Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Roy Padilla and Ray Torres, where Padilla, the landlord, filed a petition in the metropolitan court under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), alleging that Torres, his tenant, had not paid rent. The metropolitan court ruled in favor of Padilla, ordering Torres to pay past-due rent and costs amounting to $927. Torres appealed this judgment to the Second Judicial District Court, but the appeal was dismissed because Torres had failed to request a recording of the metropolitan court’s trial.The district court held that without a record of the trial, it could not effectively review Torres’s appeal. The court also rejected Torres’s assertion that he had a right to a recording, explaining that Torres, as appellant, was required to provide an adequate record on appeal. Torres then appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the metropolitan court’s practice of not recording civil proceedings except on a party’s request was inconsistent with Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993) and violated his state and federal constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the failure to record the trial in this matter is contrary to Section 34-8A-6(B) (1993). The court concluded that the statute imposes a duty on the metropolitan court to create a record of its proceedings that will be sufficient to permit appellate review in this case. The court further held that Rule 3708(A) and other similar rules impermissibly conflict with Section 34-8A-6(B) to the extent that the rules condition the creation of this record on a party’s request. The court directed its committee for the Rules of Civil Procedure for the State Courts to correct the rules in conformance with its opinion. Finally, the court reversed and remanded this matter to the metropolitan court for a new trial. View "Padilla v. Torres" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a homeowner and a citizens association over a parcel of undeveloped land, which was divided into two sections by a stone wall. The homeowner claimed adverse possession over the entire parcel. The homeowner moved for summary judgment on the claim to the smaller section, which the circuit court granted. However, a different judge presided over the bench trial on the homeowner’s claim to the larger section. When the homeowner finished his case-in-chief, the citizens association moved for judgment. The trial court granted the citizens association’s motion and entered judgment for it on the homeowner’s claims, including the claim to the smaller section that had been resolved in the homeowner’s favor on summary judgment.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s disposition of the homeowner’s claims to both the smaller and larger sections. The Supreme Court of Maryland granted the homeowner’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by implicitly vacating the summary judgment entered in the homeowner’s favor on his claim to the smaller section and then entering judgment for the citizens association on that claim. The court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Riley v. Venice Beach Citizens Ass'n" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Dirt Road Development LLC (DRD) and Robert and Kathryn Hirschman over the construction and operation of a new feedlot in Howard County, Nebraska. The Hirschmans own several properties in the county where they operate feedlot facilities. They planned to construct and operate a new feedlot on a property that is separated from their existing feedlots by a quarter section of land owned by a third party. DRD, which owns a property near the proposed new feedlot, filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the Hirschmans from constructing and operating the new feedlot without obtaining a conditional use permit from the Howard County Board of Commissioners.The District Court for Howard County heard the case initially. The court had to determine whether, under Howard County’s zoning regulations, the Hirschmans' new feedlot was “adjacent” to their existing livestock operations. If so, the regulations required the Hirschmans to obtain a conditional use permit before constructing and operating the new feedlot. The district court concluded that the new feedlot was adjacent to the Hirschmans’ other feedlots and that therefore, the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit to build and operate the new feedlot. The court granted DRD’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hirschmans’ motion.The Hirschmans appealed the decision to the Nebraska Supreme Court. They argued that the district court erred in holding that under the Howard County zoning regulations, their new feedlot was adjacent to their other feedlots and constituted a single commercial livestock operation rather than a separate feedlot. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the term "adjacent" as used within the zoning regulations is unambiguous and that the Hirschmans were required to obtain a conditional use permit for their new feedlot. View "Dirt Road Development v. Hirschman" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a residential eviction dispute between a landlord, MIMG LXXIV Colonial, LLC (Colonial), and a tenant, TajReAna Ellis. Colonial initiated eviction proceedings against Ellis for failing to pay rent, providing a seven-day notice as required by Nebraska’s Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA). Ellis, however, argued that the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) imposed a 30-day notice requirement, superseding the state law. The county court rejected Ellis' argument and ruled in favor of Colonial. Ellis appealed to the district court, which reversed the county court's decision, agreeing with Ellis that the CARES Act required a 30-day notice.The case was then brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. However, by this time, Ellis' lease had expired, and she had vacated the property. The court found that the case was moot as the relief sought by Colonial, a judgment for restitution of the premises, would have no practical effect since Ellis no longer resided in the property. Colonial argued that the case was not moot due to its interest in knowing whether it violated the law and the financial interest related to the district court's taxing of costs. The court rejected these arguments, stating that claims for costs are generally insufficient to avoid mootness.The court also considered whether to reach the merits of the case under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. However, it declined to do so, noting that the primary question in the case was a matter of federal statutory interpretation, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has final authority. The court also declined to apply the collateral consequences exception, which is typically used in criminal cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "MIMG LXXIV Colonial v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the funding of Delaware's public schools. The plaintiffs, non-profit organizations with an interest in Delaware's schools, filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging that the state's public schools were not providing an adequate education for students from low-income households, students with disabilities, and students whose first language is not English. They argued that one of the problems was a broken system for funding the schools, which relied on property taxes. The plaintiffs contended that the three counties in Delaware were using decades-old property valuations, which violated state law and the state constitution.The case was initially heard in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. During discovery, the plaintiffs served requests for admission to the counties, asking them to admit that their decades-old assessments resulted in a lack of uniformity in property taxes and violated state law. The counties denied these requests. At trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the counties' assessments violated state law and the state constitution. The court also found that the plaintiffs had proved the facts that were the subject of the requests for admission that the counties had denied.The plaintiffs then requested an award of expenses under Court of Chancery Rule 37(c), which allows the court to order a party to pay the expenses that another party incurred in proving a fact that should have been admitted. The court granted the plaintiffs' request, awarding them expenses of $337,224, which included attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs. Each county was ordered to pay a prorated share of $112,408. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

A group of Arkansas landowners sued Lawrence County, alleging that a bridge constructed by the county had caused their farms to flood, constituting an unlawful taking of their properties without just compensation, in violation of the U.S. and Arkansas Constitutions. The landowners claimed that the bridge acted as a dam, forcing excessive water into the Cache River, which then spilled onto their farms. They presented expert testimony to support their claims and sought damages based on the fair rental value of their properties during the period of the alleged taking.The district court upheld a jury award of nearly $350,000 to the landowners but rejected their request for an order to tear down the bridge. The county appealed the damages award, arguing that the landowners had failed to offer sufficient evidence of damages since they did not calculate the value of crops actually lost. The landowners cross-appealed the denial of their request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the damages award, holding that the evidence permitted the jury to make a fair and reasonable approximation of damages. The court found that the landowners were not obliged to prove damages by providing evidence of the amount of crops they expected to grow versus the amount of crops they actually grew due to increased flooding. Instead, they were entitled to recover the fair rental value of the property during the period of the taking.However, the court vacated the district court's order denying injunctive relief and remanded for the court to give the landowners' request a more focused consideration. The court found that the district court had relied heavily on the law of standing, which was not at issue, and had ventured into areas that had little bearing on a proper evaluation of the request for injunctive relief. View "Watkins v. Lawrence County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a deed reservation related to a shale pit on a property owned by the Hansen-Gier Family Trust. The deed, originally between the Haywoods and the Paughs, reserved the use of the shale pit for ingress and egress roads of "the development property." The Trust, the current property owner, sought a declaratory judgment that the reservation had fulfilled its purpose and is now void, or alternatively, that the reservation was limited to use on the ingress and egress roads of its property and two neighboring parcels. The Haywoods, however, argued that "the development property" meant any property they had developed or were going to develop.The Circuit Court of Mineral County ruled in favor of the Haywoods, interpreting "the development property" as any property the Haywoods develop. The court granted the Haywoods ownership rights to the shale and the right to remove the shale for property that they develop.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the lower court's interpretation broadened the scope of the reservation beyond the language of the deed. The court also found that the lower court failed to consider the use-and-purpose limitation in the reservation, which specified that the shale could only be used for ingress and egress roads. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to make additional findings consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the reservation. View "The Hansen-Gier Family Trust v. Haywood" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a tract of land in North Carolina. The defendants, Wade and Teresa Cornett, have lived on the property since 1983 and purchased it in 1995. The deed showed a thirty-foot access easement along the western edges of the property, which the Cornetts had used for access to a road. Over the years, the Cornetts made various improvements in the easement, under the belief that they owned the property in the easement. In 2019, the plaintiffs, Joanne and William Hinman, purchased the land from the Churches, who had inherited it from Bennie Church, the Cornetts' former neighbor. The Hinmans commissioned a survey, which confirmed the existence of the easement on their land. They demanded the Cornetts remove the improvements built inside the easement and asserted that the Cornetts could not use the portion of the paved driveway falling outside the easement boundary. The Cornetts refused, and the Hinmans brought suit for trespass and to quiet title.The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hinmans on all claims. The Cornetts appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals opined that the Cornetts’ evidence showed open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious use of the disputed land for over twenty years. The dissenting judge disagreed, arguing that the Cornetts’ use was permissive and tolled the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the Cornetts’ evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the hostility of their possession of the land. The court found that the Cornetts’ mistaken belief of ownership and their permanent improvements on the property constituted evidence rebutting the presumption of permissive use. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hinman v. Cornett" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Walton family and the Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority over the installation of sewer lines on the Walton's property. The Waltons claimed that the installation constituted a "taking" under the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for which they were entitled to "just compensation". The Sanitary Authority argued that the claim was time-barred under Oregon law, as it was not brought within the six-year limitations period.The trial court granted the Sanitary Authority's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was indeed time-barred. The Waltons appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Waltons then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Waltons' claim was subject to the six-year limitations period established by Oregon law. The court further held that the claim accrued when the sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995, and therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen years before the Waltons filed their complaint. Consequently, the court concluded that the Waltons' claim was time-barred. View "Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over property ownership between Rosalinda Ganir Saplan and Recto Ramos Saplan (the Saplans) and U.S. Bank. After the Saplans defaulted on their mortgage, U.S. Bank foreclosed on the property and filed an ejectment action against the Saplans in 2011. However, U.S. Bank failed to schedule a required pretrial conference, leading the circuit court to dismiss the ejectment action for want of prosecution. The Saplans then filed a quiet title action in 2015, arguing that the dismissal of the 2011 action had quieted title in their favor. U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Saplans had not submitted any evidence in support of their claim of title. The circuit court granted the motion.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that the 2011 dismissal was on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion, but it did not preclude U.S. Bank’s later action because the parties across these lawsuits were different. The ICA also held that summary judgment was improperly granted because U.S. Bank had not provided evidence that its foreclosure sale was fair, reasonably diligent, and in good faith, and the price was adequate.U.S. Bank appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i, arguing that the ICA erred in holding that the 2011 dismissal was on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion and that U.S. Bank had not met its burden of showing there were no genuine issues of material fact for trial. The Supreme Court held that without a final judgment, there cannot be claim preclusion. Here, there was no final judgment, so there can be no claim preclusion against U.S. Bank. The court also held that the ICA incorrectly applied the summary judgment standard when it held that U.S. Bank had not met its burden. Because this is the Saplans’ quiet title action, the Saplans have the burden of proof on the issue of property ownership. The court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Saplan v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law