Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

Eric Woolard and Breonna Hall, residents of Greenhouse Condominiums, were involved in a physical altercation with their neighbors, Eric Smith and Stacy Thorne, in December 2019. Smith and Thorne sued Woolard, Hall, and Regent Real Estate Services, Inc. (Regent), the management company, for negligence and other claims. Woolard and Hall filed a cross-complaint against Regent and Greenhouse Community Association (Greenhouse), alleging negligence and other claims, asserting that Regent and Greenhouse failed to address ongoing harassment by neighbors, which led to the altercation.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse, finding no duty of care owed by them to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. Woolard and Hall's motions to disqualify the trial judge were denied, and they did not seek writ review of these rulings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Regent and Greenhouse had no duty to intervene in the neighbor dispute or prevent the altercation. The court found that Woolard and Hall failed to establish a legal duty of care breached by Regent and Greenhouse. Additionally, the court noted that claims of housing discrimination were not supported by evidence and were not properly raised as a separate cause of action. The court also held that the disqualification motions were not reviewable on appeal. The judgment in favor of Regent and Greenhouse was affirmed, and they were entitled to their costs on appeal. View "Woolard v. Regent Real Estate Services" on Justia Law

Laura Lazar sued real estate brokers Lynette Bishop, Shen Shulz, Sotheby’s International Realty, Inc., and Shen Realty, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duty related to the sale of her father's Malibu house. Lazar's father, Daniel Gottlieb, had assigned his causes of action to her. The complaint alleged that the brokers failed to disclose a dual agency and did not work to obtain the highest possible sale price, resulting in a sale price significantly lower than the house's value.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lazar lacked standing to sue because the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was not assignable under Civil Code section 954. The court likened the relationship between a real estate broker and client to that of an attorney and client, which involves a highly personal and confidential relationship, making such claims nonassignable. Lazar appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that a cause of action for breach of a real estate broker’s fiduciary duties, which seeks only damages related to property rights and pecuniary interests, is assignable. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the remaining grounds argued in the defendants' motion. The appellate court found that the transactional nature of the broker-client relationship, unlike the attorney-client relationship, does not involve highly personalized rights of recovery, and thus, the claim is assignable. View "Lazar v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Paul O’Farrell, individually and on behalf of the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, the Estate of Victoria O’Farrell, Skyline Cattle Co., and VOR, Inc., filed a lawsuit against Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren, Inc., the Raymond and Victoria O’Farrell Living Trust, and Kelly O’Farrell. Paul alleged that Kelly manipulated their father, Raymond, to orchestrate improper transactions, including a $3.2 million land sale and the non-renewal of Skyline’s lease, causing financial harm to the family entities and himself.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Grant County, South Dakota, presided by Judge Robert L. Spears, dismissed Paul’s claims and awarded attorney fees to the defendants. Paul had requested a change of judge, which was denied by Presiding Judge Stoltenburg, who cited judicial economy and previous submissions by Paul in related cases as reasons for the denial.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Paul and Skyline followed the proper procedure for seeking a change of judge and that neither had waived their right to do so in this specific action. The court found that Judge Spears was disqualified from further proceedings upon the filing of the affidavit for change of judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated all orders entered by Judge Spears in the case and remanded for the appointment of a replacement judge. View "Estate Of O’Farrell v. Grand Valley Hutterian Brethren" on Justia Law

15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

Ms. Wilson owned a property in the District of Columbia, which she subdivided into three lots: 825, 826, and 827. She sold Lot 826 to Ntaky Management in 2009 and Lot 825 to Ms. Lumbih in 2010. The deed for Lot 826 described it as measuring twenty feet by forty feet, while the deed for Lot 825 described it as thirty-eight feet in length, based on an informal survey by Vyfhuis & Associates. This created a disputed area of eight feet between the properties. Ms. Lumbih installed an HVAC unit and deck in this disputed area. In 2018, Ntaky asked Ms. Lumbih to remove these installations, but she did not comply, leading Ntaky to sue her.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a non-jury trial and ruled that Ntaky owned the disputed area and could remove the encroachments at Ms. Lumbih’s expense. The court also denied Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson and her claim for implied indemnity, which sought to hold Ms. Wilson responsible for the costs associated with removing the encroachments.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court’s decision regarding Ntaky’s ownership of the disputed area and the removal of the encroachments. However, it vacated the denial of Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson, finding that the trial court did not address whether Ms. Wilson breached her duty to convey a property thirty-eight feet in length. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ms. Lumbih’s claim for implied indemnity, as she failed to identify a non-contractual duty of care owed by Ms. Wilson. View "Lumbih v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways (the "Cabinet") filed a petition to condemn a 30.366-acre tract of land containing subsurface coal in Floyd County for the construction of a highway. The land was part of a larger mineral parcel owned by several individuals, with Leah Atkinson holding the majority share. The owners had a coal lease with SAS Resources, LLC, which had not yet begun mining the property at the time of the condemnation.The Floyd Circuit Court appointed three commissioners to determine the fair market value of the condemned property. The commissioners concluded that the property had a fair market value of $500 both before and after the condemnation. The court adopted this award, but several owners filed exceptions, leading to a trial to determine just compensation. The Cabinet sought to exclude evidence of anticipated royalty income, but the court denied this motion. At trial, the Cabinet's expert valued the property at $145,600 using a comparable sales approach, while the owners' expert valued it at over $2 million using an income capitalization approach, considering future royalty income.The jury awarded the owners $550,000 as just compensation. The Cabinet appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the owners' expert testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the income capitalization approach was permissible.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony that considered the property's capacity to produce future royalty income. The court found that the testimony appropriately accounted for the contingencies and uncertainties of business, making it relevant and admissible. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS V. ATKINSON" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

The Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) proposed a project to reconstruct the interchange between Interstate 89 and U.S. Routes 2 and 7 in Colchester, Vermont, into a Diverging Diamond Interchange (DDI). Timberlake Associates, LLP, the landowner of a gas station at the southeast corner of the interchange, contested the necessity of the land takings required for the project. Timberlake argued that AOT did not fulfill its pre-suit obligation to negotiate and that the trial court erred in its determination of necessity.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, held a four-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Timberlake failed to demonstrate bad faith or abuse of discretion by AOT. The court found that AOT had satisfied its burden of demonstrating the necessity of taking Timberlake’s property to the extent proposed. Timberlake appealed the decision, arguing that AOT did not adequately consider the statutory factors of necessity and failed to negotiate in good faith.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court found that AOT presented sufficient evidence showing it considered the statutory factors, including the adequacy of other property and locations, the effect on the landowner’s convenience, and the environmental impacts. The Court also determined that AOT’s selection of the DDI design was justified based on its superior performance in increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving safety compared to other alternatives. Additionally, the Court concluded that AOT made reasonable efforts to negotiate with Timberlake before filing suit, as required by statute.The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining the necessity of the takings and that AOT fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to negotiate. The decision of the lower court was affirmed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law