Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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In 2012, two individuals, Moore and Lloyd, obtained a $185,000 judgment against Mikul and Sanders. They applied for a writ of execution to auction two properties owned by Mikul and Sanders, and they were the highest bidders for one parcel at $130,000. Mikul, who resided on the property, contested the sale, claiming ownership and arguing that the sale price was unconscionably low. The Shelby Circuit Court initially ruled in favor of Moore and Lloyd, granting them possession of the property. Mikul's subsequent appeals and motions to intervene were denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision without an opinion.Moore and Lloyd then filed an action in the Shelby Circuit Court seeking immediate possession of the property. The court granted their motion but stayed the execution of the judgment. Over the years, Moore and Lloyd filed multiple motions to dissolve the stay and sought writs of execution, but the court repeatedly denied their requests. In 2022, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that Moore and Lloyd had not argued that the stay was "immoderate" in the lower court and suggested they seek dissolution of the stay in the original action.Moore and Lloyd filed a motion to dissolve the stay in 2022, arguing it was immoderate. The Shelby Circuit Court, however, did not dissolve the stay and instead set the matter for a trial. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the stay, which had been in place for six years, was indefinite and without continued justification, making it immoderate and beyond the court's discretion. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dissolve the stay and a writ of prohibition to vacate the orders setting the case for trial, limiting the court to issuing orders necessary to wind up the litigation. View "Ex parte Moore" on Justia Law

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In 2010, Howard Malloy obtained a judgment against James Behrens related to their partnership, requiring Behrens to transfer his interest in the partnership and pay $341,890.26 plus interest. Behrens's homestead, subject to a 2006 mortgage, was sold at an execution sale. Behrens appealed the sale confirmation, and in a prior decision, the court reversed and remanded due to procedural errors. Upon remand, the district court issued new executions, leading to a levy on Behrens's homestead. The property was appraised and sold at auction to Malloy for $759,004.65. The court applied a $100,000 homestead exemption, deducted sale costs, allocated $118,866.27 to the mortgage, and applied the remaining proceeds to the judgment.The District Court of Morton County initially confirmed the sale, but Behrens appealed, arguing errors in the sheriff's compliance with execution laws, the application of the homestead exemption, and the allocation of sale proceeds. The court found the sheriff complied with the law requiring personal property to be used before real property. However, it erred by applying a $100,000 homestead exemption instead of the $150,000 exemption effective at the time of the sale and by allocating proceeds to the mortgage rather than the judgment.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding that the sheriff complied with execution requirements but reversed the application of the outdated homestead exemption and the allocation of sale proceeds to the mortgage. The court held that the $150,000 homestead exemption should apply and that sale proceeds should satisfy the judgment before addressing the mortgage. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Malloy v. Behrens" on Justia Law

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Dr. Stephen D. Behlmer sought declaratory relief to establish his right to access his property in the Scratchgravel Hills via a road that crosses various parcels owned by multiple property owners within the Treasure Canyon Estates subdivision. Behlmer's property is surrounded by land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and is accessible by traveling through Treasure Canyon Drive, which runs through the Landowners' properties. Behlmer has a lease from the United States to access his property via BLM land, effective until 2037.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissed Behlmer's petition for failure to join the United States as a required party, as the Landowners argued that the petition would prejudice federal interests. Behlmer amended his petition to clarify that he only sought a declaration of his rights relative to the portion of Treasure Canyon Drive traversing the Landowners' private property, not any BLM land. Despite this, the District Court granted the Landowners' motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the United States was not a required party under Rule 19 because its absence would not frustrate complete relief to the parties nor prejudice the United States' interests. The court determined that Behlmer's petition pertained only to the Landowners' interests and did not affect any adjacent property holders, including the United States. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Behlmer's petition for failure to join a required party. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Behlmer v. Crum" on Justia Law

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Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law

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In 2021, the appellee purchased a condominium unit at a foreclosure auction and later filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to quiet title against Jose Strickland. The complaint was amended to include Plus Properties, LLC, and later Plus Properties Trust as defendants. The docket indicated service was directed to Plus Properties Trust, but no affidavit of service was filed. Plus Properties Trust, represented by Kellee Baker, moved to dismiss some claims but did not allege insufficient service of process. The trial court granted partial dismissal, requiring a responsive pleading by October 4, 2022, which Plus Properties Trust failed to file.The trial court entered default against Plus Properties Trust and scheduled an ex parte proof hearing. Despite being served with notice of the hearing and subsequent motions, Plus Properties Trust did not respond. The court granted default judgment, quieting title in the appellee's name and issuing a preliminary injunction against Plus Properties Trust. Plus Properties Trust, with new counsel, filed two Rule 60(b) motions to vacate the default judgment, arguing lack of notice and ineffective service of process. Both motions were denied by the trial court.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Plus Properties Trust failed to preserve its claim of ineffective service of process by not raising it in the trial court. The court also found that Plus Properties Trust had sufficient notice of the default proceedings and the ex parte proof hearing, as evidenced by the certificates of service. The court concluded that the default judgment did not violate due process and affirmed the trial court's orders denying the Rule 60(b) motions. View "Plus Properties Trust v. Molinuevo Then" on Justia Law

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The case involves a group of relators seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Lorain County Board of Elections to place a zoning-amendment referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The relators had filed a referendum petition against a municipal ordinance that rezoned approximately 300 acres of property. However, the Board of Elections sustained a protest by intervening respondents, DBR Commercial Realty, L.L.C., and Kathryn Craig, and removed the referendum from the ballot, arguing that the relators failed to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance as required by R.C. 731.32.The relators initially received what they claimed were incomplete copies of the ordinance from the clerk of the Vermilion City Council. Despite knowing the copies were incomplete, they attempted to correct the deficiencies themselves by adding missing pages from the county recorder’s office. However, the copy they filed with the finance director was still missing two pages. The Board of Elections held a protest hearing and concluded that the relators did not strictly comply with R.C. 731.32, which requires a complete certified copy of the ordinance to be filed before circulating a referendum petition.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and upheld the Board of Elections' decision. The court emphasized that R.C. 731.32 requires strict compliance, and the relators' failure to file a complete certified copy of the ordinance rendered their petition defective. The court denied the writ of mandamus, stating that the Board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in sustaining the protest and removing the referendum from the ballot. The court also denied various motions to strike evidence and for oral argument, but granted the relators' motion to amend the case caption. View "State ex rel. Brill v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

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Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

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Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

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Dwight D. Sikes appealed a judgment from the Choctaw Circuit Court, where Michelle M. Kirkland, representing Kenneth McIlwain's estate, had obtained a judgment against him. The case involved land originally owned by Dwight's father, James Sikes, which was deeded to Dwight's brother, Archie, and subsequently to Kenneth and Patricia McIlwain. The McIlwains sued Dwight, alleging his livestock trespassed and caused damage. Dwight counterclaimed, alleging the McIlwains improperly removed James's personal property, and cross-claimed, arguing James was not competent when deeding the land to Archie.The Choctaw Circuit Court ordered Dwight to remove his livestock but did not rule on his counterclaim. After the McIlwains passed away, Kirkland was substituted as the plaintiff. The court later ruled against Dwight on his cross-claim, finding James competent when deeding the land, but did not address the counterclaim. Dwight appealed this judgment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and noted that the lower court had not disposed of all claims, specifically Dwight's counterclaim regarding the removal of personal property. The court emphasized that a final judgment must conclusively determine all issues and rights of the parties. Since the trial court's judgment did not address the counterclaim or fully resolve the initial trespass and nuisance claims, it was not a final judgment.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Dwight's appeal due to the lack of a final judgment, as the unresolved claims deprived the court of jurisdiction. View "Sikes v. Kirkland" on Justia Law

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In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law