Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

In this case, GayLe Schleve, the personal representative of the estates of Viola J. Heath and Caleb C. Heath, appealed orders from the District Court of Dunn County, North Dakota, that granted Wells Fargo Bank's motions to vacate previous orders establishing the authority of domiciliary foreign personal representatives and letters testamentary related to the estate of Viola J. Heath, and determining heirs and successors in the estate of Caleb C. Heath.Viola and Caleb Heath were residents of Montana who owned mineral rights in Dunn County, North Dakota. After their deaths, litigation ensued over the distribution of these mineral rights. The orders being challenged in this appeal had resulted in the mineral rights being transferred to the heirs of Viola Heath.Wells Fargo, as successor to Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co., the trustee appointed in Caleb Heath's will, claimed an ownership interest in the mineral rights and challenged the transfer of those rights to the heirs of Viola Heath. Wells Fargo argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the orders, and that the orders should be vacated because they were manifestly unjust and based on incorrect applications of the law.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Wells Fargo had standing to challenge the orders. The court also held that the district court had erred in ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order in the Estate of Viola J. Heath. However, the Supreme Court remanded for further determination of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties in the Estate of Viola J. Heath, and whether relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(6).Finally, the Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting Wells Fargo's Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the order in the Estate of Caleb C. Heath without sufficient findings related to timeliness. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Heath" on Justia Law

In a legal malpractice case in North Dakota, a couple, Kenneth and Carol Pinks, sued attorney Alexander Kelsch and his professional corporation, along with associated partners, alleging negligence in representing them in a quiet title action against the State of North Dakota. The District Court, South Central Judicial District, bifurcated the malpractice action to first determine the element of causation, specifically whether the Pinks would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the quiet title action but for the alleged negligence of the defendants. The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding there were genuine issues of material fact.Following a bench trial on the causation element, the district court concluded that had the evidence of the Pinks’ ownership of the disputed land been presented in the quiet title action, they would have established their ownership claim was prior and superior to the State’s claim of title. The court concluded the Pinks proved the element of causation and ordered a jury trial be set on the remaining issues of the legal malpractice claim. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, dismissed the appeal, ruling that the defendants were attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and the defendants did not seek certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule requires that, in cases with more than one claim or multiple parties, a final judgment on one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties can only be directed if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay. The court found that the district court only ruled on the causation element of the legal malpractice claim, and other elements, such as the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty by the attorney to the client, a breach of that duty by the attorney, and damages were still left to be adjudicated. The defendants' failure to comply with Rule 54(b) led to the dismissal of the appeal. The court also denied the Pinks' request for costs and attorney’s fees, determining that the defendants' appeal was not frivolously made. View "Pinks v. Kelsch" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case involving Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron, and Springville Investors, LLC, versus Multnomah County, the Metro Regional Government, and members of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, the plaintiffs challenged the designation of their land in Multnomah County, Oregon, as "rural reserves" under the Oregon Land Reserves Statute. They claimed that the statute and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and that the defendants’ rural reserve designations violated their federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the designation, concluding that the requirements for Burford abstention (a doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding a case in deference to state courts) were met for each of the as-applied claims. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs had abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. View "BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a decision by the District Court granting Camille J. Moulton's motion for summary judgment against J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. Moulton's property in Buckfield was subject to a mortgage held by J.P. Morgan. When Moulton stopped making payments on her loan, J.P. Morgan sent her a notice of default and right to cure. However, the notice overstated the amount required to cure the default due to an amount held in suspense by the bank, and was thus deemed deficient by the court.The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the District Court's decision that the notice was deficient and affirmed that portion of the judgment. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the District Court's judgment that required J.P. Morgan to discharge the mortgage, as there was no basis for the lower court to declare the effect of its judgment without a specific claim for declaratory relief. The court did not disturb the lower court's award of reasonable attorney fees to Moulton for defending against the foreclosure claim. The holding of this case is that a notice of default and right to cure is deficient if it does not clearly inform the borrower of the amount required to cure the default. If a lender has not complied with the prerequisites to acceleration, a court cannot conclude that initiation of a foreclosure action nevertheless accelerates the note balance. When a court enters summary judgment against a lender or dismisses the lender’s foreclosure claim due to a deficient notice, it does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title. View "J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton" on Justia Law

In Mississippi, Samuel and Sandra Evans appealed the trial court's decision not to set aside a foreclosure sale. They executed a deed of trust for real property in 2003, but defaulted on their payments. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale by MC&J Investments, LLC. The Evans alleged that they had an oral agreement with the managing member of MC&J Investments to buy the property at the foreclosure sale and then sell it back to them. The trial court found that the bid price paid by MC&J Investments was not so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court and that no written evidence was provided to support the alleged promise to sell back the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the oral agreement was barred under the statute of frauds and did not fall under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because there was no evidence that the Evans relied on the alleged promise. Additionally, the court found that the price paid at the foreclosure sale didn't shock the conscience of the court and therefore didn't err in not setting aside the foreclosure sale. View "Evans v. MC & J Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

The case in question involved a dispute between Epochal Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Divine Orchids, and LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation, over a commercial lease agreement for a property containing dilapidated commercial greenhouses known to contain asbestos and lead paint. Epochal Enterprises claimed that the defendants failed to disclose the presence of these hazardous substances, which resulted in economic damage when the County of San Diego quarantined the leased premises. A jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence, and awarded Epochal Enterprises damages for lost profits and other past economic loss.However, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), based on a limitation of liability clause in the lease agreement that purported to prevent Epochal Enterprises from recovering the economic damages awarded by the jury.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the trial court's judgment. It found that the jury necessarily concluded that the defendants had violated the Health and Safety Code by failing to disclose the existence of asbestos, and that this violation of law rendered the limitation of liability clause invalid under Civil Code section 1668. The court concluded that the limitation of liability clause could not bar Epochal Enterprises from recovering damages for the defendants' statutory violations.The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV on the issue of damages, finding that the jury had a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of lost profits. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, Loring De Martini agreed to sell a commercial property to Puja Gupta. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration. Subsequently, Gupta filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award and recorded a lis pendens on the property. Gupta obtained a judgment confirming the award, but abandoned the case after De Martini successfully moved to expunge the lis pendens. Gupta then filed a new action seeking to compel De Martini to complete the sale and recorded another lis pendens. De Martini moved to expunge the new lis pendens, arguing that Gupta needed the court's permission to record it under the Code of Civil Procedure section 405.36, as it was recorded by the same claimant and affected the same property. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that section 405.36 only applies to successive lis pendens filed in the same action and Gupta had established a prima facie case regarding the probable validity of a real property claim.De Martini petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three for a writ of mandate. The court granted the petition, concluding that the trial court erred both in its interpretation of section 405.36 and its application of the prima facie standard in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court held that section 405.36 requires a claimant to seek court permission before recording a lis pendens on the same property in a subsequent proceeding if a lis pendens in a prior, related proceeding has been expunged. Additionally, the court determined that the trial court should have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, not a prima facie standard, in determining the probable validity of the real property claim. The court ordered the trial court to vacate its order denying expungement of the lis pendens and to enter a new order granting the requested expungement and ruling on De Martini's motion for attorney fees. View "Di Martini v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the dismissal of Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC's appeal by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction. Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC filed a notice of appeal five days after the deadline and did not file a motion seeking leave to show good cause or a reasonable excuse for the late filing. Despite the Group's claim that it had electronically submitted the notice of appeal on the due date and that the clerk erroneously rejected it, the Court ruled that the Group failed to seek recourse for its untimely filing as required by the rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court noted that the record did not support the Group's factual assertions and that the Group did not utilize the remedies available to it, making its claim of due process violation baseless. Therefore, the Court held that the appellate court correctly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Group's appeal. The case originated from a two-count complaint for eviction filed by the Group against Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corporation, in which the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant. View "Waukegan Hospitality Group, LLC v. Stretch's Sports Bar & Grill Corp." on Justia Law