Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense.The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

A fatal car accident involving an eighteen-year-old driving a 2013 Toyota Scion led to a lawsuit by the driver’s estate against Toyota and Subaru, who had jointly developed the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged negligence, product liability, and violations of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claiming that design defects caused the occupant compartment to collapse and a fire to spread, ultimately resulting in the driver’s death. During discovery, the plaintiff requested extensive documents and depositions, including English translations of Japanese-language materials. Toyota and Subaru objected to several document requests and deposition topics, and disputes arose regarding the timing and sufficiency of their responses.The Superior Court of Robeson County granted the plaintiff’s motions to compel, ordered the production of additional documents (including English translations), and mandated that Toyota and Subaru’s corporate representatives testify to all noticed deposition topics without further objection. When the defendants failed to comply as ordered, the trial court imposed sanctions, deeming certain facts established against them—including elements of duty and breach in the plaintiff’s product liability claim—and struck their regulatory compliance defense. Toyota and Subaru appealed, challenging the discovery and sanctions orders.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and reversed the requirement to translate documents but otherwise affirmed the discovery order, holding that most of the trial court’s actions were not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed only the remaining issues in the discovery order. It held that the trial court erred by enforcing a fourteen-day deadline for objections to document requests in deposition notices (rather than the seven days required by the rules), and by waiving defendants’ objections to deposition topics for not seeking a protective order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision, instructed it to vacate the discovery order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a piece of agricultural machinery at his place of employment. The machine’s power take-off (PTO) shaft, which should have been equipped with safety guards, lacked those guards at the time of the accident. The worker alleged that the absence of these safety guards was due to his employer’s deliberate removal, and that this action directly caused his injuries. He sued his employer for an intentional tort under Ohio law, specifically invoking a statutory provision that creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to injure when an employer deliberately removes an equipment safety guard and an injury results.The Madison County Court of Common Pleas denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer had deliberately removed the safety guard. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury heard evidence about the condition of the machinery, the employer’s repair practices, and the employer’s responses to safety concerns. The jury found in favor of the worker, awarding significant compensatory damages for his injuries. On appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not support a finding of deliberate removal as a matter of law, and that the statutory presumption did not apply unless the employer both removed the guard and made a conscious decision not to replace it.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. It held that when reviewing the denial of summary judgment after a trial, appellate courts must consider the full trial record, not just the pretrial record. The court further held that the statutory presumption applies when there is evidence of deliberate removal of a safety guard, and that courts may not require proof of a separate, additional decision not to replace the guard. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Camara v. Gill Dairy, L.L.C." on Justia Law

After the death of their fourteen-year-old daughter Taylor Rose Sookra in December 2021, four months after she received Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine, Arthur Sookra and April Burch-Sookra filed a lawsuit. They alleged willful misconduct under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) against Pfizer, federal officials, the physician who administered the vaccine, and the pediatric practice. Their claims included both federal law claims and state-law tort claims.Initially, the case was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. When the Sookras added a PREP Act willful-misconduct claim, they requested and obtained a transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by the statute. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the motions were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal of the claims against the federal government on sovereign immunity grounds and against Pfizer for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Pfizer’s state-law claims based on immunity and advised that the court decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The district court adopted these recommendations, dismissed the case, and denied as moot the plaintiffs’ later request for a three-judge court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint without first convening a three-judge court, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(5) for willful-misconduct claims under the PREP Act. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to initiate procedures for convening a three-judge court. The court did not address the other arguments raised by the parties. View "Sookra v. Pfizer Inc." on Justia Law

Several parents whose premature infants developed necrotizing enterocolitis (NEC) after being fed cow’s milk-based formula at Pennsylvania Hospital sued the manufacturers of the formula, as well as the hospital, in Pennsylvania state court. The parents alleged that the manufacturers’ products caused NEC and that the hospital failed to warn of the risks and implement policies to protect patients. Some plaintiffs were Pennsylvania citizens and others from New Jersey. The hospital and its related entities were named as defendants, and the claims against them were based on state law.After the lawsuits were filed, the manufacturers removed the cases to federal court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the cases to a multidistrict litigation proceeding in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs’ initial motion to remand was granted after the district court found that the claims against the hospital were potentially viable, defeating removal on diversity grounds. The cases returned to Pennsylvania state court, where discovery proceeded and the hospital was later dismissed with prejudice after the state court sustained preliminary objections. The plaintiffs did not immediately appeal. The manufacturers then removed the cases a second time, arguing that the hospital had been fraudulently joined solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, this time concluding that the plaintiffs’ lack of active pursuit of claims against the hospital showed “no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action,” amounting to fraudulent joinder.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh Circuit held that fraudulent joinder exists only where a plaintiff makes false jurisdictional allegations or has no chance of success against the non-diverse defendant, taking all facts and law in the plaintiff’s favor. The court held that the plaintiffs’ litigation conduct and subjective intent are not proper bases for finding fraudulent joinder. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdullah v Mead Johnson & Company LLC" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as earlier litigants, alleged injuries caused by cellphone radiation exposure. Their complaints were nearly identical to those in a previous set of cases involving similar claims. The plaintiffs agreed, through joint stipulations filed in their cases, that the outcome of expert admissibility litigation in the earlier cases would apply to their own. This agreement included being bound by both the substantive ruling on whether expert testimony about general causation was admissible and all procedural rulings leading up to that determination. The stipulations were signed by counsel for both sides, and subsequent court orders stayed the plaintiffs’ cases pending the resolution of expert admissibility in the earlier litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia managed the earlier cases by first resolving whether the plaintiffs had admissible expert testimony on general causation, limiting discovery to that issue. After several hearings and rulings, the court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony under the Daubert/Rule 702 standard, and granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert evidence to support their claims. The Brooks plaintiffs later moved to lift the stays in their cases, arguing for broader discovery and the opportunity to present new expert witnesses, but the court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Brooks plaintiffs were bound by their agreements and the trial court’s rulings. The court held that the plaintiffs had agreed—expressly or implicitly—to be bound by both the outcome of the expert admissibility litigation and the procedural rulings in the earlier cases. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked admissible expert testimony required to prove their claims. View "Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation.The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law

A maintenance worker was injured when a small derrick tipped over during work on a defective transformer. Two years after the incident, the injured individual and his spouse filed suit against the derrick’s manufacturer and several corporate entities that leased the equipment to the worker’s employer. The complaint was filed on the last day permitted by the Texas statute of limitations. Plaintiffs received service citations the next day, and forwarded them to a process server three days later. Service was completed about fifty days after filing, with delays attributed to confusion over defendants’ identities and addresses, as well as disruptions caused by a courthouse fire in an unrelated case involving plaintiffs’ counsel.After defendants were served, they removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the manufacturer for insufficient diligence in service and granted summary judgment for the corporate defendants. The district court found that plaintiffs had waited too long at several points—three days before forwarding citations, several weeks before following up with the process server, and additional days before clarifying instructions—thus concluding that plaintiffs failed to exercise sufficient diligence as required by Texas law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court applied a more demanding standard than Texas law requires. Under Texas law, a plaintiff must show ordinary diligence in effecting service after timely filing suit. The appellate court found that plaintiffs’ explanations for the short delays, including handling a complex service task involving multiple corporate defendants and temporary distractions from an unrelated courthouse fire, were sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute regarding diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Larkins v. S.D.P. Manufacturing" on Justia Law

A workplace accident in 2020 resulted in the death of Colby Eldon Johnson, who was using a self-unloading bed manufactured by SRM-Double L, LLC (“SRM”) on his employer’s truck. Colby’s father, Harry Johnson, filed suit against SRM and others, alleging products liability and negligence. During pretrial proceedings, Johnson failed to submit timely responses to SRM’s discovery requests and did not file his opposition to SRM’s summary judgment motion by the court-ordered deadline. He later filed late motions and exhibits, citing scheduling conflicts and unresolved discovery issues.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, granted SRM’s motions to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no valid justification for the delay. Consequently, the court treated SRM’s summary judgment motion as unopposed and granted summary judgment in SRM’s favor, finding Johnson’s claims barred by Idaho statutes. The court also awarded attorney fees and sanctions against Johnson and his counsel under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 37, based on alleged misrepresentations and discovery delays.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike Johnson’s untimely filings, finding no abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the lower court failed to analyze whether SRM had met its burden under Rule 56(a), which is required even if the motion is unopposed. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney fees under Rule 37 for discovery violations but reversed the sanctions under Rule 11 because the only support for the sanctions was inadmissible hearsay. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. Attorney fees on appeal were denied, as no party had yet prevailed. View "Johnson v. SRM-Double L, LLC" on Justia Law

A police sergeant was injured during a training exercise when his department-issued semi-automatic pistol discharged while holstered, resulting in a gunshot wound to his leg. He could not explain what caused the trigger to be actuated but maintained that his hand was not on the weapon at the moment it discharged. He and his wife sued the firearm manufacturer, alleging strict products liability and negligence, and asserting that the pistol’s design was defective—particularly, that it lacked an external safety mechanism, making it more susceptible to unintentional discharge.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiffs sought to introduce expert testimony to establish that the design defect, specifically the lack of an external safety, caused the injury. The district court excluded the experts’ causation opinions, finding them unreliable because the experts did not adequately address the specifics of the incident or test their theories under similar circumstances. The court then granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, holding that under New York law, expert testimony as to proximate causation was necessary due to the complexity of the issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude the experts’ causation opinions, finding the exclusion within the court’s discretion. However, the appellate court held that New York law does not require expert testimony on proximate causation in all product liability cases, especially where jurors can use their own judgment, aided by other evidence, to assess causation. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could decide, based on the design-defect evidence and the circumstances of the accident, whether an external safety would have prevented the injury. The Second Circuit therefore vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hayes v Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law