Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Christina Greenfield appealed an order designating her as a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d). The order, issued by then Administrative District Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer, prohibits Greenfield from filing any new pro se litigation in Idaho without court permission. Greenfield had filed a civil suit for damages in Kootenai County related to the sale of her home and her eviction, naming several defendants. During this lawsuit, the defendants moved to designate Greenfield as a vexatious litigant, which the ADJ granted.In the lower court, Greenfield had previously sued her neighbors and her former attorney, both cases resulting in adverse judgments against her. She also declared bankruptcy, leading to the sale of her home. Greenfield filed another lawsuit against the new owners of her home and others, which led to the motion to declare her a vexatious litigant. The ADJ found that Greenfield had maintained at least three pro se litigations in the past seven years that were decided adversely to her and issued a Prefiling Order. Greenfield responded to the proposed order, but the ADJ issued an Amended Prefiling Order, finalizing the vexatious litigant designation.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The Court held that the ADJ did not abuse her discretion in refusing to disqualify herself, as there was no evidence of personal bias. The Court also found that the ADJ followed the proper procedures under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59, providing Greenfield with adequate notice and opportunity to respond. The Court concluded that Greenfield was afforded due process and that the ADJ’s findings were supported by sufficient evidence, confirming that Greenfield had maintained multiple litigations that were adversely determined against her. View "Greenfield v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Steven Chase appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The claim arose from a failed real estate transaction between Steven’s mother, Audrey Chase, and Streamline Builders, LLC, owned by Richard Swoboda, for the construction of a home. Steven was involved in the transaction, assisting his mother by communicating with Swoboda and realtors, and inspecting the home. The sale did not close due to disagreements over holdback amounts for uncompleted items. Following the failed closing, Streamline and Swoboda sued Steven for tortious interference.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Idaho, Kootenai County. At the close of Streamline and Swoboda’s evidence, Steven moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of wrongful interference. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found in favor of Streamline and Swoboda, awarding $20,000 in damages. Steven appealed, contending the district court erred in denying his motion because he acted as his mother’s agent and could not be liable for tortious interference.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that Steven failed to preserve his agency argument for appeal, as he did not present it to the district court in support of his motion for a directed verdict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, noting that Steven’s argument on appeal differed from his argument at trial, where he focused on the lack of improper motive rather than his agency status. The court also awarded attorney fees on appeal to Streamline and Swoboda, finding Steven’s appeal unreasonable and without foundation. View "Streamline Builders, LLC v. Chase" on Justia Law

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included interest payments and additional payments tied to crop yields. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented critical information about water rights and crop values, leading to financial losses and a notice of default filed by the Slates.The Superior Court of Madera County issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the property, based on JHVS's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The court granted the injunction after the defendants failed to appear or respond to the motion. The order was intended to preserve JHVS's right to rescind the contract.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never properly served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the preliminary injunction was void as to the Slates due to this lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the preliminary injunction against the Slates and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court awarded costs to the Slates. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law

In 2001, Alphonse Fletcher, Jr. acquired property associated with two apartment units in a residential cooperative corporation controlled by The Dakota, Inc. In 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. approved a loan to Fletcher, secured by his rights in the property. Fletcher, Chase, and The Dakota entered into an agreement recognizing The Dakota's priority to proceeds from any sale or subletting of Fletcher's apartments. In 2011, Fletcher sued The Dakota for racial discrimination, and The Dakota counterclaimed for legal fees and costs based on Fletcher's proprietary lease.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota in the Fletcher action and awarded attorneys' fees and costs. While this action was pending, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP initiated a CPLR 5225 proceeding against Chase, The Dakota, and Fletcher to seize and sell Fletcher's apartments to satisfy a judgment for unpaid legal fees. The Dakota claimed a superior interest in Fletcher's property based on the fee judgment, while Chase argued that The Dakota's lien was not superior and that the lease provision authorizing attorneys' fees was either inapplicable or unconscionable.The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to The Dakota, and the Appellate Division affirmed, stating that Chase's contentions were an impermissible collateral attack on The Dakota's judgment. Chase moved for leave to appeal and to intervene and vacate the judgment in the Fletcher action. The Supreme Court denied Chase's motion, but the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.The New York Court of Appeals held that Chase, as a nonparty to the original action, was not barred from challenging the fee award in a separate proceeding. The court concluded that Chase was not required to intervene in the Fletcher action to protect its interests and that doing so would violate Chase's due process rights. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the matter was remitted for further proceedings. View "Matter of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Gordon Clark, acting on his own behalf and as the executor of his late wife’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo, Santander Bank, and other defendants, alleging various tort claims and violations of federal law related to the foreclosure of his wife’s home. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ordered Clark to obtain outside counsel to represent the estate, as it had other beneficiaries and creditors besides Clark.The district court reviewed the probate records and concluded that Clark, a pro se litigant, could not represent the estate due to the presence of other beneficiaries and creditors, including Santander Bank. The court directed Clark to retain counsel for the estate by a specific date, failing which his claims on behalf of the estate would be dismissed. Clark’s motion for reconsideration was granted, but the court adhered to its decision. Clark’s second motion for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district court’s rulings denying an estate representative’s motion to proceed pro se. The standard of review for such decisions was determined to be de novo, as they involve the application of law to the facts of a given dispute. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motion to proceed pro se, as the estate had other beneficiaries and creditors. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. View "Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Several landowners owned a tract of land near the intersection of a highway and Interstate 35. The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) planned to modernize the interchange and condemned a strip of the landowners' property. The landowners anticipated being able to install a commercial entrance to the highway based on prior discussions with the DOT. However, the DOT's formal notice of condemnation indicated that all rights of direct access to the highway would be taken. The landowners filed actions challenging the condemnation after being informed that commercial access would not be allowed.The Iowa District Court for Story County dismissed the landowners' actions as untimely, citing the thirty-day deadline for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1). The landowners also delayed filing their notice of appeal in the district court, which was filed fifty-seven days after the dismissal order, although it was served on the DOT within twenty-two days.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was not fatal, as the thirty-five days from service to actual filing was deemed a reasonable time under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101(4). However, the court found that the landowners' challenge to the condemnation was untimely under Iowa Code section 6A.24(1), which requires actions to be commenced within thirty days after service of notice of assessment. The court held that this statute is the exclusive method for challenging the exercise of eminent domain authority and does not allow for exceptions or the application of a discovery rule. Consequently, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the landowners' case. View "Brendeland v. Iowa Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

A landowner in Hardin County, Iowa, refused to allow a surveyor for a pipeline developer to enter his private property. The developer, Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC, sought access under Iowa Code section 479B.15, which governs hazardous liquid pipelines. The district court ordered the landowner to allow the surveyor temporary access, rejecting the landowner’s claims that the statute was unconstitutional under the “takings” clauses of the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions and that carbon dioxide in a supercritical state is not a “hazardous liquid.”The Iowa District Court for Hardin County ruled that the statute was facially constitutional and that Summit was a “pipeline company” with access rights under section 479B.15. The court found that Summit had provided proper statutory notice to the landowner and that the landowner’s claim of having a tenant who did not receive notice was not credible. The court granted Summit’s request for injunctive relief to compel access for surveying.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that section 479B.15 is a lawful pre-existing limitation on the landowner’s title, consistent with longstanding background restrictions on property rights, and does not constitute a taking under the Federal or Iowa Constitutions. The court also held that supercritical carbon dioxide is a “hazardous liquid” within the meaning of section 479B.2, making Summit a pipeline company with access rights under the statute. The court found that Summit had complied with the statutory notice requirements and that no additional showing of irreparable harm was required for the injunction. The judgment and injunctive relief granted by the district court were affirmed. View "Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kasischke" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. ("Woods Construction") entered into a contract with John David Jordan and Carol S. Jordan to construct a house and a metal building. Woods Construction claimed the Jordans failed to pay for the work performed, leading the company to sue them in the Dallas Circuit Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Jordans moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Woods Construction's lack of a required residential-home-builder's license barred the company from bringing civil claims. They also filed counterclaims alleging improper and negligent work by Woods Construction.The Dallas Circuit Court denied the Jordans' motion to dismiss but later granted their motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods Construction, as an unlicensed residential home builder, was barred from enforcing the construction contract under § 34-14A-14(d) of the Alabama Code. The court also declared Woods Construction's "Notice of Lis Pendens/Lien" null and void. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), despite the Jordans' counterclaims remaining pending.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court noted that the claims and counterclaims were closely intertwined, as both concerned the same contract and construction work. Additionally, the resolution of the Jordans' counterclaims could potentially moot Woods Construction's claims. Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Gary Everett Martin obtained a home-equity line of credit (HELOC) from BBVA USA Bancshares, Inc. (BBVA) in May 2008, secured by a mortgage on his residential property. In June 2008, Martin hired Joseph T. Scarborough, Jr., and Scarborough & Griggs, LLC (S&G) for legal representation in a divorce action. In June 2012, Martin executed a promissory note in favor of S&G for legal fees, secured by a second mortgage on the property. The attorney-client relationship ended in June 2013, and the promissory note and mortgage were later assigned to Scarborough. In June 2019, BBVA foreclosed on the property, and Scarborough purchased it at the foreclosure sale.The Lee Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Scarborough, S&G, and BBVA, dismissing Martin's counterclaims and awarding possession of the property to Scarborough. The court found Martin's claims against the Scarborough parties time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA) and dismissed his claims against BBVA as time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale, as the sale price was significantly lower than the property's fair market value, potentially indicating fraud or unfairness. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Scarborough on his ejectment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Scarborough parties and BBVA regarding Martin's counterclaims, finding them time-barred or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "Martin v. Scarborough" on Justia Law

Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC (Active Spine) and its owners, Sara and Nicholas Muchowicz, were sued by 132 Ventures, LLC (Ventures) for breach of contract and personal guarantee after failing to pay rent and common area maintenance (CAM) charges under a lease agreement. Ventures had purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and sought damages for unpaid rent and CAM charges from June 2020 to February 2021. Active Spine argued that the lease was invalid due to fraudulent inducement and that they were under a COVID-19-related rent abatement.The district court initially ordered restitution of the premises to Ventures and denied Active Spine's request for a temporary injunction. A separate bench trial found Active Spine and the Muchowiczes liable for breach of contract. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order but reversed the breach of contract judgment, remanding for a jury trial.At the jury trial, Ventures presented evidence of unpaid rent and CAM charges, while Active Spine argued that Ventures failed to provide notice of budgeted direct expenses, a condition precedent to their obligation to pay CAM charges. The jury found in favor of Ventures, awarding $593,723.82 in damages. Active Spine and the Muchowiczes moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing errors in the jury's damage calculations and the lack of notice of budgeted direct expenses.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits as business records and not summaries under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1006. The court also held that Active Spine and the Muchowiczes failed to preserve their arguments for appeal regarding the costs of new tenancy, COVID-19 abatement, and the amended lease. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for new trial or JNOV, concluding that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. View "132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy" on Justia Law