Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. In 2019, USAA issued a personal automobile policy to Megan Jenkins. The policy defined "your covered auto" as any vehicle shown on the policy's declaration, any newly acquired vehicle, and any trailer owned by the insured. While riding her bicycle, Jenkins was struck and killed by an underinsured motorist. Defendant Vincent Rafferty—Jenkins' personal representative—made a claim under Jenkins' policy for UIM property damage arising from damage to the bicycle. USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA) denied the claim and commenced this action in federal court, asserting Jenkins' bicycle did not fall within the definition of "your covered auto." Whether USAA prevailed depended upon whether automobile insurers were required to offer UIM property damage coverage at all. If insurers were not required to offer UIM property damage coverage, they were free to restrict such coverage to an insured's "covered auto." The federal court asked the Supreme Court whether, under South Carolina Law, an auto insurer could validly limit underinsured motorist property damage coverage to property damage to vehicles defined in the policy as a “covered auto.” In their briefs and during oral argument, the parties did not directly address the question as framed by the district court. Instead, the parties briefed and argued the broader question of whether an automobile insurer's offer of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage had to include property damage coverage. Because the answer to the broader question yielded the answer to the certified question, the Supreme Court addressed the parties’ question. USAA rightly conceded that if the Supreme Court held an insurer was required to offer UIM property damage coverage, the Court had to answer the certified question "no." The Court indeed held insurers were required to offer UIM property damage coverage, and therefore answered the certified question "no." View "USAA Casualty v. Rafferty" on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision dismissing her claims against New York University (NYU) and declining to allow her to amend her complaint to add another plaintiff. Plaintiff s a parent of an adult student who attended New York University (NYU) (Defendant-Appellee) during the Spring 2020 semester—a semester during which NYU suspended its in-person operations and transitioned to remote instruction. Alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, Plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against NYU to partially recover the tuition and fees she paid for her daughter’s Spring 2020 semester. The district court granted NYU’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing and denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add a current NYU student as an additional plaintiff because it concluded that amendment would be futile.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because she has not alleged an injury-in-fact to herself, rather than to her daughter. The court held that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim for conversion. The court wrote that for these reasons, the district court properly dismissed her claims. However, the court concluded that amending the complaint to add a current student as plaintiff would not be futile. The student plaintiff plausibly alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received that would survive a motion to dismiss. View "Christina Rynasko v. New York University" on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

Insureds – who operate an annual motorcycle rally in Pattersonville, New York (the “Harley Rendezvous”) – appealed from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Covington Specialty Insurance Company (“Covington”) in this insurance-coverage dispute. Specifically, the parties disagree as to Covington’s duties, under a general commercial liability policy issued to the Insureds (the “Policy”), to defend and indemnify the Insureds against personal-injury claims asserted in a separate, state-court action by two motorcycle riders who were struck by another attendee’s automobile at the Harley Rendezvous. The district court found that a provision of the Policy (the “Absolute Auto Exclusion”) unambiguously excluded liability coverage for automobile accidents, regardless of whether the Insureds themselves owned or operated the vehicle at issue. On appeal, the Insureds argued that the district court was bound by – and erroneously failed to follow – a case in which a New York intermediate appellate court found ambiguity in a similarly worded exclusion provision in a different insurance policy.   The Second Circuit affirmed and found that Grande Stone Quarry is inapposite here and that countless other decisions by New York courts support the district court’s reading of the Absolute Auto Exclusion. The court explained the district court’s “task” here was simply “to determine how the New York Court of Appeals would decide” the issue. Here, the record reflects that the district court carried out that task soundly and carefully. The court concluded that under New York law, the Absolute Auto Exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage of the Insureds’ defense and indemnity in the Underlying Action. View "Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc." on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal brought by defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation and driver Renaud Pierrelouis (collectively, NJT), holding that NJT failed to preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general reservation rule applied.Plaintiff was injured while riding on a bus that collided with another vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, NJT moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on damages. Supreme Court denied the motion. NJT appealed, arguing for the first time that dismissal was required under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals dismissed NJT's ensuing appeal, holding that because NJT's sovereign immunity argument was unpreserved and did not qualify for any exception to the preservation requirement, an appeal as of right did not lie under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). View "Henry v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

The district court awarded damages to plaintiff Lashondra Jones who was allegedly injured when she stepped on a wooden pallet with an attached pallet guard, holding a bulk watermelon bin, to reach a watermelon in the bottom of the bin, and the pallet guard collapsed. Defendant Market Basket Stores, Inc. appealed, and the appellate court reversed the award, finding manifest error in the factual findings of the district court requiring de novo review and concluding that the watermelon display did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded there was no manifest error in the district court’s finding of negligence on the part of the defendant; therefore, the appellate court erred in its ruling. View "Jones v. Market Basket Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Matthew Morgan, an inmate assigned to the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility and under the supervision of the Sheriff of Concordia Parish, escaped from his trustee work assignment at the Concordia Parish courthouse. Morgan walked to a nearby Wal-Mart parking lot where he attempted to carjack and kidnap Sharon Tisdale. Tisdale was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the incident, and filed suit against Morgan and the Sheriff. Following a trial, the district court found both defendants liable, apportioning 90 percent of the fault to the Sheriff and 10 percent to Morgan. The district court awarded Tisdale $250,000 in general damages. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the district court erred in its apportionment of fault, and whether the court abused its discretion in awarding damages. The Supreme Court determined fault should have been reallocated, decreasing the Sheriff’s fault to 50 percent and increasing Morgan’s fault to 50 percent. However, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the award for general damages. View "Tisdale v. Hedrick, et al." on Justia Law