Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud related to property rights. The defendants, through their business, REO Holdings, LLC, bought properties at tax sales and used redemption rights to obtain titles, some of which were later found to be fraudulent. The case involved four specific properties where the defendants allegedly used misrepresentation and forged documents to redeem and sell the properties at a profit.The Chancery Court for Davidson County initially dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of redemption rights, finding that unjust enrichment required a voluntary conferral of a benefit and that Tennessee law did not recognize conversion of intangible property rights. The court also denied class certification. After a jury trial, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence preponderated against the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. The court also held that a claim for unjust enrichment does not require a voluntary conferral of a benefit, overruling previous case law to the extent it held otherwise. Finally, the court affirmed that Tennessee law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Family Trust Services LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a property owned by Indiana Land Trust #3082, located in Hammond, Indiana, which houses a lucrative fireworks and tobacco business operated by Omar and Haitham Abuzir. The City of Hammond seeks to use its eminent domain power to take this property to build a road connecting Indianapolis Boulevard and the Water Gardens neighborhood. The Abuzirs allege that the City’s actions are part of a conspiracy involving political motives and favoritism towards competitors who support the mayor.The Hammond Redevelopment Commission initially offered to purchase the property in 2018, but the Abuzirs declined. Consequently, the Commission initiated a condemnation action in Indiana state court under the state’s eminent domain statute. The Abuzirs objected, arguing that the taking was for a private purpose and motivated by ill will. Unable to assert counterclaims in state court, they filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional and federal law violations, including claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the Abuzirs' third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the City had a legitimate government interest in building a road and that the Abuzirs failed to state a claim for equal protection, substantive due process, or civil conspiracy. The court noted that the Abuzirs' complaint itself provided a rational basis for the City’s actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the Abuzirs failed to state a class-of-one equal protection claim because the City’s actions had a rational basis. The court also found that the proposed substantive due process claim was futile as the Abuzirs did not allege a deprivation of a protected interest. Lastly, the court upheld the denial of leave to add a § 1983 conspiracy claim, as the Abuzirs failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation. View "Indiana Land Trust #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc. (the Resort) and the State of Maine. In 1986, the State sold a ski area, along with easements and a portion of the abutting parcel, to the Big Squaw Mountain Corporation (BSMC). The deed included restrictive covenants prohibiting timber harvesting and requiring the continued public use of the ski area. In 1995, the Resort acquired the property, including the restrictive covenants. The Resort later closed half of the ski area and harvested timber from the area, actions which the State argued violated the covenants.The Superior Court of Kennebec County granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Resort had breached both covenants. The court ordered the Resort to pay damages for the timber harvested and to place funds into an escrow account for the repair and reopening of the ski area.The Resort appealed, arguing that the State could not enforce the covenants as it did not own a parcel that benefited from them, that the court erred in its interpretation of the public use covenant, and that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the public use covenant was unreasonable, the State failed to notify the Resort of its alleged breach, and the State was barred from enforcing the covenant by the doctrine of laches.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the State could enforce the covenants without owning a benefiting parcel, that the public use covenant required the Resort to make reasonable efforts to keep the whole ski area open for public use, and that the doctrine of laches did not apply as the Resort had not shown that the State's delay in enforcement was unreasonable or resulted in prejudice to the Resort. View "State v. Moosehead Mountain Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a relationship and cohabitated from 2002 to 2022. They shared a bank account and ran an intermingled cattle herd. The dispute arose over the ownership of a property and cattle, and the enforcement of oral loan agreements. The property in question was initially owned by Anthony and Jean Ehrmantrout, who transferred it to each other in 1994. After their deaths in 2001, the property was distributed to their grandchildren, Chet, Carlos, and Marty Meyer, as co-trustees of the Jean Ehrmantrout Residuary Trust. In 2004, Marty Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Gary Meyer. In 2010, Gary Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Mary Roth.The District Court found that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession and had valid title when he transferred it to Mary Roth in 2010. The court also found that Gary Meyer had converted 13 of Mary Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, awarding her damages. Both parties appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had erred in finding that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession. The Supreme Court also found that the District Court had erred in admitting certain evidence, in failing to determine when the alleged conversion of cattle began, in valuing the converted cattle, and in finding that Gary Meyer owed on loan contracts that were unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation claim brought by Bill Charles, a real estate professional and president of the homeowners' association of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, against Donna McQueen, a resident of the same community. McQueen had posted a critical review of Charles on Google, accusing him of using misleading tactics to deceive home buyers. Charles filed a defamation and false light claim against McQueen, who sought dismissal of the claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice.The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, agreeing that Charles had to prove actual malice for his false light claim but holding that Charles was not a public figure and therefore did not need to prove actual malice for his defamation claim.The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given his voluntary and prominent role in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. The court further held that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. The court also rejected Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. The court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Charles v. McQueen" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by homeowners in the Falcon Ridge subdivision in Billings, Montana, against Buscher Construction and Development, Inc., and other related entities and individuals (collectively referred to as the "Buschers"). The homeowners alleged that the Buschers negligently designed and developed the subdivisions, failed to construct homes to mitigate against the possibility of differential settlement on hydro-collapsible soils, and failed to disclose material adverse facts known to them as the original owners of all the lots within the subdivision.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, certified the class action. The Buschers appealed this decision, arguing that the proposed class did not satisfy the prerequisites for class certification under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and that the court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The court also found that the class action was superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the homeowners' claims were not dependent upon individual conduct but on the Buschers' alleged uniform negligence. The court also noted that the lower court has the discretion to revisit certification if class claims no longer predominate as the case proceeds. View "Busher v. Cook" on Justia Law

A group of residents and a church, collectively referred to as the "Neighbors," sued Ghassan Korban, the Executive Director of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (SWB), for damages caused to their properties during a drainage project. The Neighbors won a judgment for inverse condemnation, but the SWB did not pay. The Neighbors then filed a federal lawsuit, which was dismissed. They subsequently filed a state lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel payment of the judgment. The district court dismissed the case, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the payment of a judgment for inverse condemnation is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus.The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court found that the federal lawsuit did not bar the state lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata because the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state mandamus claim. The court also found that the Neighbors had stated a valid cause of action for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the payment of a judgment based on inverse condemnation under the Louisiana Constitution is a ministerial duty and can be enforced via a writ of mandamus. The court remanded the case to the district court to devise a plan for satisfying the judgment within a reasonable period of time. View "WATSON MEMORIAL SPIRITUAL TEMPLE OF CHRIST V. KORBAN" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott and Natalie Pinkham, who contracted with Three Peaks Homes, LLC, for the construction of a custom home. The construction did not go as planned and the contract was terminated before the home was completed. Three Peaks subsequently filed two $600,000 mechanics’ liens against the Pinkhams’ home. The Pinkhams then filed a complaint against David Plate, Rebeccah Jensen, Three Peaks, Rebel Crew Construction, LLC, and Legacy Management Enterprises, LLC, asserting several causes of action.The district court denied the Pinkhams’ motion for summary judgment. Later, the Pinkhams’ attorney, Lance Schuster, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plate, Jensen, Three Peaks, and Legacy, which the court granted. The court ordered Appellants to appoint another attorney or appear in person within twenty-one days of service of the order, failing which, the court may enter default judgment against them. The court clerk served a copy of the withdrawal order on Appellants via first class mail.The Pinkhams moved for the entry of default and default judgment against Appellants and for dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaims with prejudice. The district court granted the Pinkhams’ motion without a hearing. Appellants later secured new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied Appellants’ motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry of default. The court also held that Appellants have failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b). The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Pinkham v. Plate" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee Rali 2006QA5 (Deutsche Bank), the holder of the first deed of trust, and SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC (SFR), the purchaser of a property at a homeowners’ association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale. The dispute centers around whether the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the superpriority lien, which would mean that the HOA foreclosure did not extinguish the first deed of trust.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank, finding that the homeowner's pre-foreclosure payments satisfied the superpriority lien. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada vacated and remanded the case, instructing the district court to consider the analysis in the then recently decided case 9352 Cranesbill Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On remand, the district court ruled in favor of SFR, concluding that a portion of the superpriority lien remained unsatisfied, so the HOA foreclosure extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The court held that, unless expressly authorized by the homeowner, the HOA may not allocate a payment in a way that results in a forfeiture of the first deed of trust holder’s interest and deprives the homeowner of the security on the homeowner’s mortgage. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the court found that the homeowner's partial payments to the HOA satisfied the HOA’s superpriority lien, so the foreclosure did not extinguish Deutsche Bank’s first deed of trust. Therefore, SFR took possession of the property subject to the deed of trust. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of judgment for Deutsche Bank consistent with this opinion. View "Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the ownership of five parcels of land in Aurora County, South Dakota. The plaintiff, Edward Mohnen, initiated a quiet title action to determine the ownership of these parcels, which were titled in his father's name after his father died intestate in 1969. The defendants included the estate of Edward's late brother, John Mohnen, and the John J. Mohnen Trust. John's Estate counterclaimed, asserting that it held a complete fee interest in all the disputed parcels through adverse possession and also asserted the affirmative defense of laches.The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Aurora County, South Dakota, rejected both the laches defense and adverse possession theory. It determined ownership for the five tracts at issue, applying intestacy laws to evidence concerning the current state of record title.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in its interpretation of the adverse possession claim under South Dakota Codified Laws (SDCL) 15-3-15. The Supreme Court clarified that SDCL 15-3-15 requires only proof of “(1) claim and color of title made in good faith, (2) ten successive years in possession, and (3) payment of all taxes legally assessed.” The court found that John's Estate met these requirements and thus, reversed the lower court's decision denying John’s Estate’s adverse possession claim under SDCL 15-3-15. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Mohnen v. Estate of Mohnen" on Justia Law