Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Providers of “habilitation services” under Idaho’s Medicaid plan are reimbursed by the state Department of Health and Welfare. Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act requires Idaho’s plan to “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care” while “safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of . . . care and services,” 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A). Providers of habilitation services claimed that Idaho reimbursed them at rates lower than section 30(A) permits. The district court entered summary judgment for the providers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Supremacy Clause gave the providers an implied right of action, under which they could seek an injunction requiring compliance. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there is no private right of action. The Supremacy Clause instructs courts to give federal law priority when state and federal law clash, but it is not the source of any federal rights and does not create a cause of action. The suit cannot proceed in equity. The power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations. The express provision of a single remedy for a state’s failure to comply with Medicaid’s requirements, the withholding of Medicaid funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 42 U.S.C. 1396c, and the complexity associated with enforcing section 30(A) combine to establish Congress’s “intent to foreclose” equitable relief. View "Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Following the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Terence and Paula Kilker against defendant Frank Stillman, the trial court ordered Stillman to produce documents regarding his assets to the Kilkers. After Stillman failed to comply with that order, the trial court found Stillman in contempt and ordered that Stillman pay the Kilkers reasonable attorney fees and costs, plus interest. The underlying judgment was eventually satisfied. To collect on the attorney fees and costs award, the Kilkers served a writ of execution on Preferred Bank to levy funds in Stillman’s bank account. Stillman submitted a claim of exemption to the writ. He asserted the funds in the account were Social Security payments exempt from levy. The Kilkers opposed Stillman’s claim of exemption, arguing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.080, only Social Security funds directly deposited into a bank account by the government are protected by the exemption. The trial court found Stillman’s bank account at Preferred Bank solely contained Social Security payments, but, nevertheless, denied Stillman’s exemption claim. The court did so because those funds were not directly deposited into the bank account by the government. On review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s conclusion was legally erroneous because Stillman’s Social Security payments were protected by federal law from levy. View "Kilker v. Stillman" on Justia Law

Brian Shaffer, who had severe autism and chemical sensitivities, resided with his mother, Delores Shaffer, who was paid to provide private duty nursing (PDN) care to Brian. In 2011, Brian’s Medicaid coverage was transferred to Coventry Health Care of Nebraska, Inc. When Coventry determined that the nursing services were not medically necessary, Shaffer requested a State fair hearing with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Coventry participated in the administrative proceedings, at which a hearing officer concluded that the PDN services were not medically necessary. Delores sought judicial review of the order, but the petition did not name Coventry as a respondent. The district court reversed the order of the Department, finding the PDN services that Delores provided to Brian were medically necessary. Coventry appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, holding that Coventry was a “party of record” at the State fair hearing and therefore a necessary party in the subsequent appeal to the district court, and the failure to make Coventry a party to the appeal deprived the district court of jurisdiction. View "Shaffer v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Charlotte Perkins appealed a Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss her appeal claiming the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) wrongly deprived her of receiving food stamps and that such deprivation was the result of a DHS hearing in which Perkins was deprived of procedural safeguards. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found no statutory authority created a right of appeal to the circuit court from an administrative decision by DHS regarding food-stamp qualification(s) or disqualification(s). The Supreme Court found that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mississippi caselaw provides, however, that where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from an agency decision and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the agency decision. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to the circuit court to transfer the case to the Monroe County Chancery Court. View "Perkins v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Boley sought Social Security disability benefits. The agency denied her request initially and on reconsideration. A person dissatisfied with such a decision has 60 days to request a hearing. Boley took about nine months because SSA had notified Boley but not her lawyer (as required by 20 C.F.R.404.1715(a)). Boley was ill at the time, preparing for a double mastectomy, and did not know, until it was too late, that her lawyer was unaware of the decision. An ALJ dismissed an untimely hearing request, finding that Boley lacked “good cause” because she had received notice and could have filed a request herself. A district judge dismissed her petition for judicial review, based on 42 U.S.C. 05(g), which authorizes review of the agency’s final decisions made “after a hearing.” The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to decide whether substantial evidence, and appropriate procedures, underlie the decision that Boley lacks “good cause” for her delay in seeking intra-agency review. In doing so, the court overruled its own precedent and noted a divide among the circuits. View "Boley v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. 107–107e, gives blind persons a priority in winning contracts to operate vending facilities on federal properties. Fort Campbell, Kentucky, operates a cafeteria for its soldiers. For about 20 years, Kentucky’s Office for the Blind (OFB) has helped blind vendors apply for and win the base’s contracts for various services. In 2012, the Army, the federal entity that operates Fort Campbell, published a solicitation, asking for bids to provide dining-facility-attendant services. Rather than doing so under the Act, as it had before, the Army issued this solicitation as a set aside for Small Business Administration Historically Underutilized Business Zones. OFB, representing its blind vendor, filed for arbitration under the Act, and, days later, filed suit, seeking to prevent the Army from awarding the contract. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a request for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated. OFB’s failure to seek and complete arbitration does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. View "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Michael Wilson, a former Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (“BMS”) sales presentative, filed a complaint alleging that BMS engaged in off-label promotion of certain drugs, and that these actions caused false claims to be submitted to the government in violation of the False Claims Act (“FCA”). Wilson subsequently entered in a partial settlement agreement with BMS that concluded part of the case. In 2009, Wilson filed a second amended complaint expanding upon his earlier, not settled, allegations against BMS and adding Sanofi-Aventis, U.S., LLC as a defendant. In 2013, the district court dismissed Wilson’s federal FCA claims relating to Plavis and Pravachol because they violated the FCA’s first-to-file rule based on two complaints that were filed before Wilson filed his original complaint. Wilson appealed from the dismissal as well as from the denial of his motion to file a third amended complaint and from denial of his follow-up motion to reconsider. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed the remaining FCA claims because they ran afoul of the first-to-file rule; and (2) the district court was correct in rejecting the third amended complaint. View "United States ex rel. Wilson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc. " on Justia Law