Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on the extension of a grading and grubbing permit issued by the Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui, to Maui Lani Partners for excavation work at a residential development site containing ancestral Hawaiian burial sites. In March 2018, an unincorporated association and its members challenged the validity of the permit extension, alleging violations of state and county laws requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division and arguing that the Director exceeded his authority in granting the extension without good cause.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit granted motions to dismiss the complaint on all counts without prejudice, finding no regulatory or statutory authority requiring consultation with the State Historic Preservation Division for permit extensions and that the Director acted within his discretionary authority. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and later denied their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented new law or argument. The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court’s denial of costs and the motion for reconsideration but held that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within ten days of judgment and thus did not toll the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi reviewed the case and held that a motion for reconsideration filed under HRCP Rule 60(b) is a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within a reasonable time and before the appeal deadline, thereby extending the time to file a notice of appeal. The court also held that the ICA did not err in affirming the circuit court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kakanilua v. Director of the Department of Public Works" on Justia Law

Several homeowners initiated a lawsuit against an individual, alleging conversion, trespass, outrage, reformation of restrictive covenants, quiet title, and seeking injunctive relief to prevent interference with their use of common areas in a real estate development. The defendant retained counsel and filed a timely answer. However, when the homeowners moved for summary judgment, the defendant’s attorney failed to respond or inform his client about the motion. The district court granted summary judgment for the homeowners, awarding substantial actual and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, far exceeding the amount requested in the motion.After more than 30 days had passed since judgment, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment in the District Court of Cherokee County, Oklahoma, arguing that unavoidable casualty or misfortune, fraud, and irregularity had prevented him from defending the action. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion to vacate. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the defendant had not properly pled a valid defense and that his attorney’s negligence was imputed to him.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the attorney’s abandonment of the case without the client’s knowledge, combined with a breakdown in office procedures and lack of communication, constituted unavoidable casualty or misfortune under Oklahoma law. The court further found that the district court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees without a hearing or proper evidentiary support violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It also vacated the appellate attorney fee award previously granted to the homeowners. View "Bjorkman v. Noble" on Justia Law

Several residents of a recreational vehicle park in Oregon brought a class action lawsuit against the park’s owners and managers, alleging that the park’s utility billing practices violated the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were charged for electricity at rates higher than the actual cost and were improperly assessed meter reading fees. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class covering a ten-year period prior to the filing of the complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled until tenants discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violations.The Marion County Circuit Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the one-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.125 incorporated a discovery rule. The court certified a class including tenants who paid the disputed charges during the ten years before the complaint was filed, provided they did not or should not have discovered the facts giving rise to their claims more than one year before filing. The court later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, found the defendants liable, and awarded substantial damages and attorney fees.On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s class certification and related rulings, holding that ORS 12.125 does not include a discovery rule and that the one-year limitations period is not tolled by a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the claim. The plaintiffs sought review of this issue.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The court held that ORS 12.125 does not incorporate a discovery rule; the one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged violation or breach occurs, not when the plaintiff discovers it. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hathaway v. B & J Property Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

A business operating a strip club featuring nude dancing and alcohol sales entered into a settlement agreement with DeKalb County, Georgia, in 2001, which was later amended in 2007. The amended agreement granted the club non-conforming status, allowing it to continue its business model for fifteen years, with the possibility of renewal, and required annual licensing fees. In 2013, the City of Chamblee annexed the area containing the club and subsequently adopted ordinances restricting adult entertainment establishments, including bans on alcohol sales, stricter food sales requirements for alcohol licenses, and earlier closing times. The City initially issued alcohol licenses to the club but later denied renewal, citing failure to meet new requirements and the club’s status as an adult establishment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed some of the club’s claims for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to the City on the remaining claims. The district court found that the club lacked standing to challenge certain ordinances as it was not an alcohol licensee, and that the City’s ordinances regulating adult entertainment and alcohol sales were constitutional under the secondary-effects doctrine, applying intermediate scrutiny. The court also determined there was no valid contract between the club and the City, rejecting the Contract Clause claims, and found no equal protection violation, as the club failed to identify a similarly situated comparator.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the club lacked standing for equitable relief due to its permanent closure, but had standing for damages for a limited period. The court upheld the application of intermediate scrutiny to the ordinances, found no impairment of contract, and agreed that the club failed to establish an equal protection violation. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee, Georgia" on Justia Law

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a homeowner after the homeowner defaulted on a mortgage loan originally obtained in 2007. The mortgage was assigned several times before the foreclosure action began, and the lender’s predecessor filed suit in 2015. After a trial in 2018, the Vermont Superior Court, Civil Division, found in favor of the lender, concluding that the lender held the original note and mortgage at the time of filing and at trial, and that the homeowner had defaulted. The court issued a judgment of foreclosure by judicial sale, setting a redemption period for the homeowner.Following the expiration of the redemption period, the case was temporarily dismissed due to the homeowner’s bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy discharge, the lender successfully moved to reopen the case. The parties attempted mediation, which was unsuccessful. The lender then sought to substitute a new party as plaintiff due to post-judgment assignments of the mortgage, but later withdrew this request after issues arose regarding the validity of the assignments and the status of the note. The court vacated the substitution and ordered the lender to prove who the real party in interest was, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. After a hearing, the court found the lender failed to establish the real party in interest, dismissed the case with prejudice, and vacated the foreclosure judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court found no evidence of undue delay or failure to pursue the case by the lender, and concluded that the action could continue in the name of the original plaintiff under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the foreclosure judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ditech Financial LLC v. Brisson" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors opposed the development of a public sports park on a 65-acre parcel in Maui. The State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) sought and received a special use permit from the County of Maui Planning Commission to build the park. Several future members of the neighbors’ group, Maui Lani Neighbors, Inc. (MLN), received notice of the permit hearing, attended, and some testified, but none formally intervened in the proceedings. After the permit was granted, one future MLN member filed an administrative appeal but later dismissed it. MLN was then incorporated and filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, challenging the permit on zoning, environmental, constitutional, and procedural grounds.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit dismissed most of MLN’s claims, holding that they should have been brought as an administrative appeal of the Planning Commission’s decision under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14, and that MLN failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, but with different reasoning on some points. The ICA held that the administrative process provided an exclusive remedy for most claims, but allowed that some environmental claims under HRS chapter 343 (the Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Act, or HEPA) could proceed in circuit court if they did not seek to invalidate the permit.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the ICA’s judgment in most respects, but clarified that MLN’s claims under HRS chapter 343 were not subject to the exhaustion doctrine and could be brought directly in circuit court. The court held that, except for HEPA claims, MLN was required to challenge the permit through an administrative appeal, and that the declaratory judgment statute (HRS § 632-1) did not provide an alternative route. The court remanded the case to the circuit court to consider the HEPA-based claims. View "Maui Lani Neighbors v. State" on Justia Law

Several borrowers executed mortgage agreements with a lender, granting the lender a lien on their respective properties in Hawai‘i. Between 2008 and 2009, the borrowers defaulted on their mortgage loans, and the lender foreclosed on the properties through nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The lender was the winning bidder at each sale and subsequently conveyed the properties to third parties. In 2019, the borrowers filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure, unfair or deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), and sought quiet title and ejectment against the current titleholders. They requested both monetary damages and the return of title and possession of the properties.The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the lender and the titleholders. The court found that the borrowers could not establish compensatory damages because their outstanding mortgage debts at the time of foreclosure exceeded any damages they claimed, even when accounting for loss of use and other asserted losses. The court also determined that the borrowers’ quiet title and ejectment claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers. The borrowers appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i accepted transfer of the case.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i affirmed the circuit court’s summary judgment. The court held that, under its precedents, borrowers must establish compensatory damages after accounting for their mortgage debts to survive summary judgment on wrongful foreclosure and UDAP claims. Here, the borrowers’ debts exceeded their claimed damages. The court further held that claims for return of title and possession are subject to a six-year statute of limitations for wrongful foreclosure actions, which barred the borrowers’ claims. Additionally, the court concluded that the titleholders were bona fide purchasers, as the foreclosure affidavits did not provide constructive notice of any defects. View "McCullough v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

After the death of Arthur L. Bacon, Richard D. Gaynor, acting as the personal representative of Bacon’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Tom L. Larkin and Jerome B. Williams. The complaint alleged that a durable power of attorney in favor of Larkin was recorded shortly after Bacon’s death, though it was purportedly executed in 2019. It further claimed that, just hours before Bacon died, Larkin executed a deed transferring all of Bacon’s real property to Williams. The estate sought to void the conveyance and requested damages.Williams and Larkin each filed motions to dismiss. The Talladega Circuit Court granted Larkin’s motion to dismiss on March 3, 2025, but did not resolve the claims against Williams. On the same day, the court ordered the plaintiff to amend the complaint within 30 days to include necessary heirs or real parties in interest. Gaynor requested more time to respond, which both defendants opposed. On April 11, 2025, Gaynor filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, challenging the dismissal of Larkin. Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order stating that the dismissal of Larkin was a final order for purposes of appeal, referencing Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal. The Court held that, because the circuit court’s order did not dispose of all claims against all parties and lacked a proper Rule 54(b) certification at the time the notice of appeal was filed, there was no final judgment. The Court declined to remand for possible certification and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. View "Gaynor v. Larkin" on Justia Law

A hotel in the Town of Newburgh, New York, agreed to provide long-term housing to asylum seekers as part of a program initiated by New York City. In response, the Town alleged that the hotel’s actions violated local zoning and occupancy ordinances, which limited hotel stays to transient guests for no more than 30 days. The Town inspected the hotel, found modifications suggesting long-term use, and filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Orange County, seeking to enjoin the hotel from housing asylum seekers for extended periods. The state court issued a temporary restraining order, but allowed the asylum seekers already present to remain pending further orders.The hotel removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Town’s enforcement was racially motivated and violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus justifying removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The district court found that removal was improper because the hotel had not sufficiently pleaded grounds for removal under § 1443(1), and remanded the case to state court.While the hotel’s appeal of the remand order was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the underlying state court action was discontinued with prejudice after the asylum seekers left and the City ended its program. The Second Circuit determined that, because the state court case was permanently terminated, there was no longer a live controversy regarding removal. The court held the appeal was moot and, following standard practice when mootness occurs through no fault of the appellant, vacated the district court’s remand order and dismissed the appeal. View "Town of Newburgh v. Newburgh EOM LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, a condominium unit was sold at a foreclosure sale in 2014 to Tyroshi Investments after the original owner defaulted on both her mortgage and condominium assessments. The condominium association conducted the sale, and Tyroshi subsequently rented out the unit. In 2015, the mortgage and deed of trust were transferred to U.S. Bank, which then initiated its own judicial foreclosure and purchased the unit at a second sale in 2016. Both Tyroshi and U.S. Bank recorded their deeds at different times, and for a period, Tyroshi’s tenants continued to occupy the unit while U.S. Bank paid taxes and assessments. In 2020, Tyroshi was denied access to the unit, leading to litigation over rightful ownership.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial and determined that U.S. Bank’s claims to quiet title and invalidate the 2014 foreclosure sale were timely, applying a fifteen-year statute of limitations for actions “for the recovery of lands” under D.C. Code § 12-301(a)(1). The court declared the 2014 sale invalid and found U.S. Bank to be the legal owner. Tyroshi appealed, arguing that the claims were untimely.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the fifteen-year limitations period applies only to possessory actions, such as ejectment or adverse possession, not to claims like wrongful foreclosure or breach of contract, which are subject to shorter limitations periods. The court found that U.S. Bank’s claims were time-barred, except for a portion of its unjust enrichment claim related to payments made within three years of the suit. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of the unjust enrichment claim. View "Tyroshi Investments, LLC v. U.S. Bank, NA, Successor Trustee to LaSalle Bank NA" on Justia Law