Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

Kerry Angelos filed a defamation lawsuit against Greg and Susan Schatzel, alleging they created a website that published defamatory comments about him. During the lawsuit, Angelos faced financial difficulties, leading to his interests in the lawsuit being auctioned at a sheriff’s sale to satisfy a preexisting judgment. Greg Schatzel purchased Angelos’s interests and substituted himself as the plaintiff, subsequently dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Angelos appealed, arguing that his defamation claims were personal and could not be deemed “property” subject to execution under Idaho law.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted Schatzel’s motion to substitute as the plaintiff and denied a motion by another creditor, Pacific Global Investment, Inc. (PGI), to intervene. The court found no legal basis to support Angelos’s contention that the sheriff’s sale was invalid or that substituting Schatzel violated public policy. Consequently, the court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and held that defamation claims are personal and not assignable under Idaho law, referencing the precedent set in MacLeod v. Stelle. The court concluded that Angelos’s defamation claims could not be subject to execution as “other property” under Idaho Code section 11-201. The court vacated the district court’s order granting Schatzel’s motion to substitute and the judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. The case was remanded to determine which of Angelos’s remaining claims, if any, were properly transferred to Schatzel through the sheriff’s sale. The court also denied Schatzel’s request for attorney fees, awarding costs to Angelos as the prevailing party. View "Angelos v. Schatzel" on Justia Law

Meghan Faxel was injured while riding an inflatable tube down the "Black Hole" water slide at the Wilderness Hotel in Wisconsin Dells. Her tube became stuck and flipped over, causing a shoulder injury. Meghan and her husband, Mike Faxel, sued Wilderness for negligence, common-law premises liability, and loss of consortium. Wilderness filed a cross-claim against ProSlide Technology, Inc., the slide's manufacturer, seeking contribution if found liable. The Faxels missed the deadline to disclose their liability expert and sought an extension, which was denied by the magistrate judge. Wilderness then moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The magistrate judge agreed and entered judgment for Wilderness.The case was initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois, which transferred it to the Western District of Wisconsin due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. The Faxels filed an amended complaint adding ProSlide as a defendant, but the claims against ProSlide were dismissed as time-barred. The Faxels also missed the deadline to disclose an expert witness and their motion to extend the deadline was denied. Wilderness moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care required of water-park operators.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The court held that the hotel’s duty of care regarding the safety protocols, inspection, and maintenance of water slides required specialized knowledge and expertise. Without expert testimony, the Faxels could not prove their claims. The court concluded that the safety measures taken by Wilderness appeared reasonable on their face and that jurors could not determine the standard of care without expert testimony. Therefore, summary judgment for Wilderness was appropriate. View "Faxel v. Wilderness Hotel & Resort, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who worked at the Clark County Government Center (CCGC), alleged injuries from exposure to toxic chemicals. They claimed that toxic chemicals were released on Union Pacific property, which later became the CCGC site. After the CCGC opened in 1995, workers began experiencing illnesses and noticed black soot accumulating in workstations and air vents. Despite these concerns, Clark County assured workers that the property was safe. Plaintiffs argued that they could not have discovered the link between their illnesses and the toxic exposure until 2020, when experts established the connection.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County dismissed the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, ruling that the discovery rule did not apply to the two-year statute of limitations under NRS 11.190(4)(e). The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred because the statute did not explicitly reference discovery-rule tolling.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the discovery rule could apply to NRS 11.190(4)(e) despite the statute's lack of explicit language. The court emphasized that fairness and justice require that a claim should not accrue until the claimant is aware or should be aware of the claim through reasonable diligence. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had raised issues of fact regarding their awareness of the cause of action and the defendants' alleged concealment of information. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred by not considering equitable tolling. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "ADKINS VS. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Robert V. Bolinske, Sr., filed a defamation claim against Dale V. Sandstrom and Gail Hagerty, alleging that defamatory statements were made and published online on October 18, 2016. Bolinske served a demand for retraction on January 14, 2017, but Sandstrom did not respond. Bolinske commenced the action on February 26, 2019, beyond the two-year statute of limitations for defamation claims.The District Court of Burleigh County initially dismissed Bolinske’s defamation claim, citing the statute of limitations. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed this decision in part, noting that the statute of limitations defense was not specifically pled by answer, and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, Sandstrom answered the amended complaint, including the statute of limitations defense, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, finding the defamation claim time-barred. The court also awarded attorney’s fees to Sandstrom, deeming Bolinske’s claims frivolous.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the defamation claim was indeed barred by the statute of limitations, as the action was commenced more than two years and 45 days after the publication of the alleged defamatory statements. The court also upheld the award of attorney’s fees, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment that Bolinske’s claims were frivolous and that the fees requested were reasonable. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions. View "Bolinske v. Sandstrom" on Justia Law

Samuel Hickman was electrocuted while working on a construction site when a boom crane contacted overhead power lines. Hickman and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against Boomers, LLC, its owner Michael Landon, and employee Colter James Johnson, alleging negligence and recklessness. Boomers moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Hickman argued that the accident fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The district court granted summary judgment for Boomers and denied Hickman’s motion for reconsideration.The district court applied the 2020 amended version of Idaho Code section 72-209(3), which clarified the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception, and concluded that Boomers did not intend to harm Hickman or have actual knowledge that injury was substantially likely. Hickman appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the pre-amendment version of the statute and the standard from Gomez v. Crookham Co., which interpreted the exception to include conscious disregard of knowledge that an injury would result.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the pre-amendment version of section 72-209(3) and the Gomez standard should apply. The court found that the additional evidence submitted by Hickman in his motion for reconsideration created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Johnson consciously disregarded the known risk of injury from the power lines. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hickman v. Boomers, LLC" on Justia Law

Greg Phillips died on October 11, 2019, after receiving medical care from Dr. Anna Robbins at Logan Health. On April 22, 2021, Phillips' estate filed a medical malpractice claim with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), which issued a decision on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Phillips filed a complaint in the District Court alleging wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, a survivor’s claim, and respondeat superior. However, the complaint was not served on Logan Health. On February 10, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) adding claims of common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which was served on Logan Health on February 20, 2023.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court dismissed the FAC with prejudice on April 28, 2023, because Phillips failed to serve the original complaint within the six-month period required by § 25-3-106, MCA, and the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims under § 27-2-205, MCA, had expired. Phillips' motion to alter, amend, or set aside the dismissal was denied on June 13, 2023, as the court found that the statute of limitations resumed running after the six-month service deadline passed and that the FAC did not relate back to the original complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the six-month period for serving the complaint and that the FAC was filed outside the two-year limitations period. The court also determined that Logan Health's motion to dismiss did not constitute an appearance under § 25-3-106, MCA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips' post-judgment motion. View "Phillips v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing their minor son, sued a hospital and a doctor for medical malpractice after their baby suffered birth injuries during delivery. They sought $6,000,000 in damages. Under Puerto Rico law, damages would be capped at $150,000 if the doctor was a faculty member at the hospital at the time of the birth. The defendants claimed the doctor was a faculty member, but could not produce a contract to prove it. The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing and concluded that the doctor was a faculty member, thus applying the statutory cap on damages.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico adopted a magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which stated that the applicability of the statutory cap was a matter of law. The district court found that the doctor was a faculty member based on testimony and letters from the medical school, despite the absence of a contract. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the applicability of the statutory cap was a factual question that should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that whether the doctor was a faculty member at the time of the birth was a factual question requiring a jury's determination. The court found that the evidence was not one-sided enough to compel the district court's conclusion and that the district court improperly took the question from the jury. The First Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perez-Perez v. Hospital Episcopal San Lucas Inc." on Justia Law

David Burke died after falling down retractable steps attached to his motorhome. His estate, wife, and children filed product liability claims against Lippert Components, Inc., and LCI Industries, who had purchased the product brand after the Burkes bought the vehicle. The plaintiffs alleged negligence, design defects, manufacturing defects, and inadequate instructions and warnings. They later sought to add the previous owners of the product brand as defendants and amend the scheduling order, but the district court denied these motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Lippert and LCI.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the plaintiffs' motions to amend the complaint and the scheduling order, citing unreasonable delay. The court then granted summary judgment for Lippert and LCI, finding that they did not manufacture, distribute, or sell the steps in question, and thus were not liable under Iowa law. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Lippert and LCI were not required to plead an affirmative defense regarding successor liability, as their defense negated an essential element of the plaintiffs' claims. The court also found that Lippert and LCI did not assume liability through the purchase agreement and that expert testimony was necessary to support the claim of inadequate post-sale warnings. Finally, the court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show good cause for their delayed motions to amend the complaint and scheduling order. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Burke v. Lippert Components, Inc." on Justia Law

Jose Vasquez was detained twice by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) because he shares the same name and birthdate as a wanted criminal. He sued the District of Columbia and an officer for constitutional violations under Section 1983, and the District alone for negligence, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The District Court granted summary judgment on the Section 1983 and negligence claims. The jury found the District liable for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution, awarding Vasquez $100,000. However, the District Court later granted the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law, nullifying the jury's award, and alternatively granted a motion for remittitur.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially reviewed the case. It granted summary judgment in favor of the District and Officer Agosto on the Section 1983 claims, finding no constitutional violations. The court also dismissed the negligence claim. The jury trial on the common law claims resulted in a mixed verdict, with the jury awarding damages for false imprisonment but not for malicious prosecution. The District Court subsequently overturned the jury's verdict on false imprisonment and reduced the damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims, agreeing that there was no clearly established constitutional violation and that qualified immunity applied to Officer Agosto. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's judgment as a matter of law and the alternative remittitur on the false imprisonment claim. The appellate court reinstated the jury's verdict and remanded for further proceedings, emphasizing that the jury could reasonably find that the differing social security numbers indicated Vasquez was not the wanted criminal, and that the jury's damages award was justified based on the emotional harm suffered. View "Vasquez v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law