Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over attorney fees awarded under Minnesota Statutes section 117.031(a) in an eminent domain proceeding. The State of Minnesota, through the Department of Transportation (MnDOT), seized a portion of Joseph Hamlin's property under the "quick take" provision of Minnesota eminent domain law. Hamlin was awarded attorney fees after the compensation he received was more than 40% greater than MnDOT's final offer. The attorney fees awarded exceeded the amount Hamlin owed his attorney under a contingent fee agreement.MnDOT appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the term "reasonable" in section 117.031(a) should limit the attorney fee award to the amount owed in the contingent fee agreement. The district court had applied the lodestar method (a method for calculating attorney fees based on the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) and awarded Hamlin $63,228 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that "reasonable attorney fees" in section 117.031(a) are calculated under the lodestar method and are not limited by any existing agreement between the landowner and his attorney.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The court reiterated its previous holding in County of Dakota v. Cameron that "reasonable attorney fees" in section 117.031(a) refers to attorney fees calculated by the lodestar method. Therefore, an award of reasonable attorney fees is not capped by a contingent fee agreement. The court concluded that a landowner's fee agreement with their attorney does not limit an award of attorney fees because "reasonable attorney fees" under section 117.031(a) means attorney fees calculated using the lodestar method. View "State v. Schaffer" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land between two neighboring property owners in Park County, Wyoming. The appellants, Michael and Michelle Sellers, purchased a 12-acre property that was adjacent to a 4-acre parcel owned by the appellees, Phyllis Claudson, William Pond, Pamela Pond, and Peggy Lou Pond Paul. During the purchase, the Sellers discovered that a portion of their property was located on the Ponds' side of a boundary fence. The Ponds filed a lawsuit to claim ownership of this portion of land based on adverse possession.The District Court of Park County initially heard the case. The Ponds and the Sellers filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court ruled in favor of the Ponds, finding that they had adversely possessed the disputed property. The Sellers appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Ponds had established a prima facie case for adverse possession. They had shown actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the disputed property, which was hostile and under claim of right or color of title. The Sellers failed to rebut this claim by showing permissive use of the property through neighborly accommodation. The court also rejected the Sellers' argument that the Ponds could only have adversely possessed the areas of the property containing buildings, as the Sellers had not raised this issue in the lower court. View "Sellers v. Claudson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tax appraisal dispute involving Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and Travis Central Appraisal District (the District). The Landfill owns 344 acres of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, the District appraised the market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform taxation but did not claim that the District’s appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. The appraisal review board reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety percent. The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject property’s true market value.The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge it made before the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider market value. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that a trial court’s review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court concluded that the Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC. v. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a property deed. Earnest Coprich and Bessie Elizabeth Jones, who have known each other for about 50 years, disagreed over the terms of a property sale. Coprich claimed that he sold his residence to Jones for $15,000, while Jones contended that the sale price was $10,000. After Jones moved into the property and made several improvements, Coprich filed a complaint seeking to set aside the deed. He alleged that he was mentally incompetent at the time of signing the deed and that he was coerced and defrauded by Jones. Jones denied these allegations and asserted that she had purchased the property and occupied it since the transaction.The Montgomery Circuit Court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor of Jones. The court found that Coprich failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his incompetence or that Jones had committed fraud or misrepresentation. Coprich's postjudgment motion to vacate the order was summarily denied by the court. Coprich then appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama due to lack of appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, determined that the Court of Civil Appeals should have jurisdiction over the case. The court noted that the case is a "civil case" as defined by § 12-3-10 and that the "amount involved" does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $50,000. Therefore, the Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Coprich v. Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves plaintiffs Ronnie and Sharon Llanes and Michael and Lauren Codie (collectively, Borrowers) who purchased homes with mortgages from Bank of America, N.A. (Lender). After the Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages, the properties were foreclosed upon and sold in nonjudicial foreclosure sales. The Borrowers then sued the Lender for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the Lender's foreclosures did not comply with Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 667-5 (2008) (since repealed).The case was initially heard in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, where the Lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Borrowers did not prove damages. The circuit court denied the motion due to factual disputes and lack of clarity in existing law. However, after the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i issued its decision in Lima v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., the Lender renewed its summary judgment motion, arguing that under Lima, the Borrowers’ claims failed as a matter of law because they did not provide evidence of damages that accounted for their pre-foreclosure mortgage debts. The circuit court granted the Lender's renewed motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Borrowers had not proven their damages after accounting for their debts under Lima.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, the Borrowers argued that the circuit court erred by concluding that they bore the burden of proving their damages and did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, holding that outstanding debt may not be counted as damages in wrongful foreclosure cases. The court concluded that the Borrowers did not prove the damages element of their wrongful foreclosure claims, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Lender. View "Llanes v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, maintained landscaping and hedges on their property in violation of certain provisions of the LAMC. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations based on section 36900, subdivision (a) of the California Government Code, which states that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action. The Schwartzes relied on a prior court decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which interpreted this provision as allowing any private citizen to sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances.The trial court overruled the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on the alleged LAMC violations. The court applied the Riley decision and concluded that the Schwartzes could assert private causes of action for violations of the LAMC. The Cohens petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Riley decision was wrongly decided and that section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four agreed with the Cohens. The court found that the language of section 36900, subdivision (a) is ambiguous and that its legislative history shows that the Legislature did not intend to afford members of the public the right to bring suit to redress violations of local ordinances. The court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the portion of its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to these causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend. The court also overruled the Riley decision to the extent that it recognized a private right of action under section 36900, subdivision (a). View "Cohen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, K.E. Liggett, is a tenant in a Manhattan apartment building owned by the defendant, Lew Realty LLC. Liggett filed a lawsuit when Lew Realty attempted to increase her rent in 2021, arguing that her apartment is rent-stabilized and she is entitled to a rent-stabilized lease, overcharges, and attorney's fees. Liggett's claim is based on a stipulation from 2000 between Lew Realty and a previous tenant, Edward McKinney, which required McKinney to waive his right to file a Fair Market Rent Appeal (FMRA). Liggett argues that this stipulation is void as it goes against public policy, and because it led to the deregulation of the apartment, the deregulation is invalid and the apartment remains rent-stabilized.The Supreme Court initially denied Lew Realty's motion to dismiss, agreeing with Liggett that the stipulation is unenforceable as it waives the protections of the rent laws. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that the protection against waiving the benefits of rent control law did not apply to McKinney as he was not an established tenant when he signed the stipulation. The Appellate Division also concluded that Liggett's claim was akin to an FMRA and therefore barred by the statute of limitations.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court held that the stipulation is void as it waives a benefit of the rent laws, regardless of McKinney's status as a tenant. The court also held that the statute of limitations does not bar Liggett's claim that the apartment is subject to rent stabilization. The court remanded the case, allowing Lew Realty to establish other reasons for why the apartment was not rent-stabilized when Liggett took tenancy. The court did not address any issues related to Liggett's rent overcharge claims. View "Liggett v Lew Realty LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Summit Construction filed a lawsuit against Jay Koontz and Jennie L. Kennette for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, alleging nonpayment for work performed on Mr. Koontz’s home based on an oral agreement. The work included an addition to the home and extensive renovations to the existing structure. The District Court rejected both claims, determining that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties and that Summit did not sufficiently prove its damages for the unjust enrichment claim.The District Court found that the parties had not mutually agreed to sufficiently definite terms for an oral contract. The court noted that the project progressed without a clear understanding of the scope of work, how it would be paid for, and who would be responsible for payment. The court also found that Summit's invoices did not clearly define the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that Summit had failed to prove the amount by which Mr. Koontz was unjustly enriched, i.e., its damages.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that Summit had failed to show the existence of an enforceable oral contract with either Mr. Koontz or Ms. Kennette. The court also agreed with the lower court's finding that Summit had failed to establish its damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, which is necessary for an unjust enrichment claim. View "Summit Construction v. Koontz" on Justia Law