Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a case involving a group of plaintiffs who owned properties near proposed wind turbine sites in Page County, Iowa. The plaintiffs sued the county, its board of supervisors, and county officials after the board issued a commercial wind energy permit to Shenandoah Hills Wind Project, LLC (SHW). The plaintiffs claimed that the issuance of the permit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Iowa Constitution, Iowa Code, and county ordinances. They also claimed that county officials violated the Iowa Open Meetings Act by holding nonpublic meetings on SHW's application. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on the federal due process claim.The district court dismissed the federal due process claim for lack of prudential standing and as implausibly pleaded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It also dismissed the state claims as time-barred under Iowa law and implausibly pleaded under Rule 12(b)(6). After the district court's decision, the county revoked the permit. Despite the revocation, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's order.The Court of Appeals held that the county's revocation of SHW's permit mooted the plaintiffs' claims, except for their claims under the Iowa Open Meetings Act. The court affirmed the district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims and its dismissal of them. The court vacated the remainder of the district court's order and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the non-Open Meetings claims as moot. View "Hunter v. Page County, Iowa" on Justia Law

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An elderly woman, Janice Geerdes, and her long-time friend, Albert Gomez Cruz, had a partnership raising hogs on a piece of land. Initially, Janice deeded half of her interest in the land to Albert. Over a decade later, she deeded the rest of her interest in the land to Albert, receiving nothing in return. About six months later, Janice’s adult daughters were appointed her conservator and guardian. The conservator challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed based on undue influence and lack of capacity.The district court set aside the deed, finding that there was undue influence through a confidential relationship and that Janice lacked the necessary capacity to deed her interest in the land. The court of appeals affirmed the decision on the basis of lack of capacity.The Supreme Court of Iowa, however, disagreed with the lower courts. The Supreme Court found that the conservator did not establish by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence that there was undue influence or that Janice lacked capacity at the time of the gift. The court found that the lower courts gave too much weight to the perceived improvidence of the transaction and too little weight to the testimony of the third-party accountant who witnessed the transaction. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservatorship of Janice Geerdes v. Cruz" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed a case involving a dispute over an undeveloped island ("the island") located within a canal system on Ono Island, a residential subdivision. The island was created during the development of the canal system and was later sold in a tax sale. F Family South, LLC ("FFS") acquired the island and sought to construct a boat shelter on it. The Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc. ("the POA") objected, arguing that the island was subject to certain covenants restricting its use.The Baldwin Circuit Court ruled in favor of the POA, finding that the island was subject to both express and implied covenants restricting its use. The court also invalidated the 1995 tax sale through which FFS had obtained ownership of the island, and declared the POA as the island's owner.FFS appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in voiding the 1995 tax sale and in concluding that the island was subject to the covenants. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's decision to void the tax sale, but affirmed the finding that the island was subject to implied restrictive covenants governing its use. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "F Family South, LLC v. Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between a landlord, Daniel Johnson, and his tenant, Tina Vosberg. Johnson filed a complaint under Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) seeking restitution of the premises, unpaid rent, and statutory damages for willful holdover. The primary disagreement was over the duration of the lease agreement. Johnson presented a 90-day lease, while Vosberg claimed she had signed a 1-year lease. The county court held an expedited trial on the claim for possession and ruled in favor of Johnson. Vosberg appealed this decision.Vosberg's appeal was heard by the District Court for Douglas County, which affirmed the county court's decision. Vosberg then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the alleged 1-year lease period passed, Vosberg vacated the premises, and she stopped paying monthly rent pursuant to the supersedeas bond.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that it had appellate jurisdiction over the case. However, it ruled that the appeal was moot because the term of the alleged 1-year lease had expired, Vosberg had vacated the premises, and she was no longer paying the monthly rent under the terms of the supersedeas bond. The court also rejected Vosberg's argument that she suffered collateral consequences from the writ because a judgment of eviction on her record made it harder for her to find landlords willing to rent to her. The court dismissed Vosberg's appeal as moot. View "Johnson v. Vosberg" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Peter M. Beckerman and Ricky and Monica Conant over a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway. The parties own abutting waterfront properties in Rome, Maine. Beckerman's property, the Conant property, and a third property, formerly known as the Bruce Pooler lot, are connected to South Crane Lane by a horseshoe-shaped driveway that runs across all three properties. Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants' driveway to access South Crane Lane.Previously, Beckerman had filed an action against the Poolers, previous owners of the other two lots, to establish the location of the common boundaries of the three lots. The parties settled the action at mediation, resulting in a consent order in 2002 that established the current boundaries of the three properties. As part of the settlement, Beckerman secured a right-of-way over the driveway on the Bruce Pooler lot in order to access South Crane Lane.In 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for contempt, alleging that the Conants were in contempt of the 2002 consent judgment by impeding his use of the right-of-way over the Conant lot. The court denied Beckerman’s motion for contempt because the language of the consent order was ambiguous. Beckerman appealed and the court affirmed the denial of the contempt but vacated the portion of the court’s determination regarding whether Beckerman had an easement by deed.On remand, after a three-day bench trial, the court entered a judgment declaring that Beckerman has a deeded right-of-way over the Conants’ driveway and enjoining the Conants from interfering with that right-of-way. The Conants appealed the judgment.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment. The court found that the language of the 2016 judgment was clear and specific, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Conants in contempt. The court also found that the Superior Court did not err in concluding that Beckerman may use the entire paved driveway as needed to access his property. The court further held that the doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply in this instance as there was no valid final judgment entered with respect to Beckerman’s August 2016 motion for contempt. Lastly, the court held that the Superior Court was within its discretion to award Beckerman attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C). View "Beckerman v. Conant" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the dispute over whether the main roads within the Deerfield Estates subdivision in Newton County, Mississippi, are private or public. In 2001, the Newton County Board of Supervisors voted to accept the two main roads of the subdivision into the county road system. However, the roads were never added to the official county road registry. In 2020, the subdivision filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the roads are public and an injunction mandating the county to add them to the registry and perform repairs.The Newton County Chancery Court held that the roads had become public roads via express common law dedication and ordered that the roads be added to the county map and road register. The county appealed this decision, arguing that the subdivision's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the county's 2001 acceptance of the roads was effective and that the roads served public interest or convenience. The court also found that the county's failure to add the roads to the registry and the map in a timely manner did not negate the county's explicit acceptance of the dedication. Furthermore, the court ruled that the county could not invoke the doctrine of laches or the general three-year statute of limitations to bar the subdivision's request for a declaratory judgment that the roads are public roads. View "Newton County, Mississippi v. Deerfield Estates Subdivision Property Owners Association, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2015, GPT Maple Avenue Owner, LP (GPT) purchased a property that was subject to a lease to Equinix, LLC (Equinix). At the time of GPT’s acquisition, the remaining term of the lease was 26 years. The Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined that GPT’s acquisition resulted in a “change in ownership” permitting reassessment for property tax purposes because, at the time of the sale, the remaining term of the lease was under 35 years. This was based on the statutes implementing Proposition 13, which state that whether the transfer of a lessor’s interest in taxable real property results in a change in ownership generally depends on the length of the remaining lease term at the time of the transfer.Equinix appealed the Assessor’s 2015 change in ownership determination to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board, which found in favor of the county. Equinix and GPT then presented a refund claim to the county, which the county denied. Equinix and GPT filed a lawsuit, and the trial court ruled in favor of the county, concluding that, under the “express language” of the relevant statutes, the sale of the Property to GPT in March 2015 resulted in a change in ownership because at the time of sale the remaining term of Equinix’s lease was less than 35 years.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court found that under the unambiguous language of the relevant statute, the 2015 transaction is a change in ownership permitting reassessment. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the statute is inconsistent with Proposition 13 and another section in the statutory scheme. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the statute is inconsistent with the overarching rules set forth in another section of the law. The court concluded that the Legislature was not required to adhere to the task force’s recommendations and that the statute as enacted did not render the law illogical. View "Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over an easement, a right to cross or otherwise use someone else's land for a specified purpose. The plaintiffs, Kinderhaus North LLC, Prime Properties ME LLC, and Karen and Brian Fullerton (collectively, the Fullertons), own four lots in a subdivision and have an expressly deeded easement across a lot owned by the defendants, Karl and Stephanie Nicolas. The Fullertons claimed that the Nicolases had obstructed their easement by installing a granite lamp post and several trees. The Fullertons removed some of these trees, leading to a dispute over whether they had the right to do so and whether they had committed a timber trespass by cutting down the trees.The Business and Consumer Docket found that the Fullertons had an expressly deeded easement across the Nicolases' property, but that the easement was ambiguous as to its scope and purpose. The court found that the Fullertons did not have an unlimited right to use the full length and width of the easement as a driveway, and that the trees and lamp post did not prevent vehicle or pedestrian passage within the easement. The court also found that Karen Fullerton had committed a timber trespass by intentionally cutting down four trees within the easement, and awarded the Nicolases damages for this trespass. The court further found that Karen Fullerton had committed a common law trespass by entering the Nicolases' property without their consent, and awarded nominal and punitive damages for this trespass. The court granted summary judgment for the Nicolases on the Fullertons' slander of title and abuse of process claims.The Fullertons appealed, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the lower court's judgment on several issues and remanded for further findings. The court held that the Fullertons had the right to remove obstacles within their easement, and that Karen Fullerton was therefore an "owner" within the meaning of the timber trespass statute. The court also held that punitive damages may be awarded in common law trespass cases where nominal damages are awarded, but remanded for the lower court to make further findings under the guidelines established by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining punitive damages. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment in all other respects. View "Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicols" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a major land development project proposed for multiple parcels of real estate in North Kingstown, Rhode Island. The project was approved by the North Kingstown Planning Commission in 2012. The North Kingstown Town Council amended the zoning ordinance to create a Compact Village District (CVD) zone, which included the developers' property. In 2017, the town council again amended the zoning ordinance for the town’s CVD zone, limiting commercial building coverage and providing a ratio of buildings on the property. The developers challenged the ordinance in federal court, alleging that their project had vested prior to the 2017 ordinance’s limitations. After mediation and settlement discussions, a proposed consent judgment was prepared. The town council approved the consent judgment and the planning commission approved the developers’ preliminary plan for the project.The North Kingstown Zoning Board of Review upheld the planning commission's decision, concluding that the consent judgment recognized the developers’ vested rights and that the project was not bound by the subsequent 2017 zoning amendments. Rickey Thompson, a property owner within 200 feet of the project, filed an action in the Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the town council was not authorized to enter into the consent judgment and that the planning commission should not have relied upon the terms of the consent judgment to review the developers’ application for preliminary plan approval.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Thompson had made an improper collateral attack on the consent judgment, as a nonparty, and that the town had the authority to enter into the agreement. Thompson appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that Thompson, as a nonparty to the consent judgment, lacked the requisite standing to challenge the agreement and was thus barred from making a collateral attack on what is a valid, final judgment in federal court. The court also found that the town had the authority to enter into the agreement and the consent judgment did not illegally constrain the planning commission’s authority. The court rejected Thompson’s argument that the consent judgment illegally amended the town’s zoning ordinance. The court also found that Thompson's argument that the town and the developers engaged in contract zoning was not raised in Superior Court and was thus waived. View "Thompson v. Town of North Kingstown Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Long Lake Township and Todd and Heather Maxon. The township alleged that the Maxons were storing junk cars on their property, violating a zoning ordinance, a nuisance law, and a 2008 settlement agreement. As the property was not visible from the street, the township hired a drone operator to take aerial photographs and video of the property without the Maxons' permission or a warrant. The Maxons moved to suppress the aerial photographs and all other evidence obtained by the township from the drone, asserting that the search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.The Grand Traverse Circuit Court denied the Maxons’ motion, reasoning that the drone surveillance did not constitute a search. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the drone surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. The township appealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether the exclusionary rule applied to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court then vacated its earlier order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the exclusionary rule applied. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply and that the photographs and video could not be suppressed regardless of whether the township unreasonably searched the Maxons’ property.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the exclusionary rule may not be applied to civil enforcement proceedings that effectuate local zoning and nuisance ordinances and seek only prospective, injunctive relief. The court found that the costs of excluding the drone evidence outweighed the benefits of suppressing it, and the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Long Lake Township v. Maxon" on Justia Law