Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Steve Kovachevich, a homebuyer, was required to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) when he took out a mortgage with a down payment of less than 20%. After a year, he requested his mortgage servicer, LoanCare, to cancel his PMI. LoanCare initially denied the request, stating he had not paid down enough of his mortgage to qualify for cancellation under the Homeowners Protection Act (HPA). However, LoanCare agreed to voluntarily cancel the PMI upon meeting certain conditions, which Kovachevich fulfilled. Subsequently, he sought a refund of the prepaid PMI premiums from the mortgage insurer, National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (NMIC), but was denied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Kovachevich’s claim under the HPA, ruling that he was not entitled to a refund of unearned premiums under § 4902(f) because his PMI was canceled voluntarily and not under the statutory benchmarks of the HPA. The court also dismissed his state-law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion, stating it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kovachevich’s HPA claim, agreeing that § 4902(f) only mandates refunds for PMI canceled under the statutory benchmarks, not for voluntary cancellations. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded them to the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Kovachevich v. National Mortgage Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

A landowner recorded a plat dividing its property into seventy-three tracts, each between one and two acres. A restriction in the recorded deeds stated that no more than two residences could be built on any five-acre tract. Neighbors sued to enforce this restriction, arguing it limited development to no more than two residences per five acres.The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the neighbors, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development to two residences per five-acre tract. The court dismissed the landowner's defenses and counterclaims, except for changed conditions, and issued a temporary injunction. The jury found no changed conditions, and the court permanently enjoined the landowner from building more than two residences per five-acre tract. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the restriction unambiguously limited development and rejecting the landowner's defenses.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the restriction did not prevent the landowner from building one residence on each sub-five-acre tract. The court concluded that the restriction limited density, not tract size, and did not expressly address tracts smaller than five acres. The court reversed the judgment awarding the neighbors declaratory and injunctive relief and remanded for a new trial on the landowner's changed-conditions counterclaim, finding the jury was improperly instructed to consider only post-purchase changes. The court also held that nonparty adjoining landowners and the State were not necessary parties to the suit. View "EIS DEVELOPMENT II, LLC v. BUENA VISTA AREA ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jeanette Runey, filed a lawsuit against her neighbor, Wayne S. Faring, over a boundary dispute involving a shared driveway between their properties. The plaintiff owns property at 930 East Wallum Lake Road, while the defendant owns property at 860-900 East Wallum Lake Road. In 2019, the defendant initiated an action to determine ownership of the driveway, claiming easement by prescription, necessity, implication, and/or estoppel. The plaintiff counterclaimed for declaratory relief. In 2021, a Superior Court justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that she had title to the disputed land, and the defendant did not. Neither party appealed this decision.The plaintiff then sought a preliminary injunction to remove the defendant’s personal property from the disputed land. The defendant opposed, claiming adverse possession. A different Superior Court justice denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal after it had been docketed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the proper method to seek review of the denial of a preliminary injunction is through a petition for writ of certiorari, not a direct appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.The Supreme Court also expressed concern over the motion justice’s disregard for the unappealed April 7, 2022 judgment, emphasizing the importance of res judicata, which bars the relitigation of issues that were or could have been tried in an earlier action. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Runey v. Faring" on Justia Law

Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC (JHHR) sought to partition real property it claimed to own as a tenant in common with Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC (Leeks). Leeks counterclaimed, asserting sole ownership based on judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and adverse possession. The district court granted partial summary judgment to JHHR, dismissing Leeks’s judicial and equitable estoppel claims. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Leeks on the adverse possession claim. Leeks appealed both the summary judgment and the trial findings.The District Court of Teton County granted summary judgment to JHHR on Leeks’s judicial and equitable estoppel claims. The court found that Mr. Gill, representing JHHR, had forgotten about his 25% interest in the property during arbitration, negating the application of judicial estoppel. The court also found no evidence of willful misconduct or serious negligence by Mr. Gill, which is necessary for equitable estoppel. The court held that Mr. Gill’s statements during arbitration were not sufficient to establish estoppel.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court agreed that judicial estoppel did not apply because Mr. Gill’s prior position was based on a mistake. The court also upheld the summary judgment on equitable estoppel, finding no evidence of willful misconduct or serious negligence by Mr. Gill. Regarding adverse possession, the Supreme Court found that Leeks failed to prove that its possession of the property was hostile to JHHR’s interest. The court noted that Leeks did not provide clear notice to JHHR that its ownership was in jeopardy, a requirement for adverse possession among cotenants. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings in favor of JHHR. View "Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Town of Firestone applied for conditional groundwater rights and an augmentation plan to support its growing water needs. The application included five well fields, but Firestone did not provide specific well locations for three of these fields, instead proposing to use the water court's retained jurisdiction to provide more specific details later. St. Vrain Sanitation District opposed the application, arguing that Firestone's lack of specific well locations made its depletion calculations unreliable and that relying on retained jurisdiction to prove non-injury later was legally impermissible.The District Court for Water Division 1 partially granted St. Vrain's motion to dismiss, finding that Firestone's evidence was insufficient to establish that the proposed well fields would not injure senior water rights holders. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims for the three well fields with unspecified locations and declined to retain jurisdiction, as it could not make a threshold finding of non-injury. The court also allowed St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue at trial, despite a prior conditional stipulation.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the water court's decision, holding that the water court correctly evaluated the application on a case-by-case basis and did not create a new bright-line rule requiring completed wells for conditional groundwater rights. The court also upheld the water court's refusal to retain jurisdiction without a non-injury finding and found no abuse of discretion in allowing St. Vrain to contest the non-injury issue. The Supreme Court concluded that the water court's factual findings were supported by the trial record and were not clearly erroneous. View "Town of Firestone v. BCL Colo., LP" on Justia Law

Rick Holloway and John Hoskin entered into a Commercial Sales Agreement to purchase the UXU Resort Ranch from Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC. The sale included a special use permit from the U.S.D.A. Forest Service, which required a bridge inspection and load test before transfer. Due to the inspection's delay, the parties postponed closing and placed $200,000 in escrow for bridge-related expenses. After inspections, Park County Title released the escrow funds to Hidden Creek without H&H's consent, despite unresolved bridge issues.The District Court of Park County found that Hidden Creek and H&H each breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Park County Title breached the escrow agreement by releasing funds without H&H's approval. However, the court determined H&H failed to prove actual damages with sufficient certainty, awarding only nominal damages. The court also denied attorney’s fees to all parties.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings. The court held that H&H did not prove actual damages because the inspections did not conclusively identify necessary or required repairs. The court also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, finding no abuse of discretion, as both parties bore some fault in the litigation. The Supreme Court denied any attorney’s fees associated with the appeal. View "Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land situated at the border of adjoining properties in Owings Mills, Maryland. Dr. Sharon Saunders owns one property, while Steven and Ellen Gilman own the neighboring property. The Gilmans claimed ownership of the disputed land through adverse possession, having maintained and used the land for several decades. In 2018, the Gilmans constructed a fence on the disputed property, prompting Dr. Saunders to commission a property survey and subsequently file a lawsuit to establish the boundary line and seek damages for trespass and other tort claims.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County ruled in favor of the Gilmans, declaring them the absolute owners of the disputed property by adverse possession. The court ordered the Gilmans to prepare and file an amended deed and plat reflecting their ownership. Dr. Saunders appealed the decision, but the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the order was not a final judgment and did not fall under any exceptions allowing for an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case to determine whether the Appellate Court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court's order declaring the Gilmans as owners by adverse possession and directing the preparation of a deed was immediately appealable under Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article §§ 12-303(1) and 12-303(3)(v). The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the merits of Dr. Saunders's appeal. View "Saunders v. Gilman" on Justia Law