Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Kerry Angelos filed a defamation lawsuit against Greg and Susan Schatzel, alleging they created a website that published defamatory comments about him. During the lawsuit, Angelos faced financial difficulties, leading to his interests in the lawsuit being auctioned at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a preexisting judgment. Greg Schatzel purchased Angelos’s interests and substituted himself as the plaintiff, subsequently dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Angelos appealed, arguing that his defamation claims were personal and could not be deemed “property” subject to execution under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted Schatzel’s motion to substitute as the plaintiff and denied a motion by another creditor, Pacific Global Investment, Inc. (PGI), to intervene. The court found no legal basis to support Angelos’s contention that the sheriff’s sale was invalid or that substituting Schatzel violated public policy. Consequently, the court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that defamation claims are personal and not assignable under Idaho law, referencing the precedent set in MacLeod v. Stelle. The court concluded that Angelos’s defamation claims could not be subject to execution as “other property” under Idaho Code section 11-201. The court vacated the district court’s order granting Schatzel’s motion to substitute and the judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. The case was remanded to determine which of Angelos’s remaining claims, if any, were properly transferred to Schatzel through the sheriff’s sale. The court also denied Schatzel’s request for attorney fees, awarding costs to Angelos as the prevailing party. View "Angelos v. Schatzel" on Justia Law

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Jason Ziemann, the plaintiff, became involved in the operation of Grosz Wrecking, a business owned by his grandmother, Juanita Grosz, after her husband passed away. Ziemann moved into a home on the business property in 2014. In 2022, Grosz sought to evict Ziemann after he refused to purchase the home. Ziemann then sued Grosz, alleging they had an oral partnership agreement and sought a declaration of partnership, accounting, and dissolution, along with claims for breach of fiduciary duties and tortious interference with a business relationship. Grosz denied the partnership and counterclaimed for trespass.The District Court of McLean County denied Ziemann’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling factual issues existed regarding the partnership. The court granted Grosz’s motion, dismissing Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, citing inadmissible hearsay and lack of evidence for damages. After a bench trial, the court found the parties had formed a partnership with specific profit-sharing terms and dismissed Grosz’s trespass claim, allowing Ziemann to remain on the property until the business was dissolved. The court ordered the liquidation of partnership assets and awarded Ziemann costs.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s findings that a partnership existed and that Grosz contributed property to it. The court also upheld the dismissal of Grosz’s trespass claim and Ziemann’s claims for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty. However, it reversed the lower court’s decision not to apply the default partnership winding up provisions under N.D.C.C. § 45-20-07. The case was remanded for the district court to enter judgment consistent with this decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of costs and disbursements to Ziemann as the prevailing party. View "Ziemann v. Grosz" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Old Creek Ranch Winery, owned by Holguin Family Ventures, LLC, and leased by OCRW, Inc. The Ventura County Board of Supervisors found that the appellants violated the Ventura County Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance by expanding the winery and wine-tasting area without a conditional use permit (CUP) and changing the principal use of the ranch from crop production to a wine tasting/event venue. The Board also denied their request for zoning clearance for a paved parking lot and electric vehicle charging stations.The trial court upheld the Board's decision, applying the substantial evidence standard of review. The court found that the appellants had converted the property’s principal use from crop and wine production to a commercial wine bar and event space. The court also denied appellants' motion to amend their complaint to add a new cause of action for declaratory relief and dismissed their remaining cause of action for inverse condemnation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the substantial evidence standard was appropriate and found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision. The court also upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the complaint, concluding that the proposed new cause of action was unnecessary and that the delay in filing the motion was unjustified. Additionally, the court ruled that the Outdoor Events Ordinance did not apply to the winery, as it was separately regulated under the Non-Coastal Zoning Ordinance.The main holding is that the substantial evidence standard of review was correctly applied, and substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of zoning violations and the denial of the zoning clearance for the parking lot and charging stations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint. The judgment was affirmed. View "Holguin Family Ventures v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

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A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

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A group of Bozeman residents challenged a zoning provision within the City’s Unified Development Code (UDC), claiming they were not given sufficient notice regarding the City’s consideration of an amendment. The amendment, part of a general replacement of the UDC adopted in 2018, reclassified Greek housing into a new “group living” category, allowing fraternities and sororities in certain residential zones. The residents, who began experiencing disturbances from a nearby fraternity house in early 2022, filed a complaint against the City in October 2022, asserting that the notice provided for the zoning change was insufficient.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Gallatin County granted summary judgment in favor of the residents, declaring the Greek housing reclassification void ab initio due to insufficient notice. The court reasoned that the City’s notice did not adequately inform the public about the specific change and its impact on the community. The court also held that the residents’ claims were not time-barred under § 2-3-114(1), MCA, because the provision was void from the beginning, and thus the statute of limitations did not apply.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that § 2-3-114(1), MCA, which requires challenges to agency decisions to be filed within 30 days of when the person learns or reasonably should have learned of the decision, applied to this case. The Court concluded that the residents’ action was untimely because they filed their complaint more than 30 days after they became aware of the zoning change in April 2022. The Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the City. View "Johnson v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

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In late 2019, Verizon Wireless identified a coverage gap in Berlin Township, Ohio, and partnered with TowerCo to construct a cell tower to address this issue. TowerCo secured a lease with the local school district to build the tower on school property. Initially, TowerCo notified local residents as required by zoning regulations but later claimed immunity from these regulations under Ohio's "Brownfield immunity" doctrine, arguing that the project served a public purpose. Despite this claim, the Township insisted on compliance with local zoning laws, leading to a dispute.The Township filed a complaint in the Delaware County Common Pleas Court seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to halt the tower's construction. TowerCo counterclaimed under the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and removed the case to federal court. After negotiations failed, TowerCo filed a separate federal lawsuit asserting TCA violations and sought a preliminary injunction to continue construction. The district court granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Township's actions likely violated the TCA by effectively prohibiting wireless services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The appellate court held that the Township's filing of a state court lawsuit did not constitute a "final action" under the TCA, which is necessary to trigger the Act's remedies. Additionally, TowerCo failed to file its federal TCA claims within the 30-day statutory deadline after the Township's state court filing. The court concluded that TowerCo's claims were not ripe and were time-barred, and thus, TowerCo could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. Consequently, the preliminary injunction was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "TowerCo 2013, LLC v. Berlin Township Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

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Timothy Upchurch engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against his neighbors, Timothy and Margaret O’Brien, over a disputed easement on their property. Upchurch was convicted of disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property, and theft after trespassing and stealing a security camera from the O’Briens. In retaliation, Upchurch filed a baseless RICO lawsuit against the O’Briens, their lawyer, the local district attorney, and three sheriff’s deputies, alleging interference with his claimed easement. The lawsuit was frivolous as Upchurch did not own an easement. Facing sanctions motions, Upchurch dropped the case, but the district judge awarded sanctions, ordering Upchurch and his attorney, Timothy Provis, to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial case. The court found Upchurch’s lawsuit to be without merit and filed for the purpose of harassment. The judge imposed sanctions under Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to the baseless nature of the claims and Upchurch’s failure to comply with discovery obligations. Upchurch and his attorney were ordered to pay the defendants’ costs and attorney’s fees, and Provis was required to disgorge any fees paid by Upchurch.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Upchurch’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the notice of appeal was filed outside the 30-day statutory deadline. The court also found the appeal to be frivolous and granted the defendants’ motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that Upchurch and Provis were jointly and severally liable for the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal. The court directed the O’Briens and Lucareli to submit an accounting of their fees and costs within 15 days. View "Upchurch v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs own a 325-acre property in Tunbridge, Vermont, crossed by two legal trails. The Town of Tunbridge converted these trails from Class 4 roads in 1987. In 2021, the Town's selectboard revised the town plan to potentially expand trail use, including bicycling. Plaintiffs opposed this and claimed exclusive authority over trail maintenance on their property. In 2022, the selectboard adopted a policy allowing private individuals to apply for permission to maintain the trails, prompting plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the Town lacked such authority.The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as unripe, stating there was no justiciable controversy since no one had applied to maintain the trails. The court reiterated its stance from a prior action, emphasizing that discussions and policy adoptions did not constitute a concrete threat to plaintiffs' interests. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the new policy and procedure for trail maintenance created a sufficiently concrete controversy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated a sufficiently concrete threat of physical invasion and interference with their property rights. The Court held that the Town's formal assertion of authority to maintain and repair the trails, coupled with the procedure for private individuals to apply for permission, constituted an actual case or controversy. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action to proceed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

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In the 1950s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers purchased land from the Meltons and the Paines, using traditional surveying descriptions. A 1962 subdivision plat map indicated a stone (Peter’s Stone) that appeared to mark the boundary, but a 1974 Corps survey found the stone was not at the true centerline. This discrepancy led to a land dispute over a strip of land between the true centerline and the stone.In 1977, the United States filed quiet title actions against the owners of Lot 8 and adjacent landowners. The court consolidated the cases and found that the Meltons and the Corps likely believed the stone marked the true centerline. In 1979, the court awarded a small portion of Lot 8 to the Highfills but did not resolve the boundary for other lots. The judgment was recorded in 1989.In 2019, the Gambrells purchased several lots in the subdivision and, in 2020, were informed by the Corps that the true centerline was marked by the Corps’ monument, not Peter’s Stone. The Gambrells filed a quiet title action in 2021. The United States moved for summary judgment, arguing the 1979 judgment and the 1974 monument provided notice of a potential dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States, citing the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the 1979 judgment and the 1974 monument provided constructive notice of the United States’ claim, triggering the statute of limitations. The court also rejected the Gambrells’ collateral estoppel argument, noting that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel does not apply against the United States. The court emphasized that the statute of limitations ruling does not resolve the underlying boundary dispute, leaving the parties free to pursue further legal actions. View "Gambrell v. United States" on Justia Law

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Benjamin Nordquist appealed a judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. The case involves a dispute over the recording of a quitclaim deed for a portion of land in Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision, Stutsman County, North Dakota. Diane and Duane Witzig originally owned the land, which was platted into three lots in 2014. Diane Witzig later conveyed these lots to Gannon Van Gilder and Levi Hintz. In 2022, Diane Witzig provided a quitclaim deed to Nordquist for a portion of the subdivision depicted as 6th Street SW on the plat map. Nordquist attempted to record this deed, but the Stutsman County Recorder refused, citing discrepancies in the property description and forwarded it to the Auditor.The District Court of Stutsman County denied Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description and thus required a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. The court also noted that the Auditor had discretion to request the land be replatted due to the irregularities in the property description and previous conveyances.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed with the lower court that the quitclaim deed changed the current property description, necessitating a certificate of transfer from the Auditor. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court improperly determined that the 2018 and 2021 deeds conveyed the north 60 feet of Witzig’s Fifth Subdivision. The Supreme Court held that property ownership should be determined in a separate proceeding involving all relevant parties. The court affirmed the denial of Nordquist’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that Nordquist had not demonstrated a clear legal right to compel the Auditor to issue the certificate of transfer. View "Nordquist v. Alonge" on Justia Law