Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A jury awarded four Plaintiffs a total of more than $165 million in damages to compensate them for a tragic accident that claimed half of a young family in a single instant, and left surviving family members physically and emotionally injured. Defendants appealed the verdict as excessive, contending it was not supported by substantial evidence and was tainted by passion or prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) applying an abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for a new trial because the ruling was made by a successor judge who did not oversee the trial; and (2) affirming the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for a new trial on grounds that the verdict was excessive. The Supreme Court held: (1) because it reviews claims of excessive verdicts de novo, it did not need to adopt a new standard of review for decisions of successor judges assigned under the circumstances of this case, as requested by Defendants, and the Court declined to do so; and (2) under current law, substantial evidence supported the verdict and the record did not reflect that the verdict was tainted by passion or prejudice. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Morga v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Helen Jordan, a nurse who was formerly employed by the predecessor to the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, challenged in the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) the decision of a magistrate that she was not entitled to disability benefits under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). In 1995, plaintiff was working for defendant’s predecessor when she was injured during an altercation with a patient. Plaintiff was prescribed opioid medication to treat leg and back pain that she said resulted from the 1995 injury, and she used the opioid medication continuously after the incident and became dependent upon it. Plaintiff began receiving disability benefits under the WDCA in 1996. In 2015, plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination at defendant’s request pursuant to MCL 418.385. The doctor who conducted the examination concluded that any disability experienced by plaintiff was not the result of the 1995 incident, and defendant subsequently discontinued plaintiff’s benefits. Plaintiff applied for reinstatement of her benefits under the WDCA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the agency record was too incomplete to facilitate “meaningful” appellate review: “Despite the MCAC’s conclusion, whether the experts agreed that plaintiff had a limitation of her wage-earning capacity in work suitable to her qualifications and training was not clear from the record.” Therefore, the Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred by deciding this case as a matter of law because further administrative proceedings were needed. View "Jordan v. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Stella Grace Yeh (Yeh) attended the University of San Diego. Following a party where Yeh became highly intoxicated, a friend summoned an Uber to take Yeh back to her dorm at the University. That ride was terminated before completion, and the Uber driver, one of the codefendants, Louvensky Geffrard, exited the Interstate and allegedly ordered Yeh out of the car. Subsequently, Yeh initiated a second ride request from Uber, and petitioner Mark Rycz (Petitioner) arrived. Yeh did not enter that car and instead left the area. Half an hour later, an eyewitness observed Yeh walk onto the freeway, where she was struck by two different cars. Petitioner alleged Yeh was several miles away from where Petitioner saw her when she was killed. Plaintiffs and real parties in interest (Plaintiffs) were Josefina McGarry, Yeh’s mother, in her individual capacity; Josefina McGarry in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh; and McKenna McGarry Limentani, Yeh’s sister, in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh. In April 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber); Geffrard, an Uber driver; and Petitioner, also an Uber driver. The Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion for change of venue to San Diego County under Code of Civil Procedure section 397 (c) based on the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal directing the Superior Court to set aside denial of the motion and to grant the motion. Among other things, the Court of Appeal concluded the Superior Court erred: (1) in reasoning the location of the witnesses was unimportant because they could appear remotely under section 367.75, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) in finding Petitioner failed to show venue in San Diego would be more convenient for most witnesses and promote the interests of justice. The Court granted writ relief to require the Superior Court to grant Petitioner’s motion. View "Rycz v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Luis Munoz and LR Munoz Real Estate Holdings, LLC (together, Munoz) bought a hotel from a company owned and managed by Rajesh Patel and his son, Shivam. Before escrow closed, the parties negotiated a leaseback arrangement requiring Munoz to lease the hotel back to the Patels’ company after the sale. Escrow closed and the parties thereafter executed the previously-negotiated lease. However, Munoz contended the Patels secretly swapped out the agreed-upon lease for a lease substantially more beneficial to the Patels and worse for Munoz, and then tricked him into signing it. Munoz filed suit against the Patels, an alleged alter ego entity of the Patels called Inn Lending, LLC, and other defendants involved in the sale, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory fraud, and elder financial abuse, among other causes of action. Rajesh and Inn Lending demurred to the operative second amended complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and determined, among other things, that Munoz alleged a viable fraud cause of action based on a theory of fraud in the execution. The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case back to the appellate court, ordering a rehearing of the parties arguments for fraud. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded operative complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a viable cause of action for fraud in the execution against Rajesh, but not against Inn Lending. Additionally, the Court concluded the complaint plead facts sufficient to state an elder financial abuse cause of action against both Rajesh and Inn Lending. The Court concluded Munoz failed to establish that the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract and bad faith causes of action. In light of these determinations, the appeals court reversed the trial court judgment and remand the matter with instructions that the trial court vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to the entire complaint, and enter a new order. View "Munoz v. Patel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Lowell provided piano tuning services to defendant Medford School District and assisted in producing concerts performed in defendant’s facilities. While providing production assistance for a particular concert, plain- tiff noticed an echo near the stage. He complained to the school theater technician, Stephanie Malone, and, later, feeling that Malone had not adequately responded, he followed up with her. Malone reported to her supervisor that plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated, that he “smelled of alcohol,” and that “this was not the first time.” The supervisor repeated Malone’s statements to a district support services assistant. The assistant sent emails summarizing Malone’s statements to three other district employees, including the supervisor of purchasing. The assistant expressed concerns that appearing on district property under the influence of alcohol violated district policy and the terms of plaintiff’s piano tuning contract. Plaintiff brought this defamation action against Malone, the supervisor and assistant, later substituting the School district for the individual defendants. Defendant answered, asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including the one at issue here: that public employees are entitled to an absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in the course and scope of their employment. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on that basis. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant as a public employer, did not have an affirmative defense of absolute privilege that entitled it to summary judgment. View "Lowell v. Medford School Dist. 549C" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing on abstention grounds his complaint asserting claims of replevin, conversion, and statutory theft relating to a Jackson Pollock collage. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred in abstaining under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) because (1) the state and federal actions are not “concurrent and parallel” since they involve different parties, different issues, and different remedies; and (2) his claims will not become moot if the state court finds the collage is part of Defendant’s marital estate because Defendant is not a party to the divorce action and the state court will not adjudicate his claims.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that the federal and state proceedings at issue here are not parallel; the parties and relief sought are not the same. Here, Plaintiff is not a party to the state divorce action, and his sister is not a party to the federal court action. The issues and relief sought are distinct: the state action involves domestic relations concerns as well as identification and distribution of marital property while Plaintiff raises claims related to ownership and care of the Collage—tort claims against only Defendant seeking replevin of the Collage and monetary damages for conversion and civil theft. Mere “commonality in subject matter” does not render actions parallel. View "Mochary v. Bergstein" on Justia Law

Scott Hockenberry filed a complaint against Michelle Kalas in Oklahoma state court alleging state-law claims of defamation, tortious interference, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. Hockenberry was a Captain in the United States Army and Kalas was an Army Reserve Captain. In 2016, Hockenberry and Kalas were employed as attorneys at Fort Sill near Lawton, Oklahoma. Beginning in May 2016, Hockenberry and Kalas became involved in a consensual sexual relationship. In August 2016, Kalas made statements accusing Hockenberry of sexual assault and other misconduct to work colleagues, an officer with the Lawton Police Department, and a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator at Fort Sill. The Army brought formal charges of sexual and physical assault against Hockenberry under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The charges were referred to a general court-martial.The United States certified under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 that Kalas was acting within the scope of her federal employment when she made such statements. It then removed the action to federal court and substituted the United States as the defendant, deeming Hockenberry’s claims to be brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). Once in federal court, Hockenberry challenged the United States’ scope-of-employment (“SOE”) certification. The district court rejected that challenge, ruling that Hockenberry failed to demonstrate that Kalas had engaged in conduct beyond the scope of her federal employment. The court then granted the United States’ motion to dismiss Hockenberry’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based upon the United States’ sovereign immunity. Hockenberry appealed, arguing the the district court erred in its denial of his motion challenging the United States’ SOE certification. After review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred in concluding that an evidentiary hearing on Hockenberry’s motion was not necessary. The district court’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Hockenberry v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice suit brought by Jalena and Brian Taylor against Jalena’s OB/GYN, Dr. Donielle Daigle, and her clinic, Premier Women’s Health, PLLC. In 2017, Jalena was admitted to Memorial Hospital of Gulfport in active labor preparing to give birth. After pushing for two and a half hours, the baby’s head became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, and it was determined that a caesarean section was necessary. Following delivery of the child, Jalena’s blood pressure dropped, and her pulse increased. The nurses worked to firm Jalena’s uterus post delivery, but she continued to have heavy clots and bleeding. Jalena was given a drug to tighten the uterus, and an OR team was called to be on standby in the event surgery became necessary. Dr. Daigle called the OR team off after Jalena’s bleeding was minimal, and her uterus remained completely firm. But Jalena’s heart rate remained extremely elevated. Dr. Daigle allowed Jalena to go back to her room, and she checked her again, and the uterus was firm. A minute or two later, Jalena sat up and felt a gush of blood. Dr. Daigle prepared to perform a hysterectomy, There was still bleeding from the cervical area, which doctors decided they needed to amputate. Even after doing so, there was still bleeding because of a laceration extending into the vagina. When the vagina was sutured and incorporated into the repair of the vaginal cuff, the bleeding finally stopped. The Taylors allege that Dr. Daigle failed to adequately treat Jalena and, as a result, she cannot have any more children. A five-day jury trial was held in January 2021, and the jury returned a twelve-to-zero verdict in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier. On appeal, the Taylors argued the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) refusing to grant their cause challenges of patients of Dr. Daigle and Premier, thus failing to give them a right to a fair and impartial jury; and (2) failing to find a deviation from the standard of care for failing to perform a proper inspection of a genital tract laceration. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was reached on factual evidence in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier by an impartial jury. "All twelve of the jurors agreed on the verdict, and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It should not be disturbed." View "Taylor v. Premier Women's Health, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court declined to adopt the apex doctrine, which can prevent parties from deposing top-level corporate executives absent the requesting party making certain initial showings, holding that remand was required for the trial court to consider a motion for a protective order with the benefit of guidance set forth in this opinion.Plaintiffs sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) alleging that despite being aware of the consequences of repetitive head trauma, the NCAA failed to implement reasonable concussion-management protocols to protect its athletes, causing three former college football players to die from a neurodegenerative disease linked to repetitive head trauma. The NCAA moved twice for a protective order to prevent Plaintiffs from deposing three of its high-ranking executives. After the trial court denied the motions the NCAA sought discretionary interlocutory review, inviting the Supreme Court to adopt the apex doctrine. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) this appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) although the Court declines to adopt the apex doctrine, it establishes a framework that harmonizes its principles with the applicable trial rules to aid courts in determining whether good cause exists to prohibit or limit the deposition of a top-level official in a large organization. View "National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Finnerty" on Justia Law