Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case addressed the difference between two claims that arose from the same accident and that were based on the same medical care: a medical malpractice claim and a failure to secure informed consent claim. In 2017, Mari Davies was in a single-car rollover accident. When Davies arrived at the E.R. she had hypertension, high blood pressure, left shoulder pain, neck pain, chest pain, abdominal pain, a headache, and some tingling in her left arm. She also had preexisting kidney stones, diverticulosis, pneumonia, and diabetes. Dr. Michael Hirsig evaluated her as soon as she arrived in the E.R.: consulted with a neurosurgeon, ordered tests and prescribed medicines. Dr. Hirsig diagnosed Davies with a stable cervical spine fracture. He determined that she had no “neurological symptoms.” Davies visited her primary care provider the next day. While in his office, Davies exhibited stroke symptoms. She was immediately transported to the E.R. at Providence St. Peter Hospital. She had, indeed, suffered a stroke. It was later determined Davies’ stroke was caused by a vertebral artery dissection (VAD) that occurred at the time of the accident. A VAD is typically detected by a computed tomography angiography (CTA) scan. It was undisputed that the E.R. doctor who treated Davies when she first presented to the hospital, did not order a CTA scan. Davies filed suit against MultiCare Health System, the parent corporation of Good Samaritan Hospital, alleging (1) medical negligence, (2) failure to obtain informed consent, and (3) corporate negligence. On cross motions for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed Davies’ informed consent claim. The trial court found no material factual dispute related to the informed consent claim and dismissed it as unsupported by the law. Davies’ medical negligence claims proceeded to trial. The jury found that none of the health care provider defendants were negligent. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding facts in the record sufficient to support an informed consent claim. The Washington Supreme Court adhered to prior decisions holding that in general, a patient cannot bring an informed consent claim where, as here, the physician ruled out the undiagnosed condition entirely. View "Davies v. MultiCare Health Sys." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court in this case “boils down to one of statutory interpretation:” whether plaintiff Crystal Bufkin was “legally entitled to recover” damages from her employer under the uninsured motorist statute, Mississippi Code Section 83-11-101(1) (Supp. 2021). The Supreme Court previously held that employees are not legally entitled to recover from their employers and thus could not make a claim under uninsured motorist coverages. Bufkin acknowledged that precedent precluded her claim, but she argued Medders v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 623 So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1993 )and its progeny were wrongly decided because the uninsured motorist law should be liberally construed in her favor. The Supreme Court concluded it already rejected the arguments Bufkin presented here, and declined to overrule Medders. View "Bufkin v. Geico Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

An automobile driven by defendant Patrick McLaughlan, struck plaintiff Jerry Harwood while Harwood was leaving his work shift and crossing the street to an employer provided parking lot. After an unsuccessful attempt to recover workers compensation benefits for his injuries, Harwood filed a lawsuit against the driver and his employer. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit against the employer for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Harwood appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that because an employer may have assumed the duty to provide a safer crosswalk for access to an employer designated parking lot, the employee pled a claim for relief which is legally possible. The trial court's dismissal was premature. View "Harwood v. Ardagh Group" on Justia Law

Icylene Pearce, as the personal representative of the estate of her late husband, Dewitt Ray Pearce, appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in her wrongful-death action against the estate of Daniel Lea Day, deceased, and Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC ("Enterprise"). Dewitt was killed when the vehicle Day was driving collided head-on with Dewitt's vehicle. Pearce's appeal concerned the defense that Day suffered a sudden loss of consciousness before the collision. Pearce objected to the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence that she believed related to that defense, and she claimed that, even without considering that evidence, the trial court should have ordered a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Pearce v. The Estate of Daniel Lea Day, et al." on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's plea in bar and dismissing this case with prejudice, holding that the date of Plaintiff's second filing did not relate back to the date of her first filing and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.After Plaintiff learned that she had erred in naming Defendant in her initial pleading Plaintiff non-suited the case. One month later, Plaintiff filed the present action, correctly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a plea in bar, arguing that the present action was filed over two years after the cause of action accrued and was thus time-barred. Plaintiff objected, arguing that the error in naming Defendant was a misnomer subject to correction. The court sustained the plea in bar, concluding that Plaintiff's original filing did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's second filing was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Edwards v. Omni International Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Tomas Beauford suffered a fatal epileptic seizure in his cell while in pretrial custody at the Mesa County Detention Facility (“MCDF”). The administrator of Beauford’s estate sued various Mesa County and medical defendants in federal district court in Colorado under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to Beauford’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Deputy Dalrymple, finding that whether the deputy was aware that Beauford was not breathing was a material fact in genuine dispute: “We cannot imagine a more material fact in the context of the Estate’s deliberate indifference claim than whether Deputy Dalrymple knew of the risk that Mr. Beauford was not breathing. The district court failed to account for this dispute, which a reasonable jury could resolve in favor of the Estate.” The Court affirmed summary judgment in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Tomas Beauford, et al. v. Correct Care Solutions, et al." on Justia Law

Dahlia McKinney, M.D., a defendant in the wrongful-death/medical negligence action, petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate an order compelling Dr. McKinney, ostensibly under Alabama's discovery rules, to alter the contents of a registered death certificate she prepared in connection with the death of Paydro White ("Paydro"). On December 31, 2013, Paydro sought medical treatment at the emergency department of Princeton Baptist Medical Center where he was diagnosed with possible pneumonia; he was discharged on that same date. The following afternoon, Paydro returned to the emergency department seeking follow-up care; he was formally admitted for treatment by the emergency physician on duty at that time. Later that evening, after Dr. McKinney began her evening shift, Paydro become unresponsive. Although he was initially successfully resuscitated, Paydro later died in the early morning hours of January 2, 2014. Dr. McKinney, who completed and signed Paydro's death certificate, identified the contributing causes of Paydro's death as "Pulseless electrical activity" due to "Acute Myocardial Infarction." Subsequent postmortem examinations and the autopsy of Paydro's body revealed that "the most likely cause of ... death [was] pulmonary Thromboembolism" -- a final diagnosis with which Dr. McKinney's later deposition testimony indicated she agreed. Dorothy White ("Dorothy"), Paydro's mother, was the personal representative of Paydro's estate. In that capacity, she sued numerous defendants allegedly connected with Paydro's medical treatment, including Dr. McKinney, largely arguing Paydro's death had been caused by the defendants' purported failure to timely diagnose and treat the pulmonary thromboembolism that ultimately caused Paydro's death. Dr. McKinney, who had provided no medical treatment to Paydro other than in connection with emergency resuscitation attempts, informally requested her voluntary dismissal as a defendant. In an email communication to Dr. McKinney's counsel, the estate's counsel indicated that a decision on that request would be aided by Dr. McKinney's voluntary amendment of the original cause of death indicated on Paydro's death certificate to identify his cause of death as a pulmonary thromboembolism. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in compelling Dr. McKinney to amend the death certificate. Dr. McKinney therefore demonstrated a clear legal right to her requested relief. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order compelling Dr. McKinney to amend the cause of death on Paydro's death certificate. View "Ex parte Dahlia McKinney, M.D." on Justia Law

In 2019 a woman sued her former husband’s medical provider, alleging that from 2003 to 2010 the provider negligently prescribed the husband opioid medications, leading to his addiction, damage to the couple’s business and marital estate, the couple’s divorce in 2011, and ultimately the husband's death in 2017. The superior court ruled the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the woman’s argument that the provider should have been estopped from relying on a limitations defense. Because the undisputed evidence shows that by 2010 the woman had knowledge of her alleged injuries, the provider’s alleged role in causing those injuries, and the provider’s alleged negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claims accrued at that time and were no longer timely when filed in 2019. And because the record did not show that the woman’s failure to timely file her claims stemmed from reasonable reliance on fraudulent conduct by the provider, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Park v. Spayd" on Justia Law

A wrongful-death suit ended in default when a trucking company went bankrupt. That left two plaintiffs who both claimed to be the decedent’s common-law wife. The district court awarded damages to just one of them because Texas does not allow bigamy. The other putative wife maintains that the district court had to award damages to both plaintiffs.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision holding that a defaulting defendant is deemed to admit a plaintiff’s factual allegations, but the district court still may inquire whether those allegations demonstrate legal liability. In the putative wife’s amended complaint, she failed to make specific allegations regarding any of the elements of common-law marriage.The court reasoned that the statements she made were too “bare and conclusory” to be considered a well-pleaded factual allegation. After reviewing the putative wife’s complaint, the district court concluded that she and the decedent had agreed to be married, had cohabited, and had held themselves out as married. The court did not reject any of her factual allegations—it merely rejected the legal conclusion that she was married to the decedent. That rejection was proper in light of the other woman’s factual allegations.Moreover, where a plaintiff, but for the defendant’s default, would never have been able to show legal entitlement to a judgment, denial of that judgment is not itself a miscarriage of justice. There is nothing inequitable about allowing a district court to consider the facts alleged by all plaintiffs and award default judgment to only those whose claims are not precluded. View "Escalante v. Lidge" on Justia Law

After her ex-husband died in a containerboard mill explosion, Plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survival action against Defendant Packaging Corporation of America (“PCA”) and PCA employee, a supervisor alleged to have had specific responsibility for the safe operation of the tank at issue (collectively, the “Defendants”). Defendants removed the case to federal court on grounds of improper joinder and diversity jurisdiction. After denying a motion to remand, the district court granted successive motions for summary judgment that disposed of the plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s rulings on the motion to remand and the motions for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment and held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims because the workplace accident falls within Louisiana’s workers’ compensation scheme.The primary issue is whether Plaintiff had a plausible claim against the supervisor such that he could be properly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The court held that Plaintiff failed to show that the supervisor bears personal blame for the victim’s death. Thus, the district court was correct to pierce the pleadings to ferret out glaring legal deficiencies in Plaintiffs claims against the only defendant precluding diversity jurisdiction, and the district court’s consequent finding of improper joinder and denial of Plaintiff’s motion to remand was likewise correct. Further, the court held that this workplace fatality falls within the ambit of Louisiana’s workers’ compensation scheme. View "Rolls v. Packaging Corp of America" on Justia Law