Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case was brought before the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to resolve a dispute between neighbors over property views. The plaintiffs, Thomas Knudsen, Trustee, Ciara Ladnier, and Edward Knudsen, Trustees, own property that rests on a hill with a view of the Sakonnet River. The defendant, Dr. Gregory DeJean, owns property that borders the plaintiffs' property and sits downhill from it. In 1989, the parties' predecessors entered into a restrictive covenant agreeing to certain building height restrictions and land maintenance obligations to preserve the existing views. Over time, however, Dr. DeJean has allowed new landscaping and existing vegetation to grow, diminishing the plaintiffs' view.In response, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of their rights to maintain the agreement and enjoy the water views, as well as an injunction restraining Dr. DeJean from violating the agreement. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting them declaratory and injunctive relief. The court ordered Dr. DeJean to make a variety of changes to his property to restore the plaintiffs' view to the condition it was in as of 1989.Dr. DeJean appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the lower court had erred in its interpretation of the agreement and in its application of the legal defense of laches. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, finding that Dr. DeJean had violated the restrictive covenant and that the trial justice had not erred in dismissing his laches defense. Thus, Dr. DeJean was ordered to maintain his property in a way that preserved the plaintiffs' view. View "Knudsen v. DeJean" on Justia Law

The case at hand involves a dispute over the interpretation of a will left by Robert Pettengill Beckey, who was survived by his three children, Sandra L. Arthur, Angela M. Beckey, and Timothy E. Beckey. The will included specific instructions for dividing real property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., Greene, ME, among the three children. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the Probate Court erred in its interpretation of the will, particularly regarding Angela's share.Specifically, Angela's share was described in the will as "1/3 of property located at 848 Allen Pond Rd., minus the valuation of a piece of land on water by property line of 'Caron's'". The Probate Court had ruled that this description was ambiguous and that Angela's share therefore fell into the residue of the estate, to be divided equally among the three children. However, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the ambiguity of the "minus" clause was irrelevant because Robert never conveyed any part of the land to Angela. Therefore, Angela was entitled to a one-third share of the Allen Pond Road property’s value without any reduction.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the Probate Court's ruling was not consistent with Robert's intent for his children to receive equal shares of the property's value. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Estate of Robert Pettengill Beckey" on Justia Law

This case involves Stewart Johnston who was the defendant, cross-complainant, and appellant, against BTHHM Berkeley, LLC, PNG Berkeley, LLC, Michail Family 2004 Living Trust, Bianca Blesching, Scot Hawkins (collectively, BTHHM), and Holda Novelo and Landmark Real Estate Management, Inc. (collectively, Landmark). Johnston owned a property which he was to lease to BTHHM for a cannabis dispensary once permits were granted by the City of Berkeley. However, after the city approved the permit, Johnston refused to deliver possession of the property to BTHHM, leading to a lawsuit by BTHHM against Johnston.Following mediation, a two-page term sheet titled “Settlement Term Sheet Agreement” was signed by all parties. Johnston later wished to withdraw from the agreement. BTHHM and Landmark moved to enforce the term sheet pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court granted. Johnston failed to make the payments required by the enforcement orders. The court granted BTHHM's motion for entry of judgment, awarded prejudgment interest to BTHHM, entered judgment against Johnston, and dismissed his cross-complaint with prejudice.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four reversed the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest but otherwise affirmed the decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the term sheet’s language evinces the parties’ mutual agreement to settle the case according to its terms. However, the court concluded that the award of prejudgment interest was unauthorized as it differed materially from the terms of the parties’ agreement. View "BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland has ruled that the term "rent" under Real Property § 8-401, as applied to residential leases, refers to the fixed, periodic payments a tenant is required to make for use or occupancy of a rented premises. This definition excludes additional charges such as late fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The court also ruled that any provision in a residential lease that allows a landlord to allocate payments of "rent" to other obligations, thereby subjecting a tenant to eviction proceedings based on failure to pay "rent", violates Real Property § 8-208(d)(2). Further, penalties for late payment of rent, capped at 5% of the monthly amount of rent due, are inclusive of any costs of collection other than court-awarded costs. Finally, the court ruled that the Circuit Court erred in declining to review the merits of the tenants’ second renewed motion for class certification. The case has been remanded for further proceedings in line with these holdings. View "Westminster Management v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and remanding the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a landlord, in a lawsuit brought by the plaintiff, a tenant. The plaintiff had suffered serious burns in an explosion caused by a gas leak in the rental property. He claimed that the landlord had been negligent, violated the Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and breached the implied warranty of habitability.The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision. The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that he had notified the landlord of the issues with the flooring or the heating system, or that the landlord had any actual knowledge of these issues. Consequently, the landlord's duty under the RRAA had not yet arisen. Therefore, the landlord could not be held liable for negligence, violation of the RRAA, or breach of the implied warranty of habitability.The Court further clarified that the RRAA does not completely abrogate the common law principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) in relation to repairs and dangerous conditions on leased residential premises. The RRAA only imposes a duty on the landlord to make repairs after receiving notice or acquiring actual knowledge of the need for them. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on all of the plaintiff's claims, reinstated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the matter. View "Terry v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C" on Justia Law

In this case, Charles Crowder bought a property owned by Delores Blevins at a tax sale. After the purchase, Crowder took possession of the property and made improvements. Subsequently, Blevins sought to redeem the property following the statutory procedures. The Jefferson Probate Court granted Blevins's redemption petition and entered a judgment in her favor. Crowder then filed a postjudgment motion to set aside that judgment and a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the judgment, both of which the probate court denied.In his appeal, Crowder contested the process of service arguing that he had not been properly served with Blevins's redemption petition. He claimed that the signature on the return receipt was not his and that he had moved out of the address where the service was delivered before Blevins filed the redemption petition. However, Crowder both received and sent correspondences to and from the contested address after he claimed to have moved. Moreover, he did not deny that the signature on the return receipt was his at any point during the proceedings in the probate court.The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the probate court's judgment. It found that Crowder failed to file a timely appeal concerning the probate court's judgment on the merits. Additionally, the court concluded that the probate court's judgment was valid and properly denied Crowder's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Crowder v. Blevins" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In this case, plaintiffs Lee Anne and John Savoia-McHugh sued defendant Michael Glass, alleging misconduct related to real estate investment transactions. Despite being served with the complaint, Glass did not respond to the complaint, the amended complaint, written discovery requests, a motion to compel, or a subpoena over a period of 15 months. Consequently, the plaintiffs requested and were granted an entry of default. Glass later engaged counsel and moved to set aside the default, arguing that his delayed appearance was not willful, that he had established meritorious defenses, and that setting aside the default would not prejudice the plaintiffs. However, the district court denied his motion and entered a default judgment against him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Glass willfully defaulted. The court noted that despite Glass's contention that he was not served with the complaint or the amended complaint, he acknowledged receipt of several other legal documents related to the case. Furthermore, Glass's excuse that he was confused and did not understand the need to act until the magistrate judge’s order was deemed inadequate. As a result, the court concluded that Glass displayed an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings, which negated a finding of good cause to set aside the default. View "Savoia-McHugh v. Glass" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Lourenco DoCouto, appealed a decision by the Superior Court of Rhode Island that dismissed his case against defendants Blue Water Realty, LLC and Louis Bachetti. The dispute centered around a property DoCouto claimed he had an option to purchase. DoCouto argued that the Superior Court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata, dismissing his complaint for failure to timely serve defendants, and in determining that the District Court had jurisdiction over his equitable claims in the eviction proceedings.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court found that the parties in the eviction proceedings were the same or in privity with the parties in the present case. It also determined that DoCouto’s counterclaim in the eviction proceedings had alleged the same facts and arose out of the same transactions as those set forth in the current complaints. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata applied, barring DoCouto’s claims.Moreover, the court disagreed with DoCouto’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his equitable claims. As the eviction action pertained to a lease agreement, the court held that the District Court had the requisite jurisdiction over DoCouto’s equitable claims according to the Rhode Island statute. Lastly, the court rejected DoCouto’s argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his request for compensatory damages for services rendered because the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory limit relative to District Court jurisdiction. The statutory maximum set forth had no bearing on the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over landlord-tenant cases such as this one. View "DoCouto v. Blue Water Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed a dispute involving property owners David and Jeanie Vaudt and Wells Fargo Bank, which held the mortgage on neighboring property owned by Fredesvindo Enamorado Diaz and Denice Enamorado. The Vaudts had installed a landscaping barrier that encroached on the Enamorado's property. When the Enamorados disputed the boundary, the Vaudts filed a petition to quiet title, claiming boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the claims, arguing they were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations related to property transfers by trustees. The district court agreed with Wells Fargo, citing a previous Iowa Supreme Court ruling (Heer v. Thola).The Vaudts appealed, asking the Supreme Court to overrule Heer. They argued their claims arose from the conduct of the Enamorados' predecessors in interest, not the transfer of property by the trustee's deed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Vaudts, stating that Heer incorrectly interpreted the statute of limitations, which applies specifically to claims arising from transfers by trustees, not to all adverse claims. The court overruled Heer, rejecting its broad application of the one-year statute of limitations to boundary-by-acquiescence claims.The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the Vaudts' claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Vaudt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law