Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Ward family, who own extensive acreage in Bismarck, North Dakota, initiated a quiet title action against 152 adjacent landowners, including Dan and Lindsey Herbel, to determine adverse claims to their property. The Wards did not make any claims against the defendants personally but sought a decree that the defendants had no estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance upon their property. The Herbels moved to dismiss the action, arguing they were not proper defendants under chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., as neither the Wards nor the Herbels claimed an adverse interest against the other’s property. The Herbels also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. The district court denied the motion despite finding the Wards were not aware if any of the named defendants were claiming title to any of the property. Following a bench trial, the court granted the judicial remedy of quiet title and a judgment dismissing the Herbels’ action was entered.The Herbels appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that because neither party made an adverse claim against the other’s property, the Wards lacked standing to sue under section 32-17-01, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 requires the existence of an adverse claim. The court found that the parties’ properties did not share a fence line or a common boundary without any intervening land, and a well-traveled roadway separated the properties. The Herbels never claimed an interest in the Wards’ real property, and the Wards never asserted there was an adverse interest between the parties. The court concluded that a direct suit against the Herbels was not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01.The Herbels also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the district court has discretion to determine whether a claim is frivolous and to determine the reasonable amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The court remanded the case to determine if the claim was frivolous and, if it was, to determine attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims against the Herbels. View "Ward v. Herbel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a long-term relationship but never married. They cohabitated and ran a cattle operation together on a property that had a complex ownership history involving various members of Meyer's family. The couple's relationship ended, and Roth sued Meyer, alleging that he had converted some of her cattle and failed to repay loans she had given him.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, found in favor of Roth. It ruled that Meyer had gained title to the disputed property through adverse possession and had transferred it to Roth in 2010. The court also found that Meyer had converted 13 of Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, ordering him to pay her $52,500.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. It found that the lower court had erred in its findings on adverse possession, the admissibility of certain evidence, the timing of the alleged conversion of cattle, the valuation of the converted cattle, and the enforceability of the loan contracts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, instructing it to make new findings based on the existing record. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves Little Scholars of Arkansas, AP Consolidated Theatres II L.P., CSRC Charter LISA, LLC, and KLS Leasing LLC (collectively, appellants) who appealed against Pulaski County, Arkansas, and its officials (collectively, appellees). The appellants operate charter schools and lease properties for their schools. The appellees assessed real-property taxes against the schools, which the appellants contested, arguing that the properties used for school purposes are exempt from taxes under the Arkansas Constitution. The appellants also sought a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118, which they claimed the appellees relied on for the tax assessment, is void under the constitution.The case was initially brought before the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The appellees moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the county courts have exclusive jurisdiction over county tax matters. The circuit court agreed with the appellees, dismissing the case on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' claims.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Arkansas. The appellants argued that the circuit court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their illegal-exaction claims. They also argued that their request for a declaration that Ark. Code Ann. § 6-21-118 is void does not fall within the county court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellants, affirming the circuit court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants' claim was not an illegal-exaction claim but an assessment dispute, which falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the appellants' request for declaratory judgment. View "LITTLE SCHOLARS OF ARKANSAS FOUNDATION v. PULASKI COUNTY, ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, violated certain provisions of the LAMC by maintaining landscaping and hedges on their property that exceeded height limits and were non-compliant with the Residential Parkway Landscaping Guidelines. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations under Government Code section 36900, subdivision (a), which provides that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action.The trial court sustained the Cohens' demurrer to the Schwartzes' first and fourth causes of action, but overruled the demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on alleged violations of the LAMC. The trial court relied on a previous decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which held that anyone can sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances under section 36900. The Cohens petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order overruling their demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four, granted the Cohens' petition. The court disagreed with the interpretation of section 36900 in Riley, finding that the statute only grants city authorities, not private parties, the right to redress violations of municipal ordinances via either criminal prosecution or civil action. The court overruled Riley and held that section 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. The court clarified that its holding does not disturb caselaw recognizing that a defendant's violation of a local ordinance may be relevant to, or provide an element of, some other cause of action by a private party, such as nuisance or public nuisance. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer to these causes of action without leave to amend. View "Cohen v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Lori Lundeen, a property developer, and Lake County, Montana. Lundeen planned to develop a 60-lot subdivision, Wild Horse RV Resort, on her property in Lake County. She intended to use roads through the Big Arm townsite for access to her development. The Board of Lake County Commissioners granted conditional approval for the development. However, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes contested the County’s ownership, regulatory authority, and right to use the access routes. Lundeen alleges that she relied on Lake County and the Lake County Attorney to research her access issue. After an eight-month moratorium on Lundeen’s development application, the Board conditionally approved an amended road layout for the development. Lundeen claims the Lake County Attorney represented to her that the Tribes’ claim was baseless and that she could proceed with the development.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granted Lake County’s motion to dismiss Lundeen's lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Lundeen was on inquiry notice of the negligent misrepresentation when she became aware the Tribes had blocked off her property. The court also determined the discovery and accrual rules for the statute of limitations were satisfied no later than when the Tribes blocked Lundeen’s access. Based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the court found Lundeen’s claims filed were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Lundeen had sufficiently asserted facts that, if accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to her, establish a basis for the claims asserted in her complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court erred by granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Lundeen v. Lake County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Roy Padilla and Ray Torres, where Padilla, the landlord, filed a petition in the metropolitan court under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), alleging that Torres, his tenant, had not paid rent. The metropolitan court ruled in favor of Padilla, ordering Torres to pay past-due rent and costs amounting to $927. Torres appealed this judgment to the Second Judicial District Court, but the appeal was dismissed because Torres had failed to request a recording of the metropolitan court’s trial.The district court held that without a record of the trial, it could not effectively review Torres’s appeal. The court also rejected Torres’s assertion that he had a right to a recording, explaining that Torres, as appellant, was required to provide an adequate record on appeal. Torres then appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the metropolitan court’s practice of not recording civil proceedings except on a party’s request was inconsistent with Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) and violated his state and federal constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the failure to record the trial in this matter is contrary to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993). The court concluded that the statute imposes a duty on the metropolitan court to create a record of its proceedings that will be sufficient to permit appellate review in this case. The court further held that Rule 3708(A) and other similar rules impermissibly conflict with Section 34-8A-6(B) to the extent that the rules condition the creation of this record on a party’s request. The court directed its committee for the Rules of Civil Procedure for the State Courts to correct the rules in conformance with its opinion. Finally, the court reversed and remanded this matter to the metropolitan court for a new trial. View "Padilla v. Torres" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land, which was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. However, a different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted the homeowner’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Dirt Road Development LLC (DRD) and Robert and Kathryn Hirschman over the construction and operation of a new feedlot in Howard County, Nebraska. The Hirschmans own several properties in the county where they operate feedlot facilities. They planned to construct and operate a new feedlot on a property that is separated from their existing feedlots by a quarter section of land owned by a third party. DRD, which owns a property near the proposed new feedlot, filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the Hirschmans from constructing and operating the new feedlot without obtaining a conditional use permit from the Howard County Board of Commissioners.The District Court for Howard County heard the case initially. The court had to determine whether, under Howard County’s zoning regulations, the Hirschmans' new feedlot was “adjacent” to their existing livestock operations. If so, the regulations required the Hirschmans to obtain a conditional use permit before constructing and operating the new feedlot. The district court concluded that the new feedlot was adjacent to the Hirschmans’ other feedlots and that therefore, the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit to build and operate the new feedlot. The court granted DRD’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hirschmans’ motion.The Hirschmans appealed the decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court. They argued that the district court erred in holding that under the Howard County zoning regulations, their new feedlot was adjacent to their other feedlots and constituted a single commercial livestock operation rather than a separate feedlot. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the term "adjacent" as used within the zoning regulations is unambiguous and that the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit for their new feedlot. View "Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a residential eviction dispute between a landlord, MIMG LXXIV Colonial, LLC (Colonial), and a tenant, TajReAna Ellis. Colonial initiated eviction proceedings against Ellis for failing to pay rent, providing a seven-day notice as required by Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Ellis, however, argued that the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) imposed a 30-day notice requirement, superseding the state law. The county court rejected Ellis' argument and ruled in favor of Colonial. Ellis appealed to the district court, which reversed the county court's decision, agreeing with Ellis that the CARES Act required a 30-day notice.The case was then brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, by this time, Ellis' lease had expired, and she had vacated the property. The court found that the case was moot as the relief sought by Colonial, a judgment for restitution of the premises, would have no practical effect since Ellis no longer resided in the property. Colonial argued that the case was not moot due to its interest in knowing whether it violated the law and the financial interest related to the district court's taxing of costs. The court rejected these arguments, stating that claims for costs are generally insufficient to avoid mootness.The court also considered whether to reach the merits of the case under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. However, it declined to do so, noting that the primary question in the case was a matter of federal statutory interpretation, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has final authority. The court also declined to apply the collateral consequences exception, which is typically used in criminal cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the funding of Delaware's public schools. The plaintiffs, non-profit organizations with an interest in Delaware's schools, filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging that the state's public schools were not providing an adequate education for students from low-income households, students with disabilities, and students whose first language is not English. They argued that one of the problems was a broken system for funding the schools, which relied on property taxes. The plaintiffs contended that the three counties in Delaware were using decades-old property valuations, which violated state law and the state constitution.The case was initially heard in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. During discovery, the plaintiffs served requests for admission to the counties, asking them to admit that their decades-old assessments resulted in a lack of uniformity in property taxes and violated state law. The counties denied these requests. At trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the counties' assessments violated state law and the state constitution. The court also found that the plaintiffs had proved the facts that were the subject of the requests for admission that the counties had denied.The plaintiffs then requested an award of expenses under Court of Chancery Rule 37(c), which allows the court to order a party to pay the expenses that another party incurred in proving a fact that should have been admitted. The court granted the plaintiffs' request, awarding them expenses of $337,224, which included attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs. Each county was ordered to pay a prorated share of $112,408. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law