. The RAM defendants moved for summary judgment on MCA's counterclaims and third-party claims, arguing that MCA was not properly licensed when it signed the contract, thus making the contract void for public policy. The circuit court granted the RAM defendants' motion for summary judgment and certified its judgment as final.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that the circuit court had exceeded its discretion in certifying its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the claims pending below and those on appeal were closely intertwined, arising from the same contract and the parties' performance under that contract. The Court noted that if the contract was indeed void for public policy, then neither party would be able to enforce it, impacting the remaining claims pending in the circuit court. As the Court found that deciding the issues at this stage would create an intolerable risk of inconsistent results, it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Construction Services, LLC v. RAM-Robertsdale Subdivision Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Janet Palmtag, a real estate agent and general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature, against The Republican Party of Nebraska. The case stems from political mailers, sent by the Party, which stated that Palmtag had been disciplined by the Iowa Real Estate Commission for illegal activities and had lost her Iowa real estate license. Palmtag claims these statements are false and defamatory. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Party, finding a genuine issue that the statements were false but no genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. Palmtag appealed this decision, and the Party cross-appealed the district court’s conclusion that Palmtag did not have to plead and prove special damages.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that when the facts presented by Palmtag are viewed in the light most favorable to her, those facts are sufficient for a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that the Party acted with actual malice. The court also rejected the Party's argument that in all public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages, finding that Palmtag's action involves defamation per se, for which no proof of actual harm is necessary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmtag v. Republican Party of Nebraska" on Justia Law

In Washington State, a second-tier subcontractor, Velazquez Framing LLC, was not paid for the work it did on property owned by Cascadia Homes Inc., a general contracting company. High End Construction LLC, who had been contracted by Cascadia, subcontracted the work to Velazquez without informing Cascadia. After completing the work, Velazquez filed a lien for labor and materials without giving prelien notice, which resulted in a dispute over whether prelien notice was required for labor liens under Chapter 60.04 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that, based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and legislative history, prelien notice is not required for labor liens. The court noted that while Velazquez could not lien for its materials and equipment without providing prelien notice, it could lien for its labor. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the value of the labor performed. The court's decision reversed the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, both of which had concluded that prelien notice was required. View "Velazquez Framing, LLC v. Cascadia Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999, Bernard Stockwell had his agriculturally zoned property in McCook County, South Dakota, replatted into five individual lots. In 2022, he sought an opinion from the McCook County Zoning Administrator on the number of building eligibilities for his lots. The Zoning Administrator determined that all five lots shared one building eligibility, based on her interpretation of the 2014 McCook County Zoning Ordinance. Stockwell appealed this decision to the McCook County Board of Adjustment (BOA), arguing each lot should have its own building eligibility. The BOA sided with the Zoning Administrator.Stockwell then petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari and sought declaratory relief. The County sought summary judgment, which the Circuit Court granted. Stockwell appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota.The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s decision. The Court held that the 2014 zoning ordinance unambiguously refers to its own effective date, and the Circuit Court erred by not applying this definition, despite recognizing that Stockwell’s lots meet this definition. The Court also noted that if the County wishes to change the definition, it is up to the County’s legislative body, not the courts, to do so. View "Stockwell V. Mccook County Board Of Commissioners" on Justia Law