Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Landowners Anne and Mark Guillemette appealed an Environmental Division order denying their motion to dismiss neighbor Michael Casey’s appeal and remanding the matter to the Monkton Development Review Board (DRB) for consideration on the merits. Casey had challenged the zoning administrator’s decision that the Guillemettes’ wood-processing facility was exempt from enforcement due to the fifteen-year limitations period. Casey filed his appeal late, relying on incorrect instructions from the zoning administrator.The Environmental Division concluded that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) allowed Casey’s appeal to proceed despite the untimely filing, as disallowing the appeal would result in manifest injustice. The court remanded the matter to the DRB for consideration on the merits.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Environmental Division’s decision. The Supreme Court held that 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(C) does not apply to appeals from the decisions of municipal administrative officers, such as zoning administrators. Instead, it applies only to appeals from municipal regulatory proceedings to the Environmental Division. Therefore, the finality provision at 24 V.S.A. § 4472 barred Casey’s untimely appeal, and the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction to permit the appeal to proceed. View "In re Guillemette ZA Determination Appeal" on Justia Law

In the late 1980s, Ronald Koziol purchased property in Central Falls, Rhode Island, zoned for heavy industrial use. In 1992, the zoning changed to residential, making the existing automotive repair business a legal nonconforming use. In 2022, Koziol Firearms, Inc. was formed to operate a firearms business on the property. The City’s zoning official denied the request, stating the property was in a residential zone, requiring a use variance. The Zoning Board of Review denied the variance application, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, also seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1992 zoning amendment was invalid.The Superior Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to present additional evidence and dismissed the zoning appeal, finding the property had a viable use as an automotive repair business. The court dismissed the declaratory judgment count without prejudice, stating it lacked sufficient evidence to rule on the validity of the 1992 zoning amendment.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The plaintiff argued the trial justice overlooked material evidence and that the zoning classification was in dispute. The City contended the case was moot, the plaintiff lacked standing, and the claim was barred by laches. The Supreme Court found the trial justice did not conduct necessary fact-finding for the declaratory judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new hearing to determine if the plaintiff should be granted declaratory relief. View "Koziol Firearms, Inc. v. Marchand" on Justia Law

Neely, acting as his own general contractor, hired Grosvold to perform excavation work on his property under an oral contract. Grosvold worked from April to October 2021, but their relationship deteriorated, and Neely refused to pay for an invoice amounting to $55,858. Neely sent Grosvold a notice of alleged defects in the work, which Grosvold disputed. Grosvold then filed a complaint for breach of contract and prejudgment interest, while Neely counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, and construction defect.The District Court of the Third Judicial District in Anaconda-Deer Lodge County tried the case before a jury. The court refused to instruct the jury on Neely’s construction defect and negligence claims, reasoning that the evidence did not substantiate the work was done to a residence and that the case was strictly a breach of contract matter. The jury found Neely had breached the contract and awarded Grosvold $60,512.60 in damages. The court denied Grosvold’s request for prejudgment interest, finding the damages were not certain until the jury’s determination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the construction defect claim, holding that the residential construction defect statute did not create an independent cause of action beyond breach of contract or tort. The court also affirmed the refusal to instruct the jury on negligence, finding that Neely’s substantial rights were not affected as the breach of contract instructions adequately covered the disputed subject matter. Finally, the court upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, concluding the amount of recovery was not capable of being made certain until the jury’s verdict. View "Grosvold v. Neely" on Justia Law

Cindy Thompson, individually and as heir of Charles Thompson, and CC & T Investments, LLC, sought to void a default judgment and a subsequent purchaser’s deed, claiming the taxing authorities failed to properly serve her with suit papers, leading to foreclosure of tax liens. The subsequent purchaser, Mae Landry, argued that Thompson had notice of the property’s sale years before the collateral attack.The trial court sustained the collateral attack, setting aside the default judgment and tax sale. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed, holding that fact issues exist regarding the adequacy of service in the underlying tax suit. The subsequent purchaser petitioned for review, asserting that the owner’s notice of the property’s sale years earlier defeats her claim as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a property owner may not set aside a subsequent property purchase on due process grounds if the owner obtained notice of the default judgment or the property’s sale during the statutory limitations and redemption period. Such an owner has notice of any due process violation in time to assert a legal remedy. Additionally, a subsequent purchaser may advance equitable defenses against a collateral attack if a prior owner unreasonably delays, to the current owner’s detriment, in suing to quiet title after obtaining notice of the judgment or the property’s sale. However, the evidence in this case fails to conclusively demonstrate the date of such notice.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THOMPSON v. LANDRY" on Justia Law

Two property owners in the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of College Station, Texas, challenged city ordinances regulating off-premise signage and driveway construction. They argued that these regulations, imposed without granting them the right to vote in city elections, violated the Texas Constitution's requirement for a "republican form of government." The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ordinances were void and unenforceable.The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, agreeing with the City that the form of local government is a political question for the legislature, not the courts. The plaintiffs appealed, but while the appeal was pending, the legislature amended the law to allow ETJ residents to unilaterally opt out of a city's ETJ. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's dismissal, not addressing the new statutory opt-out provision.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the legislative change provided a nonjudicial remedy that could moot the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The court vacated the lower court judgments and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to abate the proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to complete the opt-out process. The court emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance, noting that the new law offered a means of relief that should be pursued before addressing broader constitutional questions. View "ELLIOTT v. CITY OF COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the North Dakota Department of Health inspected ND Indoor RV Park, LLC and found several health, safety, and fire code violations. The Park was informed that its 2020 operating license would be revoked unless the violations were corrected. The Park did not address the violations, leading to the initiation of the license revocation process. The Park also requested a renewal of its license for 2021, which was denied due to the existing violations. The Park was allowed to operate until the hearing proceedings were final. The Park later withdrew its request for a hearing, and the Department of Health dismissed the renewal application and closed the case. Subsequently, the Park sold its property.The Park filed a complaint against the State of North Dakota, alleging regulatory taking, deprivation of substantive and procedural due process, inverse condemnation, unlawful interference with business relationships, systemic violation of due process, and estoppel. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming qualified immunity for individual defendants and lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the takings claims. The district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the takings and due process claims but granted summary judgment on the unlawful interference claim. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court granted a writ of supervision, directing the district court to dismiss counts II and III because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also directed the dismissal of counts I and IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Park failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Park could not prevail on its substantive and procedural due process claims and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the takings claims. View "ND Indoor RV Park v. State" on Justia Law

B-R Penn Realty defaulted on a $46 million loan backed by a mortgage on its Philadelphia apartment building. U.S. Bank, the lender, sued to foreclose in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. After a bench trial, the District Court ruled that Penn Realty had breached the loan agreement and entered a money judgment in U.S. Bank’s favor for $51,392,086.96. U.S. Bank then sought a foreclosure sale of the building to recover the judgment amount. Penn Realty moved twice to halt the sale, but the District Court denied both motions, and the building was sold.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania initially ruled in favor of U.S. Bank, issuing a money judgment for the amount owed by Penn Realty. Penn Realty appealed the judgment but did not obtain a stay. Subsequently, U.S. Bank renewed its foreclosure efforts, and the District Court denied Penn Realty’s emergency motion to quash the writ of execution and cancel the sale. The sale was rescheduled, and Penn Realty filed a second motion to quash, which was also denied by the District Court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the sale of the building was an execution sale governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), not a judicial sale under 28 U.S.C. § 2001. The court determined that U.S. Bank complied with the requirements of Rule 69(a), which imports Pennsylvania law for execution sales. The court also found that service of the writ was proper under Pennsylvania law. Consequently, the Third Circuit upheld the sale and affirmed the District Court’s denial of Penn Realty’s motion to quash. View "US Bank NA v. B R Penn Realty Owner LP" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute arising from alleged breaches of a partnership agreement between PNC Bank, N.A., Columbia Housing SLP Corporation (collectively, the "PNC Parties"), and Rene O. Campos, along with 2013 Travis Creek GP, LLC, as general partner. The partnership was formed to acquire, construct, develop, and operate an affordable housing apartment complex in Austin, Texas, with anticipated federal tax credits. A mechanic’s lien was placed on the property, leading to a default on the construction loan. The PNC Parties sought to remove the general partner and replace it with Columbia, resulting in a lawsuit.The PNC Parties filed the lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement that resolved the 2017 lawsuit. In 2021, the Eureka Parties moved to re-open the case to enforce the settlement agreement, leading to competing motions to enforce. The district court severed the motions from the original lawsuit, creating a new case, and granted each motion in part, offsetting the balance owed. The Eureka Parties and the Partnership appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the parties failed to establish an independent jurisdictional basis for the severed motions. The court noted that severed claims must have an independent jurisdictional basis and that the record lacked sufficient evidence to establish diversity of citizenship. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether such jurisdiction exists. The panel retained jurisdiction over the limited remand. View "PNC Bank v. 2013 Travis Oak Creek" on Justia Law

The case involves the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama (collectively "RSA"), which received a land-use certificate from the Baldwin County zoning administrator to construct a five-story structure at The Grand Hotel. The Point Clear Property Owners Association, Inc. (PCPOA), representing around 400 members in the district, appealed the issuance of the certificate to the Baldwin County Board of Adjustment. The Board agreed with PCPOA and rescinded the certificate.RSA appealed the Board's decision to the Baldwin Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board's ruling. RSA then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that PCPOA was not "aggrieved" by the issuance of the certificate and thus lacked standing to appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals held that RSA had waived this argument by not raising it before the Board and cited the precedent set in City of Mobile v. Lee. The court also noted in a footnote that PCPOA did qualify as a "person aggrieved."The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that whether PCPOA was "aggrieved" was a waivable issue of capacity, not subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, RSA's failure to raise the issue before the Board constituted a waiver. The court did not address whether PCPOA was actually "aggrieved," as it affirmed the lower court's decision based on the waiver. View "Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama and Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Baldwin County Planning and Zoning Department" on Justia Law