Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the possession of Touro Synagogue, the oldest active synagogue in the United States, located in Newport, Rhode Island. Congregation Shearith Israel (Shearith Israel) sought to evict Congregation Jeshuat Israel (Jeshuat Israel) from the synagogue. Shearith Israel sent a notice of termination to Jeshuat Israel, demanding they vacate the premises by February 1, 2023. Jeshuat Israel did not vacate, leading Shearith Israel to file an action for trespass and repossession by ejectment.The Rhode Island Superior Court ruled in favor of Shearith Israel, granting them the right to immediate possession of the property. Jeshuat Israel appealed, raising four arguments: the validity of the termination notice, the existence of a condition precedent in a 1945 agreement, the modification of a 1908 lease by the 1945 agreement, and the waiver of a defense by Shearith Israel.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the termination notice was valid and that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also determined that the 1945 agreement did not modify the lease to include a condition precedent requiring consultation before eviction. The agreement's requirement for consultation pertained only to matters of historical preservation and not to eviction actions. The court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, granting Shearith Israel the right to take immediate possession of Touro Synagogue. View "Congregation Shearith Israel v. Congregation Jeshuat Israel" on Justia Law

Asegedech Kelecha rented a room in her house to Sara Menghesha starting in 2019. On May 1, 2020, Kelecha changed the locks without giving Menghesha a key, leaving her homeless during the COVID-19 pandemic. Menghesha sued Kelecha for unlawful eviction and obtained injunctive relief to regain access to the property. She then won a partial motion for summary judgment on liability for unlawful eviction. At a jury trial on damages, Menghesha was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.After the trial, a juror emailed stating disagreement with the decisions made during deliberations. Kelecha filed a motion for a new trial based on this email. The Superior Court initially ordered an evidentiary hearing but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding that such an inquiry would impermissibly intrude into the jury’s deliberative process.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Kelecha argued that the Superior Court should have held a hearing before denying her new trial motion and that the punitive damages were unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of malice and were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, stating that jurors generally cannot impeach their own verdicts under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court found that any inquiry into the juror’s email would fall under the no-impeachment rule and that no exceptions applied. Additionally, Kelecha’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages and the excessiveness of the award were deemed forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict and the Superior Court’s rulings. View "Kelecha v. Menghesha" on Justia Law

Salvador Rivas purchased a condominium unit with a mortgage loan from Flagstar Bank, secured by a deed of trust. Rivas fell behind on his condo association dues, leading the New Hampshire House Condominium Unit Owners Association (NHH) to foreclose on the unit in 2014. The foreclosure sale terms indicated the unit was sold subject to Flagstar’s first deed of trust of approximately $256,632. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC (AFI) bought the unit for $26,000, despite its tax-assessed value of $237,930. Flagstar later filed for judicial foreclosure, claiming its lien was extinguished by NHH’s foreclosure sale.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Flagstar’s judicial foreclosure claim, reasoning that the lien was extinguished by the prior foreclosure sale. The court also dismissed Flagstar’s claims for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment as time-barred, as they were raised for the first time in an amended complaint filed almost four years after the foreclosure sale.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Flagstar that its judicial foreclosure claim was improperly dismissed, as rebuttals to affirmative defenses are not subject to any statute of limitations. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the alternative ground that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the judicial foreclosure claim. The court held that the 2014 foreclosure sale was not unconscionable as a matter of law, given the legal uncertainty at the time regarding whether Flagstar’s lien would survive the sale.The court also rejected Flagstar’s remaining arguments, except for the unjust enrichment claim against AFI. The court found that this claim should not have been dismissed as time-barred and could not be resolved on summary judgment. The case was remanded for trial on the unjust enrichment claim against AFI, while the trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Blossom Bell, a long-term public housing tenant, was held responsible for the criminal conduct of her guest, Daniel Lambert, who assaulted another tenant, Aaron George. Following the assault, Bell forbade Lambert from returning to her unit, and he never did. Despite this, the Oahu Eviction Board terminated Bell's rental agreement and evicted her.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit initially ruled that the Board applied the wrong legal authority and remanded the case for a new hearing. On remand, the parties agreed that the curability of Bell's violation would be governed by specific notification requirements in the rental agreement. The Board again ruled that Bell's violation was incurable and evicted her. Bell appealed, and the circuit court ruled that Bell had cured the violation by barring Lambert from the property, reversing the Board's eviction order and reinstating Bell's lease.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case. The court held that the Board erred, abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in evicting Bell. The court noted that the Board did not properly consider all relevant factors, such as the degree of crime in the housing project, the seriousness of the offending action, and the extent to which Bell took reasonable steps to mitigate the offending action. The court agreed with the circuit court that Bell's violation was curable and that she had cured it by permanently barring Lambert from the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's final judgment reinstating Bell's lease. View "Bell v. Hawai'i Public Housing Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, E&I Global Energy Services, Inc. and E&C Global, LLC, sued Liberty Mutual Insurance Company for breach of contract and tort claims related to a construction project. The United States, through the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), contracted with Isolux to build a substation, and Liberty issued performance and payment bonds for Isolux. After Isolux was terminated, Liberty hired E&C as the completion contractor, but E&I performed the work. Plaintiffs claimed Liberty failed to pay for the work completed.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted summary judgment for Liberty on the unjust enrichment claim and ruled in Liberty's favor on all other claims after a bench trial. The court denied Plaintiffs' untimely request for a jury trial, excluded an expert witness report filed after the deadline, found no evidence of an assignment of rights between E&C and E&I, and ruled against Plaintiffs on their fraud, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the jury trial request, as Plaintiffs failed to timely file the motion and did not justify the delay. The exclusion of the expert report was also upheld, as the district court properly applied the relevant factors and found the late report was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court affirmed the district court's finding that there was no valid assignment of rights from E&C to E&I, meaning Liberty's promise to pay was to E&C, not E&I. The court also upheld the findings that Liberty did not have the intent to deceive or induce reliance, and that Bruce did not reasonably rely on Mattingly's statements. Finally, the court declined to address the unjust enrichment claim as Plaintiffs did not raise the argument below. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings in their entirety. View "E&I Global Energy Services v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A county board of supervisors approved a nonprofit entity’s application to rezone a parcel of land in rural Polk County. Another nonprofit entity and several nearby landowners filed a lawsuit challenging the rezoning decision. The plaintiffs argued that the rezoning violated the county’s comprehensive land use plan, zoning ordinances, and constituted illegal spot zoning. The board of supervisors moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming the plaintiffs lacked standing and were subject to heightened pleading requirements under Iowa’s Municipal Tort Claims Act.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing and were subject to the Act’s heightened pleading requirements. The court found that the individual plaintiffs did not adequately allege their proximity to the rezoned property or their personal concerns, and that the nonprofit organization did not sufficiently allege that its members had a specific and personal interest in the rezoning. The court also ruled that the plaintiffs could not amend their petition due to the Act’s requirements.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the heightened pleading requirements and penalties under Iowa Code § 670.4A(3) did not apply because the plaintiffs were not seeking monetary damages. The court found that the individual plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged standing based on their proximity to the rezoned property and the nature of the proposed changes. However, the court concluded that the nonprofit organization had not established standing but should be allowed to amend its petition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

A property owner applied for a conditional use permit to build a commercial hog facility on its land in rural Cherry County, Nebraska. The facility was intended to provide manure for fertilizing the owner's crops. Neighboring landowners objected to the issuance of the permit, arguing that the owner, not being the operator of the facility, could not establish compliance with zoning regulations regarding odor mitigation and water contamination.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners issued the permit, and the neighboring landowners appealed to the district court, seeking a trial de novo. The district court held a trial and determined that the owner's application complied with the relevant zoning regulations, affirming the issuance of the permit. The neighboring landowners then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, while the Board cross-appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the neighboring landowners' appeal.The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal, as the relevant statutes did not limit the right to appeal to applicants only. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the property owner demonstrated compliance with the zoning regulations. The court held that the property owner, not the operator, was responsible for showing compliance with the regulations and that the odor and water contamination mitigation plans submitted by the owner were sufficient. The court affirmed the district court's decision to uphold the issuance of the conditional use permit. View "Amorak v. Cherry Cty. Bd. of Comrs." on Justia Law

Allan Gumarang entered into a lease agreement with Braemer on Raymond, LLC (Lessor) to operate an ice cream parlor. The lease included provisions requiring the Lessor to maintain the property and for Gumarang to obtain liability insurance and indemnify the Lessor against claims arising from his use of the property. In October 2017, a fire destroyed the property, and Gumarang alleged that the Lessor and its management (Management) failed to ensure the property had adequate fire prevention systems.Gumarang filed a lawsuit against the Lessor and Management for breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. In response, the Lessor and Management demanded that Gumarang defend and indemnify them under the lease terms. When Gumarang refused, they filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and breach of contract. Gumarang filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint, arguing it arose from his protected activity of filing the lawsuit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Gumarang’s anti-SLAPP motion in part, striking the cross-claims for comparative indemnity and equitable indemnity but denied it for the contractual indemnity and breach of contract claims. The court found that the latter claims did not arise from protected activity and that the indemnity provision in the lease was enforceable. The court also denied Gumarang’s request for attorney fees, finding he did not achieve a practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the cross-claims for contractual indemnity and breach of contract did not arise from Gumarang’s protected activity of filing the lawsuit but from his alleged breach of the lease’s indemnity provision. The court also upheld the denial of attorney fees, concluding that Gumarang did not obtain a significant practical benefit from the partial success of his anti-SLAPP motion. View "Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC" on Justia Law

Jose and Kirstin Aroca executed a "Note Secured by Deed of Trust" in 2007, agreeing to pay Tang Investment Company $40,000, secured by real property in Pinal County. They made interest-only payments for one year and then stopped. Tang did not initiate foreclosure or any action to enforce the debt, which remains unpaid. In 2022, the Arocas filed a suit to quiet title, claiming the Deed of Trust was invalid as the statute of limitations on the Note had expired.The Superior Court in Pinal County dismissed the Arocas' complaint, agreeing with Tang that under A.R.S. § 33-714, the Deed of Trust lien was valid until 2057. The court of appeals reversed, holding that A.R.S. § 33-714 did not extend the statute of limitations for foreclosure, which was governed by A.R.S. § 33-816 and A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(1), setting a six-year limit. The court concluded that Tang could not foreclose or initiate a trustee’s sale after 2018 and that the Arocas were entitled to quiet title under A.R.S. § 12-1104(B).The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the equitable principles from Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner do not override the statutory rights established in A.R.S. § 12-1104(B). The court determined that an action to quiet title can proceed even if the underlying debt remains unpaid, provided the statute of limitations for enforcing the debt has expired. The court reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Arocas, affirming their right to quiet title. The court also vacated parts of the court of appeals' opinion but left the attorney fees award intact. Tang's request for attorney fees and costs was denied. View "AROCA v TANG INVESTMENT" on Justia Law

Several residents of the City of Muscle Shoals filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking damages for negligence and trespass due to flooding caused by the City's management of a stormwater-drainage pond in their neighborhood. The plaintiffs claimed that heavy rainfall in February 2019 overwhelmed the pond, leading to the flooding of their homes. They argued that the City failed to plan adequately for such events and did not maintain the pond properly.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Colbert Circuit Court in March 2020, seeking damages for negligence, wantonness, and trespass. They later amended their complaint to drop the wantonness claim and added a request for injunctive relief, which the trial court denied. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the trespass claim. The trial court denied the City's motion, leading the City to file a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the City was immune from the plaintiffs' claims under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The Court found that the City's decision to plan for 25-year rainfall events was within common municipal practice and did not constitute neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness. Additionally, the Court concluded that the City's design and maintenance of the pond were not defective within the meaning of the statute. As a result, the Court granted the City's petition and issued a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the City, effectively barring the plaintiffs' claims for damages. View "In re: Burrell v. City of Muscle Shoals" on Justia Law