Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between neighbors over alleged violations of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) related to landscaping and hedges. The plaintiffs, Thomas and Lisa Schwartz, claimed that their neighbors, Charles and Katyna Cohen, maintained landscaping and hedges on their property in violation of certain provisions of the LAMC. The Schwartzes sought redress for these alleged violations based on section 36900, subdivision (a) of the California Government Code, which states that a violation of a city ordinance may be redressed by civil action. The Schwartzes relied on a prior court decision, Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., which interpreted this provision as allowing any private citizen to sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances.The trial court overruled the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action, which were based on the alleged LAMC violations. The court applied the Riley decision and concluded that the Schwartzes could assert private causes of action for violations of the LAMC. The Cohens petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that the Riley decision was wrongly decided and that section 36900, subdivision (a) does not create a private right of action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four agreed with the Cohens. The court found that the language of section 36900, subdivision (a) is ambiguous and that its legislative history shows that the Legislature did not intend to afford members of the public the right to bring suit to redress violations of local ordinances. The court concluded that the trial court erred by overruling the Cohens' demurrer to the second and third causes of action. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate the portion of its order overruling the Cohens' demurrer to these causes of action and to enter an order sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend. The court also overruled the Riley decision to the extent that it recognized a private right of action under section 36900, subdivision (a). View "Cohen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Washington State Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the city of Sunnyside and several of its officials, alleging that the city's crime-free rental housing program (CFRHP) was being used to evict tenants without due process and that these evictions disproportionately impacted Latinx renters, women-headed households, and families with minor children. The city argued that the Attorney General lacked the authority to bring this suit, as the scope of the Attorney General's authority under RCW 43.10.030(1) limits their ability to act to matters that impact more people than those affected by the CFRHP. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the Attorney General did have the authority to bring the suit, as the case involved matters of public concern in which the state had an interest. The court also found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the city's enforcement of the CFRHP had a disparate impact on protected classes, and whether the individual respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Attorney General's claims under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, finding that the respondents were not landlords and therefore the Act did not apply to them. View "State v. City of Sunnyside" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, K.E. Liggett, is a tenant in a Manhattan apartment building owned by the defendant, Lew Realty LLC. Liggett filed a lawsuit when Lew Realty attempted to increase her rent in 2021, arguing that her apartment is rent-stabilized and she is entitled to a rent-stabilized lease, overcharges, and attorney's fees. Liggett's claim is based on a stipulation from 2000 between Lew Realty and a previous tenant, Edward McKinney, which required McKinney to waive his right to file a Fair Market Rent Appeal (FMRA). Liggett argues that this stipulation is void as it goes against public policy, and because it led to the deregulation of the apartment, the deregulation is invalid and the apartment remains rent-stabilized.The Supreme Court initially denied Lew Realty's motion to dismiss, agreeing with Liggett that the stipulation is unenforceable as it waives the protections of the rent laws. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that the protection against waiving the benefits of rent control law did not apply to McKinney as he was not an established tenant when he signed the stipulation. The Appellate Division also concluded that Liggett's claim was akin to an FMRA and therefore barred by the statute of limitations.The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court held that the stipulation is void as it waives a benefit of the rent laws, regardless of McKinney's status as a tenant. The court also held that the statute of limitations does not bar Liggett's claim that the apartment is subject to rent stabilization. The court remanded the case, allowing Lew Realty to establish other reasons for why the apartment was not rent-stabilized when Liggett took tenancy. The court did not address any issues related to Liggett's rent overcharge claims. View "Liggett v Lew Realty LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the adoption of certain amendments to Fenwick’s zoning regulations by the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Borough of Fenwick (the Commission). The plaintiffs, who owned real property in Fenwick, appealed the Commission's decision, arguing that the Commission had unlawfully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision in a newspaper with a substantial circulation in Fenwick, as required by statute. The Commission moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was untimely. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Commission properly published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The court adopted an availability-centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality. The court considered factors such as the type of news covered by the publication, its general availability in the municipality, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, and whether residents are aware of its use for the publication of legal notices. Applying this test, the court found that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick. Consequently, the plaintiffs' zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the Commission's decision was published, was required to be dismissed. View "9 Pettipaug, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Summit Construction filed a lawsuit against Jay Koontz and Jennie L. Kennette for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, alleging nonpayment for work performed on Mr. Koontz’s home based on an oral agreement. The work included an addition to the home and extensive renovations to the existing structure. The District Court rejected both claims, determining that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties and that Summit did not sufficiently prove its damages for the unjust enrichment claim.The District Court found that the parties had not mutually agreed to sufficiently definite terms for an oral contract. The court noted that the project progressed without a clear understanding of the scope of work, how it would be paid for, and who would be responsible for payment. The court also found that Summit's invoices did not clearly define the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that Summit had failed to prove the amount by which Mr. Koontz was unjustly enriched, i.e., its damages.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that Summit had failed to show the existence of an enforceable oral contract with either Mr. Koontz or Ms. Kennette. The court also agreed with the lower court's finding that Summit had failed to establish its damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, which is necessary for an unjust enrichment claim. View "Summit Construction v. Koontz" on Justia Law

The Ministry of Defence of the State of Kuwait entered into three contracts with Joseph M. Naffa and his fictitious law firm, Naffa & Associates, LLP, for legal advice and representation in real estate transactions. The Ministry later discovered that Naffa was not authorized to practice law in the United States and that he had kept a credit meant for the Ministry from one of the real estate transactions. The Ministry sued Naffa and his firm for breach of contract and conversion of funds.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Ministry's claims under Rule 12(b)(1), ruling that the Ministry had not pleaded damages sufficient to meet the amount in controversy requirement for federal court jurisdiction. The court also held that the agreements did not require Naffa to be a licensed attorney and that the Ministry could not show that it did not receive legal advice or that its outcome would have been different if it was represented by a licensed attorney.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing the Ministry's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint contained sufficient allegations to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Ministry had pleaded damages of at least $635,000, an amount that substantially exceeds the statutory minimum for federal court jurisdiction. The court vacated all other determinations made by the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ministry of Defence of the State of Kuwait v. Naffa" on Justia Law

A general contractor, Graycor Construction Company Inc., was involved in a dispute with a subcontractor, Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust, over unpaid invoices for flooring work performed on a movie theater project. Business Interiors submitted three separate applications for periodic payments, which Graycor neither approved nor rejected within the time limit set by the Prompt Pay Act. As a result, the applications were deemed approved under the Act. Business Interiors sued Graycor for breach of contract and other claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted Business Interiors's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and entered separate and final judgment. Graycor appealed.Graycor argued that the original contract was not a "contract for construction" within the meaning of the Act, and that it had a valid impossibility defense due to its failure to pay. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Act defines its scope broadly, and the subcontract at issue was a "contract for construction" under the Act. The Court also held that common-law defenses are not precluded by the Act, but a contractor that does not approve or reject an application for payment in compliance with the Act must pay the amount due prior to, or contemporaneous with, the invocation of any common-law defenses in any subsequent proceeding regarding enforcement of the invoices. As Graycor sought to exercise its defenses without ever paying the invoices, it could not pursue the defenses. The Court also vacated and remanded the rule 54 (b) certification to the motion judge for reconsideration. View "Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the boundary between two parcels of land in Wapello County, Iowa. The northern parcel was owned by the Handlings and the southern parcel by the Sims. Both parties treated a fence line as the boundary between their properties for many years. In the mid-1990s, Scott Hubbell began leasing both properties for farming. In 2004, he built a machine shed south of the fence line, assuming it was on the southern property. In 2014, Hubbell and his wife purchased both properties, becoming the sole owners. In 2017, they sold the southern property to the Remmarks and in 2018, they sold the northern property to Sundance Land Company. A survey commissioned by Sundance revealed that the legal boundary between the properties ran south of the fence line, meaning the machine shed was encroaching onto the northern property. Sundance filed a petition to quiet title according to the survey boundary lines, alleging that the Remmarks were trespassing on the northern property.The district court found that a boundary line by acquiescence had been established at the old fence line during the Handlings’ and Sims’ respective ownership of the properties. The court rejected Sundance’s argument that the Hubbells’ common ownership of both parcels from 2014 to 2017 erased the boundary by acquiescence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that when two adjoining parcels come under common ownership, any potential boundary by acquiescence between them is eradicated, and the ten-year clock for calculating boundary by acquiescence restarts when separate ownership resumes. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for entry of judgment for Sundance in accordance with this opinion. View "Sundance Land Company, LLC v. Remmark" on Justia Law

The case involves Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats (the plaintiffs) who filed a private right-of-way condemnation case against Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers (the defendants). The plaintiffs sought a right-of-way across the defendants' property to access their own landlocked properties. The properties in question include several parcels of land, some of which are low-lying wetlands often flooded and used for hunting and fishing. A private dirt road, referred to as the "farm road," crosses the defendants' property and has been historically used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors to access their properties.The Tuscaloosa Probate Court initially granted the plaintiffs a right-of-way across the defendants' property, concluding that the plaintiffs' property was landlocked. The defendants appealed this decision to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked due to inheritance of additional land that touched a public road. The Circuit Court agreed with the defendants, granting a summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the plaintiffs' property was no longer landlocked and they had reasonable access to their property from a public road.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the decision of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs have an existing, reasonable means to access their landlocked property. The court noted that the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence indicating that they could not travel from the public road across their property to access their landlocked property. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had permission to cross an intervening property, and thus there was no requirement for them to seek a right-of-way over it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Coats v. Ayers" on Justia Law