Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Carter served in the Army, 1965-1967. In 1989, he sought disability benefits for an injury to his back. The VA denied his claim. He sought to reopen in 2005, filing new evidence that he had aggravated the injury during his service. In 2006, the VA reopened, but denied the claim. The Board of Appeals affirmed in 2009. While appeal was pending, Carter changed counsel. He filed Form 21-22a in March 2010, naming a private attorney in place of Disabled American Veterans. New counsel requested a copy of Carter’s claim file. In June 2010, new counsel and the government jointly requested partial vacatur of the 2009 decision; the Veterans Court remanded the case with instructions. The Board sent a letter to Carter and Disabled American Veterans, stating that additional evidence must be submitted within 90 days (November 4, 2010). Counsel did not receive the letter. On December 13, 2010, the VA sent new counsel Carter’s file, nearly nine months after her requested. She did not immediately read the file and did not see the letter. In February 2011, without hearing from Carter, the Board again denied his claim. Carter’s attorney received a copy of the decision in December 2011. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Veterans Court incorrectly understood the law governing this notice defect. View "Carter v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Scott served on active duty in 1972. In 1999, Scott tested positive for hepatitis C. He applied for disability benefits in 2005, alleging that he contracted hepatitis C in service from air-gun inoculations. The VA denied service connection. Scott was incarcerated during his appeal. The VA acknowledged Scott’s request for a video conference hearing, and requested the date on which he was expected to be released. Scott responded “January 13, 2017,” and “next parole review date is scheduled for March of 2009.” The VA notified Scott that his hearing was scheduled for March 14, 2008. Scott, still incarcerated, failed to appear. On March 23, Scott requested a rescheduled hearing. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that Scott had “not shown good cause,” with no mention of Scott’s incarceration. The Board denied Scott’s claim for service connection, noting that Scott “failed to report for his scheduled hearing.” Before the Veterans Court, Scott, then represented by counsel, did not raise the hearing issue. The Veterans Court vacated based on an inadequate medical examination. In 2011, the VA continued the denial without mentioning the hearing issue. Scott submitted a re-certification of appeal form which checked “YES” in answer to “WAS HEARING REQUESTED?” Scott did not raise the hearing issue with the Board, which affirmed, noting that Scott “has not renewed his request” for a hearing. Before the Veterans Court, in 2013, Scott raised the hearing issue for the first time since March 23, 2008. That court affirmed, stating that raising the hearing issue “amounts to … undesirable piecemeal litigation” for no compelling reason. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board or the Veterans Court to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them. View "Scott v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Delisle served on active duty in the U.S. Army, 1952-1954, and injured his left knee in a ski accident. After that injury, Delisle also began to experience chronic pain in his other knee. In 1978, the Department of Veterans Affairs granted Delisle’s claim for entitlement to a service connection for his right-knee disorder and assigned a 10 percent disability rating. Despite continued treatment, the condition of Delisle’s right knee continued to deteriorate. In 2009, Delisle unsuccessfully sought an increase to the 10 percent disability rating for his right knee. While appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals was pending, he underwent the total right-knee replacement. As a result, the VA assigned a 100 percent disability rating for the period from April 7, 2010 to May 31, 2011, and assigned a 60 percent rating, along with a total disability rating based on individual employability for the period following May 31, 2011. Delisle challenged only the determination that he was not entitled to a higher disability rating for the nine months before his surgery. The Board rejected the claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit dismissed. The Veterans Court’s determination concerned questions of fact, which are beyond the court’s jurisdiction, 38 U.S.C. 7292(d)(2) View "Delisle v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In the “NOVA” decision, the Federal Circuit approved a plan requiring the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to identify and rectify harms caused by wrongful application of former 38 C.F.R. 3.103. The Plan required that the VA notify every claimant who received a final Board decision during the specified period and did not receive full relief. If a claimant had a case outside of the Board’s jurisdiction, but mandate had not issued and the appellate court’s judgment was not final, the VA was obligated to offer to submit a joint motion for remand. If the mandate had issued, the VA was required to offer to submit a joint motion to recall mandate and a joint motion for remand. Smith served in the Army, 1963-1965. In 2000, Smith filed an unsuccessful claim for compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2008, Smith was awarded service connection for PTSD with a 100% disability rating and a 2006 effective date. Smith appealed to the Board, which, in 2011, denied entitlement to an earlier effective date. The Board did not apply the invalid Rule interpretation. The Veterans Court affirmed and, days before the NOVA decision, entered judgment. In 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to recall that judgment. The decision fit the search terms profile under the Plan and triggered the VA’s obligation to offer to submit a joint motion. Smith did not claim that VA failed to comply with 38 C.F.R. 3.103(c)(2) or any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. The Federal Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, stating that neither its decisions nor the Plan preclude appropriate denial. View "Smith v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Kentucky Spirit Health Care Plan, Inc. brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it had a right to terminate its Medicaid managed care contract with the Finance and Administration Cabinet prior to the expiration of the contract without penalty. The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Cabinet. Both parties appealed. While the appeals were pending, the circuit court stayed Kentucky Spirit’s pre-trial discovery efforts relating to its rights under the Medicaid contract until resolution of the partial summary judgment appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Kentucky Spirit’s petition for a writ of prohibition against the circuit court judge prohibiting the judge from enforcing the order imposing the stay of discovery. The Supreme Court vacated the writ and remanded for entry of an order denying Kentucky Spirit’s petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by temporarily staying discovery, as a stay of discovery was appropriate pending resolution of the threshold issues currently on appeal. View "Commonwealth v. Hon. Wingate" on Justia Law

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider for Meuse, an elderly blind man. He required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes inside the house and to change into street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard a deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell. She fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands. She sought compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1). Because Meuse lacked workers’ compensation insurance, Zakarzecka named the custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the Illinois State Treasurer. An arbitrator awarded temporary total disability benefits and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of her hands to Zakarzecka, against the Fund. The Commission affirmed. As custodian , the Treasurer sought judicial review. The circuit court confirmed the ruling. The appellate court initially reversed. On rehearing, Zakarzecka argued, for the first time, that judicial review was barred because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction, 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2). Agreeing that a bond was required, the appellate court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Providers of “habilitation services” under Idaho’s Medicaid plan are reimbursed by the state Department of Health and Welfare. Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act requires Idaho’s plan to “assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care” while “safeguard[ing] against unnecessary utilization of . . . care and services,” 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A). Providers of habilitation services claimed that Idaho reimbursed them at rates lower than section 30(A) permits. The district court entered summary judgment for the providers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Supremacy Clause gave the providers an implied right of action, under which they could seek an injunction requiring compliance. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there is no private right of action. The Supremacy Clause instructs courts to give federal law priority when state and federal law clash, but it is not the source of any federal rights and does not create a cause of action. The suit cannot proceed in equity. The power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations. The express provision of a single remedy for a state’s failure to comply with Medicaid’s requirements, the withholding of Medicaid funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 42 U.S.C. 1396c, and the complexity associated with enforcing section 30(A) combine to establish Congress’s “intent to foreclose” equitable relief. View "Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Following the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Terence and Paula Kilker against defendant Frank Stillman, the trial court ordered Stillman to produce documents regarding his assets to the Kilkers. After Stillman failed to comply with that order, the trial court found Stillman in contempt and ordered that Stillman pay the Kilkers reasonable attorney fees and costs, plus interest. The underlying judgment was eventually satisfied. To collect on the attorney fees and costs award, the Kilkers served a writ of execution on Preferred Bank to levy funds in Stillman’s bank account. Stillman submitted a claim of exemption to the writ. He asserted the funds in the account were Social Security payments exempt from levy. The Kilkers opposed Stillman’s claim of exemption, arguing that under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.080, only Social Security funds directly deposited into a bank account by the government are protected by the exemption. The trial court found Stillman’s bank account at Preferred Bank solely contained Social Security payments, but, nevertheless, denied Stillman’s exemption claim. The court did so because those funds were not directly deposited into the bank account by the government. On review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s conclusion was legally erroneous because Stillman’s Social Security payments were protected by federal law from levy. View "Kilker v. Stillman" on Justia Law